In the following contribution we will investigate the digital divide with respect to a philosophically and ideologically founded concept of universalisation. The documents of the World Summit on the Information Society show that the creation of a global information society not only concerns a technical structural transformation, but also a technical implementation of a normative guiding principle. I will show that overcoming the digital divide corresponds to the inner logic of universalisation as an ethical model of reasoning. Furthermore, (...) we will see that in reality this formal approach to reasoning proves to be a means of realising certain ideological perspectives. This interdependency of cultural dispositions and technical developments in the global information society will be shown in five aspects: • The creation of a global social utopia based on the concept of the information society. • The objectification of the concept of universalisation in information and communication technology. • The linking of global internet use to a normative idea of the public sphere. • The tendency towards totality as a problem of the public sphere and ICT. • Possible reasons for demanding ICT-free areas. (shrink)

Les réalités démocratiques, différentes d'une contrée du globe à une autre, parasitent la question d'un modèle universel de démocratie dont l'enjeu reste l'émancipation des êtres humains. L'universalisation de la démocratie, en vue d'une paix perpétuelle (E. Kant), d'une paix de satisfaction (R. Aron), trouve son fondement dans la Constitution. Aucune démocratie n'est réalisable sans une Constitution républicaine susceptible de permettre aux êtres humains d'exprimer leur citoyenneté sur le modèle du patriotisme constitutionnel. Est paradigmatique d'une telle conception politique, le patriotisme (...) constitutionnel prôné par Habermas, censé conduire inexorablement l'Humanité à la démocratie radicale, celle qui est favorable à la participation, à la délibération, à la constitution d'un espace public qui se consolide dans la communication. C'est la démocratie délibérative, l'autre nom de la démocratie radicale, qui permettra aux hommes d'atteindre l'émancipation collective et l'expression des libertés individuelles. (shrink)

In diesem Beitrag wird die These vertreten, daß die gegenwärtig herrschende liberal-egalitaristische idealistische Doktrin eine verzerrte Darstellung der liberalen politischen Ethik liefert. Diese idealistisch-theoretische Verzerrung kann erhebliche praktische Konsequenzen haben, insbesondere im Kontext des idealistisch-theoretischen Denkens über die Probleme globaler Gerechtigkeit. Aus einer globalen Perspektive betrachtet sind die idealistisch-theoretischen Verzerrungen der historisch entstandenen liberalen politischen Ethik in zweifacher Hinsicht gegeben. Zum einen überschätzt die liberal-egalitaristische idealistische Doktrin die substanzielle Reichweite der Universalisierungsanforderungen des Kontraktua-lismus. Zum anderen unterschätzt die Doktrin die Bindungen, (...) die liberal teleolo-gische Werte für die Verallgemeinbarkeit bedeuten. Der vorliegende Beitrag unterscheidet zwischen einer deontologischen und einer teleologischen Richtung innerhalb der idealistischen Doktrin. Außerdem werden die historisch erzeugten begrifflichen und substanziellen Bindungen innerhalb jeder der beiden Richtungen benannt, und es wird die These vertreten, daß global denkende liberale Egalitaristen diesen Bindungen ausweichen, a) indem sie die kontraktu-alistische Deontologie mit einer Naturrechts-Deontologie vermengen und b), indem sie die historische materialistische Konzeption eines aus liberaler Perspektive guten Lebens durch eine nicht-materialistische idealistisch-theoretische Variante ersetzen. Der Beitrag schließt mit der Frage, ob solche idealistisch-theoretischen Verzerrungen nicht möglicherweise die Propagierung einer politischen Ethik ermutigen könnten, die zumindest in bestimmter Hinsicht besonders ungeeignet ist, um als ein Modell für das Denken über globale Gerechtigkeit zu dienen. Wenn hier diese Bedenken erhoben werden, so bedeutet das nicht, in Abrede zu stellen, daß eine realistischer konzipierte liberale Ethik durchaus die einzige politisch lebensfähige, für diese Aufgabe verfügbare ist. The paper argues that currently dominant liberal-egalitarian ideal theory offers a distorted account of liberal political morality. These ideal-theoretical distortions may have grave practical consequences especially in the context of ideal-theoretical thinking about issues of global justice. Considered from a global perspective, ideal-theoretical distortions of historically evolved liberal political morality are twofold. First, liberal-egalitarian ideal theory overestimates the substantive reach of contractarianism"s universalisability requirements. Second, it underestimates the constraints upon universalisability imposed by liberal teleological values. The paper distinguishes between a deontological and a teleological strand within ideal theory. It specifies some of the historically engendered conceptual and substantive constraints within each strand and argues that global liberal-egalitarians evade these constraints a.) by conflating contractualist deontology with natural law deontology, and b.) by substituting the historically materialistic conception of the liberal good life with a non-materialistic ideal-theoretical variant. The paper concludes by asking whether such ideal theoretical distortions may not encourage the recommendation of a political morality that is at least in certain respect particularly ill-suited to serve as a model for thinking about global justice. Raising these worries is not to deny, however, that a more realistically conceived liberal morality may well be the only politically viable alternative available to this task. (shrink)

In 1965 Peter Winch published ‘The Universalisability of Moral Judgements’. I feel that the argument in this paper has never been successfully refuted, and that it remains relevant to many contemporary debates in moral philosophy. Winch argued against the widespread assumption that a moral judgement, if true, ought to be universalisable for all people in relevantly similar situations. He considers the example of Captain Vere in Melville’s ‘Billy Budd’: Vere managed to condemn a man he considered innocent, while Winch concludes (...) that in the same situation he could not have done it. Many contemporary moral realists would demand that at least one of them was incorrect, probably because of misperceiving the situation . Instead, says Winch, there is a sense in which one action legitimately ‘struck’ Vere, but not Winch, as correct, and that this is the end of the ‘dispute’ between them. However, this requires a robust defence against counter-charges of relativism. Part of the problem with Winch’s article, I argue, is his ambiguous use of the concept of ‘moral rightness’, but I remedy this, and defend Winch against two further sympathetic criticisms. (shrink)

Admettons comme hypothèse de travail pour les besoins de la discussion qui va suivre que les jugements moraux ne sont pas fondés sur des valeurs objectives, sur des propriétés naturelles des choses, des actes ou des hommes, ni sur les volontés d'un Etre supréme quelconque; admettons qu'ils relevènt ultimement de decisions individuelles, que chaque homme est sur le plan logique libre de décider des principes en vertu desquels il entend guider sa vie. La question qui se pose est la suivante: (...) ces jugements concernant ma propre vie sont-ils logiquement universalisables? Le sont-ils nécessairement? Le sont-ils parfois et à quelles conditions? En d'autres termes, le fait qu'au plan moral je valorise tel type d'action doit-il m'amener à poser que les autres “devraient” également valoriser le même type d'action? La logique du discours moral me permet-elle de poser des valeurs uniquement pour moi-méme?Ou au contraire le jugement : “je devrais agir de telle façon” entraîne-t-il le locuteur à adhérer à cet autre jugement: “X, dans des circonstances semblables, devrait agir de la même façon”? (shrink)

D. A. Rees; XIV*—Some Problems of Universalisation, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 71, Issue 1, 1 June 1971, Pages 243–257, https://doi.org/10.

In 1894, the Institut Colonial International was founded in Brussels, with the aim to engage and promote transnational exchanges between jurists, scholars, politicians, colonial administrators and experts, comparing different colonial experiences. As the Institut Colonial International’s founders had hoped, its publications promoted legal debates, discussions and the prospects of specific legislation, decrees or norms to be adapted and used in entirely different colonial systems. This paper will show that the Institut Colonial International encouraged the exchange of ideas about the various (...) colonial experiences in order to create common and universal principles. International law and domestic law, or national law concerning land register systems and land law were part of the colonial discourse as it endeavoured to create and adopt universal principles of law, trying to establish a platform of common dialogue, with common premises, concerning different colonies, different colonial experiences and ultimately different cultural, social and political contexts. (shrink)

An influential view of liberalism and its view of education holds that it is a western construct unsuited to non-western societies. Bikhu Parekh’s critique of liberal democracy is taken here as representative of that position. In challenging that view, this article shows through an analysis of recent policy that post-apartheid education in South Africa expresses a liberal view of education, just as the political order introduced in 1994 is a liberal one. If we adopt Parekh’s principle that societies should be (...) allowed to choose their own destinies, there are transcendental grounds for promoting liberalism and a liberal view of education outside of the liberal western democracies. (shrink)

While the critically oriented writings of Immanuel Kant remain the key theoretical grounds from which universalists challenge reduction of international rights law and protection to the practical particularities of sovereign states, Kant’s theory can be read as also a crucial argument for a human rights regime ordered around sovereign states and citizens. Consequently, universalists may be tempted to push Kant’s thinking to greater critical examination of ‘the human’ and its properties. However, such a move to more theoretical rigour in critique (...) only solidifies the subversive statism of Kant’s apparent universalism, as long as it remains embedded in his prior theory of critical philosophy that privileges a singular form of reason. Universalist theories of human rights can break with this contradiction only insofar as they also displace the right to philosophy from the subject and site of ‘civil’ man to a politics of theory where no such subject or site is guaranteed. (shrink)

In ‘Why not NIMBY?’, Simon Feldman and Derek Turner mount a compelling case that NIMBY claims are not intrinsically morally unjustified, despite the fact that NIMBY-claimants...

Pauline Kleingeld’s “Contradiction and Kant’s Formula of Universal Law”, published in this journal in 2017, presents a powerful challenge to what has become the standard reconstruction of the categorical imperative. In this response to Kleingeld, I argue that she is right to emphasise the ‘simultaneity requirement’ - that we must be able to will a proposed maxim and ‘simulataneously’, ‘also’ or ‘at the same time’ the maxim in its universalised form - but I deny that this removes the categorical imperative (...) test from the world of universalisation because the agent must be understood as part of that world. There are two distinct types of conflict: a contradiction that results from non-universalisability and Kleingeld’s ‘volitional’ conflict, located within the will of the immoral agent. The standard ‘practical’ reconstruction of the categorical imperative remains largely intact. (shrink)

The Arabic-Islamic tradition is founded on the following new epistemic attitude that reinvents knowledge: to learn from the contributions of previous civilisations through the systematic survey of all extant scientific works; to contribute to the further development of knowledge by linking it, through usefulness, to practice and the practical need of society; to facilitate its learning for younger generations and its transmission to future civilizations since it is conceived not as a finished product but as an ongoing process. The worldwide (...) development of the reinvented knowledge has led to its universalisation and the rapid expansion of mathematics has particularly and led to the complete de-hellinisation of the Greek conception of science and philosophy. (shrink)

Onora O'Neill recently argued that environmental ethics could and should be reformulated in terms of a search for the obligations held by moral agents towards each other, with respect to the non-human world. The more popular alternative, which seeks to establish the intrinsic value of the non-human, is plagued with various theoretical difficulties attaching to the concept of value. It is here argued that O'Neill's attempt to determine fundamental obligations of moral agents on the basis of a non-universalisability criterion does (...) not succeed. It is further claimed that such an approach, in spite of the advantages which O'Neill sees it as having, is itself open to serious objection from the viewpoint of environmental ethics, especially as human beings are able in principle to release each other from mutual obligations. It is concluded that, in spite of the difficulties involved, postulations of (intrinsic) value to non-human nature do seem to be indispensable to environmental ethics. (shrink)

The Arabic-Islamic tradition is founded on the following new epistemic attitude that reinvents knowledge: to learn from the contributions of previous civilisations through the systematic survey of all extant scientific works; to contribute to the further development of knowledge by linking it, through usefulness, to practice and the practical need of society; to facilitate its learning for younger generations and its transmission to future civilizations since it is conceived not as a finished product but as an ongoing process. The worldwide (...) development of the reinvented knowledge has led to its universalisation and the rapid expansion of mathematics has particularly and led to the complete de-hellinisation of the Greek conception of science and philosophy. (shrink)

Introduction: Eurocentrism, capitalism and modernity -- The emergence of Eurocentrism: fragments and contradictions -- Anthropocentrism and Europic universals -- Marxism and the Europic problematic -- The dual dialectics of Europic theory -- Critique of the Eurocentrism of civil society -- Ethical economic symbolic representation: Eurocentrism and imaginary dialectical universalisation -- Capital: Marx's anti-Europic theory of modernity -- Conclusion: Eurocentrism, capitalism and the end of modernity (and post-modernity).

The central task to which contemporary moral philosophers have addressed themselves is that of listing the distinctive characteristics of moral utterances. In this paper I am concerned to propound an entirely negative thesis about these characteristics. It is widely held that it is of the essence of moral valuations that they are universalisable and prescriptive. This is the contention which I wish to deny. I shall proceed by first examining the thesis that moral judgments are necessarily and essentially universalisable and (...) then the thesis that their distinctive function is a prescriptive one. But as the argument proceeds I shall be unable to separate the discussion of the latter thesis from that of the former. (shrink)

Taking a new look at the language of ‘religious experience’, the authors in this contribution take into review this aspect in the current theological discussion, and in the church pew, asking the question: Does George Lindbeck’s criticism of the experiential-expressive model of religion still have something to say to us? Firstly, Lindbeck is reviewed and recouped. Then, religious experience and its commodification are discussed, at the hand also of the heritage from Schleiermacher onwards on experience. Taking a position within the (...) post-modern, relativist, critical realist and pragmatist possibilities, a community-embedded sense of truth is concluded to without sacrificing the possibility of universalising claims. Is it possible, though, within the cultural reflex towards psychologised faith to retain a historically oriented depth? (shrink)

Suppose we believe that a property F is coextensive with moral permissibility. F may be, for example, the property of having the best consequences, if we are Consequentialists, or that of conforming to a universalisable maxim, if we are Kantians, and so on. This may raise the following problem. It is plausible that permissibility is “closed under implication”: any act that is implied by a permissible act must itself be permissible. Yet, in some cases, F might not be closed under (...) implication. If that is so, then F cannot be coextensive with permissibility. Maximalism has been proposed as a solution to this problem. A “maximal” act is one not implied by any other act. Maximalism restricts the claim that F is coextensive with permissibility to maximal acts only. A non-maximal act may be permissible without being F if it is implied by a maximal act that is F. The general aim of this paper is to investigate these issues by considering the formal structure of acts, or the “act-implication” relation. Discussions of Maximalism have tended to assume implicitly that acts have structure of some sort, but there has been little careful attention given to this structure. I aim to show that, by thinking about structure, we can provide a stronger defence of Maximalism. (shrink)

Learning to address moral dilemmas is important for participants on courses in business ethics and corporate social responsibility (CSR). While modern, rule‐based ethical theory often provides the normative input here, this has faced criticism in its application. In response, post‐modern and Aristotelian perspectives have found favour. This paper follows a similar line, presenting an approach based initially on a critical interpretation of Ross's theory of prima facie duties, which emphasises moral judgement in actual situations. However, the retention of a modern (...) element is suggested, with an invitation to hypothetically universalise detailed proposals for action, following Hare. This further step may reassure students/managers who seek additional closure in their decision‐making. Some pedagogical implications are also briefly raised regarding the use of case material and the need to recognise questions of social interaction and personal character as features of dilemma resolution in actual organisational contexts. (shrink)

It is hypothesised and argued that “the four principles of medical ethics” can explain and justify, alone or in combination, all the substantive and universalisable claims of medical ethics and probably of ethics more generally. A request is renewed for falsification of this hypothesis showing reason to reject any one of the principles or to require any additional principle(s) that can’t be explained by one or some combination of the four principles. This approach is argued to be compatible with a (...) wide variety of moral theories that are often themselves mutually incompatible. It affords a way forward in the context of intercultural ethics, that treads the delicate path between moral relativism and moral imperialism. Reasons are given for regarding the principle of respect for autonomy as “first among equals”, not least because it is a necessary component of aspects of the other three. A plea is made for bioethicists to celebrate the approach as a basis for global moral ecumenism rather than mistakenly perceiving and denigrating it as an attempt at global moral imperialism. (shrink)

Many types of `other-regarding' acts and beliefs cannotbe accounted for satisfactorilyas instances of sophisticated selfishness, altruism,team-reasoning, Kantian duty, kinselection etc. This paper argues in favour ofre-inventing the notion of solidarity as ananalytical category capable of shedding importantnew light on hitherto under-explainedaspects of human motivation. Unlike altruism andnatural sympathy (which turn theinterests of specific others into one's own), orteam-reasoning (which applies exclusivelyto members of some team), or Kantian duty (whichdemands universalisable principlesof action), the essence of solidarity lies in thehypothesis that people (...) are capable ofresponding sympathetically to (or empathising with)a condition afflicting ‘others’,irrespectively of who those others are or whetherone cares for them personally. Andwhen that condition is a social artefact, we argue,solidarity turns radical. (shrink)

This article proposes an analytical approach to algorithms that stresses operations of folding. The aim of this approach is to broaden the common analytical focus on algorithms as biased and opaque black boxes, and to instead highlight the many relations that algorithms are interwoven with. Our proposed approach thus highlights how algorithms fold heterogeneous things: data, methods and objects with multiple ethical and political effects. We exemplify the utility of our approach by proposing three specific operations of folding—proximation, universalisation (...) and normalisation. The article develops these three operations through four empirical vignettes, drawn from different settings that deal with algorithms in relation to AIDS, Zika and stock markets. In proposing this analytical approach, we wish to highlight the many different attachments and relations that algorithms enfold. The approach thus aims to produce accounts that highlight how algorithms dynamically combine and reconfigure different social and material heterogeneities as well as the ethical, normative and political consequences of these reconfigurations. (shrink)

Professor Monro presents an original view of ethics based on empiricism, which leads him to a subjectivist position about moral values. He starts by examining the central problem in moral philosophy: are moral statements objectively true, or are they expressions of preference? The first view conflicts with the empiricist beliefs current in modern thought; the opposing naturalistic theory seems to lead to moral scepticism. After discussing both views, the author presents a detailed defence of the subjectivist position. In the course (...) of his argument he gives a detailed analysis and criticism of the 'universalisability thesis', the theory that moral aspirations differ from others in being applicable to all men, and that it is this that makes them moral. He then offers an alternative account of the nature of moral attitudes. The author illustrates his explanations with straightforward analogies and examples. His clear exposition of the fundamental concepts arising in his argument makes this a book for students as well as for professional moral philosophers. (shrink)

This essay consists of an examination of the work of three thinkers who conceive of liberal education primarily in teleological terms, and, implicitly if not explicitly, attempt to offer some answer to the question: what does it mean to be fully human? John Henry Newman, T. S. Eliot, and Josef Pieper developed their understanding of liberal education from their own intellectual and religious experience, which was informed by a specifically Christian conception of the place of education in a fully developed (...) human life. I suggest that the strength of their understanding of liberal education derives from its connection to the various small cohesive religious communities to which they were connected. Nonetheless, this insularity was also the primary weakness because each writer ended universalising what was in fact a particular and unique cultural and religious experience instead of providing convincing proof of a single human nature with a single telos. I will contrast this teleological conception of liberal education with that of Michael Oakeshott and his student Kenneth Minogue, both of whom wrote about education in a post-religious era in which the earlier consensus had completely broken down. They both celebrated the variety of practices which human beings have invented for themselves over the past several centuries (and past several millennia), and did not appear to suffer from the lack of any unifying single human telos. I will suggest that their understanding of practice insulated them from the need for a single unifying telos. (shrink)

The word solidarity is a borrowing from the French solidarité, which until the nineteenth century had the restricted legal meaning of a contractual obligation. I argue that in the pre-revolutionary decades, a newly born French lexeme was much closer to what solidarity would mean for modern societies, at least if we accept the agonistic context of most phenomena of solidarity: ‘esprit de corps’, taken from the military language and changed into a combat concept by the Philosophes. A ‘corps’ in French, (...) among other definitions, is an organised group with its own cohesion, its own interests, and its instinct of preservation. In this article, I argue that the study of the birth of ‘esprit de corps’, and the French Revolution attempt to universalise the concept, can shed some light on later debates on democratic forms of solidarity. If solidarity is a form of esprit de corps, and because of the military origin of the latter, solidarity should be considered as a ‘war machine’, an agonistic union rather than an all-encompassing and vague ideal of global fraternity. (shrink)

This article addresses Barthes’s development from a structuralist semiotician towards an affectively responding reader in terms of ‘postrational’ subjectivity. In light of his whole oeuvre, Barthes anticipates the understanding of emotion as an integral part of cognition presented in contemporary social neuroscience. To illustrate Barthes’s growing awareness of the importance of this epistemological move, the article starts from his textual ‘reality effect’ as a critical vehicle of realist representation. It then shifts to his attempt at conceptualising an affective reading which (...) resists the universalising idea of one ideologically determined signified. Barthes’s progress towards embracing the actual reader’s embodied self-feeling is prompted by two conceptual milestones: the obtuse meaning found incinematic stills, and the experience of punctum felt in photos. In light of his lectures in the Collège de France, Barthes substitutes the Husserlian disembodied method of introspection with the Chinese wu-wei as a reading practice. As a result, his Zen-Buddhist concentration on bodily feelings elicited by visual/verbal images becomes a method capable of creating a fruitful link between language and wordless cognition. Finally, the article proposes an idea of the ‘embodied reality effect’ by reading affectively two similar scenes interpreted by the early and late Barthes himself. (shrink)

Cet article cherche à préciser, à partir de la foi, dans quelle mesure le Christ peut être dit Norme de notre vie et de l'Histoire. L'auteur articule sa réponse à partir de la théologie de la grâce de Von Balthasar, de la morale théonome de Tillich et de la réflexion de Ricoeur sur le rapport à autrui. L'auteur soutient qu'il est possible de comprendre l'agapè comme un impératif catégorique non seulement formel, mais également concret. L'acte de la rencontre du Christ, (...) universalisé dans et par l'Esprit, est tout à la fois la forme et le contenu de l'impératif catégorique. Sous cet aspect la norme n'est plus imposition, mais interpellation eschatologique à laquelle le croyant répondra par une configuration de sa vie au Christ. (shrink)

L'époque moderne, qui s'est ouverte avec les révolutions industrielles et l'universalisation du salariat, a engendré de nouvelles formes de violence. Parallèlement aux formes classiques de l'affrontement, de la guerre, du massacre, sont apparues des violences structurelles liées à la réorganisation économique et politique de la vie des êtres humains. Un mouvement d'exterminisme généralisé se fait jour, qui instrumentalise et institutionnalise les catastrophes naturelles, et qui organise l'utilisation et la consommation intégrale des forces de travail, la mise à mort de (...) populations entières. Les exterminations des Arméniens, des Juifs, des Tsiganes, et la perspective d'une autodestruction de l'humanité (avec Hiroshima, le développement d'armes chimiques et les atteintes irréversibles portées à la biosphère) apparaissent ainsi comme des symptômes majeurs du XXe siècle, qu'aucune réflexion philosophique ne devrait négliger. Désormais, la violence ne s'intéresse plus seulement aux comportements des êtres ou à leurs représentations, mais à leur statut même de vivants, à leur simple présence. Il ne s'agit ainsi plus simplement de cynisme et d'absence de préoccupation de l'avenir de la part des pouvoirs : ces formes nouvelles de violence entraînent une chosification systématique des êtres. La violence moderne est une violence naturalisée, rendue irreprésentable, réduite à une simple "gestion". L'être humain n'est plus seulement superflu ou surnuméraire. Confronté pour la première fois dans l'histoire à la transposition dans le champ politique de l'irreprésentable du réel, à des formes de violences qui tentent de s'imposer comme l'expression d'une nature inéluctable, il est devenu "jetable". (shrink)

Grenzen van dialoog -/- De universalismegedachte van de Verlichting heeft een -postmodernistische maatschappij van slachtoffers geschapen. Het geloofsverlies in de grote verhalen en de universalisering van het individu zorgen ervoor, dat zijn schreeuw naar verontwaardiging geen toehoorders meer vindt. Zijn roep in de woestijn gaat verloren in het chaotisch geschreeuw van de anderen. Tegenover dit koude, steriele postmodernisme stellen wij het eco-communautarisme. Vanuit de vaststelling dat het individu denkt, spreekt en handelt in de context van zijn taal en cultuur, dus (...) vanuit zijn gemeenschap, voegen wij aan Kants transcendentale ideeën 'Ik', 'Wereld' en 'God', een vierde idee toe: het 'Wij' of het principe van inclusiviteit. De Kantiaanse burgermoraal is Copernicaans geïnspireerd en steunt op de Newtoniaanse ruimte-tijdstructuur. Door middel van Hackings sociaal constructivisme, het Leibniziaanse meer-werelden-beeld en het biologische paradigma als nieuw denkkader, structureren wij de -gemeenschap volgens een cyclisch en een lineair tijdsverloop. Het cyclische waarborgt de traditie van een gemeenschap, het lineaire doet de gemeenschap evolueren naar een moreel betere toekomst. Het eco-communautarisme biedt het kader voor een kwalitatieve evolutie van individuen en gemeenschappen. Het normerend aspect hiervan is de pluriforme en multi-culturele dialoog. Een dialoog met grenzen. (shrink)