La question des frontières des arts plastiques et littéraires contemporains peut être approchée à travers l'exemple de la géopoétique de Kenneth White. Renonçant à réduire l'art à la production d'une représentation dominée par le plaisir de la vue, le mouvement esthétique de la géopoétique cherche à faire de la création artistique un geste de participation aux matières de la terre sur fond d'une expérience polysensorielle où la marche et le nomadisme constituent des explorations d'un proto-monde. L'oeuvre écrite ou plastique est (...) destinée à conserver des fragments et traces de cette aventure sensible, ouvrant ainsi la voie à une rencontre qui n'est plus un spectacle mais une expérience quasi chamanique. Reste à savoir dans quelle mesure on peut s'émanciper totalement de la représentation pour accéder à une auto-présentation du cosmos dont l'artiste serait le médium. (shrink)

Ce livre est donc voué à la bizarrerie. Mais c'est qu'à accorder tout son soin à l'écriture, il la soumet à une réévaluation radicale. Et les voies sont nécessairement extravagantes lorsqu'il importe d'excéder, pour en penser la possibilité, ce qui se donne pour la logique elle-même - celle qui doit déterminer les rapports de la parole et de l'écriture en se rassurant dans l'évidence du sens commun, dans les catégories de 'représentation' ou 'd'image', dans l'opposition du dedans et du dehors, (...) du plus et du moins, de l'essence et de l'apparence, de l'originaire et du dérivé. Analysant les investissements dont notre culture a chargé le signe écrit, Jacques Derrida en démontre aussi les effets les plus actuels et parfois les plus inaperçus. Cela n'est possible que par un déplacement systématique des concepts - on ne saurait en effet répondre à la question 'qu'est-ce que l'écriture?' par un appel de style 'phénoménologique' à quelque expérience sauvage, immédiate, spontanée. L'interprétation occidentale de l'écriture commande tous les champs de l'expérience, de la pratique et du savoir, et jusqu'à la forme ultime de la question ('qu'est-ce que?') qu'on croit pouvoir libérer de cette prise. L'histoire de cette interprétation n'est pas celle d'un préjugé déterminé, d'une erreur localisée, d'une limite accidentelle. Elle forme une structure finie mais nécessaire dans le mouvement qui se trouve ici reconnu sous le nom de différance. (shrink)

This collection of essays and interviews, some previously unpublished and almost all of which appear in English for the first time, encompasses the political and ethical thinking of Jacques Derrida over thirty years. Passionate, rigorous, beautifully argued, wide-ranging, the texts shed an entirely new light on his work and will be welcomed by scholars in many disciplines--politics, philosophy, history, cultural studies, literature, and a range of interdisciplinary programs. Derrida's arguments vary in their responsiveness to given political questions--sometimes they are (...) vivid polemics on behalf of a position or figure, sometimes they are reflective analyses of a philosophical problem. They are united by the recurrent question of political decision or responsibility and the insistence that the apparent simplicity or programmatic character of political decision is in fact a profound avoidance of the political. This volume testifies to the possibility and the necessity of a philosophical politics. Negotiations assembles some of the most telling examples of the intrinsic relationship, so often affirmed by Derrida in more abstract philosophical terms, between deconstructive reading practices and what is called the "political"--more precisely, politics in an almost down-to-earth, pragmatic, and commonsense use of the word. Among the many subjects covered in the book are: the death penalty in the United States, the civil war in Algeria, globalization and cosmopolitanism, the American Declaration of Independence, Jean-Paul Sartre, the value of objectivity, politics and friendship, and the relationship between deconstruction and actuality. (shrink)

Jacques Derrida is probably the most famous European philosopher alive today. The University of Nebraska Press makes available for the first English translation of his most important work to date, Glas. Its appearance will assist Derrida's readers pro and con in coming to terms with a complex and controversial book. Glas extensively reworks the problems of reading and writing in philosophy and literature; questions the possibility of linear reading and its consequent notions of theme, author, narrative, and discursive demonstration; (...) and ingeniously disrupts the positions of reader and writer in the text. Glas is extraordinary in many ways, most obviously in its typography. Arranged in two columns, with inserted sections within these, the book simultaneously discusses Hegel’s philosophy and Jean Genet’s fiction, and shows how two such seemingly distinct kinds of criticism can reflect and influence one another. The customary segregation of philosophy, rhetoric, psychoanalysis, linguistics, history, and poetics is systematically subverted. In design and content, the books calls into question “types” of literature (history, philosophy, literary criticism), the ownership of ideas and styles, the glorification of literary heroes, and the limits of literary representation. (shrink)

Cet ouvrage, un grand classique désormais, son auteur l'a écrit pour répondre au "devoir qui s'impose, aujourd'hui plus que jamais, aux hommes de science de penser leur discipline dans l'ensemble de la culture moderne pour l'enrichir non seulement de connaissances techniquement importantes, mais aussi des idées venues de leur science qu'ils peuvent croire humainement signifiantes. L ingénuité même d'un regard neuf (celui de la science l'est toujours) peut parfois éclairer d'un jour nouveau d'anciens problèmes...".

" Ce livre est un livre sur l'héritage, bien qu'il ne doive pas s'enfermer avec des "fils de Marx". C'est plus précisément un livre sur ce que "hériter" peut non pas vouloir-dire, de façon univoque, mais, peut-être, enjoindre de façon contradictoire et contradictoirement obligatoire. Comment répondre, comment se sentir responsable d'un héritage qui vous lègue des ordres contradictoires? " Avec Marx & Sons, Jacques Derrida nous livre sa contribution au débat suscité par son Spectres de Marx, paru chez Galilée (...) en 1993. Dans ce texte, qui répond aux questions et objections formulées par une dizaine d'intellectuels, en majorité des marxistes de langue anglaise, il affronte dans son ensemble la question de la signification historique du marxisme. (shrink)

It is widely held that assertions are partially governed by an epistemic norm. But what is the epistemic condition set out in the norm? Is it knowledge, truth, belief, or something else? In this paper, I defend a view similar to that of Stanley (2008), according to which the relevant epistemic condition is epistemic certainty, where epistemic certainty (but not knowledge) is context-sensitive. I start by distinguishing epistemic certainty, subjective certainty, and knowledge. Then, I explain why it's much more plausible (...) to think that "certain", rather than "know", is context-sensitive. After that, I respond to an important worry raised by Pritchard, according to which the proposed view is too strong to accommodate our current practice of assertion. I then show that the main linguistic and conversational data advanced in the recent literature in favour of the knowledge condition are best explained by the certainty view. Finally, I offer two principled considerations: the certainty view is the only one compatible with three independently plausible claims and it fits very well with the common thought that knowledge does not entail certainty. (shrink)

Is knowledge the epistemic norm of action and assertion? Gettier and justified-false-belief cases have been raised as counterexamples to the necessity direction of that claim. Most knowledge normers reply by distinguishing permissibility from excusability. An important objection to this move, however, is that it requires a still lacking view of epistemic excuses sufficiently general to cover all the cases, correctly relating the supposed excuse to the subject's cognitive life, and not collapsing into an account of the fundamental normative standard (see (...) Gerken 2017). In this paper, I rely on independent work in epistemology and cognitive science to suggest a novel account of epistemic excuses in terms of epistemic feelings. In contrast to other existing accounts, this account is immune from the above objection and can thus be used to rescue the knowledge norm. (shrink)

Distinguer pour unir, ou Les degres du savoir was first published in 1932 by Jacques Maritain. In this new translation of The Degrees of Knowledge, Ralph McInerny attempts a more careful expression of Maritain's original masterpiece than previous translations. Maritain proposes a hierarchy of the forms of knowledge by discussing the degrees of rational and suprarational understanding. Nine appendices, some longer than the chapters of the book, advance Maritain's thought, often by taking on criticism of earlier editions of the (...) work. Rightly called Maritain's cardinal work, The Degrees of Knowledge is a magnificent and sagacious achievement. Jacques Maritain's masterpiece proposes a hierarchy of forms of knowledge that culminate in mystical experience and wisdom, which is a gift of the Holy Ghost. Maritain argues that the intellectual life is meant to be complemented by the spiritual life and should culminate in sanctity. (shrink)

According to a widely discussed view, knowledge plays a significant normative role in action: It is epistemically rational to treat p as your reason for action if and only if you know that p. As many philosophers have observed, however, this view clashes with the claim that knowledge is moderate and stable. For, granting that claim, there will be high stakes cases in which knowledge seems insufficient. To deal with such cases, some philosophers embracing the knowledge norm combine three independently (...) plausible claims. First, they say that no non-trivial condition is luminous; second, they say that doing something while not being in a position to know that that is appropriate is bad (in high stakes cases); third, they say that in the high stakes cases in question, the subject knows but fails to be in a position to know that she knows (Williamson Philos Q 55:213–235, 2005). This paper argues that this account can overcome the main objections already raised in the literature, but that it still faces the apparently insurmountable challenge of providing a natural and helpful way of substantiating the second claim. (shrink)

A certain number of cases suggest that our willingness to ascribe “knowledge” can be influenced by practical factors. For revisionary proposals, they indicate that the truth‐values of “knowledge” ascriptions vary with practical factors. For conservative proposals, on the contrary, nothing surprising is happening. Standard pragmatic approaches appeal to pragmatic implicatures and psychological approaches to the idea that belief formation is influenced by practical factors. Conservative proposals have not yet offered a fully satisfactory explanation, though. In this article, I introduce and (...) defend a third conservative proposal which I call “Refined Invariantism”. The two main claims of this proposal are that (1) we should distinguish between high stakes cases in which the subject does not believe (that he knows) the target proposition and those in which he believes (that he knows) the target proposition and that (2) we should adopt a psychological treatment for the first kind of case and a pragmatic treatment based on the epistemic standards for appropriate assertion and action for the second kind of case. I argue that this new combined approach avoids the main pitfalls of its two conservative rivals and that it gives new life to the generality objection levelled against revisionary views. (shrink)

Among the main reactions to scepticism, fallibilism is certainly the most popular nowadays. However, fallibilism faces a very strong and well-known objection. It has to grant that concessive knowledge attributions—assertions of the form “I know that p but it might be that not p”—can be true. Yet, these assertions plainly sound incoherent. Fallibilists have proposed to explain this incoherence pragmatically. The main proponents of this approach appeal to Gricean implicatures (Rysiew in Noûs 35(4):477514, 2001; Dougherty and Rysiew in Philos Phenomenol (...) Res 78(1):123132, 2009; Dougherty and Rysiew in Synthese 181(3):395403, 2011). Very recently, some philosophers have observed that fallibilists can also explain this apparent incoherence pragmatically if they embrace a (context-sensitive) certainty norm for assertion (Petersen in Synthese 196(11):4691–4710, 2019; Beddor in Philos Impr 20(8), 2020; Vollet in Dialectica 74:3, 2020). In this paper, I argue for the superiority of this latter explanation over its older rivals. (shrink)

Personne, personne n’ose dire je. Journal. Les illustres stades que Kierkegaard a traversés – esthétique, éthique, religieux – désignent une succession nécessaire et libre à la fois pour une conscience religieuse radicalisée de façon singulière, au point de devoir manquer la rencontre avec l’autre, en l’occurrence pour lui avec Régine Olsen. Le recours aux pseudonymes signale son errance (amplifiée par le menaçant verdict paternel) et ses velléités décisionnaires. C’est une forme de salut qui est peu à peu recherchée et qui (...) passera par la pensée critique et une foi résolue mais néanmoins dans le temps d’un penseur subjectif et volontairement centré sur un exister quasi-solitaire. La chape prédictive du père malmène intimement l’équilibre psychologique de Kierkegaard et la mort paternelle sera pour lui en partie comme une deuxième naissance même si ce lourd passé lui restera comme une écharde dans la chair. Préférant se consacrer à la voie religieuse de sa vie spirituelle, il abandonnera ce qu’il estimera ne pas pouvoir accomplir : le mariage qui restera à jamais à l’état de virtualité avec Régine sa bien-aimée – dont l’éducation religieuse lui aurait paru insuffisante – mais sa vocation restera un pacte de larmes… Fixé en partie malgré lui sur le religieux, il ne peut y avoir pour lui de synthèse des trois stades précités mais le choix religieux est ramené vers l’éthique et l’apparaître de la phénoménalité au sens où il réalise peu à peu et se construit une Régine idéale qui sanctifiera et accompagnera sa volonté de subjectivation centrée sur le souci d’un absolu. Kierkegaard garde la conviction que l’homme recèle en lui l’éternel alors que se façonne un homme modifié de plus exposé à des risques d’aliénation s’il n’aiguise pas sa vigilance à rester lui-même. On restera dans un mouvement d’aspiration religieuse à mesure humaine n’excluant pas la tendance ascétique. Penseur subjectif, passion et intelligence de l’incertitude vont ensemble. Kierkegaard est plus dans l’intériorité vécue que dans le concept qui a aussi ses vertus. (shrink)

The traditional view in epistemology has it that knowledge is insensitive to the practical stakes. More recently, some philosophers have argued that knowledge is sufficient for rational action: if you know p, then p is a reason you have (epistemically speaking). Many epistemologists contend that these two claims stand in tension with one another. In support of this, they ask us to start with a low stakes case where, intuitively, a subject knows that p and appropriately acts on p. Then, (...) they ask us to consider a high stakes version of the case where, intuitively, this subject does not know that p and could not appropriately act on p without double-checking. Finally, they suggest that the best explanation for our shifty intuitions is that p is a reason the subject has in the low stakes case but not in the high stakes case. In short, according to this explanation, having a reason (in the epistemic sense) is sensitive to the stakes. If so, either knowledge is sensitive to the stakes or else you can know that p even if p is not a reason you have (in the epistemic sense). In this paper, I consider more closely the relation between having a reason (in the epistemic sense) and having a reason to check. I argue that the supposition that if one has p as a reason (in the epistemic sense) then one has a reason not to check whether p, or no reason to check whether p, is highly doubtful. On the contrary, I suggest, it is plausible that, given our fallibility, one always has an epistemic reason to check whether p, whether or not p is a reason one has (in the epistemic sense). On the basis of this observation, I show that one can offer a new way of explaining the cases in question, allowing us to reconcile the traditional view about knowledge and the sufficiency of knowledge for rational action. (shrink)

In this paper about Chile, Weber's taxonomy of rational behavior is used together with a genetic-structural approach to explain chilean political life, which can be understood by the following variables : a mean demography, an authoritarian and religious culture, a capitalistic, dependent and under-developed economy, an hybrid social stratification, a centralised state characterized by an higly developed burocracy.In such a context the «Popular Unity» results from a specific acculturationof antagonistic ideologies related to different social strata, to competitive political groups as (...) welt as to rival pressure groups. In the short term ; the confiicting interests might coexist thanks to a growing social support motivated by a superficial economie nationalism, emotional anti-capitalistic feelings and the rise in the income of the popular and middle classes strata.On the other hand, the left government, divided by social, political and ideological oppositions was unable to run the civil service, to structure a congruent economic policy and to face international or national subversion. (shrink)

Jacques Derrida’s Cinders is among the most remarkable and revealing of this distinguished author’s many writings. White Derrida customarily devotes his powers of analysis to exacting readings of texts from Plato and Aristotle to Freud and Heidegger, readers of Cinders will soon discover that here Derrida is engaged in a poetic self-analysis. Ranging across his numerous writings over the past twenty years, Derrida discerns a recurrent cluster of arguments and images, all involving in one way or another ashes and (...) cinders. First published in 1982, revised in 1987, and printed here in a bilingual edition, Cinders enables readers to follow the development of Derrida’s thinking from 1968 to the present as it defines itself as a persistent questioning of origins that invariably leads to the thought of ash and cinder. Written in a highly condensed poetic style, Cinders reveals some of Derrida’s most probing etymological and philosophical reflections on the relation of language to the human. It also contains some of his most essential elaborations of his thinking on the feminine and on the legacy of the Holocaust in contemporary poetry and philosophy.Uniquely accessible to readers who have only recently begun to read Derrida and essential for all those familiar with Derrida’s work, Cinders is an evocative and thoughtful contribution to our understanding of deconstruction. (shrink)

This notion of knowledge through connaturality is classical in the Thomist school. Thomas Aquinas refers in this connection to the Pseudo--Dionysius, and to the Nicomachean Ethics, Book 10, chapter V, where Aristotle states that the virtuous man is the rule and measure of human actions. I have no doubt that this notion, or equivalent notions, had, before Thomas Aquinas, a long history in human thought; an inquiry into this particular chapter in the history of ideas,--which would perhaps have to take (...) into account such philosophers as Ramanuja, and the Indian school of bhakti,--would be of considerable interest. I did not embark on such historical research; the question for me was rather to test the validity of the notion of knowledge through connaturality, as elaborated in the Thomist school, and more systematically to recognize the various domains to which it must be extended. (shrink)

A certain number of philosophers are attracted to the idea that knowledge is the epistemic norm of practical reasoning in the sense that it is epistemically appropriate to rely on p in one’s practical reasoning if and only if one knows that p. A well-known objection to the sufficiency direction of that claim is that there are cases in which a subject supposedly knows that p and yet should not rely on p. In light of the distinction between sufficient and (...) insufficient reasons, some philosophers contend that these cases are inconclusive. In this paper, I argue that this insufficient reason manoeuvre is defective because it either misconstrues the relevant cases or is at odds with strong intuitions about how we (should) reason. I then put forward further considerations relative to the instability of some pieces of reasoning and show how they can be explained by a certainty norm for practical reasoning. (shrink)

This article is concerned with pragmatic connectives and their uses in discursive argumentation. Three approaches to pragmatic connectives will be presented: (1) argumentation theory, which implies a conception of pragmatics integrated within semantics, and a specific type of argumentative rules, called ‘topoi’; (2) discourse structure theory, which associates a function in the structuring of discourse sequences to pragmatic connectives; (3) relevance theory, which constitutes a cognitive pragmatic theory, in which no specific principle is associated to linguistic items. However, two main (...) functions to pragmatic connectives can be proposed: the facilitation of inferences, and the access to relevance. The final purpose of this article is to indicate how argumentative effects in discourse can be explained in a cognitively-based pragmatic theory. (shrink)

Many philosophers agree that there is an epistemic norm governing action. However, they disagree on what this norm is. It has been observed that the word ‘know’ is prominent in ordinary epistemic evaluations of actions. Any opponent of the knowledge norm must provide an explanation of this fact. Gerken has recently proposed the most developed explanation. It invokes the hypothesis that, in normal contexts, knowledge-level warrant is frequently necessary and very frequently sufficient (Normal Coincidence), so that knowledge-based assessments would be (...) a good heuristic for practical reasoning and epistemic evaluations of action. In this paper, I raise three problems for this approach. First, I argue that Normal Coincidence is ad hoc: it relies on an unsupported frequency hypothesis that we should expect to be false given the warrant account that Gerken also endorses. Second, I argue that, in any case, Normal Coincidence is insufficient to support the hypothesis that knowledge-based evaluation of action constitutes a good heuristic. Third, I consider three other hypotheses close to Normal Coincidence apparently more likely to support the heuristic hypothesis, but I argue that they seem even more ad hoc than Normal Coincidence. (shrink)

In the English-speaking world, Jacques Derrida’s writings have most influenced the discipline of literary studies. Yet what has emerged since the initial phase of Derrida’s influence on the study of English literature, classed under the rubric of deconstruction, has often been disowned by Derrida. What, then, can Derrida teach us about literary language, about the rhetoric of literature, and about questions concerning style, form, and structure? The Derrida Reader draws together a number of Derrida’s most interesting and idiosyncratic essays (...) that treat literary language, the idea of the literary, and questions of poetics and poetry. The essays discuss single tropes or concepts, a figure such as metaphor, the ideas of titles and signatures, proper names, and Derrida’s thinking on such subjects as undecidability or aporia. The editor’s introduction is a demonstration in practice of how Derrida reads and how he adapts the act of reading to the text or figure in question. The introduction also outlines each essay’s main points, its usefulness for reading literary texts, and its particular area of interest. The Derrida Reader thus provides students of literature with a focused, contextualized, and readily understandable volume. (shrink)

Catholic philosopher's attempt to show the traditional ways by which the reality of God has been demonstrated.

"This book is a collection of superbly crafted essays on some fundamental texts of modern and contemporary philosophy. All were first published elsewhere in French. The translation here is accurate and graceful. Typically the author comments on works in which one philosopher engages in dialogue with another: Hegel with Hobbes, Hegel and Heidegger with Kant, Heidegger with Husserl, Merleau-Ponty with Husserl.... All of these essays repay a second or third reading, but the pieces on 'Hegel and Hobbes' and 'Heidegger and (...) Husserl's Logical Investigations' seem to have an exceptionally evocative character." --Review of Metaphysics. (shrink)