A deeply personal reckoning with family, mental illness, and suicide, Dana Trusso captures the meaning of Nietzsche's armor fati--to love one's fate--through her surreal imagery and longing to heal intergenerational wounds. Lines are drawn from Lars von Trier's Melancholia, Sonic Youth's Experimental Jet Set, Trash and No Star, and lines she read from her aunt's journals as a child. -/- The photo is a sculpture of an earth goddess by Jean-Philippe Richard located in the botanical gardens of Èze, France. (...) Nearby is Le Chemin de Nietzsche, a steep hike from the seaside to mountainous ruins that is said to have inspired Thus Spoke Zarathustra. (shrink)

On the basis of an interpretation of key passages in The Gay Science, this paper examines Nietzsche's idea of amor fati—love of fate. Nietzsche's idea of amor fati involves the wish to be able to learn how to see things as beautiful. This gives the impression that amor, love, is supposed to play some role in the beautification of fate. But Nietzsche also explains amor fati in relation to his desire to be a (...) devoted “Yes-sayer.” This pulls the interpretation of amor in a different direction; for now it seems as if the love Nietzsche wants to cultivate is supposed to be expressed in a positive, affirmative attitude toward one's fate. How to think this duality under the single idea of amor fati? I develop a novel reading of amor fati as a form of practice, as something that we can do, and explain in its light how the two moments of love are to be brought together. The relation of amor fati to the “Eternal Recurrence of the Same” is also addressed: mastering the practice of amor fati can enable one to pass successfully the test of the Eternal Recurrence of the Same. (shrink)

In this essay I examine the tension between Nietzsche's doctrine of amor fati and his political project of Zuchtung. As philosophical naturalist, Nietzsche espouses a love of fate and a respect for necessity and reality. However, as philosophical legislator, he apparently denies the fatality of the human being in his attempts to cultivate or perfect it. I argue that Nietzsche's Zuchtung differs importantly from "idealistic" varieties of legislation in that it both requires and aims at the affirmation of (...) fate. On my reading, Nietzsche's nomothetic project neither contradicts nor undermines his naturalistic project: rather it represents its apotheosis and culmination. (shrink)

O presente artigo tem como objetivo principal investigar as nuances da relação estabelecida entre a noção de amor fati e o pensamento do eterno retorno tal como aparecem no livro IV de “A gaia ciência”, obra de Friedrich Nietzsche. O tom afirmativo da obra, que se expressa de forma poética e artística, nos permite partir de uma perspectiva estética de análise das questões a serem exploradas. Pretende-se, portanto, abordar as diferentes acepções do conceito de arte no percurso da (...) filosofia nietzschiana para melhor compreender o conceito de vida como obra de arte e, a partir disso, pensar as possíveis maneiras de articulação entre a noção de vida como obra de arte e a comunicação do amor fati e do eterno retorno como partes constituintes do projeto de transvaloração dos valores. Diante disso, torna-se viável uma melhor compreensão da possível relação que o filósofo estabelece entre a noção de amor fati – a qual tem lugar no primeiro aforismo do livro IV – e o pensamento do eterno retorno – o qual, por sua vez, é anunciado no penúltimo aforismo do mesmo livro. Trata-se, em última instância, de investigar em que medida e de quais maneiras ocorre o atravessamento mútuo de ambos os conceitos e a relevância disso no quadro geral da proposta da filosofia nietzschiana. (shrink)

Abstract: This paper identifies two central paradoxes threatening the notion of amor fati [love of fate]: it requires us to love a potentially repellent object (as fate entails significant negativity for us) and this, in the knowledge that our love will not modify our fate. Thus such love may seem impossible or pointless. I analyse the distinction between two different sorts of love (eros and agape) and the type of valuation they involve (in the first case, the object (...) is loved because we value it; in the second, we value the object because we love it). I use this as a lens to interpret Nietzsche's cryptic pronouncements on amor fati and show that while an erotic reading is, up to a point, plausible, an agapic interpretation is preferable both for its own sake and because it allows for a resolution of the paradoxes initially identified. In doing so, I clarify the relation of amor fati to the eternal return on the one hand, and to Nietzsche's autobiographical remarks about suffering on the other. Finally, I examine a set of objections pertaining both to the sustainability and limits of amor fati, and to its status as an ideal. (shrink)

ABSTRACTAmor fati—the love of fate—is one of many Nietzschean terms which seem to point towards a positive ethics, but which appear infrequently and are seldom defined. On a traditional understanding, Nietzsche is asking us to love whatever it is that happens to have happened to us—including all sorts of horrible things. My paper analyses amor fati by looking closely at Nietzsche's most sustained discussion of the concept—in book four of The Gay Science—and at closely related passages in (...) that book. I argue that by ignoring the context in which Nietzsche writes about amor fati in The Gay Science, we are liable to ignore several exegetical and philosophical problems with the traditional understanding of the term. I'll argue for a different interpretation which locates Nietzsche's amor fati within the philosophical project of The Gay Science and which copes better with the objections that plague the traditional view. (shrink)

Nietzsche criticizes Stoicism for overstating the significance of its ethical ideal of rational self-sufficiency and for undervaluing pain and passion when pursuing an unconditional acceptance of fate. Apparent affinities between Stoicism and Nietzsche’s philosophy, especially his celebration of self-mastery and his pursuit of amor fati, lead some scholars to conclude that Nietzsche cannot advance these criticisms without contradicting himself. In this article, I narrow the target and scope of Nietzsche’s complaints against Stoicism before showing how they follow from (...) his other philosophic commitments. I suggest that the first line of criticism follows from his denial of teleology and his skepticism toward moral values’ descriptive objectivity. I then suggest that the second line of criticism follows from Nietzsche’s account of overcoming as bestowing contributory value upon pain and suffering. Explaining Nietzsche’s criticisms of Stoicism in this way substantially qualifies similarities between his philosophy and that of Stoicism while absolving him of the charge of inconsistency. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to analyze some basic aspects of Nietzsche’s thought by tracing them back to the idea of Amor Fati, understood as the matrix from which they spring and the keystone to their pattern. The freedom-necessity duality is analyzed, posing the crucial question of why Amor Fati is for Nietzsche a call to radically face the problem of responsibility.

In this paper I advance an interpretation of Nietzsche's notions of amor fati and eternal recurrence in which they are taken to delimit the project of becoming well-disposed to life and oneself. I argue that interpreted in this way these notions do not have the problematic implications which stand in the way of our adopting them and, in fact, cast light on how we may theoretically understand and practically live our lives.

Ecce Homo aims to prepare its readers for the coming reevaluation of all values to be inaugurated by The Antichrist(ian). Nietzsche explicitly tells his friends and publisher this, and he is relatively clear about it in Ecce Homo itself.1 From the opening line "Seeing that before long I must confront humanity with the most difficult demand ever made of it," the reader knows Ecce Homo is a propaedeutic. Again in letters and in Ecce Homo itself, Nietzsche describes the preparation as (...) consisting of an explanation of who exactly he is.2 The opening line continues: "[I]t seems indispensable to me to say who I am."3 If humanity is going to abandon its values for a set of new tablets, we need to know who this bifurcator .. (shrink)

Rather than assume—based on the contents of the Nachlass—that the Eternal Recurrence, in its initial formulation, coheres with the later theoretico-metaphysical sense (i.e., sharing abstract space with the Will to Power) I propose the inverse (contrary to Heidegger, Deleuze, and Nehamas (whose Proustian exegesis (Nietzsche: Life as Literature) I’m obliged to radically extend)); namely, that the rotary cosmology of recurrence, as a literal proposition, is a consequence of the poetic sense of the earlier parable (GS)–which, I find, ultimately prefigures the (...) design of his own virulent relapse into theoria (WP). (shrink)

Apresenta a vida e fragmentos dos escritos de S. Francisco de Assis, em sentido positivo, a partir de chaves de leitura dos conceitos de dionisíaco e amor fati no filósofo germânico F. Nietzsche, bem como da integração do naturalismo em seus escritos.

I want to learn more and more to see as beautiful what is necessary in things; then I shall be one of those who make things beautiful. Amor fati: let that be my love henceforth!Death. The certain prospect of death could sweeten every life with a precious and fragrant drop of levity. …Recent scholarship has provided a useful framework for interpreting the work of the Kyoto School philosopher Keiji Nishitani, through a comparative analysis of his critical relation to (...) Friedrich Nietzsche.1 No doubt Nishitani's lifelong attention to Nietzsche's writings had a substantial impact on the development of his thought. However, mapping the contours of this relationship is somewhat complicated by the fact that Nishitani was... (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Nietzscheforschung Jahrgang: 23 Heft: 1 Seiten: 211-224.

Martin Heidegger's fame and influence are based, for the most part, on his first work, Being and Time. That this was to have been the first half of a larger two-volume project, the second half of which was never completed, is well known. That Heidegger's subsequent writings have been continuous developments of that project, in some sense, is generally acknowledged, although there is considerable disagreement concerning the manner in which his later works stand related to Being and Time. Heidegger scholars (...) are deeply divided over that question. Some maintain that there is a sharp thematic cleavage in Heidegger's thought, so that the later works either refute or, at best, abandon the earlier themes. Others maintain that even to speak of a shift or a "reversal" in Heidegger's thinking is mistaken and argue, in conse quence, that his thinking develops entirely consistently. Lastly, there are those who admit a shift in emphasis and themes in his works but introduce a principle of complementarity - the shift is said to repre sent a logical development of his thi.nking. Too often the groups re semble armed camps. (shrink)

"Following her subjects from 1933 to 1943, Sylvie Courtine-Denamy recounts how these three great philosophers of the twentieth century endeavored with profound moral commitment to address the issues confronting them."--BOOK JACKET.

Prolog -- Eros : auf dem Weg zur Erkenntnis -- Liebe als einheitsstiftende Macht -- Das tragische Chorspiel der Hellenen und ihre Imaginationen von Liebe -- Narkissos : die unstillbare Selbstliebe und das Spiegelmotiv -- Gnosis als erlösende Erkenntnis der Liebe -- Liebe in der kontemplativen Metaphysik Plotins -- Das Eine und das Viele -- Kontemplation und Liebe : das Mysterium Sacrum -- Sensorisches und Imaginatives : Weisen der Vergeistigung der Liebe -- Mystische Liebe : Gott-Leiden und Gott-Lieben in der (...) "Rheinischen Mystik" (Eckhart, Tauler, Seuse, Ruusbroec) -- Figurationen der Liebe auf den Brettern, die "die Welt bedeuten" (Wissen, Macht, Liebe, Tod) -- Amor fati : die Liebe zum Schicksal -- Die Liebe auf der Bühne des Theatrum Mundi -- Reflexionen und Mythopoetik der Liebe : philosophisch, theologisch, poetisch -- Liebe in der Theologie des Alten Bundes -- Liebe in der Theologie des Neuen Bundes. (shrink)

본 논문에서는 스토아사상에 관한 니체의 해석을 중점적으로 다룬다. 그런데 해당되는 선행연구는 국내에 없다. 우리는 그 이유를 두 가지로 추측할 수 있다. 첫째는 스토아사상이 가지는 실천적 성격 때문이다. 자연학과 논리학에 집중되었던 초기 스토아사상과 달리, 중기 이후 스토아사상은 윤리학에 집중되어 있다. 그러한 특성은 스토아사상에 대한 평가절하로 이어졌을 가능성이 농후하다. 둘째는 스토아사상에 대한 니체의 모순적 해석에 그 이유가 있다. 예를 들면, 니체는 에픽테토스(Epictetus)를 가장 이상적인 인물로 묘사하기도 하고, 견인주의를 견지하며 인간의 고통이 가지는 값어치를 낮게 다루는 원흉으로 비판하기도 한다. 우선 니체는 그의 중기저작을 통해 (...) 스토아사상의 색채를 곳곳에서 드러내고 그것에 찬성한다. 먼저 그는 스토아사상의 자기치료 개념에 천착한다. 즉 스토아사상과 마찬가지로, ‘자기’에게 집중한 최초의 인물로 소크라테스(Socrates)를 지목하면서 철학과 의학의 연관성을 밝힌다. 다음으로 니체는 스토아사상과 마찬가지로 연민을 신랄하게 비판하고, 그것을 대체하는 것으로 자족성을 내세운다. 이러한 자족성의 개념은 마지막으로 니체의 운명애(Amor Fati)논의로 이어지며, 니체는 운명애의 이론적 기저가 되는 영원회귀에 관한 것을 스토아사상으로부터 영향 받는다. 니체는 동시에 스토아사상에 대한 신랄한 비판도 서슴지 않는데, 니체의 비판을 대략 두 가지로 대별해 볼 수 있다. 첫째는 스토아사상의 견인주의가 인간의 고통이 가지는 가치를 평가 절하했다는 것이고, 둘째는 스토아사상이 가지는 목적론에 관한 비판이 그것이다. 본 논문에서는 스토아사상에 대한 니체의 모순적 해석을 있는 그대로 드러내는 것에 그 임무를 두고자 한다. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to show in what terms reality can be considered as a stratification of surfaces by developing Mario Perniola's philosophy of transit. The first part will deal with the etymology of the word transit, in order to explain its meanings and uses. As it will be clarified, the development of the notion of transit goes together with the conception of reality as deep in the sense of full, available, rich, as the realm of "difference" and (...) "enigmas". The second part will explain the particular conception of temporality implied in the transit. Together with Perniola's analysis, Nietzschean and Deleuzian reflections about "amor fati" and "eternal return" will be further explored. This concept is crucial to understand not only Perniola's overall philosophy by clarifying his position against postmodern thinkers; it also provides a theoretical framework from which the task and the challenge of the philosopher in the contemporary world emerge. (shrink)

GS 341 is one of the most familiar of Nietzsche’s writings. This article proposes a new reading that stands in contrast with most English-language Nietzsche scholarship. The text presents a communication and its reception. A ‘demon’ makes an announcement, and a hearer responds in one way or another. But there is also another narrative altogether, whose conceptual vocabulary comes from a dynamic world-view. In this an interaction of forces leads to a new situation. If the hearer is not crushed by (...) the ‘greatest weight’, there must be an inner force that counteracts its impact. I argue that what Nietzsche calls amor fati is a state that allows our drives to achieve full expression, and so makes possible a collective strength able to withstand the greatest impact. The final sentence refers to a “confirmation and sealing”. What happens is that the demon’s message makes an impression on the receptive hearer. For Nietzsche this is a working metaphor, not a turn of phrase. In a draft from this period he writes: “Let us stamp the image of eternity on our life!” That sudden and forceful act, embodying an evaluative judgement, is the event that GS 341 is all about. (shrink)

"Amor fati"—"Love your fate!" "Say 'yes' to life and recognize that you are a 'destiny'." "Languagefalsifiesreality.""TranscendyourmereÂly human nature and become superman!" These are just a few of..

I examine Zarathustra's increasing ambivalence about his role as philosopher-prophet-legislator, connecting the speech "On Passing By" (Z III.7) with his doctrine of amor fati (GS 276) as a pivotal moment in his gradual ascent up the ladder of love/affirmation and consequent overcoming of great politics. Forthcoming 2022.

Nietzsche claims that we are fated to be as we are. He also claims, however, that we can create ourselves. To many commentators these twin commitments have seemed self-contradictory or paradoxical. The argument of this paper, by contrast, is that, despite appearances, there is no paradox here, nor even a tension between Nietzsche's two claims. Instead, when properly interpreted these claims turn out to be intimately related to one another, so that our fatedness emerges as integral to our capacity to (...) become self-creators. The paper also offers, in the course of undermining a false alternative that is deeply entrenched in the philosophical tradition, a reading of Nietzsche's doctrine of amor fati that actually – and perhaps uniquely – makes full sense of section 276 of The Gay Science, the chief source for this aspect of his thought. (shrink)

Nietzsche famously rails against Christian virtues such as humility and compassion. Yet he is well aware that historical Christians, especially those in positions of power, typically preached such values but did not practice them. This raises the question whom Nietzsche is really targeting in his animadversions against Christian virtues. The answer developed here is that his real targets are his contemporaries, including atheist, socialists such as Eugen Dühring, who, with their advocacy of egalitarian, democratic social and political policies, are trying (...) to implement the values Christians long preached but rarely practiced. In nominating moderns, including those who seek the realization of enlightenment liberal democratic values, rather than past Christians, as Nietzsche’s real targets we create space for reconciling Nietzsche’s claim that he accepts the past (as embodied in his doctrine of amor fati) with his project of seeking to open up new possibilities for the future. In the concluding sections the questions are raised to what extent do Nietzsche’s attacks on Christian virtues exhibit the very ressentiment he so vehemently criticises as a source of Christian values, and whether his criticism of the modern social and political implementation of those values is really supported by his own values. (shrink)

This book argues that Nietzsche bases his affirmative morality on the model of individual responsiveness to otherness which he takes from the mythology of Dionysus. The subject is not free to choose to avoid such responding to the demands of the other. Nietzsche finds that the basic mode of responding is pleasure. This feeling, as a basis for morality, underlies the morality which is true to the earth and the major concepts of "will to power", "eternal return", and "amor (...) fati". The priority of otherness makes all thought ethical and not only aesthetic. The basis of all meanings combines the fundamental impulse of responding outwards with an immediate complement in the individual interpretation-world. This is specifically ethical because the recognition of our own historical specificity arises as a result of the refusal of others to become mere differences within our notion of the Same, and through their demand that we "become who we are" in the recognition of their separate existence. (shrink)

In part I I reply to Seymour Feldman's criticism of volume 1 of The Marrano of Reason. I try to show that Professor Feldman misreads me, first, by overlooking the transformation of Spinoza's Marrano traits from the world of religion to the world of reason; second, by failing to recognize the diversity of Marrano responses as part of my own thesis; and thirdly, by paying no heed to the mental (or, phenomenological) structures and analysis upon which a good deal of (...) my argument relies. Since many of Feldman's particular points hinge upon the first two points, I need not address each item separately. This leaves a few smaller points. I also restate the methodological boundaries of my ?Marrano? thesis, what the book does and does not do. In parts II and III I respond to criticisms on volume 2 of The Adventures of Immanence from Henry Allison and Richard Schacht. I admit the book calls for a chapter on Lessing and the Pantheismusstreit, and also on existentialists like Sartre (and Heidegger too), though not Kierkegaard. I defend, against Allison, my not self?evident decision to include Kant, whose position I characterize as ?immanent humanism?. Although Kant opposed reason to nature, his revolution made the human mind, rather than a transcendent God, the source of objectivity in knowledge, morality in action, legitimacy in politics, and even sanctity in religion. I also defend my reconstruction of Marx's immanentist ontology. I further clarify two crucial distinctions: a philosophy of immanence is not necessarily the same as ?Spinozism?, and is not necessarily critical. Hence my protagonists need not be strict Spinozists, or critical philosophers, to figure in the ?adventures of immanence?. My debate with Schacht concerns the question whether Nietzsche and Marx saw the immanent world as divine (which I deny); the place of pantheism in these thinkers (in Nietzsche I see it as a temptation which amor fati has to overcome); and whether Hegel's discovery of the role of the social world in mediating knowledge depended on his metaphysical anthropomorphism (viewing the immanent domain as subject and Spirit, and assigning the human race a privileged ontological ? and theological ? role in it: I deny that dependence). Finally, in the reply to both Allison and Schacht I rephrase my criticism of Nietzsche's ?cult of transitoriness and explain my preference for ?tentative rationality"? (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Nietzsche's Immoralism: Politics as First Philosophy by Donovan Miyasaki, and: Politics after Morality: Toward a Nietzschean Left by Donovan MiyasakiJeffrey ChurchDonovan Miyasaki, Nietzsche's Immoralism: Politics as First Philosophy Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2022. xv + 292 pp. isbn: 978-3-031-11358-1. Cloth, $54.99.Donovan Miyasaki, Politics after Morality: Toward a Nietzschean Left Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2022. xv + 330 pp. isbn: 978-3-031-12227-9. Cloth, $54.99.Without a doubt, Nietzsche's political philosophy is one of (...) the most elusive and ambiguous features of his corpus. How else can we explain the dizzying, even contradictory, variety of interpretations of Nietzsche's politics? Some read him as anti-political or a liberal skeptical of state power. For others, he is an aristocratic radical, obsessed with using state power to entrench a new class of Übermenschen. For still others, his thought is most compatible with democracy, as his defenses of perspectivism and agonism are best realized within a democratic political system. Finally, some other scholars throw up their hands and say that Nietzsche's political thought is incoherent.In this two-volume work, Donovan Miyasaki enters this fray with a distinctive defense of the democratic Nietzsche. Two features distinguish his view from others. First, it provides a novel grounding of Nietzschean democracy—what Miyasaki calls Nietzsche's "metapolitics." This grounding is examined in the first volume, Nietzsche's Immoralism (hereafter NI). Second, it offers the most radical political vision of a left Nietzschean form of Nietzschean socialism. For Miyasaki, socialism follows from Nietzsche's fundamental commitments, rather than the aristocratic radicalism that Miyasaki sees Nietzsche inferring—wrongly—from his own commitments. [End Page 97] This extrapolation from Nietzsche's "metapolitics" is undertaken in the second volume, Politics after Morality (hereafter PM). I discuss each of these contributions in turn. In general, I found Miyasaki's work to be clear, perceptive, and bold in their interpretations. That said, with a book that critiques so much of the Nietzsche scholarship and offers such a radical take on Nietzsche's politics, I have some potential objections to raise.Nietzsche's MetapoliticsOther interpreters of a left Nietzsche ground their reading on what they take to be Nietzsche's radical epistemological views: either his perspectivism or his anti-essentialism. This was a popular approach for the postmodern and agonistic readings. By contrast, Miyasaki grounds Nietzschean democracy in a completely different way, on his metaphysics, particularly his determinism and "hard incompatibilism" (NI 25). On Miyasaki's view, Nietzsche denies that freedom and determinism are compatible and hence also that any kind of moral responsibility or moral agency is possible. This is the meaning of Nietzsche's "immoralism." For Miyasaki, Nietzsche's alternative ideal is to engender a particular feeling, namely, the love of this determinism or amor fati.This thesis of hard incompatibilism leads Miyasaki to some sweeping critiques of scholarship on Nietzsche's ethics. Against the many recent interpreters who develop a Nietzschean view of freedom, Miyasaki argues that freedom is impossible in a deterministic world. Against the perfectionist and constitutivist interpreters of Nietzsche's ethics, Miyasaki argues that ethics requires the freedom to improve or fail, and such freedom is impossible. At the same time, Miyasaki admits that Nietzsche at times appeals to and even defends freedom. Yet he explains that what Nietzsche is after in these passages is not freedom, but only the "feeling" of freedom (NI 49). Miyasaki is driven to some strained interpretive moves, such as when he argues that higher individuals' feeling of freedom is enhanced precisely to the degree to which they have abandoned the "illusion of freedom" (NI 49). How can I have the feeling of something I have come to see as an illusion?It is true that Nietzsche critiques the traditional metaphysical notion of the freedom of the will on the basis of his naturalism and determinism. Yet in recent years, scholars have argued that Nietzsche defends a novel conception of freedom that is compatible with determinism, akin to what we find in Spinoza. On this view, freedom is defined in terms of agency rather [End Page 98] than a power or faculty of choice. A free agent is... (shrink)

In contrast to positivistic assignations of influence in Nietzsche-studies, this article considers the possibility of “conversational” reconstructions of contexts, where the focus is less on “whether” and “when” Nietzsche read a text, and concentrates instead on “how” and “why” he read it. This method is exemplified by the case of Philipp Mainländer, a contemporary about whom Nietzsche says almost nothing of philosophical importance. This article shows that six key leitmotifs of the Zarathustrazeit happen to form direct solutions to dangers entailed (...) by Mainländer’s system: the Death of God, the Übermensch, the Last Man, Will to Power, Eternal Return, and Amor Fati. That each of these tropes serves as a neat solution to Mainländer suggests that Nietzsche was engaged in a sort of competitive intellectual conversation with his philosophy. And as such, Mainländer’s influence on Nietzsche, even if mostly negative, should not continue to be neglected. (shrink)