The question of whether or not early Chinese philosophers had a concept of truth has been the topic of some scholarly debate over the past few decades. The present essay offers a novel assessment of the debate, and suggests that no answer is fully satisfactory, as the plausibility of each turns in no small part on difficult and unsettled philosophical issues prior to the interpretation of any ancient Chinese philosophical texts—particularly the issues of what it means to “have a concept” (...) and how we understand the concept of truth itself. This essay summarizes prominent views within the debate over truth and Chinese philosophy and offers conditional assessments of each answer with respect to contemporary theories of concepts and theories of truth. The essay concludes with an appeal to methodological and interpretive pluralism, within reasonable constraints, in discussions of this topic. (shrink)

Responsibility gaps concern the attribution of blame for harms caused by autonomous machines. The worry has been that, because they are artificial agents, it is impossible to attribute blame, even though doing so would be appropriate given the harms they cause. We argue that there are no responsibility gaps. The harms can be blameless. And if they are not, the blame that is appropriate is indirect and can be attributed to designers, engineers, software developers, manufacturers or regulators. The real problem (...) lies elsewhere: autonomous machines should be built so as to exhibit a level of risk that is morally acceptable. If they fall short of this standard, they exhibit what we call ‘a control gap.’ The causal control that autonomous machines have will then fall short of the guidance control they should emulate. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is twofold: (i) to introduce the framework of update semantics and to explain what kind of semantic phenomena may successfully be analysed in it: (ii) to give a detailed analysis of one such phenomenon: default reasoning.

This article rebuts Ramsey's earlier theory, in 'Universals of Law and of Fact', of how laws of nature differ from other true generalisations. It argues that our laws are rules we use in judging 'if I meet an F I shall regard it as a G'. This temporal asymmetry is derived from that of cause and effect and used to distinguish what's past as what we can know about without knowing our present intentions.

I present a “reduced” version of the fifteen Pragma-dialectical rules and inquire into their theoretical status as necessary conditions for a critical discussion. Questions: In what respect is PD’s non-sufficiency a deficiency, can and must it be remedied? Brief answers: with respect to defining the concept ‘critical discussion,’ possibly, yes, if, and only if, one seeks to identify the concept ‘critical discussion’; no, if PD is for fallacy-detection.

This chapter focuses on one of the common fallacies in Western philosophy called 'genetic fallacy' (GnF). One commits the GnF when advocating for a conclusion based solely on origin. This is a fallacy of relevance—irrelevance, really—because the origin of a claim may be irrelevant to its truth‐value. That is to say, providing an account of the genesis of a claim, its history or origin, may be informative and helpful; however, it need not determine the truth‐value of the claim. Therefore, when (...) one draws a conclusion regarding the truth‐value of a claim based solely on the origin of the claim, then one may have committed the GnF. In the ethical language of “means and ends” reasoning, GnF helps to highlight the problematic nature of the utilitarian‐style disconnect between the justice of actions and the goodness of their consequences. (shrink)

This paper provides an update semantics for counterfactual conditionals. It does so by giving a dynamic twist to the ‘Premise Semantics’ for counterfactuals developed in Veltman (1976) and Kratzer (1981). It also offers an alternative solution to the problems with naive Premise Semantics discussed by Angelika Kratzer in ‘Lumps of Thought’ (Kratzer, 1989). Such an alternative is called for given the triviality results presented in Kanazawa et al. (2005, this issue).

Time travel has been a staple of science fiction. With the advent of general relativity it has been entertained by serious physicists. But, especially in the philosophy literature, there have been arguments that time travel is inherently paradoxical. The most famous paradox is the grandfather paradox: you travel back in time and kill your grandfather, thereby preventing your own existence. To avoid inconsistency some circumstance will have to occur which makes you fail in this attempt to kill your grandfather. Doesn't (...) this require some implausible constraint on otherwise unrelated circumstances? We examine such worries in the context of modern physics. (shrink)

Anthony Shiver (2013) desenvolveu dois jogos de cartas lógicas para a prática da derivação no contexto da Lógica Proposicional Clássica. Embora ele tenha apresentado os contornos gerais desses jogos, muitos detalhes do desenho deles estão faltando. Neste artigo proponho uma metodologia para o desenho detalhado do primeiro dos jogos de Shiver. Esta metodologia utiliza uma abordagem informacional para a seleção das cartas do baralho, que conforma-se a critérios de alcançabilidade de cada carta e de balanço entre elas.

Motivated by Hoff and Stiglitz’s :753–763, 2004) theory, we examine empirically how the creation of “rules of the game” affect the behavior of economic agents in a transition economy. Using a sample of Chinese state-owned enterprises in which controlling ownership was transferred to private acquirers between 1994 and 2006, we find that the post-privatization performance of firms depends on institutional factors. Before 2003, we observe severe post-privatization tunneling behaviors by acquirers and worse PPP. However, from 2003, when the State issued (...) regulations against tunneling and strengthened enforcement, the incidence of tunneling behaviors declined, and PPP improved. We find that better implementation of ownership transfer and longer prior experience of private acquirers are key factors that contribute to the improvement. (shrink)

For the past seventy years, a host of scientific and public health bodies in the United States have strongly endorsed the practice of adding fluoride compounds to public water supplies as a prophylactic against dental caries. Throughout that period, a constant undercurrent of skepticism and outright opposition has slowed the adoption of the practice in the United States and limited its spread to just a handful of countries around the world. One of the attractions of water fluoridation is its affordability: (...) the fluoride compounds are sourced from the phosphate and aluminum industries, for whom they would otherwise constitute an annoying toxic waste disposal problem. Despite this, proponents have nonetheless succeeded in shaping a narrative that casts fluoridation as “natural” or at least mimicking nature. I demonstrate how fluoridationists were able to persuasively argue that adding a pollutant to the water supply was safe and natural. In the process, I examine how environmental historians and historians of science approach topics such as fluoridation. I suggest that as a result of the influence of science and technology studies and an ontological turn toward hybridity, the two subdisciplines are becoming increasingly convergent. (shrink)

This work contrasts conservative or minimally mutilating revisions of empirical theories as they are identified in the presently dominant AGM model of formal belief revision and the structuralist program for the reconstruction of empirical theories. The aim is to make understandable why both approaches only partly succeed in substantially informing and formally restraining the issue. With respect to the rationality of minimal change, the overall result is negative. Readers with an interest in formal epistemology are provided with application cases, the (...) historically inclined reader is offered a systematic perspective. The discussion can largely be followed without a background in formal logic. (shrink)

Editor's Preface from the 9th OSSA Conference.

Autor (2020) desenvolveu duas semânticas informacionais para a Lógica Sentencial Clássica, decorrentes da utilização de formais normais. A abordagem informacional em questão utiliza unidades mínimas de informação (infons) para realizar o trabalho lógico. Neste artigo, expandiremos a aplicação da abordagem informacional às lógicas sentenciais polivalentes finitas mediante um procedimento dedicado à extração de unidades mínimas de informação (infons). Tal procedimento decorre do trabalho com tablôs semânticos para Lógicas Sentenciais Polivalentes Finitas desenvolvido por Carnielli (1982).

This chapter focuses on one of the common fallacies in Western philosophy, 'existential fallacy'. This fallacy occurs when we erroneously suppose some class or group has members. In other words, statements may be true about classes or groups even if no members of the class or group exist. In terms of syllogistic argumentation, this is a formal fallacy in that it results when the premises are universal in quantification and the conclusion is particular. In the history of logic, the existential (...) fallacy may be traced to dictum de omni, which refers to the principle in Aristotelian logic that whatever is said universally of a subject is said of everything that is contained under such a subject. In order to avoid this fallacy, one should look for empirical verification of the existence of whatever entity may be in question. (shrink)

This chapter focuses on one of the common fallacies in Western philosophy called 'psychologist's fallacy'. William James, in his Principles of Psychology, coined “the psychologist's fallacy”. It is a fallacy of relativism. James articulated the psychologist's fallacy as if it were a confusion between first‐person and third‐person points of view. Importantly, an experience and its description are different, and from the first‐person point of view, whatever a person experiences is identical with what that experience is. Therefore, the first‐person point of (...) view of an experience, because it is the view of actually having the experience itself, is itself the truth of the experience. To avoid this fallacy, one needs to ground arguments with claims that hold necessarily and universally. Neither descriptions of experience based on subjective judgments nor the occurrence of specific accidental‐psychological events hold necessarily or universally regarding human psychology. (shrink)

This chapter focuses on one of the common fallacies in Western philosophy called the subjectivist fallacy (SbF). The SbF occurs when one concludes that something is true for one person (a subject) but not true for another person (another subject), when, in fact, it is true objectively for all persons. SbF is a fallacy of relativism. Relativism, in general, means the truth‐value of a judgment is neither necessary nor universal; however, there are multiple kinds of relativism. SbF is not only (...) a fallacious depiction of relativity; it is also self‐refuting. To avoid this fallacy, one needs to ground arguments with claims that are objective or that hold universally. When the claims on which an argument is based are objectively verifiable or pertain to a set of individuals universally, then the logical necessity of the argument's conclusion may be determined. (shrink)