If social relations often require the choice of a cooperative solution to a prisoners' dilemma, we must ask how people generally solve the games. Three possible devices are that those who choose non-cooperative strategies get a bad reputation and so learn to be cooperative, that people are taught by parents that non-cooperators have unhappy lives, or that an official can be paid a salary to make the cooperative choice. By analyzing erotic love and marriage, and why people try to do (...) their jobs, it is suggested that these devices result in people often solving prisoners' dilemma games without being conscious of them. How then do these structures that 'have the function' of solving prisoners' dilemmas get created and maintain themselves? It is suggested that Deweyan consciousness, existing only when structural strains or unsolved games create personal problems, is adequate to explain many such functional structures. (shrink)

Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit is a careful description of the progressive unfolding of Spirit. Its dialectic is the education of consciousness. There are three stages of unhappy consciousness: external beyond, changing individual, and achieved reconciliation. Being aware of its own mutability, the self yearns for reconciliation, which can only come from the external beyond, from the unchanging. The quest of unhappy consciousness for reconciliation is characterized by the three stages of devotion, sacramental desire and labour, and self-mortification. (...) The self, constituted by what is other, is never able to achieve lasting satisfaction; it desires the unity of self-consciousness. Through the experience of itself, the self comes to a clearer self-awareness and transgresses its own limits. (shrink)

Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit is a careful description of the progressive unfolding of Spirit. Its dialectic is the education of consciousness. There are three stages of unhappy consciousness: external beyond, changing individual, and achieved reconciliation. Being aware of its own mutability, the self yearns for reconciliation, which can only come from the external beyond, from the unchanging. The quest of unhappy consciousness for reconciliation is characterized by the three stages of devotion, sacramental desire and labour, and self-mortification. (...) The self, constituted by what is other, is never able to achieve lasting satisfaction; it desires the unity of self-consciousness. Through the experience of itself, the self comes to a clearer self-awareness and transgresses its own limits. (shrink)

dicates implying a surplus in the background from previous negation) and the other three combinations . The second part of the study in relation to the issue of intersubjectivity summarizes Hegel's unhappy consciousness analysis of figures from the Phenomenology of Spirit and shows that it takes insufficient account of Hegel older authors, which is just Dionysios. In writings on mystical theology can find is the formal structure of intersubjectivity, and Hegel's analysis so they can not be correct.

Human consciousness is a finite entity; therefore, memory must be selective: remembering must also mean being able to forget. In 2006, James McGaugh documented the first known case of hyperthymesia—a syndrome that affects a very limited percentage of the world population. The main symptoms of this mental disorder involve the concept of memory stuck in the past, where the individual is imprisoned by his or her own memories, and any projection towards the future is precluded. The inevitable change produced (...) by the flowing of time naturally helps people to find reasons to live and to search for a sense of being in the world. The present study puts forward a phenomenological approach to hyperthymesia in the quest for a natural, healthy form of oblivion, or the ability to forget. Through existential analysis, it could be possible for the individual to recover the natural and necessary structure of Dasein. (shrink)

헤겔의 주인과 노예의 변증법은 근대성의 양면성과 현대사회의 이념적 모델을 파악하는데 핵심적인 요소다. 여기서 헤겔이 노예제를 인지하고 그것을 자신의 철학적 구도에 어떻게 수용했으며, 어떻게 관념적으로 재구성했느냐 하는 점은 무수한 논의의 대상이다. 헤겔은 당시의 다른 철학자들과 마찬가지로 계몽주의와 노예제의 공존에서 혼란을 느꼈으며 이를 구체적으로 파악하려고 했던 것으로 보인다. 이러한 상황에서 헤겔은 ‘자유’의 문제를 전면적으로 제기하게 되었으며, 자유의 변증법을 전개함으로써 프랑스 혁명과 계몽주의 전반을 성찰하는 ‘정신’의 변증법을 구상하게 되었다. 주인과 노예의 변증법이 은유를 넘어선 현실적 의미를 획득하게 된 것도 이러한 과정 때문이었다.BR 주인과 노예의 (...) 상호인정의 투쟁은 ‘시민사회’에서 원자적 개인이 무한 경쟁을 통해 자신들의 욕망을 실현하려고 하는 데서 비롯된다. 시민사회의 욕망은 생존하고자 하는 자기유지의 본성에 따라 이루어짐으로써 목숨을 건 투쟁에 이르게 되고, 이를 통해 지배와 예속의 관계가 정립된다. 주인의 지위를 차지한 욕망은 권력욕망 또는 순수욕망의 실현으로, 노예의 지위를 차지한 욕망은 노동욕망 또는 간접욕망(매개된 욕망)의 실현으로 귀결되었다. 이 두 가지 욕망이 근대성의 틀을 유지하는 기본 개념인 셈이다. 이때 주인은 추상적 체계의 원형으로 기능하고, 노예는 근대적 개인의 원형으로서 노동하는 개인의 표상이 된다. 특히 노예는 노동욕망을 가진 개인으로서 생의 자기유지를 위해 불가피한 생산활동과 생산체계에 자의적으로나 타의적으로 편입됨으로써 현대 사회의 대중을 이루게 되었다. 이러한 원형적 개인이 프로테스탄티즘을 내면화하면 비로소 자본주의적 개인이 등장하게 된다.BR 헤겔이 말하는 ‘시민사회’의 욕망의 무한경쟁은 바로 부르주아의 무한경쟁을 말한다. 이는 소유하는 개인의 자유라는 근대성의 인간형을 모델화한 것이다. 여기에 헤겔은 노동하는 개인을 덧붙여 욕망과 노동의 근대적 개인을 완성한다. 욕망과 노동은 상호보완하는 역할을 하는 것이 아니라, 각자의 정신에서 발생하는, 동일성과 비동일성, 또는 동일성과 차이의 동일성을 말한다. 우리가 자본주의적 개인이라 말하는 이념적 존재는 바로 추상적 체계를 대변하는 주인의 의식이겠다. 그러나 구체성을 상실한 추상성의 전개는 윤리적 상황을 비롯한 철학적 상황을 추상성 일변도로 만들었다. 물론 헤겔도 추상성에 대한 전면적인 반성 체계로 주인과 노예의 변증법을 전개했으나 근본적으로는 구체적 추상성이라는 ‘추상적’ 수준에 머물렀다. 이는 헤겔의 윤리학과 인륜성의 전개에서 뚜렷하게 전개된다.BR 또한 세계사의 도정을 역사철학적으로 단절/분절시켜 이해하는 것 또한 계몽의 특징이다. 헤겔이 직접 시도한 ‘철학사’ 강의 또한 서구 중심주의의 산물이며 계몽주의 시기의 산물이다. 철학사 서술에서 그리스 철학을 호출한 것도 이러한 보편주의의 요청 때문이었다. 말하자면 헤겔은 구체와 추상을 통일하는 변증법적 과정을 제시했지만 철학적 관성에 따른 추상성의 요구로 인해 다시 서구 일변도의 근대성과 추상성으로 빠져버렸다. 헤겔 사유의 추상성에 대한 비판적 검토를 통해 식민성과 노예제의 현대적 의미를 다시 살펴보는 계기로 삼아야 할 것이다. 인륜성을 인식론적 견지가 아니라 존재론적 견지에서 다룬다고 하더라도 추상성의 윤리학의 범주를 넘어설 수 없기 때문이다. (shrink)

While many connections can be drawn with some confidence between neoliberalism and penal policy and practice, it is difficult to support Loïc Wacquant’s attempt to render punitive penality integral to neoliberalism, and to regard both as being strategically exported from the US. Neoliberalism is a fluid and variable political formation, both over time and internationally, and is impossible to reduce to a few primary characteristics such as a specific penal policy. Correspondingly, neoliberal doctrines and regimes appear to be consistent with (...) many forms of penal policy other than punitive imprisonment. This is partly because of neoliberalism’s own variability, but also because of the impact of local conditions and the multiple ways through which penal policy may be linked with particular political formations. Not only theoretically but also politically, Wacquant’s thesis remains of questionable strategic utility although evidently valuable in consciousness raising. (shrink)

Perhaps even more radically than under the criticism of the ‘Maîtres du soupçon’, a whole world goes down in Greek comedy. Not only traditional religion, but also ethical life and finally even reason itself seem to be affected by the all-destroying power of laughter.The title of Aristophanes’ famous play ‘The Clouds’ has a symbolic meaning: in the comedy, Greek ethical life dissolves into a vanishing mist. Behind the player’s mask hides the principle of this total decomposition: the autonomous, selfconfident individual. (...) This event does not only have a theatrical meaning. It does not only exist in the artist’s imagination. It concerns a whole nation, a whole culture. The comedy is an expression of the way society understands itself. It represents in an aesthetic way the fact that the individual human being sees himself as ‘principium essendi et cognoscendi’ of everything. The comedy voices a new truth, namely that all truth begins and ends with man. The gods — symbols of truth and actuality- have dissolved in the shamelessness of a laughter, which does not halt for anything anymore. Formulated in modern terms: the comedy voices the philosophical principle that from now on the subject will be the reference point of all reality. Long before Descartes’s Cogito, a metaphysics of subjectivity here finds one of its remarkable expressions.At least, that is how Hegel interprets the comedy in his Phenomenology of Spirit. According to him, the destruction of the Greek world announces itself in the comedy. It signals the experience that a certain culture has grown old, that something new is coming. This new actuality will get its first, symbolic expression in the Christian religion. However, this transition is only possible if consciousness undergoes new experiences, by which the self-sufficient and frivolous cheerfulness of the comedy gets lost. In these new experiences the implications of the principle of the autonomous subjectivity, which is decisive for the comedy, come to light. Hegel defines this principle as following: “das Selbst ist das absolute Wesen; das Wesen, das Substanz und an dem das Selbst die Akzidentalität war, ist zum Prädikate herunter gesunken ...”.These new experiences are indicated by a term which is already familiar to the readers of the Phenomenology, namely ‘the unhappy consciousness’. Hegel writes: “We see that this Unhappy Consciousness constitutes the counterpart and the completion of the comic consciousness that is perfectly happy within itself”. The text is clear: the unhappy consciousness is not only that into which the comic consciousness turns. It is at the same time a change in which this consciousness accomplishes itself.The “Self which is for itself the absolute being” could not durably maintain itself in its position. Its “Leichtsinn” makes it “light”, too light to be the substance of everything. Very quickly, it loses its uncomplicated enjoyment of itself and becomes unhappy, even more: it has to become unhappy. I will return to the reason for this “having to” later on. But first, how does Hegel typify this historical experience, which is connected with the origin of Christianity? What does the bitter fruit of Greek comedy consist of? (shrink)

The anti-metaphysical kind of philosophy known as Deconstruction, associated with the name of Derrida, has done much to trouble the conventional distinctions between philosophy and literature. Its project of "textualizing" metaphysical works in order to expose their rhetorical components and reliance on metaphor, their groundless erection of fundamenta inconcussa, has radically affected, among other things, literary criticism. Even where literary critics dissociate themselves from the deconstructive enterprise, their activity betrays an increasing involvement with issues that once belonged to the domain (...) of philosophy alone. Eugene Kaelin's book on "The Poetic Plight of Samuel Beckett" is an example of this relatively recent and problematical marriage between philosophy and literary analysis. (shrink)

Whitford states in her preface that the limits of Merleau-Ponty's critique of Sartre form the limits of her investigation. Since Merleau-Ponty had little to say about Sartre's later development, except that it brought to light certain contradictions inherent in his ontology, the discussion centers around L'Etre et le néant. In effect, Merleau-Ponty, even after his break with Sartre, never ceased returning to that work in order to challenge some of its premises, speculate upon its implications, and use it as a (...) point of reference in the elaboration of his own phenomenology. Whitford has done a solid job of analyzing this rather one-way dialogue between the two thinkers. Her method is expository and her approach unbias. Unlike Simone de Beauvoir, who defended Sartre against Merleau-Ponty's criticisms by arguing that they were based upon flagrant misinterpretations and misrepresentations, Whitford attempts to expose, with straightforward lucidity, the validity as well as shortcomings of Merleau-Ponty's critique. (shrink)

This contribution addresses some bioethical and medico-legal issues of the opinion formulated by the Italian National Bioethics Committee (CNB) in response to the dilemma between the State’s duty to protect the life and health of the prisoner entrusted to its care and the prisoner’s right to exercise his freedom of expression. The prisoner hunger strike is a form of protest frequently encountered in prison and it is a form of communication but also a language used by the (...) prisoner in order to provoke changes in the prison condition. There are no rules in the prison regulations, nor in the laws governing the legal status of prisoners, that allow the conscious will of the capable and informed subject to be opposed and forced nutrition to be carried out. However, this can in no manner make therapeutic abandonment legitimate: the medical doctor should promote every action to support the patient. In the recent opinion formulated by the CNB it was remarked how self-determination is a central concept in human rights and refers to an individual’s ability to make autonomous and free decisions about his or her life and body. (shrink)

Prisons are a feminist issue. This chapter offers an account of central issues and themes in feminist philosophical work on prisons, examples of important contributions, and future directions for feminist work in the field. It does so, however, in a way that consciously deploys a feminist methodology that resists the replication of hierarchical norms and structural violence in the very doing of theory and history. In this spirit, it emphasizes the record of struggle across the prison’s history, the resistance efforts (...) that live behind individual academic theories, the conceptual frameworks generated by groups bearing the brunt of carcerality, and it investigates alternative strategies of harm reduction developed across those communities. The chapter closes with an explicit exploration of prison abolitionism, which works not only to radically rethink punishment but also to shift the locus of voice and leadership. In so doing, the chapter aims to review, as much as to create anew, a feminist theoretical analysis of prisons. (shrink)

Drawing on compelling material from research interviews with former hostages and political prisoners, Guy Saunders reworks three classic thought experiment stories: Parfit's 'Teleporter', Nagel's 'What is it like to be a bat?' and Jackson's 'Mary the colour scientist' to form a fresh look at the study of consciousness. By examining consciousness from a social psychology perspective, Saunders develops a 'cubist psychology of consciousness' through which he challenges the accepted wisdom of mainstream approaches by arguing that people can (...) act freely. What makes 'cubist psychology' is both the many examples taken from different viewpoints and the multiple ways of looking at the key issues of person, mind and world. This is a unique and engaging book that will appeal to students and academics in the field of consciousness studies and other readers with an interest in consciousness. (shrink)

Even with the very best intentions , Western culture’s approach to wilderness and wildness, the otherness of nature, tends to be one of imperialistic domination and appropriation. Nevertheless, in spite of Western culture’s attempt to gain total control over nature by imprisoning wildness in wilderness areas, which are meant to be merely controlled “simulations” of wildness, a real wildness, a real otherness, can still be found in wilderness reserves . This wildness can serve as the literal ground for the subversion (...) of the imperium, and consequently as the basis for the practical establishment of and residence in what WendeII Berry has called the “landscape of harmony.” Here all land becomes wild sacred space that humans consciously come to reinhabit. In this subversive potential lies the most fundamental justification for the legal establishment of wilderness reserves. (shrink)

One of the greatest challenges of consciousness research is to understand the relationship between consciousness and its implementing substrate. Current research into the neural correlates of consciousness regards the biological brain as being this substrate, but largely fails to clarify the nature of the brain-consciousness connection. A popular approach within this research is to construe brain-consciousness correlations in causal terms: the neural correlates of consciousness are the causes of states of consciousness. After introducing (...) the notion of the neural correlate of consciousness, we argue (in section 2) that this causal strategy is misguided. It implicitly involves an undesirable dualism of matter and mind and should thus be avoided. A non-causal account of the brain-mind correlations is to be preferred. We favor the theory of the identity of mind and brain, according to which states of phenomenal consciousness are identical with their neural correlates. Research into the neural correlates of consciousness and the theory of identity (in the philosophy of mind) are two major research paradigms that hitherto have had very little mutual contact. We aim to demonstrate that they can enrich each other. This is the task of the third part of the paper in which we show that the identity theory must work with a suitably defined concept of type. Surprisingly, neither philosophers nor neuroscientists have taken much care in defining this central concept; more often than not, the term is used only implicitly and vaguely. We attempt to open a debate on this subject and remedy this unhappy state of affairs, proposing a tentative hierarchical classification of phenomenal and neurophysiological types, spanning multiple levels of varying degrees of generality. The fourth part of the paper compares the theory of identity with other prominent conceptions of the mind-body connection. We conclude by stressing that scientists working on consciousness should engage more with metaphysical issues concerning the relation of brain processes and states of consciousness. Without this, the ultimate goals of consciousness research can hardly be fulfilled. (shrink)

War captivity is an extreme traumatic experience typically involving exposure to repeated stressors, including torture, isolation, and humiliation. Captives are flung from their previous known world into an unfamiliar reality in which their state of consciousness may undergo significant change. In the present study extensive interviews were conducted with fifteen Israeli former prisoners of war who fell captive during the 1973 Yom Kippur war with the goal of examining the architecture of human thought in subjects lacking a sense of (...) body (disembodiment) as a result of confinement and isolation. Analysis of the interviews revealed that threats to a normal sense of body often lead to a loss of the sense of time as an objective dimension. Evidence suggests that the loss of the sense of body and the loss of the sense of time are in fact connected; that is, they collapse together. This breakdown in turn results in a collapse of the sense of self. (shrink)

The transition from self-consciousness as the unhappy consciousness to reason as the critique of idealism is among the most important in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit. Yet this transition is implicit and not readily discernible. This paper investigates (1) whether we can discover and describe any roadblock that the unhappy consciousness is able to knock down, or despite which it is able to maneuver, and so become reason; or (2) whether the unhappy consciousness arrives at an impassable (...) dead end and either manages to create a detour around it or just begins again, unexplained and unexplainably, almost ex nihilo, as reason; or (3) whether, despite its implicitness, there exists a continuous, tenable, and unimpeded path from self-consciousness to reason. (shrink)

The purpose of the present work is to analyze Hegel's Unhappy Consciousness in light of the psychoanalytic conceptualization of the relation Subject-Other. The analysis will investigate unhappiness on two counts: its relation to Hegelian dialectic and the possibility of its coming to an end. Examining Hegelian unhappiness through the prism of psychoanalytic thought will allow us to formulate a crucial distinction between the philosophical (Hegelian) and psychoanalytic (Freudian, Lacanian) approaches to unhappiness as they relate to the (...) arch-concepts of knowledge, possibility, negation, and end.The first part of this work will be dedicated to the investigation of these arch-concepts through two main and opposing .. (shrink)

The transition from self-consciousness as the unhappy consciousness to reason as the critique of idealism is among the most important in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit. Yet this transition is implicit and not readily discernible. This paper investigates whether we can discover and describe any roadblock that the unhappy consciousness is able to knock down, or despite which it is able to maneuver, and so become reason; or whether the unhappy consciousness arrives at an impassable dead end (...) and either manages to create a detour around it or just begins again, unexplained and unexplainably, almost ex nihilo, as reason; or whether, despite its implicitness, there exists a continuous, tenable, and unimpeded path from self-consciousness to reason. (shrink)

This book explores the religious experiences of two notable figures who endured severe trials under authoritarian regimes: Bediuzzaman Said Nursi (1877–1960) within the Islamic tradition, and Aleksander Solzhenitsyn (1918–2008) within the Russian Orthodox Christian tradition. Against the tumultuous backdrop of the twentieth century’s spiritual, social, political, and intellectual upheavals, both Nursi and Solzhenitsyn grappled with immense hardships because of their beliefs. Despite immense tribulations, both individuals demonstrated unwavering faith and resilience in the face of adversity, continuing their scholarly and literary (...) activities. The current study centers on the dichotomy of spiritual confinement and expansiveness, illustrating how people can experience spiritual distress even without physical restraints. It explores the historical and conceptual aspects of imprisonment within Christian and Muslim perspectives, explores the reasons for Nursi and Solzhenitsyn's incarceration, examines their coping mechanisms in the face of hardship, and underscores the role of faith and spirituality. The author integrates personal experiences, particularly his own incarceration during the aftermath of the 2016 Turkish staged coup attempt, within the context of the narratives of Nursi and Solzhenitsyn. The book addresses court proceedings, release, departure from Turkey, and resettlement in Australia. Throughout, the author draws parallels between their own observations and those of Nursi and Solzhenitsyn, contributing to the broader discourse on individual spirituality and collective consciousness. The book offers insights into spiritual resilience in the face of adversity, utilizing the lives of these figures to illuminate shared human experiences. A unique collation of personal narration and scholarly reflection, it is relevant to academics and students in history, political science, sociology, Islamic and Middle Eastern studies, and to social scientists researching the phenomenon of exile and prison in different countries across the world. It also speaks to the work of activists and policymakers in human rights. (shrink)

The early 20thcentury works of Kurdish Islamic thinker Said Nursî explore how cinema can provide access to the divine. Yet, considering the periods of Nursî’s life that were spent in prison, or in exile in remote locations, it is likely that the cinema he was discussing was, very specifically, the early silent cinema of attractions. Thus the distinctive format of this cinema can be uncovered in, and seen to structure, Nursî’s formulation of ‘God's cinema’. With this proposition in mind, this (...) article indicates something of the potential that an engagement with Nursî’s cinematic writing offers for reconsidering topics already much discussed in film-philosophy, such as that of time in the works of Gilles Deleuze. (shrink)

There is in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit a relatively brief passage at the beginning of Chapter IV, “Self-Consciousness,” which may well be one of the most difficult passages in the whole Hegelian corpus, but which is also of supreme importance for coming to grips with the movement of Hegel’s thought, not only in the Phenomenology but in the entire “system.” It is precisely the difficulty of the passage, it would seem, that explains why it has not been given by (...) commentators an attention proportionate to its significance. So much attention has been focused on the “independence of self-consciousness,” expressed in the sections on “Lordship and Bondage,” “Stoicism and Skepticism” and “The Unhappy Consciousness” — which are, it is true, important and which lend themselves most readily to extended interpretation — that not enough attention has been given to the introductory section, entitled “The Truth of the Certainty of Self,” in which are enunciated the principles which regulate the whole movement of Hegel’s thought. The section might be described as the indispensable transition from those forms of consciousness, which are merely “objective” yet try to give themselves off as authentic knowing, to what Hegel considers to be the only possible way of authenticating the objectivity of human consciousness, i.e., the self, which claims to know, progressively coming to know itself, a self-knowing which will be knowing at all only if it culminates in “absolute knowing.” Only in the light of this section will the preface be intelligible; only in its light will the whole of the Phenomenology hang together. (shrink)

The lack of clarity of religious values in rehabilitation program conducted for prisoners in jails has been the cause of a failure of the rehabilitation process of prisoners. This research aims to examine the implementation of the prisoner rehabilitation program and offer relevant components of humanist values for rehabilitation in prisons. The research method used a naturalistic qualitative approach and an analytical descriptive data analysis technique, and revealed in detail the prisoner rehabilitation program through the developing of religious (...) values for behavioral change. This research showed that the prisoner rehabilitation programs in prisons is a very significant effort to bring behavioral change in prisoners. Despite this, the evaluation undertaken of the rehabilitation program shows sub-optimal results. It was found that application of humanist values can replace prohibitions and punishment which are applied on prisoners. The research has implications for positive changes in prisoner behavior which tend to be more grounded in consciousness than fear of prohibition and punishment. This research provides further evidence as to the effectiveness of the humanist approach in prisoner religious rehabilitation. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Convention for Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with Regard to the Application of Biology and Biomedicine: Convention on Human Rights and BiomedicineCouncil of EuropePreambleThe Member States of the Council of Europe, the other States and the European Community signatories hereto,Bearing in mind the Universal Declaration of Human Rights proclaimed by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 10 December 1948;Bearing in mind the (...) Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 4 November 1950;Bearing in mind the European Social Charter of 18 October 1961;Bearing in mind the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 16 December 1966;Bearing in mind the Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data of 28 January 1981;Bearing also in mind the Convention on the Rights of the Child of 20 November 1989;Considering that the aim of the Council of Europe is the achievement of a greater unity between its members and that one of the methods by which that aim is to be pursued is the maintenance and further realisation of human rights and fundamental freedoms;Conscious of the accelerating developments in biology and medicine;Convinced of the need to respect the human being both as an individual and as a member of the human species and recognising the importance of ensuring the dignity of the human being; [End Page 277]Conscious that the misuse of biology and medicine may lead to acts endangering human dignity;Affirming that progress in biology and medicine should be used for the benefit of present and future generations;Stressing the need for international co-operation so that all humanity may enjoy the benefits of biology and medicine;Recognising the importance of promoting a public debate on the questions posed by the application of biology and medicine and the responses to be given thereto;Wishing to remind all members of society of their rights and responsibilities;Taking account of the work of the Parliamentary Assembly in this field, including Recommendation 1160 (1991) on the preparation of a Convention on bioethics;Resolving to take such measures as are necessary to safeguard human dignity and the fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual with regard to the application of biology and medicine;Have agreed as follows:Chapter IGeneral provisionsArticle 1. (Purpose and object)Parties to this Convention shall protect the dignity and identity of all human beings and guarantee everyone, without discrimination, respect for their integrity and other rights and fundamental freedoms with regard to the application of biology and medicine.Each Party shall take in its internal law the necessary measures to give effect to the provisions of this Convention.Article 2. (Primacy of the human being)The interests and welfare of the human being shall prevail over the sole interest of society or science.Article 3. (Equitable access to health care)Parties, taking into account health needs and available resources, shall take appropriate measures with a view to providing, within their jurisdiction, equitable access to health care of appropriate quality. [End Page 278]Article 4. (Professional standards)Any intervention in the health field, including research, must be carried out in accordance with relevant professional obligations and standards.Chapter IIConsentArticle 5. (General rule)An intervention in the health field may only be carried out after the person concerned has given free and informed consent to it.This person shall beforehand be given appropriate information as to the purpose and nature of the intervention as well as on its consequences and risks.The person concerned may freely withdraw consent at any time.Article 6. (Protection of persons not able to consent)1. Subject to Articles 17 and 20 below, an intervention may only be carried out on a person who does not have the capacity to consent, for his or her direct benefit.2. Where, according to law, a minor does not have the capacity to consent to an intervention, the intervention may only be carried out with the authorisation of his or her representative or an authority or a person or... (shrink)

The phrase “cosmic consciousness” has a surprising and fascinating history. I will show how it first enters into circulation in the writings of the remarkable Englishman Edward Carpenter, a socialist, philosopher, and prescient activist for gay rights and prison reform. Carpenter made a trip to India and Sri Lanka in 1890, where he spent two months sitting at the feet of Ramaswami, an Indian sage and disciple of Tilleinathan Swami. Carpenter invents the phrase in order to paraphrase Ramaswami’s teaching, (...) which was itself a commonplace among the Advaita-inspired sages of the period, that there is in human beings the possibility of an all-encompassing consciousness. Later still, in the writings of William James and others, the phrase acquires a new and different meaning in the idea that the cosmos itself exhibits a form of consciousness. James, indeed, uses just this phrase in his early formulation of cosmopsychism. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Radical Democracy:John Dewey and Angela Y. Davis on Pluralism and PrisonsAmanda Dubrulein 2013, the multiculturalism act marked its 25th anniversary; at the same time, the Office of the Correctional Investigator (OCI) was celebrating its 40th anniversary (Elizabeth qtd. in Eng 2–3) The OCI was created in response to the prison riot in Kingston Penitentiary that occurred in 1971. Yet, 40 years after, prisons in Canada still face "overcrowding, the (...) shortage of professional staff, programming cuts, the confinement in the institution of a number of people who did not require maximum security confinement, too much time spent in cells, a lack of adequate channels to deal with complaints" (Elizabeth qtd. in Eng 3). The "Annual Report on the Operation of the Canadian Multiculturalism Act 2019–20" (subtitled "Building a Better Canada Through Diversity") lists four principal objectives of the Canadian Multiculturalism Act: "the retaining and fostering of identity …, overcoming barriers to participation …, promoting exchanges, and language acquisition" (Canadian Heritage 10; emphasis added). One can then see that there is a marked disconnect between the ideals of plurality and participation that Canada supposedly rests on and the practices of the systems it maintains.Drawing on John Dewey's conception of democracy and Angela Davis's critique of the prison industrial complex, I aim to show that a state cannot truly be pluralistic or participatory while continuing to engage in carceral practices. To do so, I will first explicate Dewey's conception of democracy,1 then I will lay out the contemporary problems surrounding incarceration in Canada, and, finally, I will end with a discussion of abolition as a constructive practice.Discussions of democracy often center on the mechanisms of voting. We have formed the habit of believing that democracies will carry on as long as citizens perform rote political duties (Dewey, "Creative Democracy" 225). Yet, as Dewey saw and as we continue to see, a healthy democracy cannot [End Page 40] be maintained through rote action alone. Instead, it requires "conscious and resolute effort" because democracy is not a mere political system ("Creative Democracy" 224). Instead, as Dewey phrases it, it is a "way of life" and therefore has moral implications. A democracy cannot flourish where there is no community (Dewey, "Creative Democracy" 225). This is accomplished through dialogue and debate with others and the recognition of the transactional nature of associated living. The purpose of a state is to supply the "right conditions" so that every person can lead their life and flourish in their own capacity (Dewey, "Creative Democracy" 227).The public is composed of individuals who act and associate with each other; every individual is "subject to all kinds of social influences which determine what they can think of, plan and choose" (Dewey, The Public 115). Yet when people come together and discuss their wants and needs, new ideas are tested, and new beliefs are formed. This creates an unsettling of current modes and processes of political action (Dewey, The Public 103).2 Thus, Dewey argues that one of the main tasks required for maintaining (and reclaiming) democracy is the constant "discovering [of] means by which a scattered, mobile, and manifold public may so recognize itself as to define and express its interests" (The Public 174). For this to occur, the creation and recognition of community is central. For Dewey, community is not merely "physical and organic" (though it often is this), it is also "moral … emotional, [and] intellectual" (The Public 177–78). For the individual, who becomes a part of this association, democracy involves the responsibility of sharing with others the "capacity in forming and directing the activities of the groups to which one belongs and in participating according to the need in the values which the group sustains" (Dewey, The Public 175). For the group, democracy "demands liberation of the potentialities of [its] members" to flourish "in harmony with the interests and goods which are common" (Dewey, The Public 175). The flourishing of the group can only come about when we, as individuals, recognize the worth and potential of those around us and our capacity, when combined to direct the community, as a community.Thus, critique plays an important role in democracies: we... (shrink)

This paper explores the connection between Søren Kierkegaard’s concept of despair and W.E.B. Du Bois’ concept of double consciousness. The concepts have been separately argued to share a root in Hegel’s “Unhappy Consciousness,” and further, each notion in part explains the interaction of a person with their culture. The paper seeks to highlight the importance of culture in interpreting Kierkegaard’s despair, and to do so by including a critique via Du Bois that a person’s existence in a culture (...) of oppression potentially impacts one’s relation to oneself, whether that person is the oppressor or the oppressed. (shrink)

This article explores the dream descriptions submitted in 1973–1974 by former Polish prisoners of the Auschwitz concentration camp in response to a questionnaire sent out by Polish psychiatrists. These descriptions are being investigated as testimonies that represent the Auschwitz inmates’ experiences commonly regarded as “unspeakable.” Not only the dream experience itself, but also the respondents’ attitudes toward and beliefs about dreams are taken into consideration in an attempt to understand the impact of the Holocaust on the survivors. Their general inability (...) of comprehending the Auschwitz and post‐Auschwitz dreams seems to be the most important and significant aspect of their testimonies. The experience of dreams as completely strange and astonishing phenomena is being explained in this article in connection with the respondents’ ability and inability to recover from their Holocaust trauma. (shrink)

Explores deep sleep (susupti), one of the three states of consciousness in Advaita Vedanta, and the major role it plays in this philosophy.

The article is aimed at comprehending the perception of J. Wahl’s philosophy in Russia. The central role is assigned to the notion of “unhappy consciousness” in Hegel’s “The Phenomenology of Spirit” and to the interpretation of this notion in J. Wahl’s philosophy. The analysis of Russian–language studies dealing with his philosophy allows to outline two primary strands of engagement with it: within the framework of “French Neo–Hegelianism”, and within the framework of existentialism. Th e need to renounce this established (...) characteristic of his philosophy is shown. Two arguments are stated in favour of this, conceptual and substantial. As for the former, the restriction of J. Wahl’s philosophy to the two aforementioned frameworks narrows the real horizons of his research. For the latter, the “unhappy consciousness” in J. Wahl’s philosophy besides the tragic–religious interpretation of Hegel’s ideas also contains pluralistic criticism of Hegel’s “monism” as a part of J. Wahl’s own philosophical project of “metaphysical empiricism”. It is argued that treating the entire corpus of J. Wahl’s writings will allow for a more thorough insight into the history of 20th century French philosophy, in particular “French Neo–Hegelianism” and the Franco-German debates concerning phenomenology and existentialism. (shrink)

The Coming Home Project of the Snowflower Sangha in Madison, Wisconsin is an active member of MOSES, a nonpartisan interfaith organization that works to promote systemic change for social justice issues with a focus on mass incarceration and ending the use of solitary confinement in the state's prisons and jails. To support these efforts, and to restore dignity and safety to the entire community, CHP members work to make Wisconsin's sentencing rules and laws more just and humane, increase treatment alternatives (...) to incarceration, stop crimeless revocations back to prison, and remove barriers to employment for previously incarcerated individuals returning to their communities. (shrink)

The unifying idea of Gramsci's famous Prison Notebooks is the concept of hegemony. In his study of these fragmentary writings, now published in paperback for the first time, Dr Femia elucidates the precise character of this concept, explores its basic philosophical assumptions, and sets out its implications for Gramsci's explanation of social stability and his vision of the revolutionary process. A number of prevalent and often contradictory myths are demolished, and, moreover, certain neglected aspects of his thought are stressed, including (...) the predominant role he attributed to economic factors, the importance he gave to 'contradictory consciousness', and the close connection between his political thinking and his fundamental philosophical premises. The author concludes by critically examining Gramsci's novel solutions to three long-standing problems for Marxist theory: why has the Western working class not carried out its revolutionary mission; what is the appropriate strategy for a Marxist party working within an advanced capitalist framework; and what are the reasons behind the failure of existing socialist states in their task of liberation. (shrink)