Female sex steroids can affect the motor system, modulating motor cortex excitability as well as performance in dexterity and coordination tasks. However, it has not yet been explored whether FSS affects the cognitive components of motor behavior. Mu is a sensorimotor rhythm observed by electroencephalography in alpha and beta frequency bands in practices such as motor imagery and action observation. This rhythm represents a window for studying the activity of neural circuits involved in motor cognition. Herein we investigated whether the (...) alpha-mu and beta-mu power in the sensorimotor region and the alpha and beta power over frontal, parietal, and occipital regions are modulated differently in the menstrual, follicular, and luteal phases of menstrual cycles in right-handed dominant women. To do so, these women underwent MI and AO in the three menstrual cycle phases. The spectral activity of the cortical regions for the alpha and beta bands were compared between phases of the menstrual cycle and a correlation analysis was also performed in relation to estrogen and progesterone levels. For the hypothesis-based approach, beta-mu event-related desynchronization was significantly stronger in the C3 channel in the follicular phase than in the menstrual and luteal phases. For the data-driven approach, beta ERD during MI was higher in the follicular phase than in the menstrual and luteal phases in the frontal region. These findings suggest the effect of FSS on executive movement control. No effect of menstrual cycle phases was observed in cortical areas investigated during OA, but alpha and beta bands correlated positively with the follicular phase plasma estradiol level. Thus, the attenuation of alpha and beta bands referring to mirror neuron activities appears to be associated with inhibition of cortical activity when estradiol levels are lower, improving cognitive processing of motor action. (shrink)

É um dever diário atuar para que não se repita Auschwitz e tudo o que representou esse fato histórico para a humanidade. A memória deve ser sempre mantida como forma de garantir que algo tão horrível não se repita. A discussão, as lembranças são fundamentais, mas mais do que isso, devem existir ferramentas que possibilitem a sua não reprodução novamente. Nesse ponto surge a educação, como sugerido por Adorno, como instrumento garantidor da “lembrança” de Auschwitz e, portanto, um meio de (...) evitar a sua repetição. A importância da educação nesse processo se mostra fundamental, principalmente, em um mundo marcado pela volatilidade da informação e conhecimento, por uma cultura de pós verdade. E se a pós-verdade evidencia a desnecessidade da verdade nos tempos atuais, somente por meio da educação é que a verdade volta a ser central para a construção de mundo. A educação combate a pós-verdade e evita a repetição de Auschwitz. O presente artigo utiliza metodologia de pesquisa filosóficoteórica, por meio do raciocínio dedutivo e análise da sociedade atual, bem como leitura de bibliografia sobre o tema. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Acosta, José de (1539–1600) Alberdi, Juan Bautista (1810–84) Bello, Andrés (1781–1865) Bilbao, Francisco (1823–65) Bolkvar, Simón (1783–1830) Casas, Bartolomé de las (1484–1566) Caso, Antonio (1883–1946) Cruz, Sor Juana Inés de la (1651–95) da Costa, Newton Carneiro Affonso (b. 1929) Dussel, Enrique (b. 1934) Frondizi, Risieri (1910–83) Gaos, José (1900–69) González Prada, Manuel (1848–1918) Gracia, Jorge J. E. (b. 1942) Haya de la Torre, Victor Raúl (1895–1979) Hostos, Eugenio Marka de (1839–1903) Ingenieros, José (1877–1925) Korn, Alejandro (...) (1860–1936) Lastarria, José Victorino (1817–88) Lemos, Miguel (1854–1917) Mariátegui, José Carlos (1895–1930) Martk, José (1853–95) Méndez Sierra, Justo (1848–1912) Mora, José Maria Luis (1794–1850) Miró Quesada, Francisco (b. 1918) Rabossi, Eduardo (1930–2005) Ramos, Samuel (1897–1959) Rodó, José Enrique (1872–1917) Romero, Francisco (1891–1962) Sahagún, Fray Bernardino de (1499–1590) Salazar Bondy, Augusto (1925–74) Sarmiento, Domingo Faustino (1811–88) Ofelia Schutte (b. 1945) Sepslveda, Juan Ginés de (ca. 1494–1573) Torretti, Roberto (b. 1930) Vasconcelos, José (1882–1959) Vaz Ferreira, Carlos (1872–1958) Villoro, Luis (b. 1922) Vitoria, Francisco de (ca. 1483–1546) Zea Aguilar, Leopoldo (1912–2004) Acknowledgment Further Reading. (shrink)

We compare various notions of algorithmic randomness. First we consider relativized randomness. A set is n-random if it is Martin-Löf random relative to ∅. We show that a set is 2-random if and only if there is a constant c such that infinitely many initial segments x of the set are c-incompressible: C ≥ |x|-c. The ‘only if' direction was obtained independently by Joseph Miller. This characterization can be extended to the case of time-bounded C-complexity. Next we prove some results (...) on lowness. Among other things, we characterize the 2-random sets as those 1-random sets that are low for Chaitin's Ω. Also, 2-random sets form minimal pairs with 2-generic sets. The r.e. low for Ω sets coincide with the r.e. K-trivial ones. Finally we show that the notions of Martin-Löf randomness, recursive randomness, and Schnorr randomness can be separated in every high degree while the same notions coincide in every non-high degree. We make some remarks about hyperimmune-free and PA-complete degrees. (shrink)

In my article "berkeley's master argument" I attempt to show that an argument berkeley uses in the 'dialogues' and 'principles' to support his contention that whatever is perceivable is perceived can be seen as an illuminating attempt to relate conceptualizing, Imaging and perceiving. In consequence it cannot be dismissed as resting on an elementary fallacy, But reflects on the conditions for the self ascription of experience.

The book generalises earlier theories of belief change to cover all kinds of changes of sets by sets. The principal focus is still on changes of belief sets in response to new evidence, but the formal theory extends to all domains with a closure operation and a preference structure including, for example, systems of action. Contraction is the key notion; all other changes can be defined. Various new applications of the theory are outlined. A sentential version of contraction, subtraction, is (...) proposed as a formal counterpart to 'except'-locutions in natural language. Connections are emphasised with other areas at the interface between philosophical logic and artificial intelligence such as reasoning from default assumptions or from inconsistent premises. A relation of merge inference is proposed as a means of retrieving maximal but nontrivial information from inconsistent premises. Merge inference respects certain anti-Boolean intuitions while avoiding a revision of classical logic. (shrink)

The philosophy problem of identity and the related problem of change go back to the ancient Greek philosophers and fascinated later figures including Leibniz, Locke and Hume. Heraclitus argued that one could not swim in the same river twice because new waters were ever flowing in. When is a river not the same river? If one removes one plank at a time when is a ship no longer a ship? What is the basic nature of identity and persistence? This book (...) introduces and asseses the philosophical puzzles posed by things persisting through time. Beginning with essential historical background to the problem it explores the following key topics and debates: mereology and identity, including 'Leibniz's Law' the constitution view of identity the 'relative identity' argument concerning identity temporary identity four-dimensionalism, counterpart and mulitiple counterpart theory supervenience the problem of temporary intrinsics the necessity of identity presentism ontological and epistemological criteria for persistence and the difference between them. Including chapter summaries, annotated further reading and a glossary this book is essential reading for anyone seeking a clear and informative introduction to and assessement of the metaphysics of identity. (shrink)

Trata-se de capítulo de um livro sobre a noção de "substância" na história da filosofia e contém uma discussão sobre a noção ordinária de "corpo" do ponto de vista da filosofia analítica.

La délicate mise en rapport de la philosophie nietzschéenne et de l’économie est d’une pratique récente. Dans ce contexte, cet article est motivé par l’introduction du traitement nietzschéen de la « destruction créatrice » en économie et la manière de justifier philosophiquement cette référence. Pour cela, nous mettons en concurrence les interprétations évolutionnistes et nietzschéennes de la destruction créatrice. Ces deux métaphores nous semblent difficilement conciliables et nous avançons des arguments en faveur de la volonté de puissance, contre la lutte (...) pour la vie, pour mieux interpréter le mécanisme de destruction créatrice. (shrink)

The objective of this article is to try to elucidate Wittgenstein’s ex-travagant thesis that each and every mathematical advancement involves some “semantical mutation”, i.e., some alteration of the very meanings of the terms involved. To do that we will argue in favor of the idea of a “modal incompati-bility” between the concepts involved, as they were prior to the advancement, and what they become after the new result was obtained. We will also argue that the adoption of this thesis profoundly (...) alters the traditional way of con-struing the idea of “progress” in mathematics. (shrink)

Pierre André,Michel Bourban | : Dans un contexte d’urgence, les philosophes ne peuvent plus se contenter d’élaborer des théories idéales de la justice climatique fondées sur des motivations purement morales. Il est désormais nécessaire d’envisager des approches non idéales. Nous proposons ici de prendre au sérieux le problème de la motivation à l’action et nous mettons en avant certains motifs prudentiels pour lutter contre le changement climatique, en vue non pas de remplacer, mais de renforcer les motivations morales existantes, (...) mais insuffisantes. Nous commençons par présenter trois grandes approches idéales qui ont prévalu jusqu’ici dans la recherche sur la justice climatique et sont fondées respectivement sur l’éthique déontologique, sur l’éthique des vertus et sur l’utilitarisme. Nous mettons en évidence leurs limites pratiques, en ciblant le problème de la motivation à l’action. Nous proposons ensuite quelques pistes pour résoudre ce problème en esquissant une approche non idéale de la justice climatique. Cette approche est centrée sur les motivations amorales ressortant de l’examen attentif des perturbations systémiques globales et des contextes nationaux et locaux spécifiques. Elle est à notre sens incontournable pour motiver les États-nations, les entreprises et les individus. Il s’agit cependant moins de la substituer totalement aux théories idéales de la justice climatique que de compléter celles-ci pour établir une vision plus compréhensive qui distingue le problème de la justification morale de celui de la motivation. | : In a situation of urgency, philosophers can no longer rely exclusively on ideal theories of climate justice grounded on purely moral motives. It has become necessary to build nonideal approaches. We propose to give serious consideration to the problem of motivation to act by putting forward some prudential reasons for tackling climate change—with the aim not of replacing existing but inadequate moral motivations, but of strengthening them. First, we identify three major ideal approaches that have so far prevailed in climate justice research, grounded respectively on deontological ethics, on virtue ethics, and on utilitarianism. We highlight their practical limitations, particularly with regards to the problem of motivation to act. Second, we open the way for an alternative nonideal approach to climate justice based on amoral motivations issuing from a careful examination of global systemic disruptions as well as of specific national and local situations. This approach cannot be ignored if one wishes to motivate nation-states, corporations, and individuals to act. However, our goal is not to replace ideal theory with nonideal theory, but rather to complete the former with the latter for a more comprehensive account of climate justice that distinguishes the problem of moral justification from the problem of motivation. (shrink)

Effective infectious disease control may require states to restrict the liberty of individuals. Since preventing harm to others is almost universally accepted as a legitimate (prima facie) reason for restricting the liberty of individuals, it seems plausible to employ a mid‐level harm principle in infectious disease control. Moral practices like infectious disease control support – or even require – a certain level of theory‐modesty. However, employing a mid‐level harm principle in infectious disease control faces at least three problems. First, it (...) is unclear what we gain by attaining convergence on a specific formulation of the harm principle. Likely candidates for convergence, a harm principle aimed at preventing harmful conduct, supplemented by considerations of effectiveness and always choosing the least intrusive means still leave ample room for normative disagreement. Second, while mid‐level principles are sometimes put forward in response to the problem of normative theories attaching different weight to moral principles, employing a mid‐level harm principle completely leaves open how to determine what weight to attach to it in application. Third, there appears to be a trade‐off between attaining convergence and finding a formulation of the harm principle that can justify liberty‐restrictions in all situations of contagion, including interventions that are commonly allowed. These are not reasons to abandon mid‐level theorizing altogether. But there is no reason to be too theory‐modest in applied ethics. Morally justifying e.g. if a liberty‐restriction in infectious disease control is proportional to the aim of harm‐prevention, promptly requires moving beyond the mid‐level harm principle. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to study a set of three issues related to the understanding of partial justice and partial injustice as character dispositions, namely the distinctive circumstance of action, the emotion involved therein and the pleasure or pain following it. Those points are treated in a relatively obscure way by Aristotle, especially in comparison with their treatment in the expositions of other character virtues in the Nicomachean Ethics. Building on the expression ‘capacity towards the other’ (δύναμις ἐν (...) τῷ πρὸς ἕτερον), the paper highlights the interpersonal nature of the circumstances of just and unjust actions, and points how such nature is directly related to notions such as ‘profit’ (κέρδος) or ‘getting more’(πλεονεκτεῖν) as well as to the unusual conception of excess, defect and intermediacy in Nicomachean Ethics Book V. The interpersonal nature of just and unjust actions works also as the starting-point for the interpretation both of the pleasure briefly mentioned in 1130b4 as characterizing the greedy person and of the emotion involved in acting justly or greedy, which is mentioned in an extremely elliptical way in 1130b1-2: the paper argues, on the one hand, that the pleasure felt in acting justly or unjustly concerns not only the goods that are the object of just or unjust interactions, but also the way such interactions affect the people involved; on the other hand, it argues that the emotion actuated in just or unjust interactions relates to the agent’s concern or lack of concern with the good of those people. (shrink)

This paper offers a new interpretation for Wittgenstein`s treatment of mathematical identities. As it is widely known, Wittgenstein`s mature philosophy of mathematics includes a general rejection of abstract objects. On the other hand, the traditional interpretation of mathematical identities involves precisely the idea of a single abstract object – usually a number –named by both sides of an equation.

>e paper studies the discussion about human good in Eudemian Ethics I.7. It is particularly concerned with the existence, in the text, of two characteristics of the human good: its peculiarity, on the one hand, which consists not only in the quali- (cation ‘human’ (anthropinon), but also in the assignment of this good to the domain of action (the activity that distinguishes humans from other beings), and, on the other hand, the fact that it belongs to a spectrum containing the (...) goods of other beings, like god and the remaining living beings. Divinity works as the standard for the distinction between eudaimonic goods – belonging to beings whose nature implies participation in the divine (humans, for example) – and non-eudaimonic goods that belong to those beings deprived of such participation. Resorting to other passages from the Eudemian Ethics, as well as other texts from the corpus, the paper defends that the two characteristics of the human good presented in EE I.7 foreshadow an important di?erence between the two Aristotelian treatises on eudaimonia: whereas the Nicomachean Ethics emphasizes contemplation as the activity through which humans participate in the divine, the Eudemian Ethics stresses virtuous actions as a human activity related to the divine. (shrink)

Mit seiner Theorie der vernünftigen Übereinkunft liefert André Olbrich die Grundlegung eines Kriteriums für moralische Urteile über richtig und falsch: Im Anschluss an klassische und moderne Vertragstheoretiker wird die Akzeptanz eines Urteils durch die Betroffenen zum obersten Rechtfertigungsmaßstab erhoben. Das vertragstheoretische Denken wird weiterentwickelt und konsequent als umfassende normative Theorie ausformuliert. Die Leserinnen und Leser erfahren, von welchem Standpunkt aus sich die Regeln unseres sozialen Miteinanders einer Kritik unterziehen lassen und auf welchen moralischen Grundlagen Recht und Politik aufbauen.

A. Selbstverortung: Der hermssche Blick auf andere Religionen -- b. Öffnung zu Anderen: Das Problem geschlossener Rationalitätsformen -- ii. Einheit in der Vielfalt. Die interpretative Vernunft -- III. 3.C. Schlussfolgerungen. Bildung der Weltanschauungen -- IV. Ergebnisse und Ausblicke -- IV. 1. Perspektiven des Theorievergleichs -- IV. 1.A. Eine 'Topik der Verständigung' - als Struktur der Forschungsfragen -- IV. 1.B. Vernunft und Religion als komplementäre Konkurrenz -- IV. 2. Möglichkeiten interkultureller Koexistenz -- IV. 2.A. Evangelischer Glaube im Horizont des globalen Wandels (...) -- IV. 2.B. Diskurskultur und Diskurs der Kulturen -- IV. 2.C. Konstitutionalisierung der Wirkungsgemeinschaft der Menschheit -- Bibliografie -- Literatur von Jürgen Habermas -- Literatur von Eilert Herms -- Weitere Literatur -- Personenregister -- Sachregister. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:370 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY Leibniz. By Edmondo Clone. (Napoli : Libreria scientifica editrice. Pp. 540. L.4.000.) L'ouvrage d'E. Cione est une presentation d'ensemble de l'oeuvre de Leibniz. L'auteur situe d'abord Leibniz dans son milieu culturel et dans son ambiance historique. Puis il aborde les probl~mes relatifs ~ la monade et ~ l'univers. Une troisi~me partie traite du choix divin, du real et des possibles. La quatri~me s'attache au difficile (...) probl~me de la liberte~ en Dieu et dans l'homme. Enfin, Clone precise queles sont et doivent ~tre les activite~s de l'homme dans los domaines de la logique, de la morale, de l'esth~tique, de la religion. Par consequent, ne serait-que par l'ampleur des mati~res ~tudi~es, on dispose ici d'une vaste fresque qui met en place l'ensemble des preoccupations philosophiques de Leibniz, et qui d~ploie son ~ventail en un certain sens, disons celui de la Monadologie, toute entree dans la philosophie de Leibniz ~tant bonne, pourvu, si j'ose dire, qu'on en sorte. Or, on en sort, car l'au~eur appuie ses connaissanc~s sur une pratique quotidienne des ~extes de Leibniz, sur une documentation de premiere main qui lui fair honneur, sur une somme de lectures [eibniziennes qui l'aident s orienter son dessein. Cet ouvrage repose sur l'humus fertile d'un vaste savoir technique et livresque concernant la philosophic de Leibniz. I1 est donc, de ce point de vue, document~ avec pr4cision, et il atteint le fond des probl~mes abord4s. Enfin, rauteur ne perd pas ses propres droits dans cette ~tude, et pr4cise d'un oeil vigilant quelles sont es d4fectuositds de cette pens4e, qui n'a sa pleine signification que si on ne la coupe pas de sos racines th4ologiques. I1 semble que lh, le destin de Leibniz diff~re de celui de Clone, puisque, pour ce dernier, le philosophe d'Hanovre ne parvient pas ~ p4n~trer le sens profond de la r~alit(~ spirituelle, c'est-h-dire de la libert4 de l'homme. ANDRE ROBINET Orldans, France David Hume: Prophet o] the Counter-Revolution. By Laurence L. Bongie. (Oxford University Press, 1965. Pp. xvii + 182.35s.) This excellent work uncovers and analyzes the amazing influence of Hume's historical and political views on the world of late 18th-century France. First Professor Bongie admirably recounts the immense impact of Hume's History o] England in France when it originally appeared. The work was wildly praised by French royalty, by the philosophes, by Catholic intellectuals, by almost everyone except the Huguenot exiles. Hume's alleged impartiality and philosophical approach made him for France of the time, the finest historian of the age, the new Tacitus. Everyone found great profundity in the History, and each group managed to overlook those aspects of Hume's views that conflicted with their own outlook, and stressed those aspects that fitted in with their own predilections. it was Turgot who apparently first realized that Hume was not the zeal hero of those who were to transform France, and that Hume's political philosophy and his picture of human nature "glean'd" through the study of history were hardly in accord with the theories of the reformers and the future revolutionists. In their correspondence, Hume and Turgot revealed the enormous gulf that separated them, the latter believing in the endless perfectibility of mankind, the former, much more sceptical and much readier to accept man in his historical condition. For Hume, there was always a struggle between order and liberty, and dangers on both sides with no ideal solution in sight, while for the optimistic Turgot a new and better world was just around the corner. What Turgot saw as their differences became clearer a few years later to moderates like Mirabeau, Mably and Brissot. Hume, for them, did not really see the importance of liberty, the fundamental rights of man, the real lessons of History. The moderates began boosting, translating and commenting on an antidote to Hume's History, the liberal Whig version of English history by Catherine Macaulay-Graham, a work finally published in French under Mirabeau... (shrink)

O presente artigo tem como tema as extensas discussões de Wittgenstein sobre uma das formas mais simples e elementares de infinitude em matemática: as dízimas periódicas. Tentamos organizar os vários argumentos do autor em uma única exposição continuada. No final do artigo, introduzimos, ainda que de forma breve, o famoso argumento sobre “execução de regras” de Wittgenstein, bem como a idéia de interpretações nãostandard de processos infinitos.

nombreux textes inédits André Robinet. 2. LE SECOND MEMBRE DE LA DISJONCTION ARCHITECTONIQUE (D2): LES AUTOMATES SYSTÉMIQUES ( 1686-1716) Le discours leibnizien dans (v>4) emprunte la voie d'une communication qui ...

This paper deals with the recent Swedish proposals of a Intuitionistic notion of Truth, by Dag Prawitz and Per Martin-Löf.

The objective of this paper will be to present a critical evaluation of the so-called “standard conception of a proof”. According to this conception, a text could only be called a “demonstration of a certain mathematical proposition” if we could find a completely formalized version of that demonstration, its “corresponding formal proof”. We will compare these ideas with the treatment of the same topic within two markedly different contexts, that of contemporary Swedish intuitionism and that of modern software engineering. Finally, (...) we will offer a quick discussion of some of Wittgenstein's proposals regarding the subject. /// -/- O objetivo deste texto será o de apresentar uma avaliação crítica da assim chamada “concepção estândar” do que seja uma prova. Segundo essa concepção, um texto só poderia ser chamado de uma “demonstração de uma certa proposição matemática” se pudéssemos encontrar uma versão completamente formalizada daquela demonstração, sua “prova formal correspondente”. Faremos comparações com o tratamento do mesmo tópico em dois contextos muito distintos, aquele do intuicionismo sueco contemporâneo e o da moderna engenharia de software. Por fim, faremos uma rápida apresentação de algumas propostas de Wittgenstein sobre o assunto. (shrink)

This paper addresses longstanding debates around changing patterns of farm ownership and structure on the North American plains. Over the last 150 years, the agrifood system has been transformed by a process of capitalist penetration through which non-farm capital has appropriated key links in the ‘food chain’. Today, large, often transnational corporations dominate in the provision of farm inputs, as well as in food processing, distribution, and retailing. The paradox for food system scholars has been that primary food production (i.e., (...) farming) has generally remained in the hands of independent, family-based operations, especially in the grains sector. This paradox has generated a substantial literature on the barriers to capitalist penetration in agriculture. I revisit these debates in light of two recent trends. First, I highlight the emergence of a class of farm family entrepreneurs comprised of very large, albeit family-owned, grain farming operations, in Saskatchewan. I provide a case study of a vertically integrated, family-based mega-farm to illustrate. Second, I discuss the implications of the launch of One Earth Farms, a corporate farming entity embodying altogether new strategies of land use, labor, and ownership. Structured as a partnership between a Toronto-based investment firm and nine First Nations bands, One Earth Farms brings together the interests of private investors who increasingly view agriculture as a profitable resource sector, and aboriginal communities hoping to redress the historical marginalization of First Nations farming. I interpret the significance of these new avenues of corporatization for “family farms” and prairie agricultural development. (shrink)

This paper offers a reconstruction of Wittgenstein's discussion on inductive proofs. A "algebraic version" of these indirect proofs is offered and contrasted with the usual ones in which an infinite sequence of modus pones is projected.

The causal/explanatory exclusion argument is one of the principal weapons against the possibility of mental causes/explanations having genuine causal/explanatory power. I argue that the causal and the explanatory versions of the exlusion argument should be distinguished. There are really two arguments, one of them perhaps successful, the other one not.

This paper presents a new reconstruction of Wittgenstein’s famous (and controversial) rule-following arguments. Two are the novel features offered by our reconstruction. In the first place, we propose a shift of the central focus of the discussion, from the general semantics and the philosophy of mind to the philosophy of mathematics and the rejection of the notion of a function. The second new feature is positive: we argue that Wittgenstein offers us a new alternative notion of a rule (to replace (...) the rejected functions), a notion reminiscent of Category Theory’s notion of a morphism. (shrink)

Wittgenstein’s philosophy of mathematics involves two highly controversial theses: the idea that mathematical propositions are not about (abstract) objects and the idea that no mathematical conjecture is ever answered as such, because the advent of the proof always determines a semantical shift of the meanings of the terms involved in the conjecture. The present article offers a reconstruction of Wittgenstein’s arguments supporting these theses within a very restricted setting: Archimedes’ discovery of an algorithm for calculating the number Pi.

This is an account of a reading project that began in February 2020. Australia was burning, a pandemic was simmering, the two of us were early in our PhD journeys at the Melbourne Law School. Already, we felt exhausted by critical theory which seemed to amplify the affects we felt all too intensely. Our reading project began as an attempt to find and inhabit texts that might move beyond critique, that might allow us to find wonder and vitality in legal (...) theory. Taking up the literary critic Rita Felski’s invitation to craft a post-critical reading practice, our reading list evolved iteratively to encompass themes and concerns that we identified as possibly correlating with said practice. It evolved too, in conversation with Melbourne, as the city journeyed through different stages of the pandemic. Constantly changing restrictions changed the ways in which we met and conversed, influencing in turn the texts we chose to read and the manner in which we read them. In this account, we pay attention to the time and place of our encounters with these interlocutors, and to the feelings these encounters generated. As such, this article takes the form of a series of (revised) diary entries: first written in 2020, then revisited in the corresponding months of 2021. What we hope emerges from these entries is a sense of how these theoretical texts train us to live in a world undergoing a compounding series of crises – and, perhaps, to imagine that world otherwise. In a more jurisprudential register, we hope that our experiment will identify the methods these texts might give us for (re-)engaging with law in a spirit of wonder and vitality. (shrink)

Alors qu'Internet semblait pouvoir ouvrir des capacités inédites à l'édition scientifique, le durcissement législatif visant à protéger la propriété intellectuelle a compliqué l'exploitation des sources multimédia. En excluant l'application d'un usage raisonnable propre à l'exception pédagogique ou scientifique, le droit français se présente désormais comme une anomalie dans un contexte international de multiplication des ressources en ligne. Pour remédier à des conditions inadaptées, les pratiques sauvages se multiplient, symptôme de l'échec du dispositif existant.

The externalist interpretation of Kant allows for a rational reconstruction of what is fundamental to transcendental idealism: action. Kant resorts to action several times in the Critique of Pure Reason. The very notion of "synthesis," which plays a vital role in his philosophy, is presented as a Handlung. The externalist interpretation endeavours to explain what Kant means by action in those contexts so as to make philosophical sense of Kant's thought and at the same time to prevent it from being (...) turned into a flawed internalism. Whereas internalism struggles to present synthesis as a mental act that is as private as thinking quietly, or even as an unconscious activity, externalism shows that, according to Kant, human knowledge depends on the ability to carry out observable actions that involve human body in a very particular way. In this article, externalism will be vindicated in relation to (1) the foundations of Kant's conception of figurative synthesis of transcendental imagination; and (2) the nature of transcendental esquemata in his critical speculative philosophy. (shrink)