Aparecen aquí Miranda y Bolívar con algunas ideas fundamentales, que nos permiten visualizar las consecuencias políticas de sus postulados. Nos proponemos analizar algunos conceptos básicos del período de la independencia, a saber: liberalismo, republicanismo y dictadura, pero enmarcados y relacionados con otros que le fueron afines: centralismo y federalismo. Los defensores de estos últimos elaboraron sus ideas con el propósito de definir formas de gobierno acordes con las nuevas naciones, sin embargo, esas elaboraciones trajeron consecuencias políticas decisivas para afirmar formas (...) autoritarias o democráticas, según los criterios y modelos asumidos. (shrink)

Usualmente, Francisco de Miranda es conocido como el Precursor de la Independencia de América Latina. Sin entrar a detallar esta aseveración, podemos afirmar que su accionar estuvo orientado por su pensamiento político. Pensamiento poco conocido hasta entonces. No obstante, en él se encuentran elaboradas unas ideas que podemos señalar, sin lugar a dudas, de originales, tanto por el contexto político en que las realizó, como por su actualidad. En este sentido, su labor desplegada en Venezuela a su regreso de Londres, (...) (sólo un año y ocho meses) fue más productiva de lo que se conoce. Tal es el caso, de su participación en los actos preparativos de la independencia el 05 de julio de 1811, como los resultados de la Confederación de 1811, que se originan por la aprobación de la Constitución de ese mismo año el 21 de diciembre. Pretendemos analizar la actuación de Miranda en ese evento, al igual que revisar el alcance de sus opiniones con relación a aquella Constitución. Ello nos permitirá evaluar el pensamiento político de Miranda, en correspondencia con lo acaecido en la primera república. Palabras clave: democracia; cabildos; derechos humanos; confederación; federación. Francisco de Miranda and 1811’s ConstitutionFrancisco de Miranda is usually known as the forerunner of Latin America’s independence. Without getting into a detailed examination of this statement, we can say that his doing was oriented by his political thought, which was little known until then. Nevertheless, in the latter one can find some ideas which are undoubtedly original, due to both the political context in which he posed them, and their current validity. In this regard, his work in Venezuela upon returning from London (just one year and eight months) was more productive than is known. Such is the case of his participation in the preparatory actions of the independence, on July 5, 1811, as well as the results of 1811’s Confederation, which were brought about by the approval of that same year’s Constitution, on December 21. We aim to analyze Miranda’s role in that event, as well as to go over the reach of his opinions regarding that constitution. This will allow us to evaluate Miranda’s political thought Keywords: Democracy; City Councils; Human Rights; Confederation; Federation. (shrink)

Resumen Aparecen aquí Miranda y Bolívar con algunas ideas fundamentales, que nos permiten visualizar las consecuencias políticas de sus postulados. Nos proponemos analizar algunos conceptos básicos del período de la independencia, a saber: liberalismo, republicanismo y dictadura, pero enmarcados y relacionados con otros que le fueron afines: centralismo y federalismo. Los defensores de estos últimos elaboraron sus ideas con el propósito de definir formas de gobierno acordes con las nuevas naciones, sin embargo, esas elaboraciones trajeron consecuencias políticas decisivas para afirmar (...) formas autoritarias o democráticas, según los criterios y modelos asumidos. Palabras clave: Miranda; Bolívar; liberalismo; republicanismo; dictadura; centralismo; federalismo. Miranda and Bolívar: Republicanism, Liberalism and DictatorshipMiranda and Bolívar are shown here with some fundamental ideas, which allow us to visualize the political consequences of their postulates. We aim to analyze some basic concepts of the independence period, namely: liberalism, republicanism and dictatorship, framed in and related with others that were akin to them: centralism and federalism. The defenders of the latter concepts elaborated their ideas with the aim to define forms of government suitable to the new nations. However, these elaborations brought about political consequences decisive to strengthen either authoritarian or democratic forms, according to the criteria and models assumed. Keywords: Miranda; Bolívar; liberalism;republicanism; dictatorship;centralism; federalism. (shrink)

Discussion about project management, in both the academic literature and industry, is predominantly based on theories of control, many of which have been developed since the 1950s. However, issues arise when these ideas are applied unilaterally to all types of projects and in all contexts. In complex environments, management problems arise from assuming that results, predicted at the start of a project, can be sufficiently described and delivered as planned. Thus, once a project reaches a critical size, a calendar, and (...) a certain level of ambiguity and interconnection, the analysis centered on control does not function adequately. Projects that involve complex situations can be described as adaptive complex systems, consistent in multiple interdependent dynamic components, multiple feedback processes, nonlinear relations, and management of hard data and soft data. In this study, through a complex network, the dynamic structure of a project and its trajectories are simulated using inference processes. Finally, some numerical simulations are described, leading to a decision making tool that identifies critical processes, thereby obtaining better performance outcomes of projects. (shrink)

RESUMEN Se expone críticamente una interpretación reciente del hedonismo epicúreo, según la cual este podría comprenderse como hedonismo actitudinal. Esta lectura conlleva ciertas tensiones internas y descuida el sentido fundamental del epicureismo, esto es, que se trata de una teoría del bienestar prudencial. Al examinar solo este aspecto, se omiten ciertos problemas secundarios, como la legitimidad de interpretar de manera actitudinal una doctrina asentada en el atomismo. ABSTRACT The paper offers a critical review of a recent interpretation of Epicurean hedonism, (...) according to which the latter could be understood as an attitudinal hedonism. Such reading implies certain internal tensions and neglects the fundamental meaning of Epicureanism as a theory of prudential well-being. By focusing exclusively on one aspect, that reading omits certain secondary issues, such as the legitimacy of an attitudinal interpretation of a doctrine grounded in atomism. (shrink)

Se expone cr.ticamente una interpretación reciente del hedonismo epic.reo, según la cual este podr.a comprenderse como hedonismo actitudinal. Esta lectura conlleva ciertas tensiones internas y descuida el sentido fundamental del epicure.smo, esto es, que se trata de una teor.a del bienestar prudencial. Al examinar solo este aspecto, se omiten ciertos problemas secundarios, como la legitimidad de interpretar de manera actitudinal una doctrina asentada en el atomismo.

Many philosophers have been attracted to the idea of using the logical form of a true sentence as a guide to the metaphysical grounds of the fact stated by that sentence. This paper looks at a particular instance of that idea: the widely accepted principle that disjunctions are grounded in their true disjuncts. I will argue that an unrestricted version of this principle has several problematic consequences and that it’s not obvious how the principle might be restricted in order to (...) avoid them. My suggestion is that, instead of trying to restrict the principle, we should distinguish between metaphysical and conceptual grounds and take the principle to apply exclusively to the latter. This suggestion, if correct, carries over to other prominent attempts at using logical form as a guide to ground. (shrink)

There are two intuitions about time. The first is that there's something special about the present that objectively differentiates it from the past and the future. Call this intuition Specialness. The second is that the time at which we happen to live is just one among many other times, all of which are ‘on a par’ when it comes to their forming part of reality. Call this other intuition Egalitarianism. Tradition has it that the so-called ‘A-theories of time’ fare well (...) at addressing the first intuition, but rather badly when it comes to the second. The goal of this article is to offer advice to A-theorists about how to reconcile their view with Egalitarianism. (shrink)

Solving the meta-problem of consciousness requires, among other things, explaining why we are so reluctant to endorse various forms of illusionism about the phenomenal. I will try to tackle this task in two steps. The first consists in clarifying how the concept of consciousness precludes the possibility of any distinction between 'appearance' and 'reality'. The second consists in spelling out our reasons for recognizing the existence of something that satisfies that concept.

This paper defends the view that one's own mental states are metaphysically privileged vis-à-vis the mental states of others, even if only subjectively so. This is an instance of a more general view called Subjectivism, according to which reality is only subjectively the way it is. After characterizing Subjectivism in analogy to two relatively familiar views in the metaphysics of modality and time, I compare the Subjectivist View of the Mental with Egocentric Presentism, a version of Subjectivism recently advocated by (...) Caspar Hare. I argue that the Subjectivist View of the Mental goes a considerable way towards solving certain long-standing philosophical puzzles having to do with the unity of consciousness, the contents of self-awareness and the intransmissibility of experiential knowledge through testimony. (shrink)

Assuming a radical stance on embodied cognition, according to which the information ac- quired through basic cognitive processes is not contentful (Hutto and Myin, 2013), and as- suming that perception is a source of rationally grounded knowledge (Pritchard, 2012), a pluralistic account of perceptual knowledge is developed. The paper explains: (i) how the varieties of perceptual knowledge fall under the same broader category; (ii) how they are subject to the same kind of normative constraints; (iii) why there could not be (...) a conflict between the different varieties of perceptual knowledge; and (iv) why the traditional episte- mological inquiry is inclined to overestimate the role of propositional perceptual knowledge. (shrink)

Ecological-enactive approaches to cognition aim to explain cognition in terms of the dynamic coupling between agent and environment. Accordingly, cognition of one’s immediate environment (which is sometimes labeled “basic” cognition) depends on enaction and the picking up of affordances. However, ecological-enactive views supposedly fail to account for what is sometimes called “higher” cognition, i.e., cognition about potentially absent targets, which therefore can only be explained by postulating representational content. This challenge levelled against ecological-enactive approaches highlights a putative explanatory gap between (...) basic and higher cognition. In this paper, we examine scientific cognition—a paradigmatic case of higher cognition—and argue that it shares fundamental features with basic cognition, for enaction and affordance selection are central to the scientific enterprise. Our argument focuses on modeling, and on how models promote scientific understanding. We base our argument on a non-representational account of scientific understanding and on the material engagement theory, for models are hereby conceived as material objects designed for scientific engagements. Having done so, we conclude that the explanatory gap is significantly less threatening to the ecological-enactive approach than it might appear. (shrink)

Humanity’s self-ordained mandate to subdue and dominate nature is part of the cognitive foundation of the modern world—a perspective that remains deeply ingrained in science and technology. Marine biology has not been immune to this anthropocentric bias. But this needs to change, and the gaps between basic scientific disciplines and the global conservation imperatives of our time need to be bridged. In the face of a looming ecological and climate crisis, marine biologists must upgrade their values and professional standards and (...) help foster the radical transformation needed to avert a climate and ecological breakdown. To prevent some of the damage, they must cross the imaginary line that separates science from science-based activism and consciously pursue the health and durability of human and natural communities. To this end, they can (1) develop compelling narratives that engage human society, with emphasis on care for the wild living world; (2) move beyond marine conservation on paper and avoid self-serving complaisance; (3) advocate constructive changes in market and human behaviour, not only by documenting damage but also by clarifying how the extraction, production and consumption system can be steered away from practices that harm nature; (4) push for systemic change in politics through individual and collective efforts, supporting environmental activism and those who demand biosphere-saving policies; and (5) endorse a more ecocentric and holistic world vision, relinquishing contempt for spiritual wisdom and liaising with (or at least not dismissing) spiritual traditions that encourage equality, self-restraint and environmental sustainability. (shrink)

Introduction: Previous findings that inattention and hyperactive/impulsive symptoms predict later peer problems have been mixed. Utilizing two culturally diverse samples with shared methodologies, we assessed the predictive power of dimensionally measured childhood IA and HI symptoms regarding adolescent peer relationships.Methods: A US-based, clinical sample of 228 girls with and without childhood diagnosed attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder was assessed and followed 5 years later. A Norwegian, population-based sample of 3,467 children was assessed and followed approximately 4 years later. Both investigations used parent and (...) teacher reports of ADHD symptoms and peer relations. Multivariate regression analyses examined the independent contributions of IA and HI symptoms to later peer problems, adjusting for baseline childhood peer problems. We also examined childhood sex as a potential moderator within the Norwegian sample.Results: Higher levels of childhood HI symptoms, but not IA symptoms, independently predicted adolescent peer problems in the all-female clinical sample. Conversely, higher levels of IA symptoms, but not HI symptoms, independently predicted preadolescent peer problems in the mixed-sex population sample. Results did not differ between informants. Associations between ADHD symptom dimensions and peer problems within the Norwegian sample were not moderated by child sex.Discussion: Differential associations between childhood hyperactive/impulsive and inattention symptoms and adolescent peer problems were found across two diverse samples using a shared methodology. Potential explanations for different findings in the clinical vs. population samples include symptom severity as well as age, sex, and cultural factors. We discuss implications for future research, including the importance of dimensional measures of ADHD-related symptoms and the need for shared methodologies across clinical and normative samples. (shrink)

En la historia intelectual de América Latina existe una laguna respecto a la producción de las mujeres en el género de ensayo. Son los ensayos de identidad criolla, de hechura masculina, los que construyen el canon respecto a las temáticas y a las maneras de ser abordado. Los ensayos de género que las escritoras han realizado se articulan como respuesta a esta visión dominante de los procesos sociales, políticos y culturales de los países latinoamericanos. Revelan un fuerte descontento con la (...) construcción de la identidad femenina, una preocupación por la construcción de una ciudadanía plena y representan una respuesta a las demandas sociales políticas y culturales de las mujeres y otros grupos marginales. Las intelectuales debatieron, discutieron y polemizaron con las propuestas que al respecto portaban los discursos dominantes y el ensayo de género se vuelve el “arma de combate”. Lo que aquí se presenta, tiene como objetivo la recuperación de este corpus de conocimiento en la historia literaria de Cuba, Puerto Rico y República Dominicana. Una labor de arqueología literaria de temas, obras y autoras a partir del siglo XX. Se brinda, a partir del libro Mujeres ensayistas del Caribe Hispano: Hilvanando el silencio (2007) deAnna Freire Ashbaugh, Lourdes Rojas y Raquel Romeu, una visión panorámica del conjunto de ensayistas de cada país. Otras investigadoras como Catharina Vallejo, Ivette Sóñora, Carmen Dolores Hernández y Consuelo Meza Márquez ampliaran ese corpus y señalan algunos rasgos temáticos de la obra ensayística de autoras como Luisa Campuzano, Mirta Yáñez, Nara Araujo, Marta Núñez Sarmiento y Zaida Capote Cruz de Cuba; Concha Meléndez, Rosario Ferré, Norma Valle Ferrer, Nara Negrón Marreño y Silvia Álvarez Curbelo de Puerto Rico; y, de República Dominicana, Camila Henríquez Ureña, Carmita Landestoy, Carmen Durán y Rosa Inés Curiel Pichardo. (shrink)

Kilimanjaro is an example of what some philosophers would call a ‘vague object’: it is only roughly 5895 m tall, its weight is not precise and its boundaries are fuzzy because some particles are neither determinately part of it nor determinately not part of it. It has been suggested that this vagueness arises as a result of semantic indecision: it is because we didn’t make up our mind what the expression “Kilimanjaro” applies to that we can truthfully say such things (...) as “It is indeterminate whether this particle is part of Kilimanjaro”. After reviewing some of the limitations of this approach, I will propose an alternative account, based on a new semantic relation—multiple reference—capable of holding in a one-many pattern between a term and several objects in the domain. I will explain how multiple reference works, what differentiates it from plural reference and how it might be used to accommodate at least some aspects of our ordinary discourse about vague objects. (shrink)

We investigate the pair-splitting number $\germ{s}_{pair}$ which is a variation of splitting number, pair-reaping number $\germ{r}_{pair}$ which is a variation of reaping number and cardinal invariants of ideals on ω. We also study cardinal invariants of F σ ideals and their upper bounds and lower bounds. As an application, we answer a question of S. Solecki by showing that the ideal of finitely chromatic graphs is not locally Katětov-minimal among ideals not satisfying Fatou's lemma.

En este artículo analizo algunos aspectos claves del desarrollo y la evolución de las musicalizaciones de textos poéticos en Chile y profundizo en su relación con el canon literario. El análisis lo realizo tomando como referencia tres producciones de relevancia en el escenario músico-poético chileno: la musicalización del poema Alturas de Macchu Picchu de Pablo Neruda por Los Jaivas (1981), el disco Desiertos de amor (2011) de Raúl Zurita junto al grupo González y Los Asistentes, y la musicalización de poemas (...) de Elicura Chihuailaf por el grupo Kalfu en su disco Trawvn = ReUnión (2017). En términos generales, el estudio propone que las musicalizaciones de poesía constituyen un aporte a los estudios literarios, ya que permiten ampliar las perspectivas de análisis más allá de lo textual, lo que ropicia un entendimiento más profundo de las particularidades de la producción poética. (shrink)

We address some phenomena about the interaction between lower semicontinuous submeasures on $${\mathbb {N}}$$ N and $$F_{\sigma }$$ F σ ideals. We analyze the pathology degree of a submeasure and present a method to construct pathological $$F_{\sigma }$$ F σ ideals. We give a partial answers to the question of whether every nonpathological tall $$F_{\sigma }$$ F σ ideal is Katětov above the random ideal or at least has a Borel selector. Finally, we show a representation of nonpathological $$F_{\sigma }$$ (...) F σ ideals using sequences in Banach spaces. (shrink)

According to Leibniz’s infinite-analysis account of contingency, any derivative truth is contingent if and only if it does not admit of a finite proof. Following a tradition that goes back at least as far as Bertrand Russell, several interpreters have been tempted to explain this biconditional in terms of two other principles: first, that a derivative truth is contingent if and only if it contains infinitely complex concepts and, second, that a derivative truth contains infinitely complex concepts if and only (...) if it does not admit of a finite proof. A consequence of this interpretation is that Leibniz’s infinite-analysis account of contingency falls prey to Robert Adams’s Problem of Lucky Proof. I will argue that this interpretation is mistaken and that, once it is properly understood how the idea of an infinite proof fits into Leibniz’s circle of modal notions, the problem of lucky proof simply disappears. (shrink)

It has been observed that, unlike other kinds of singular judgments, mental self-ascriptions are immune to error through misidentification: they may go wrong, but not as a result of mistaking someone else’s mental states for one’s own. Although recent years have witnessed increasing interest in this phenomenon, three basic questions about it remain without a satisfactory answer: what is exactly an error through misidentification? What does immunity to such errors consist in? And what does it take to explain the fact (...) that mental self-ascriptions exhibit this sort of immunity? The aim of this paper is to bring these questions into focus, propose some tentative answers and use them to show that one prominent attempt to explain the immunity to error through misidentification of mental self-ascriptions is unsuccessful. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that knowledge is dimly luminous. That is: if a person knows that p, she knows how she knows that p. The argument depends on a safety-based account of propositional knowledge, which is salient in Williamson’s critique of the ‘KK’ principle. I combine that account with non-intellectualism about knowledge-how – according to which, if a person knows how to φ, then in nearly all (if not all) nearby possible worlds in which she φes in the same (...) way as in the actual world, she only φes successfully. Thus, the possession of first-order propositional knowledge implies secondorder practical knowledge, and this can be iterated. Because of the assumed nonintellectualism about know-how, dim luminosity does not imply bright luminosity about knowledge, which is expressed by the traditional KK principle. I conclude by considering some potential counterexamples to the view that knowledge is dimly luminous. (shrink)

ABSTRACT I propose a middle-ground between a perceptual model of self-knowledge, according to which the objects of self-awareness are accessed through some kind of causal mechanism, and a rationalist model, according to which self-knowledge is constituted by one's rational agency. Through an analogy with the role of the exercises of sensorimotor abilities in rationally grounded perceptual knowledge, self-knowledge is construed as an exercise of action-oriented and action-orienting abilities. This view satisfies the privileged access condition usually associated with self-knowledge without entailing (...) an insurmountable gap between self- knowledge and knowledge of other minds. RESUMO Proponho um meio-termo entre um modelo perceptual de autoconhecimento, segundo o qual os objetos de autoconhecimento são acessadas mediante um tipo de mecanismo causal, e um modelo racionalista, segundo o qual o autoconhecimento é constituído pela agência racional. Por analogia ao papel que o exercício de habilidades sensório-motoras desempenham no conhecimento perceptual racionalmente fundado, autoconhecimento é entendido como um exercício de habilidades que são orientadas pela e orientam a ação. Essa imagem satisfaz a condição de acesso privilegiado que geralmente é associada ao autoconhecimento sem implicar uma lacuna intransponível entre autoconhecimento e conhecimento de outras mentes. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is two-fold: first, it is intended to articulate theses that are often assessed independently, thus showing that a strong version of epistemological disjunctivism about perceptual knowledge implies a transformative conception of rationality. This entails that individuals in skeptical scenarios could not entertain rational thoughts about their environment, for they would fail to have perceptual states. The secondary aim is to show that this consequence is not a sufficient reason to abandon the variety of disjunctivism presented. (...) The argument for this claim depends on the assessment of rationality attributions to subjects in plausible cases of illusion and some clinical cases of hallucination. RESUMO Este artigo tem dois objetivos: primeiramente, pretende-se articular teses que são frequentemente avaliadas independentemente, mostrando com isso que uma versão robusta do disjuntivismo epistemológico sobre conhecimento perceptual implica uma concepção transformativa da racionalidade. Uma consequência disso é que indivíduos em cenários céticos não poderiam entreter pensamentos racionais sobre o ambiente em que habitam, pois eles não possuiriam estados perceptuais. Em segundo lugar, argumenta-se que a consequência delineada acima não é uma razão suficiente para rejeitar o disjuntivismo tal como apresentado. Esse argumento depende da avaliação de atribuições de racionalidade a indivíduos em casos plausíveis de ilusão e em alguns casos clínicos de alucinação. (shrink)

In this paper, I present a possible solution to the puzzle unveiled by Kornblith about the sources and the possibility of knowledge of epistemic norms. The puzzle is: if such norms cannot be discovered solely by reflection, and if there are correct ways of thinking and inferring, then such norms can only be discovered by investigating the world —a counterintuitive conclusion. To avoid skepticism about normativity, I argue that we create normative correctness and discover normative demands by investigating the world (...) and reflecting about our epistemic practices. This is done by an exposition of the method known as reflective equilibrium, which is defended against Kornblith’s thesis that the appeal to reflective equilibrium is doomed to failure because it implies reflection. (shrink)

This handbook is currently in development, with individual articles publishing online in advance of print publication. At this time, we cannot add information about unpublished articles in this handbook, however the table of contents will continue to grow as additional articles pass through the review process and are added to the site. Please note that the online publication date for this handbook is the date that the first article in the title was published online.