Results for 'Dan Lloyd Valtteri Arstila'

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  1.  56
    Subjective Time: The Philosophy, Psychology, and Neuroscience of Temporality.Valtteri Arstila & Dan Lloyd (eds.) - 2014 - MIT Press.
    Our awareness of time and temporal properties is a constant feature of conscious life. Subjective temporality structures and guides every aspect of behavior and cognition, distinguishing memory, perception, and anticipation. This milestone volume brings together research on temporality from leading scholars in philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience, defining a new field of interdisciplinary research. The book's thirty chapters include selections from classic texts by William James and Edmund Husserl and new essays setting them in historical context; contemporary philosophical accounts of lived (...)
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  2. Art and Science Meet with Novel Results.Dan Lloyd - manuscript
    adiant Cool" has the makings of a gripping noir thriller: a missing body, a tough-talking female sleuth and a mustachioed Russian agent mixed up in a shadowy plot to take over the world. But the novel, by Dan Lloyd, a neurophilosopher at Trinity College in Hartford, is also a serious work of scholarship, the unlikely vehicle for an abstruse new theory of consciousness.
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  3.  49
    Simple Minds.Dan Lloyd - 1989 - MIT Press.
    Drawing on philosophy, neuroscience, and artificial intelligence, Simple Minds explores the construction of the mind from the matter of the brain.
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  4.  7
    Simple Minds.Jean R. Kazez & Dan Lloyd - 1994 - Philosophical Review 103 (4):718.
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  5. Temporal Experiences Without the Specious Present.Valtteri Arstila - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (2):287-302.
    Most philosophers believe that we have experiences as of temporally extended phenomena like change, motion, and succession. Almost all theories of time consciousness explain these temporal experiences by subscribing to the doctrine of the specious present, the idea that the contents of our experiences embrace temporally extended intervals of time and are presented as temporally structured. Against these theories, I argue that the doctrine is false and present a theory that does not require the notion of a specious present. Furthermore, (...)
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  6.  17
    Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind.Dan Lloyd - 1991 - Philosophical Review 100 (2):289.
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  7.  81
    Perceptual Learning Explains Two Candidates for Cognitive Penetration.Valtteri Arstila - 2016 - Erkenntnis 81 (6):1151-1172.
    The cognitive penetrability of perceptual experiences has been a long-standing topic of disagreement among philosophers and psychologists. Although the notion of cognitive penetrability itself has also been under dispute, the debate has mainly focused on the cases in which cognitive states allegedly penetrate perceptual experiences. This paper concerns the plausibility of two prominent cases. The first one originates from Susanna Siegel’s claim that perceptual experiences can represent natural kind properties. If this is true, then the concepts we possess change the (...)
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  8.  32
    Leaping to Conclusions: Connectionism, Consciousness, and the Computational Mind.Dan Lloyd - 1991 - In Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson (eds.), Connectionism and the Philosophy of Mind. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 444--459.
  9. Functional MRI and the Study of Human Consciousness.Dan Lloyd - 2002 - Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 14 (6):818-831.
    & Functional brain imaging offers new opportunities for the begin with single-subject (preprocessed) scan series, and study of that most pervasive of cognitive conditions, human consider the patterns of all voxels as potential multivariate consciousness. Since consciousness is attendant to so much encodings of phenomenal information. Twenty-seven subjects of human cognitive life, its study requires secondary analysis from the four studies were analyzed with multivariate of multiple experimental datasets. Here, four preprocessed methods, revealing analogues of phenomenal structures, datasets from the (...)
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  10.  14
    Microcognition.Dan Lloyd & Andy Clark - 1992 - Philosophical Review 101 (3):706.
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  11.  36
    Radiant Cool: A Novel Theory of Consciousness.Dan Lloyd - 2004 - MIT Press.
    An innovative theory of consciousness, drawing on the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl and supported by brain-imaging, presented in the form of a hardboiled ..
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  12. The Limits of Cognitive Liberalism.Dan Lloyd - 1986 - Behaviorism 14 (1):1-14.
    The central characteristic of cognitive explanations of behavior is the appeal to inner representations. I examine the grounds which justify representational explanations, seeking the minimum conditions which organisms must meet to be candidates for such explanations. I first discuss Fodor's proposal that representationality be attributed to systems which respond to nonnomic properties, arguing that the distinction between the nomic and nonnomic in perception is fatally ambiguous. Then I turn to an illustrative review of the behavior and neurobiology of Hermissenda crassicornis, (...)
     
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  13.  59
    Theories of Apparent Motion.Valtteri Arstila - 2016 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 15 (3):337-358.
    Apparent motion is an illusion in which two sequentially presented and spatially separated stimuli give rise to the experience of one moving stimulus. This phenomenon has been deployed in various philosophical arguments for and against various theories of consciousness, time consciousness and the ontology of time. Nevertheless, philosophers have continued working within a framework that does not reflect the current understanding of apparent motion. The main objectives of this paper are to expose the shortcomings of the explanations provided for apparent (...)
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  14.  75
    Mental Representation From the Bottom Up.Dan Lloyd - 1987 - Synthese 70 (January):23-78.
    Commonsense psychology and cognitive science both regularly assume the existence of representational states. I propose a naturalistic theory of representation sufficient to meet the pretheoretical constraints of a "folk theory of representation", constraints including the capacities for accuracy and inaccuracy, selectivity of proper objects of representation, perspective, articulation, and "efficacy" or content-determined functionality. The proposed model states that a representing device is a device which changes state when information is received over multiple information channels originating at a single source. The (...)
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  15.  46
    Cognitive Penetration, Hypnosis and Imagination.Valtteri Arstila - 2017 - Analysis 77 (1):3-10.
    The thesis of cognitive penetrability, according to which cognitive states can affect perceptual experiences, remains the topic of intense debate among philosophers. A new candidate for a case of cognitive penetration is presented and defended. The candidate is based on studies involving suggestions that something is a certain way, which are usually given under hypnosis, rather than mere request to imagine that things are a certain way.
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  16.  29
    Neural Correlates of Temporality: Default Mode Variability and Temporal Awareness.Dan Lloyd - 2012 - Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):695-703.
    The continual background awareness of duration is an essential structure of consciousness, conferring temporal extension to the many objects of awareness within the evanescent sensory present. Seeking the possible neural correlates of ubiquitous temporal awareness, this article reexamines fMRI data from off-task “default mode” periods in 25 healthy subjects studied by Grady et al. , 2005). “Brain reading” using support vector machines detected information specifying elapsed time, and further analysis specified distributed networks encoding implicit time. These networks fluctuate; none are (...)
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  17.  28
    Keeping Postdiction Simple.Valtteri Arstila - 2015 - Consciousness and Cognition 38:205-216.
    abstract Postdiction effects are phenomena in which a stimulus influences the appearance of events taking place before it. In metacontrast masking, for instance, a masking stimulus can ren- der a target stimulus shown before the mask invisible. This and other postdiction effects have been considered incompatible with a simple explanation according to which (i) our perceptual experiences are delayed for only the time it takes for a distal stimulus to reach our sensory receptors and for our neural mechanisms to process (...)
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  18.  69
    Terra Cognita: From Functional Neuroimaging to the Map of the Mind. [REVIEW]Dan Lloyd - 2000 - Brain and Mind 1 (1):93-116.
    For more than a century the paradigm inspiringcognitive neuroscience has been modular and localist.Contemporary research in functional brain imaginggenerally relies on methods favorable to localizingparticular functions in one or more specific brainregions. Meanwhile, connectionist cognitive scientistshave celebrated the computational powers ofdistributed processing, and pioneered methods forinterpreting distributed representations. This papertakes a connectionist approach to functionalneuroimaging. A tabulation of 35 PET (positronemission tomography) experiments strongly indicatesdistributed function for at least the ''medium sized''anatomical units, the cortical Brodmann areas. Moreimportant, when these PET (...)
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  19. The Causal Theory of Perception Revisited.Valtteri Arstila & Kalle Pihlainen - 2009 - Erkenntnis 70 (3):397-417.
    It is generally agreed upon that Grice's causal theory of perception describes a necessary condition for perception. It does not describe sufficient conditions, however, since there are entities in causal chains that we do not perceive and not all causal chains yield perceptions. One strategy for overcoming these problems is that of strengthening the notion of causality. Another is that of specifying the criteria according to which perceptual experiences should match the way the world is. Finally, one can also try (...)
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  20.  71
    Consciousness: A Connectionist Manifesto. [REVIEW]Dan Lloyd - 1995 - Minds and Machines 5 (2):161-85.
    Connectionism and phenomenology can mutually inform and mutually constrain each other. In this manifesto I outline an approach to consciousness based on distinctions developed by connectionists. Two core identities are central to a connectionist theory of consciouness: conscious states of mind are identical to occurrent activation patterns of processing units; and the variable dispositional strengths on connections between units store latent and unconscious information. Within this broad framework, a connectionist model of consciousness succeeds according to the degree of correspondence between (...)
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  21. Parallel Distributed Processing and Cognition: Only Connect?Dan Lloyd - 1989 - In Simple Minds. MIT Press.
  22.  16
    Loose Connections: Four Problems in Searie's Argument for the “Connection Principle”.Dan Lloyd - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):615-616.
  23.  32
    Consciousness, Connectionism, and Cognitive Neuroscience: A Meeting of the Minds.Dan Lloyd - 1996 - Philosophical Psychology 9 (1):61-78.
    Accounting for phenomenal structure—the forms, aspects, and features of conscious experience—poses a deep challenge for the scientific study of consciousness, but rather than abandon hope I propose a way forward. Connectionism, I argue, offers a bi-directional analogy, with its oft-noted “neural inspiration” on the one hand, and its largely unnoticed capacity to illuminate our phenomenology on the other. Specifically, distributed representations in a recurrent network enable networks to superpose categorical, contextual, and temporal information on a specific input representation, much as (...)
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  24.  23
    What Makes Unique Hues Unique?Valtteri Arstila - 2018 - Synthese 195 (5):1849-1872.
    There exist two widely used notions concerning the structure of phenomenal color space. The first is the notion of unique/binary hue structure, which maintains that there are four unique hues from which all other hues are composed. The second notion is the similarity structure of hues, which describes the interrelations between the hues and hence does not divide hues into two types as the first notion does. Philosophers have considered the existence of the unique/binary hue structure to be empirically and (...)
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  25.  20
    Desires, Magnitudes, and Orectic Penetration.Valtteri Arstila - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (8):1175-1185.
    Dustin Stokes argues for the existence of orectic penetration, a phenomenon in which a desire-like state penetrates our perceptual experience. His candidate for a case of orectic penetration is the most convincing candidate presented thus far. It is argued here that his candidate and his further arguments for the existence of orectic penetration do not support the claim that orectic penetration takes place. As a result, it is concluded that there are no convincing cases of desire-like states penetrating perceptual experience.
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  26.  19
    Erratum To: Perceptual Learning Explains Two Candidates for Cognitive Penetration.Valtteri Arstila - 2016 - Erkenntnis 81 (5):1149-1150.
  27.  51
    Through a Glass Darkly: Schizophrenia and Functional Brain Imaging.Dan Lloyd - 2011 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 18 (4):257-274.
    To william james, conscious life was a stream; to Edmund Husserl, a flow. These metaphors point to the marvelous continuity of experience as it weaves through the world of thought and things. We might similarly talk about the flow of the body, as I reach for my cup of coffee. A physiologist could decompose the action, isolating the contribution of each muscle and joint to the whole. This functional analysis would constitute one form of explanation of the movement. As we (...)
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  28.  21
    Access Denied.Dan Lloyd - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):261-262.
    The information processing that constitutes accessconsciousness is not sufficient to make a representational state conscious in any sense. Standard examples of computation without consciousness undermine A-consciousness, and Block's cases seem to derive their plausibility from a lurking phenomenal awareness. That is, people and other minded systems seem to have access-consciousness only insofar as the state accessed is a phenomenal one, or the state resulting from access is phenomenal, or both.
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  29.  11
    Defense of the Brain Time View.Valtteri Arstila - 2015 - Frontiers in Psychology 6.
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  30.  71
    Color Eliminativism and Intuitions About Colors.Valtteri Arstila - 2010 - Rivista di Estetica 43:29-45.
    The philosophical debate over the nature of color has been governed by what we have learnt from color vision science and what color phenomenology suggests to us. It is usually thought that color eliminativism, which maintains that physical objects do not have any properties that can be identified with colors, can account for the former but not the latter. After all, what could be more obvious than the external world to be colored? Here I outline one color eliminativistic response to (...)
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  31.  47
    When is Cognitive Penetration a Plausible Explanation?Valtteri Arstila - 2018 - Consciousness and Cognition 59:78-86.
    Albert Newen and Petra Vetter argue that neurophysiological considerations and psychophysical studies provide striking evidence for cognitive penetration. This commentary focuses mainly on the neurophysiological considerations, which have thus far remained largely absent in the philosophical debate concerning cognitive penetration, and on the cognitive penetration of perceptual experiences, which is the form of cognitive penetration philosophers have debated about the most. It is argued that Newen and Vetter's evidence for cognitive penetration is unpersuasive because they do not sufficiently scrutinize the (...)
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  32.  76
    Studying the Mind From the Inside Out.Dan Lloyd - 2002 - Brain and Mind 3 (1):243-59.
    Good research requires, among other virtues,(i) methods that yield stable experimentalobservations without arbitrary (post hoc)assumptions, (ii) logical interpretations ofthe sources of observations, and (iii) soundinferences to general causal mechanismsexplaining experimental results by placing themin larger explanatory contexts. In TheNew Phrenology , William Uttal examines theresearch tradition of localization, and findsit deficient in all three virtues, whetherbased on lesion studies or on new technologiesfor functional brain imaging. In this paper Iconsider just the arguments concerning brainimaging, especially functional MagneticResonance Imaging. I think (...)
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  33.  15
    The Scope and Ingenuity of Evolutionary Systems.Dan Lloyd - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):368.
  34.  40
    Connectionist Hysteria: Reducing a Freudian Case Study to a Network Model.Dan Lloyd - 1994 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 1 (2):69-88.
    Connectionism—also known as parallel distributed processing, or neural network modeling—offers promise as a framework to unite clinical and cognitive psychology, and as a tool for studying conscious and unconscious mental activity. This paper describes a neural network model of the case study of Lucy R., from Freud and Breuer's Studies on Hysteria. Though very simple in architecture, the network spontaneously displays analogues of repression and hallucination, corresponding to Lucy R.'s symptoms. Salient elements of Lucy's conscious experience are represented in the (...)
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  35. Twilight of the Zombies.Dan Lloyd - manuscript
    A philosophical zombie is a being indistinguishable from an ordinary human in every observable respect, but lacking subjective consciousness. Zombiehood implies *linguistic indiscriminability*, the zombie tendency to talk and even do philosophy of mind in language indiscriminable from ordinary discourse. Zombies thus speak *Zombish*, indistinguishable from English but radically distinct in reference for mental terms. The fate of zombies ultimately depends on whether Zombish can be consistently interpreted. If it can be interpreted consistently, then zombies remain possible, but no test (...)
     
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  36.  1
    Mapping Out the Philosophical Questions of AI and Clinical Practice in Diagnosing and Treating Mental Disorders.Susanne Uusitalo, Jarno Tuominen & Valtteri Arstila - forthcoming - Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice.
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  37. Consciousness and its Discontents.Dan Lloyd - 1997 - Communication and Cognition: An Interdisciplinary Quarterly Journal 30 (3-4):273-284.
    Our heads are full of representations, according to cognitive science. It might seem inevitable that conscious states are a type of brain-based representation, but in this paper I argue that representation and consciousness each form conceptually distinct domains. Representational content depends on context, usually causal, as shown by familiar cases in which context varies while brain states do not -- twin earth cases and brains-in-vats, for example. But these same cases show that conscious content does not depend on context. The (...)
     
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  38.  32
    Toward an Identity Theory of Consciousness.Dan Lloyd - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (2):215-216.
  39.  18
    Connectionism in the Golden Age of Cognitive Science.Dan Lloyd - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (1):42-43.
  40.  27
    Protention and Predictive Processing: The Wave of the Future.Dan Lloyd - 2017 - Constructivist Foundations 13 (1):98-99.
    Gallagher’s main claim can be enhanced neurophenomenologically. In his 1907 lectures Thing and Space, Husserl argued that perception in general is enactive. Moreover, the neuroscientific theory of predictive processing connects neatly to a future-oriented phenomenology.
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  41.  4
    Time Markers and Temporal Illusions.Valtteri Arstila - 2019 - In Adrian Bardon, Valtteri Arstila, Sean Power & Argiro Vatakis (eds.), The Illusions of Time: Philosophical and Psychological Essays on Timing and Time Perception. Palgrave-Macmillan.
    According to the thesis of temporal isomorphism, the experienced order of events in the world and the order in which experiences are processed in the brain are the same. The thesis is encompassed in the brain-time view, a popular view on the literature of the temporal illusions. The view is commonly contrasted with the event-time view, which maintains that the experienced order of events reflects the order in which the events occur in the world. This chapter focuses on the conflict (...)
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  42.  33
    Frankenstein's Children: Artificial Intelligence and Human Value.Dan Lloyd - 1985 - Metaphilosophy 16 (4):307-318.
  43.  59
    The Music of Consciousness: Can Musical Form Harmonize Phenomenology and the Brain?Dan Lloyd - 2013 - Constructivist Foundations 8 (3):324-331.
    Context: Neurophenomenology lies at a rich intersection of neuroscience and lived human experience, as described by phenomenology. As a new discipline, it is open to many new questions, methods, and proposals. Problem: The best available scientific ontology for neurophenomenology is based in dynamical systems. However, dynamical systems afford myriad strategies for organizing and representing neurodynamics, just as phenomenology presents an array of aspects of experience to be captured. Here, the focus is on the pervasive experience of subjective time. There is (...)
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  44.  2
    Apparent Motion and Ontology of Time.Valtteri Arstila - 2018 - Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy 23:5-9.
    Introspectively, it appears that we can have experiences as of temporally extended phenomena such as change, motion, and the passage of time. A central question in the ontology of time is whether we can make sense of these experiences without assuming that the passage of time is real. The antireductionist argument against such a possibility maintains that if there is no passage of time, but only static time slices, then our experiences as of arguably temporally extended phenomena cannot be explained. (...)
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  45.  4
    More Than Meets the Eye: Commentary on Bruce Mangan's "Sensations Ghost".Dan Lloyd - 2004 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 10.
    “Sensation’s Ghost” identifies one type of non-sensory experience, the quasi-feelings that attend perception, inflecting them vaguely and globally. Following Husserl, I suggest that non-sensory awareness includes much more than the fringe elements Mangan discusses. Every perceptual property can be either sensed, or apprehended in a non-sensory manner. Non-sensory apprehensions are nonetheless part of the occurrent conscious awareness of objects and scenes.
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  46.  56
    Is "Cognitive Neuroscience" an Oxymoron?Dan Lloyd - 2011 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 18 (4):283-286.
    Could "cognitive neuroscience" be an oxymoron? "Cognitive" and "neuroscience" cohere only to the extent that the entities identified as "cognitive" can be coordinated with entities identified as neural. This coordination is typically construed as intertheoretic reduction between "levels" of scientific description. On the cognitive side, folk psychological concepts crystallize into behavioral taxonomies, which are further analyzed into purported cognitive capacities. These capacities are expressed or operationalized in paradigmatic experimental tasks. These cogs comprise a stable ontology, sustaining more than a century (...)
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  47.  22
    Popping the Thought Balloon.Dan Lloyd - 2000 - In Don Ross, Andrew Brook & David L. Thompson (eds.), Dennett's Philosophy: A Comprehensive Assessment. MIT Press. pp. 169--99.
    Many recovering dualists find that the old Cartesian demons are hard to exorcise. Dual substance abuse manifests itself not only as metaphysical dualism, but as a pervasive epistemological framework that creates an unhealthy codependent relationship between scientific realism and phenomenology. Daniel Dennett has led philosophers to recognize many of the symptoms of creeping crypto Cartesianism. In this paper, I try to take Dennett to the limit: Descartes lives on, I argue, in the very heart of cognitive science, in the concept (...)
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  48.  51
    A Novel Theory.Dan Lloyd - 2004 - The Philosophers' Magazine 26 (26):49-50.
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  49. Simple Minds.Dan Lloyd - 1991 - Behavior and Philosophy 19 (2):91-102.
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  50.  65
    Beyond “the Fringe”: A Cautionary Critique of William James.Dan Lloyd - 2000 - Consciousness and Cognition 9 (4):629-637.
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