In At the Will of the Body , Arthur Frank told the story of his own illnesses, heart attack and cancer. That book ended by describing the existence of a "remission society," whose members all live with some form of illness or disability. The Wounded Storyteller is their collective portrait. Ill people are more than victims of disease or patients of medicine they are wounded storytellers. People tell stories to make sense of their suffering when they turn their diseases (...) into stories, they find healing. Drawing on the work of authors such as Oliver Sacks, Anatole Broyard, Norman Cousins, and Audre Lorde, as well as from people he met during the years he spent among different illness groups, Frank recounts a stirring collection of illness stories, ranging from the well-known--Gilda Radner's battle with ovarian cancer--to the private testimonials of people with cancer, chronic fatigue syndrome, and disabilties. Their stories are more than accounts of personal suffering: they abound with moral choices and point to a social ethic. Frank identifies three basic narratives of illness in restitution, chaos, and quest. Restitution narratives anticipate getting well again and give prominence to the technology of cure. In chaos narratives, illness seems to stretch on forever, with no respite or redeeming insights. Quest narratives are about finding that insight as illness is transformed into a means for the ill person to become someone new. (shrink)

A scholarly edition of Volume 2 of The Clarendon Edition of the Works of John Locke: A Paraphrase and Notes on the Epistles of St. Paul by Arthur Wainwright. The edition presents an authoritative text, together with an introduction, commentary notes, and scholarly apparatus.

"More than any thing else technology creates our world. It creates our wealth, our economy, our very way of being," says W. Brian Arthur. Yet, until now the major questions of technology have gone unanswered. Where do new technologies come from -- how exactly does invention work? What constitutes innovation, and how is it achieved? Why are certain regions -- Cambridge, England, in the 1920s and Silicon Valley today -- hotbeds of innovation, while others languish? Does technology, like biological (...) life, evolve? How do new industries, and the economy itself, emerge from technologies? In this groundbreaking work, pioneering technology thinker and economist W. Brian Arthur sets forth a boldly original way of thinking about technology that gives answers to these questions. The Nature of Technology is an elegant and powerful theory of technology's origins and evolution. It achieves for the progress of technology what Thomas Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions did for scientific progress. Arthur explains how transformative new technologies arise and how innovation really works. Conventional thinking ascribes the invention of technologies to "thinking outside the box," or vaguely to genius or creativity, but Arthur shows that such explanations are inadequate. Rather, technologies are put together from pieces -- themselves technologies -- that already exist. Technologies therefore share common ancestries and combine, morph, and combine again to create further technologies. Technology evolves much as a coral reef builds itself from activities of small organisms -- it creates itself from itself; all technologies are descended from earlier technologies. Drawing on a wealth of examples, from historical inventions to the high-tech wonders of today, and writing in wonder fully engaging and clear prose, Arthur takes us on a mind-opening journey that will change the way we think about technology and how it structures our lives. (shrink)

Contemporary health care often lacks generosity of spirit, even when treatment is most efficient. Too many patients are left unhappy with how they are treated, and too many medical professionals feel estranged from the calling that drew them to medicine. Arthur W. Frank tells the stories of ill people, doctors, and nurses who are restoring generosity to medicine--generosity toward others and to themselves. The Renewal of Generosity evokes medicine as the face-to-face encounter that comes before and after diagnostics, pharmaceuticals, (...) and surgeries. Frank calls upon the Roman emperor Marcus Aurelius, philosopher Emmanuel Levinas, and literary critic Mikhail Bakhtin to reflect on stories of ill people, doctors, and nurses who transform demoralized medicine into caring relationships. He presents their stories as a source of consolation for both ill and professional alike and as an impetus to changing medical systems. Frank shows how generosity is being renewed through dialogue that is more than the exchange of information. Dialogue is an ethic and an ideal for people on both sides of the medical encounter who want to offer more to those they meet and who want their own lives enriched in the process. The Renewal of Generosity views illness and medical work with grace and compassion, making an invaluable contribution to expanding our vision of suffering and healing. (shrink)

Arthur Collins's succinct, revisionist exposition of Kant's _Critique of Pure Reason_ brings a new clarity to this notoriously difficult text. Until recently most readers, ascribing broadly Cartesian assumptions to Kant, have concluded that the _Critique_ advances an idealist philosophy, because Kant calls it "transcendental idealism" and because the work abounds in apparent confirmations of that interpretation. Collins maintains not only that this reading of Kant is false but also that it conceals Kant's real achievements. To counter it, he addresses (...) the themes and passages in the _Critique_ that seem to require an idealist thesis and shows how they may be better understood without ascribing any idealist philosophy to Kant. His account coheres with Kant's explicit "refutations" of idealism, it fits Kant's rejection of the imputation of idealism to him by early critics and readers, and it validates Kant's contention that the second edition of the _Critique_ changes the expression but not the doctrine of the first. (shrink)

We show that the theories “ZFC \ There is a supercompact cardinal” and “ZFC \ There is a supercompact cardinal \ Level by level inequivalence between strong compactness and supercompactness holds” are equiconsistent.

The narrative ethicist imagines life as multiple points of view, each reflecting a distinct imagination and each more or less capable of comprehending other points of view and how they imagine. Each point of view is constantly being acted out and then modified in response to how others respond. People generally have good intentions, but they get stuck realizing those intentions. Stories stall when dialogue breaks down. People stop hearing others' stories, maybe because those others have quit telling their stories. (...) The narrative ethicist's job is to help people generate new imaginations that can restart dialogues. (shrink)

Action explanations like ‘I am heading to the ferry because the bridge is closed,’ are supposed to require restatement: ‘I am... because I believe the bridge is closed,’ because (i) the objective claim may be false though the intended explanation is correct, and (ii) because objective circumstances have to be cognitively mediated if they are to bear on action. This supposition is rejected here. Restatements cannot withdraw the objective claim without withdrawing the explanation. In the context of reason‐giving, belief statements (...) do not function as assertions about the inner life. The fact that belief statements may be true though the belief itself is false creates the illusion of distinctive subject matters. The illusion is exploited by conceptions of belief positing stored representations. Even if there were such representations, retrieved for the sake of expressing previously acquired beliefs, the expression of belief must endorse p and cannot merely advert to the existence and content of a representation. The reverse of the standard philosophical view about restatement is actually correct. Wherever an agent correctly adduces a belief that an objective circumstance obtains in explaining his action, a de‐psychologizing restatement that merely makes the objective claim must be ascribable to the agent. (shrink)

We force and construct a model in which level by level equivalence between strong compactness and supercompactness holds, along with certain additional combinatorial properties. In particular, in this model, ♦ δ holds for every regular uncountable cardinal δ, and below the least supercompact cardinal κ, □ δ holds on a stationary subset of κ. There are no restrictions in our model on the structure of the class of supercompact cardinals.

One task of logic, Peirce held, is to classify arguments so as to determine the validity of each kind. His own classification is interesting because it includes a novel type of argument in addition to the two traditionally recognized types. It is the purpose of this paper to discuss what Peirce thought to be sufficiently distinctive about abduction to warrant calling it a new kind of argument. But since one finds in his writings on abduction a number of different views (...) it is first necessary to make a few remarks concerning the unity of Peirce's thought. (shrink)

A scholarly edition of Volume 1 of The Clarendon Edition of the Works of John Locke: A Paraphrase and Notes on the Epistles of St. Paul: Corinthians, Romans, Ephesians by Arthur Wainwright. The edition presents an authoritative text, together with an introduction, commentary notes, and scholarly apparatus.

We prove three theorems which show that it is relatively consistent for any strong cardinal κ to be fully Laver indestructible under κ-directed closed forcing.

.In this paper, we first prove several general theorems about strongness, supercompactness, and indestructibility, along the way giving some new applications of Hamkins’ lottery preparation forcing to indestructibility. We then show that it is consistent, relative to the existence of cardinals κ<λ so that κ is λ supercompact and λ is inaccessible, for the least strongly compact cardinal κ to be the least strong cardinal and to have its strongness, but not its strong compactness, indestructible under κ-strategically closed forcing.

Increasingly, medicine is used to remodel, revise, and revamp as much as to heal and mend. It is tempting to say that people make merely personal choices about these new uses. But such choices have implications for everybody, and they ought to be made cautiously, slowly, and in a way that opens them to discussion.

Suppose that \(\kappa \) is indestructibly supercompact and there is a measurable cardinal \(\lambda > \kappa \). It then follows that \(A_0 = \{\delta is a measurable cardinal and the Mitchell ordering of normal measures over \(\delta \) is nonlinear \(\}\) is unbounded in \(\kappa \). If the Mitchell ordering of normal measures over \(\lambda \) is also linear, then by reflection (and without any use of indestructibility), \(A_1= \{\delta is a measurable cardinal and the Mitchell ordering of normal measures (...) over \(\delta \) is linear \(\}\) is unbounded in \(\kappa \) as well. The large cardinal hypothesis on \(\lambda \) is necessary. We demonstrate this by constructing via forcing two models in which \(\kappa \) is supercompact and \(\kappa \) exhibits an indestructibility property slightly weaker than full indestructibility but sufficient to infer that \(A_0\) is unbounded in \(\kappa \) if \(\lambda > \kappa \) is measurable. In one of these models, for every measurable cardinal \(\delta \), the Mitchell ordering of normal measures over \(\delta \) is linear. In the other of these models, for every measurable cardinal \(\delta \), the Mitchell ordering of normal measures over \(\delta \) is nonlinear. (shrink)

Narrative ethics holds that if you ask someone what goodness is, as a basis of action, most people will first appeal to various abstractions, each of which can be defined only by other abstractions that in turn require further definition. If you persist in asking what each of these abstractions actually means, eventually that person will have to tell you a story and expect you to recognize goodness in the story. Goodness and badness need stories to make them thinkable and (...) to translate them into individual and collective actions. Yet after more than two decades of considering the issue, I do not believe that a collection of stories can by itself guide actions in ways that are sufficient to respond to ethical troubles in institutional settings. The question will always remain open for me, but my present belief is that narrative bioethics is always hyphenated, in the sense that guidance from stories needs to be allied with other ethical guidance. Each side of the hyphen qualifies the other side. The hyphenation I will argue for in this essay is “narrative-deontology.”. (shrink)

Can a supercompact cardinal κ be Laver indestructible when there is a level-by-level agreement between strong compactness and supercompactness? In this article, we show that if there is a sufficiently large cardinal above κ, then no, it cannot. Conversely, if one weakens the requirement either by demanding less indestructibility, such as requiring only indestructibility by stratified posets, or less level-by-level agreement, such as requiring it only on measure one sets, then yes, it can.

. From a proper class of supercompact cardinals, we force and obtain a model in which the proper classes of strongly compact and strong cardinals precisely coincide. In this model, it is the case that no strongly compact cardinal \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document} $\kappa$\end{document} is \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document} $2^\kappa = \kappa^+$\end{document} supercompact.

Combining techniques of the first author and Shelah with ideas of Magidor, we show how to get a model in which, for fixed but arbitrary finite n, the first n strongly compact cardinals κ 1 ,..., κ n are so that κ i for i = 1,..., n is both the i th measurable cardinal and κ + i supercompact. This generalizes an unpublished theorem of Magidor and answers a question of Apter and Shelah.

We show the consistency, relative to a supercompact cardinal, of the least measurable cardinal being both strongly compact and fully Laver indestructible. We also show the consistency, relative to a supercompact cardinal, of the least strongly compact cardinal being somewhat supercompact yet not completely supercompact and having both its strong compactness and degree of supercompactness fully Laver indestructible.

We obtain 2 models in which AC is false and in which there are long sequences of consecutive large cardinals.

Because statements like ‘This object is soluble in aqua regia’ involve the causal modalities, we call them causal dispositional statements. Now while this involvement has long been recognized, no thorough examination of its exact nature has ever been made. One purpose of this paper is to begin such an examination. In Sec. 2 we will suggest an analysis of causal dispositional statements, and in Sec. 3 we will discuss some philosophic issues to which this analysis is relevant.

1. Introduction. It is generally admitted that a large part of man's knowledge is based on inductive arguments. Hence any philosophical theory concerning the nature of inductive arguments constitutes an epistemological theory. Any such philosophical theory of induction must, if it is to be satisfactory, take adequate account of Hume's criticism of inductive arguments. One way of treating his criticism is to say that the validity of inductive arguments is in an important sense relative to some broad factual assumptions about (...) the general nature of the universe and that these general factual assumptions are presupposed in a certain way by the users of inductive arguments. Let us call any theory of this general type a postulate theory of induction. (shrink)

Brian Garrett constructs cases satisfying Andy Hamilton’s definition of weak q‐memory. This does not establish that a peculiar kind of memory is at least conceptually coherent. Any ‘apparent memory experiences’ that satisfy the definition turn out not to involve remembering anything at all. This conclusion follows if we accept, as both Hamilton and Garrett do, a variety of first‐person authority according to which memory judgements may be false, but not on the ground that someone other than the remembering subject had (...) the remembered experience. Garrett’s brain‐bisection illustration sounds convincing, but only because we retain the idea that the subjects created by implanting a hemisphere each in two different bodies are entitled to say that they remember experiences before the surgery in the ordinary sense. To that extent the illustration presents a case of ordinary memory, not q‐memory. (shrink)

We show relative to strong hypotheses that patterns of compact cardinals in the universe, where a compact cardinal is one which is either strongly compact or supercompact, can be virtually arbitrary. Specifically, we prove if V “ZFC + Ω is the least inaccessible limit of measurable limits of supercompact cardinals + ƒ : Ω → 2 is a function”, then there is a partial ordering P V so that for , There is a proper class of compact cardinals + If (...) ƒ = 0, then the αth compact cardinal is not supercompact + If ƒ = 1, then the αth compact cardinal is supercompact”. We then prove a generalized version of this theorem assuming κ is a supercompact limit of supercompact cardinals and ƒ : κ → 2 is a function, and we derive as corollaries of the generalized version of the theorem the consistency of the least measurable limit of supercompact cardinals being the same as the least measurable limit of nonsupercompact strongly compact cardinals and the consistency of the least supercompact cardinal being a limit of strongly compact cardinals. (shrink)