The article studies the shift of Enlightment in the interpretation of enjoyment, which led to the construction of a particular ethos/nomos enjoyment and transformation in the model of be-ing/thinking. Thus, constituted the transition from the metaphysics of mind, grounded by Des-cartes, to physic of body, presented by Marquis de Sade. This shift or meta/physical gap is carried out at the intersection of two lines: the reason and enjoyment. Given line of reason, the article specifically actualized line of enjoyment, allowing to (...) explore the transformation of the identity of being and thinking which is fundamental to Western philosophy. It sets the place of enjoyment in Cartesian concept of the identity of being and thinking, and the distinc-tion of soul and body. Hence it formulates the maxim of the subject of cogito: it is in thinking that I enjoy being. Approach of Descartes is opposed by the materialistic definition of enjoy-ment and pleasure worked out by de Sade. This conceptualization of the enjoyment enables the transition to physics of body, which recognizes only bodily/physical being hypertrophi-cated by the imagination. Hence the Sadian subject imago constitutes the maxim: it is only by enjoying being that I think. (shrink)

Entend dégager l'enjeu philosophique de la pensée augustinienne du cogito, dans " La cité de Dieu " et dans " La Trinité ", en situant la réflexion du saint dans le champ de la philosophie antique, et en rapprochant sa perspective de celles de Descartes et de Husserl.

Borges’ The Circular Ruins tells the story of a magician who turns out to be a character in a dream. Leibowitz (2021) argues that this scenario undermines the rational indubitability of Descartes’ Cogito. The magician, he argues, is an unreal appearance and therefore does not exist. I argue that Borges drew a distinction between reality and existence and that he was right to do so. There are various senses of reality and the sense in which a dreamt character is (...) unreal poses no threat to their existence or to the indubitability of the Cogito. The magician is unreal because he is a mind-dependent, illusory and fake. Nonetheless, he can be certain that he thinks, therefore he is. (shrink)

The key mutation of the schizophrenic psyche can be described as a disturbance of the first person-ness of the I-sense, i.e., of the sense of the "I" as personal subject of experience and of action. Under these circumstances, representations of things are not definitively experienced as "my" representations—with the self-evidence of belonging to me. This uncertainty of selfhood, specific to schizophrenia, cannot be reduced to a disability of intellect, logic, judgment, or memory. In the course of developing his argument, the (...) author criticizes philosopher Michel Henry's critique of Heidegger's (1961) interpretation of Descartes's cogito ergo sum. (shrink)

This volume looks at the first half of the proposition--cogito.

La conférence que Georges Canguilhem donna au Collège philosophique de Jean Wahl en 1956, « Qu’est-ce que la psychologie? », fut saluée par Jacques Lacan comme une défense de la psychanalyse contre les prétentions hégémoniques de la psychologie. La psychanalyse, dont la naissance est malgré tout comprise dans la généalogie esquissée par Canguilhem, est-elle toutefois vraiment à l’abri des critiques que celui-ci adresse à la psychologie? Cette contribution analyse le rapport de la psychanalyse à l’instrumentalisme foncier de la psychologie sous (...) trois aspects : la relation entre science et vérité, la réduction par Gassendi et la tradition aristotélique du niveau originaire et spéculatif du cogito cartésien à celui spéculaire de la connaissance physique de l’âme par soi-même, et le choix freudien et lacanien d’un être-pour-la-mort contre toute philosophie de la vie. À la lumière du scientisme de la psychanalyse et de son rapport constitutif au mythe et au sacré, que Lacan pas plus que Freud n’arrive à dépasser, un lien est enfin établi avec, d’une part, l’archéologie de la psychanalyse développée dans Naissance de la clinique et La volonté de savoir et, de l’autre, le privilège que Foucault accorde à la psychanalyse et à l’ethnologie parmi les sciences humaines dans Les mots et les choses. (shrink)

The Cogito formulation in Discourse on Method attributes properties to one conceptual category that belong to another. Correcting the error ends up defeating Descartes’ response to skepticism. His own creation, the Evil Genius, is to blame.

Cogito, as the first principle of Descartes’ metaphysical system, initiated the modern philosophy of consciousness, becoming both the source and subject of modern Western philosophical discourse. The philosophies of Maine de Biran, Kant, Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, and others developed by answering the following questions? Is consciousness substantial or not? Does consciousness require the guarantee of a transcendental subject? Is Cogito epistemological or ontological? Am I a being-for-myself or a being-for-others? Outlining the developmental history of the idea of (...) Cogito from Descartes to Sartre is important for totally comprehending the evolution and development of Western philosophy. (shrink)

Le « cogito, ergo sum » cartésien apparaît depuis quarante ans comme « inférence et performance » (J. Hintikka). Mais de quelle inférence s'agit-il précisément ? Pour le savoir, cet article poursuit deux objectifs : d'abord, montrer que la question pertinente à laquelle il s'agit de répondre ne concerne pas la relation logique interne qui lie le cogito au sum, et qui est une intuition, mais celle, externe, qui lie le « cogito, ergo sum » tout entier (...) au « quicquid cogitat, est ». Ensuite, montrer que cette dernière relation est tout à la fois une induction et une déduction. (shrink)

I argue that George Nakhnikian's analysis of the logic of cogito propositions (roughly, Descartes's 'cogito' and 'sum') is incomplete. The incompleteness is rectified by showing that disjunctions of cogito propositions with contingent, non-cogito propositions satisfy conditions of incorrigibility, self-certifyingness, and pragmatic consistency; hence, they belong to the class of propositions with whose help a complete characterization of cogito propositions is made possible.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Cogito, Ergo Sum: The Life of René DescartesDennis Des CheneRichard Watson. Cogito, Ergo Sum: The Life of René Descartes. Boston: David R. Godine, 2002. pp. viii + 375. Cloth, $35.00.Somewhere between hagiography and debunking lies truth. Or so we may think: the biographer's sources are almost always tipped one way or the other, and it is his or her job to establish, or divine, the way (...) of authentic fact and, if facts fall short, then of sturdy sober hypothesis. In general the debunker has more fun, especially when the weight of tradition favors the ennobling, if not the beatification, of its subject.Descartes is a case in point. Until a few years ago, there was in English no satisfactory biography. Now there are three: an "intellectual biography" by Stephen Gaukroger, the Descartes of Geneviève Rodis-Lewis, and Watson's. Gaukroger dwells on Descartes's natural philosophy, especially in the early years. Only after 300 pages does he reach the period of the Discourse, Descartes's first published work. Rodis-Lewis offers a more even-handed treatment, the fruits of a lifetime of study. Her Descartes resembles, not the modern scientist or professional philosopher, but the ancient sage for whom metaphysics is a once-in-a-lifetime affair, and even natural philosophy subordinate to wisdom. Watson's Descartes is an altogether more worldly type, born into a family of lawyers, well-connected, touchy [End Page 113] about his place in social and scientific circles, and not all that interested in what we think of now as philosophy. Nor, for that matter, is Watson: you will look in vain for an analysis of the Meditations, a discussion of method, or a definition of générosité. (Watson does conclude, I should note, with a discussion of Descartes's doctrine on the soul, whose title might well have been "The future of an illusion" if Freud had not used it already.)If you like your philosophy uncluttered by context, if you find it worthwhile to read or write about "Cartesian skepticism" or "Cartesian dualism" without troubling yourself to understand who the historical Descartes was, or what might have moved him to confront the skeptics and save the soul, then Watson is not for you. It is emphatically a Life, not a Life and Works. It is, moreover, a life in the manner of many modern biographers, in which the biographer, rather than conceal himself behind the curtains of scholarly convention, figures into the narrative, retracing the steps of Descartes's passage to Italy, examining the baptismal certificate of Descartes's illegitimate daughter Francine, and eating lunch at the Queen Kristina restaurant "next door to the house in which Descartes died" (303). The quality of a biography thus written depends in part on the personality of its author (and in the case of Cogito Ergo Sum, the author's wife, who intervenes more than once on the side of common sense during their peregrinations). Watson is, to my mind, an agreeable companion, dedicated to the search for biographical truth, impatient with hagiographic fog and time-hallowed error, down-to-earth in his assessment of Descartes's motives and circumstances.One example to show the differences among the three biographies. In November 1618 Descartes met the future Latin schoolmaster Isaac Beeckman in Breda. Beeckman records with enthusiasm their joint endeavors in physico-mathematics over the next few months (Gaukroger has the details). It seems clear that the impetus for studying the various problems mentioned in Beeckman's Journal came from Beeckman, who had been pondering physical questions since 1613 or before. Descartes's contribution, at least at first, was his immense mathematical skill. Their interests lay largely within the "mixed mathematics" of the period, especially hydrostatics and mechanics. They also discussed music, an aspect of the "new science" now often neglected (but see H. F. Cohen, Quantifying Music [Dordrecht, 1984]). On New Year's day 1619 Descartes presented Beeckman with his Compendium musicæ (Gaukroger 74, Rodis-Lewis 51/29). A decade later, Descartes, having heard that Beeckman had appropriated the Compendium to himself, became angry and eventually, late in 1630, dismissed Beeckman with a masterpiece of de haut... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Cogito, Ergo Sum: The Life of René DescartesDennis Des CheneRichard Watson. Cogito, Ergo Sum: The Life of René Descartes. Boston: David R. Godine, 2002. pp. viii + 375. Cloth, $35.00.Somewhere between hagiography and debunking lies truth. Or so we may think: the biographer's sources are almost always tipped one way or the other, and it is his or her job to establish, or divine, the way (...) of authentic fact and, if facts fall short, then of sturdy sober hypothesis. In general the debunker has more fun, especially when the weight of tradition favors the ennobling, if not the beatification, of its subject.Descartes is a case in point. Until a few years ago, there was in English no satisfactory biography. Now there are three: an "intellectual biography" by Stephen Gaukroger, the Descartes of Geneviève Rodis-Lewis, and Watson's. Gaukroger dwells on Descartes's natural philosophy, especially in the early years. Only after 300 pages does he reach the period of the Discourse, Descartes's first published work. Rodis-Lewis offers a more even-handed treatment, the fruits of a lifetime of study. Her Descartes resembles, not the modern scientist or professional philosopher, but the ancient sage for whom metaphysics is a once-in-a-lifetime affair, and even natural philosophy subordinate to wisdom. Watson's Descartes is an altogether more worldly type, born into a family of lawyers, well-connected, touchy [End Page 113] about his place in social and scientific circles, and not all that interested in what we think of now as philosophy. Nor, for that matter, is Watson: you will look in vain for an analysis of the Meditations, a discussion of method, or a definition of générosité. (Watson does conclude, I should note, with a discussion of Descartes's doctrine on the soul, whose title might well have been "The future of an illusion" if Freud had not used it already.)If you like your philosophy uncluttered by context, if you find it worthwhile to read or write about "Cartesian skepticism" or "Cartesian dualism" without troubling yourself to understand who the historical Descartes was, or what might have moved him to confront the skeptics and save the soul, then Watson is not for you. It is emphatically a Life, not a Life and Works. It is, moreover, a life in the manner of many modern biographers, in which the biographer, rather than conceal himself behind the curtains of scholarly convention, figures into the narrative, retracing the steps of Descartes's passage to Italy, examining the baptismal certificate of Descartes's illegitimate daughter Francine, and eating lunch at the Queen Kristina restaurant "next door to the house in which Descartes died" (303). The quality of a biography thus written depends in part on the personality of its author (and in the case of Cogito Ergo Sum, the author's wife, who intervenes more than once on the side of common sense during their peregrinations). Watson is, to my mind, an agreeable companion, dedicated to the search for biographical truth, impatient with hagiographic fog and time-hallowed error, down-to-earth in his assessment of Descartes's motives and circumstances.One example to show the differences among the three biographies. In November 1618 Descartes met the future Latin schoolmaster Isaac Beeckman in Breda. Beeckman records with enthusiasm their joint endeavors in physico-mathematics over the next few months (Gaukroger has the details). It seems clear that the impetus for studying the various problems mentioned in Beeckman's Journal came from Beeckman, who had been pondering physical questions since 1613 or before. Descartes's contribution, at least at first, was his immense mathematical skill. Their interests lay largely within the "mixed mathematics" of the period, especially hydrostatics and mechanics. They also discussed music, an aspect of the "new science" now often neglected (but see H. F. Cohen, Quantifying Music [Dordrecht, 1984]). On New Year's day 1619 Descartes presented Beeckman with his Compendium musicæ (Gaukroger 74, Rodis-Lewis 51/29). A decade later, Descartes, having heard that Beeckman had appropriated the Compendium to himself, became angry and eventually, late in 1630, dismissed Beeckman with a masterpiece of de haut... (shrink)

O presente artigo visa investigar se a afirmação eu sou, eu existo, presente no quarto parágrafo da Segunda Meditação, expressa única e exclusivamente uma existência, ou se é a expressão, também, do conhecimento sobre o que é o Eu que se descobre existente. Para tanto, além dos textos cartesianos, serão abordadas algumas linhas interpretativas que se ocupam desta questão sobretudo as teses de Alquié, Frankfurt e Marion. A partir da discussão realizada, pretende-se defender que o eu sou, eu existo expressa, (...) concomitantemente, o conhecimento da existência do Eu e o conhecimento de que o Eu existe como ser pensante. (shrink)

Статтю присвячено дослідженню альтернативних можливостей інтерпретації Декартової концепції cogito: як авто-референтної структури і як авто-афекційності. Контекстом аналізу виступає трансцендентально-феноменологічний ракурс погляду на картезіанську філософію як на засновок трансцендентального мотиву. Визначено роль принципу авто-референтності в трансцендентальному дискурсі. На ґрунті розгляду перспектив тлумачення картезіанського підходу, запропонованих М. Анрі й Ж.-Л. Марйоном, виявлено моменти іррелевантності авто-афекційної настанови вимогам трансцендентального мислення і втомивовано адекватність авто-референтної моделі його засадам. Авторка доходить висновку, що, попри позірну пріоритетність авто-афекційності для трансцендентального дискурсу, пов’язану насамперед з притаманною їй (...) радикалізацією функціонального аспекту свідомості й усуненням небезпеки субстантивації cogito, закладеної в структурі авто-референтності, остання видається відповіднішою вимогам трансцендентального мислення, оскільки передбачає збереження принципу відношення-відмінності, конститутивного для трансцендентальної думки – який в умовах авто-афекційності виявляється редукованим. (shrink)

In a letter to Mesland (1645), Descartes suggests that "a greater freedom" consists in a positive faculty to follow "the worse", although "we see the better". What does such freedom presuppose? A good illustration of this kind of excess of the will, as suggested by Beyssade, is Attila, the "black hero" in one of Corneille's tragedies. This article tries to relate the possibility of that freedom with the very nature of the cogito.

O artigo enfoca duas maneiras possíveis, não necessariamente excludentes, de se compreender o “'penso, logo existo" cartesiano: a primeira, enquanto representação de si, decorre de uma compreensão do eu como sujeito , quer dizer, de um sujeito diante de um objeto e se remete a uma consciência refletida de si; a segunda, como presença a si mesmo, é relativa a uma compreensão do ego como ser ou existência, dados numa experiência originária se remete a uma consciência imediata de si. O (...) artigo pretende também apontar as possibilidades e os limites de cada uma destas leituras. (shrink)

Self-verifying judgments like _I exist_ seem rational, and self-defeating ones like _It will rain, but I don’t believe it will rain_ seem irrational_._ But one’s evidence might support a self-defeating judgment, and fail to support a self-verifying one. This paper explains how it can be rational to defy one’s evidence if judgment is construed as a mental performance or act, akin to inner assertion. The explanation comes at significant cost, however. Instead of causing or constituting beliefs, judgments turn out to (...) be mere epiphenomena, and self-verification and self-defeat lack the broader philosophical import often claimed for them. (shrink)

Arnold Cusmariu ABSTRACT: The Cogito formulation in Discourse on Method attributes properties to one conceptual category that belong to another. Correcting the error ends up defeating Descartes’ response to skepticism. His own creation, the Evil Genius, is to blame. Download PDF.

Cet ouvrage cherche a depasser l'alternative: Ou bien Descartes, ou bien Vico, en poursuivant un triple objectif. D'une part analyser la place que la phenomenologie hermeneutique occupe dans le nouveau paysage de la phenomenologie francaise, caracterise par des tentatives de refondation de l'idee de phenomenologie (E. Levinas, M. Henry, M. Richir, J.-L. Marion). D'autre part, reflechir sur le concept d'interpretation radicale en mettant en question la pertinence du principe d'equite cher a Quine et Davidson. Enfin, l'hermeneutique ne doit pas seulement (...) definir son projet en reference a la mort de Dieu, la fin de l'onto-theo-logie, etc. Cette reflexion, eteyee par une relecture de l'article de Kant, Qu'appelle-t-on s'orienter dans la pensee?, definit une relation plus complexe a la tradition metaphysique et debouche sur une nouvelle definition de l'idee de transcendance. (shrink)

Je m’intéresse au cogito au XVIIe siècle avant sa formulation officielle par Descartes. Les raisonnements avancés par Jean de Silhon, correspondant de Descartes, et par le Jésuite Antoine Sirmond, publiés en 1634-1635, peuvent éclairer le cogito cartésien et l’atmosphère générale de l’augustinisme au XVIIe siècle. Cela peut nous permettre de mieux comprendre en quoi consiste la contribution de Descartes au cogito et d’interpréter ses critiques ultérieures.

Cette étude entend rendre compte de la conception que propose George Berkeley de la connaissance de mon existence en tant qu’esprit. Il s’agit en particulier d’interpréter sa formulation du cogito : « Je sais ce que j’entends par les termes je et moi-même ». Cette question est liée aux problèmes intrinsèques de la doctrine controversée des « notions » et plus généralement de la sémantique berkeleyenne. On doit accorder une certaine attention aux différences d’accent entre des passages parallèles des (...) Principes de la connaissance humaine, des Trois dialogues et de l’Alciphron VII. Les principales interprétations XXe siècle, usuel dans le commentaire, est une source de simplification abusive. (shrink)

That there is an epistemological difference between the mental and the physical is well- known. Introspection readily generates knowledge of one’s own conscious experience, but fails to yield evidence for the existence of anything physical. Conversely, empirical investigation delivers knowledge of physical properties, but neither finds nor requires us to posit conscious experience. In recent decades, a series of neo-Cartesian arguments have emerged that rest on this epistemological difference and purport to demonstrate that mind-brain identity is false and that consciousness (...) is not even realized by or supervenient on physical properties. Where Descartes argued he could clearly and distinctly conceive mind and body as existing separately, contemporary anti-physicalists hold that the conceivability of worlds in which actual world correlations between physical and phenomenological properties fail shows that these correlations are contingent rather than logically or metaphysically necessary. Together with Descartes, they conclude from conceivability that identity, as well as strong supervenience, is false. 1 If the argument of this paper is correct, however, then there is an argument for dualism that arises from the epistemological distinction, is grounded in the Meditations, and is yet distinct from the " 1 " conceivability arguments pursued both by Descartes and contemporary anti-physicalists. Furthermore, the argument is immune to the standard objections to conceivability arguments: its conclusion follows even if there are a posteriori identities between physical and phenomenal properties. (shrink)

Our use of ‘I’, or something like it, is implicated in our self-regarding emotions, in the concern to survive, and so seems basic to ordinary human life. But why does that pattern of use require a referring term? Don't Lichtenberg's formulations show how we could have our ordinary pattern of use here without the first person? I argue that what explains our compulsion to regard the first person as a referring term is our ordinary causal thinking, which requires us to (...) find a persisting object as the mechanism that underpins the causal structure we naturally ascribe to the self. I thus argue against Peacocke's picture (2012), on which it's the cogito that explains one's knowledge of one's own existence. (shrink)

Analytical philosophy opens new perspectives of studies in the history of philosophy. There are generalized history of analytical interpretations of Cartesian principle cogito ergo sum and analysis of Cartesianism through the prism of contemporary philosophy of action, with special attention to performativity of the mentioned principle. The importance of such research necessarily goes beyond "pure" history of philosophy: it also contributes to revision of traditional approaches to justification of knowledge, which still remain problematic. Attention to performativism of cogito (...) ergo sum thesis is the key to new convenient interpretation of knowledge justification problem, because it allows for justification as selfjustification in terms of accomplishment. Inevitable accomplishment, peculiar to evidfently performative knowledge, suggests that fundamentalist strategy of knowledge justification, in the perspective of philosophy of action, amounts to a preferable interpretation compared to traditional epistemological approach. (shrink)

Este artículo propone un análisis de las relaciones entre una idea clave del pensamiento filosófico moderno como es la del llamado cogito cartesiano y un trastorno de naturaleza psiquiátrica descrito por el médico francés Jules Cotard en las últimas décadas del siglo XIX. Mientras que Descartes, y toda la estela de sus descendientes, habrían tendido a situar en la existencia auto-trasparente del sujeto el fundamento de la filosofía en la Modernidad, los pacientes aquejados del síndrome de Cotard piensan, con (...) el mismo grado de evidencia clara y distinta, que no existen. El ensayo termina por sugerir que trastornos psicopatológicos como el de Cotard tienden a disolver la hipóstasis cartesiana del ego apuntando en la dirección de un sujeto concebido como anómalo y atravesado por discontinuidades. (shrink)

Le Malin génie est absent du Discours de la méthode et des Principes de la philosophie. En différenciant les deux figures du Dieu trompeur et du Malin génie, ainsi que leurs fonctions respectives, on se donne les moyens de discerner la spécificité du cogito de la Seconde Méditation, dont l’un des enjeux majeurs est de renverser littéralement le pyrrhonisme conquis grâce à la fiction du Malin génie par l’affirmation d’une certitude première qui n’est autre que celle de mon existence (...) rétorquée à ce même Malin génie! Un tel renversement du pyrrhonisme dans le cogito fait de la première vérité, non le cogito qui n’est qu’une certitude première, mais la réfutation du scepticisme académique qui affirme l’incertitude de toutes choses et se rabat sur la probabilité. (shrink)

Perhaps the most famous proposition in the history of philosophy is Descartes' cogito 'I think, therefore I am'. Husain Sarkar claims in this provocative interpretation of Descartes that the ancient tradition of reading the cogito as an argument is mistaken. It should, he says, be read as an intuition. Through this interpretative lens, the author reconsiders key Cartesian topics: the ideal inquirer, the role of clear and distinct ideas, the relation of these to the will, memory, the nature (...) of intuition and deduction, the nature, content and elusiveness of 'I', and the tenability of the doctrine of the creation of eternal truths. Finally, the book demonstrates how Descartes' attempt to prove the existence of God is foiled by a new Cartesian Circle. (shrink)

Cette étude entend rendre compte de la conception que propose George Berkeley de la connaissance de mon existence en tant qu’esprit. Il s’agit en particulier d’interpréter sa formulation du cogito : « Je sais ce que j’entends par les termes je et moi-même ». Cette question est liée aux problèmes intrinsèques de la doctrine controversée des « notions » et plus généralement de la sémantique berkeleyenne. On doit accorder une certaine attention aux différences d’accent entre des passages parallèles des (...) Principes de la connaissance humaine, des Trois dialogues et de l’Alciphron VII. Les principales interprétations XXe siècle, usuel dans le commentaire, est une source de simplification abusive. (shrink)

How should we understand both the nature, and the epistemic potential, of Descartes’s Cogito? Peter Slezak’s interpretation of the Cogito’s nature sees it strictly as a selfreferential kind of denial: Descartes cannot doubt that he is doubting. And what epistemic implications flow from this interpretation of the Cogito? We find that there is a consequent lack of knowledge being described by Descartes: on Cartesian grounds, indubitability is incompatible with knowing. Even as the Cogito halts doubt, therefore, (...) it fails to be knowledge. (shrink)

Jean-Luc Marion’s phenomenology has received much attention recently, both critical and constructive, but much less work has been done looking at the relationship between Marion’s work on Descartes and his phenomenological project. The present article begins by making a point of clarifying Marion’s understanding of the meaning of Descartes’s cogito, and contrasting it with the standard understanding as found in Leibniz, Kant, and Heidegger. Following the discussion of these various interpretations of the cogito, we examine some of the (...) similarities between Marion’s particular interpretation of Descartes’s cogito as a performative exercise and Marion’s particular phenomenological analyses of givenness and the saturated phenomenon. Notably, in Marion’s view both the cogito and givenness overcome incorrect conceptions of objectness and being, both of them exceed the limits of syllogistic logical formulations, and both are irreducible to their apparent constituting parts. (shrink)

Jean-Luc Marion’s phenomenology has received much attention recently, both critical and constructive, but much less work has been done looking at the relationship between Marion’s work on Descartes and his phenomenological project. The present article begins by making a point of clarifying Marion’s understanding of the meaning of Descartes’s cogito, and contrasting it with the standard understanding as found in Leibniz, Kant, and Heidegger. Following the discussion of these various interpretations of the cogito, we examine some of the (...) similarities between Marion’s particular interpretation of Descartes’s cogito as a performative exercise and Marion’s particular phenomenological analyses of givenness and the saturated phenomenon. Notably, in Marion’s view both the cogito and givenness overcome incorrect conceptions of objectness and being, both of them exceed the limits of syllogistic logical formulations, and both are irreducible to their apparent constituting parts. (shrink)

The Cartesian cogito—the principle articulated by Descartes that "I think, therefore I am"—is often hailed as the precursor of modern science. At the same time, the cogito's agent, the ego, is sometimes feared as the agency of manipulative domination responsible for all present woes, from patriarchal oppression to ecological catastrophes. Without psychoanalyzing philosophy, _Cogito and the Unconscious_ explores the vicissitudes of the cogito and shows that psychoanalyses can render visible a constitutive madness within modern philosophy, the point (...) at which "I think, therefore I am" becomes obsessional neurosis characterized by "If I stop thinking, I will cease to exist." Noting that for Lacan the Cartesian construct is the same as the Freudian "subject of the unconscious," the contributors follow Lacan's plea for a psychoanalytic return to the cogito. Along the path of this return, they examine the ethical attitude that befits modern subjectivity, the inherent sexualization of modern subjectivity, the impasse in which the Cartesian project becomes involved given the enigmatic status of the human body, and the Cartesian subject's confrontation with its modern critics, including Althusser, Bataille, and Dennett. In a style that has become familiar to Žižek's readers, these essays bring together a strict conceptual analysis and an approach to a wide range of cultural and ideological phenomena—from the sadist paradoxes of Kant's moral philosophy to the universe of Ayn Rand's novels, from the question "Which, if any, is the sex of the cogito?" to the defense of the cogito against the onslaught of cognitive sciences. Challenging us to reconsider fundamental notions of human consciousness and modern subjectivity, this is a book whose very Lacanian orthodoxy makes it irreverently transgressive of predominant theoretical paradigms. _Cogito and the Unconscious_ will appeal to readers interested in philosophy, psychoanalysis, cultural studies, and theories of ideology. _Contributors. _Miran Bozovic, Mladen Dolar, Alain Grosrichard, Marc de Kessel, Robert Pfaller, Renata Salecl, Slavoj Žižek, Alenka Zupancic. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Descartes' Cogito Augustine's “Si fallor, sum” Argument (If I Am Mistaken, I Exist).

The Cartesian cogito—the principle articulated by Descartes that "I think, therefore I am"—is often hailed as the precursor of modern science. At the same time, the cogito's agent, the ego, is sometimes feared as the agency of manipulative domination responsible for all present woes, from patriarchal oppression to ecological catastrophes. Without psychoanalyzing philosophy, _Cogito and the Unconscious_ explores the vicissitudes of the cogito and shows that psychoanalyses can render visible a constitutive madness within modern philosophy, the point (...) at which "I think, therefore I am" becomes obsessional neurosis characterized by "If I stop thinking, I will cease to exist." Noting that for Lacan the Cartesian construct is the same as the Freudian "subject of the unconscious," the contributors follow Lacan's plea for a psychoanalytic return to the cogito. Along the path of this return, they examine the ethical attitude that befits modern subjectivity, the inherent sexualization of modern subjectivity, the impasse in which the Cartesian project becomes involved given the enigmatic status of the human body, and the Cartesian subject's confrontation with its modern critics, including Althusser, Bataille, and Dennett. In a style that has become familiar to Žižek's readers, these essays bring together a strict conceptual analysis and an approach to a wide range of cultural and ideological phenomena—from the sadist paradoxes of Kant's moral philosophy to the universe of Ayn Rand's novels, from the question "Which, if any, is the sex of the cogito?" to the defense of the cogito against the onslaught of cognitive sciences. Challenging us to reconsider fundamental notions of human consciousness and modern subjectivity, this is a book whose very Lacanian orthodoxy makes it irreverently transgressive of predominant theoretical paradigms. _Cogito and the Unconscious_ will appeal to readers interested in philosophy, psychoanalysis, cultural studies, and theories of ideology. _Contributors. _Miran Bozovic, Mladen Dolar, Alain Grosrichard, Marc de Kessel, Robert Pfaller, Renata Salecl, Slavoj Žižek, Alenka Zupancic. (shrink)

L’histoire du Cogito ergo sum de Descartes montre la problématique de l’esprit moderne. Leibniz et Kant ont insisté sur le conditionnement empirique de la proposition. Fichte l’a défendue, en la rapportant au moi supra- individuel. Schelling et Hegel ont combattu le Cogito, qui a introduit le dualisme moderne entre l’esprit et la nature. La critique la plus pressante est celle de Schelling ; cependant Hegel et lui ont reconnu comme un grand événement historique la séparation, opérée par Descartes, (...) entre la philosophie et l’autorité. (shrink)