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Jonathan Vogel [34]Jonathan Maxwell Vogel [1]
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Jonathan Vogel
Amherst College
  1. Cartesian Skepticism and Inference to the Best Explanation.Jonathan Vogel - 1990 - Journal of Philosophy 87 (11):658-666.
  2. Epistemic Bootstrapping.Jonathan Vogel - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (9):518-539.
  3. Reliabilism Leveled.Jonathan Vogel - 2000 - Journal of Philosophy 97 (11):602-623.
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    Reliabilism Leveled.Jonathan Vogel - 2000 - Journal of Philosophy 97 (11):602.
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  5.  53
    Inference to the Best Explanation.Jonathan Vogel - 1993 - Philosophical Review 102 (3):419.
  6. The New Relevant Alternatives Theory.Jonathan Vogel - 1999 - Philosophical Perspectives 13 (s13):155-180.
  7. Subjunctivitis.Jonathan Vogel - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 134 (1):73 - 88.
    Subjunctivitis is the doctrine that what is distinctive about knowledge is essential modal in character, and thus is captured by certain subjunctive conditionals. One principal formulation of subjunctivism invokes a ``sensitivity condition'' (Nozick, De Rose), the other invokes a ``safety condition'' (Sosa). It is shown in detail how defects in the sensitivity condition generate unwanted results, and that the virtues of that condition are merely apparent. The safety condition is untenable also, because it is too easily satisfied. A powerful motivation (...)
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  8. Are There Counterexamples to the Closure Principle.Jonathan Vogel - 1990 - In Michael David Roth & Glenn Ross (eds.), Doubting: Contemporary Perspectives on Skepiticism. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 13-29.
  9.  17
    Evidence and Inquiry: Towards Reconstruction in Epistemology.Jonathan Vogel & Susan Haack - 1995 - Philosophical Review 104 (4):621.
    For some time, it seemed that one had to choose between two sharply different theories of epistemic justification, foundationalism and coherentism. Foundationalists typically held that some beliefs were certain, and, hence, basic. Basic beliefs could impart justification to other, non-basic beliefs, but needed no such support themselves. Coherentists denied that there are any basic beliefs; on their view, all justified beliefs require support from other beliefs. The divide between foundationalism and coherentism has narrowed lately, and Susan Haack attempts to synthesize (...)
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  10. The Refutation of Skepticism.Jonathan Vogel - 2005 - In Steup Matthias & Sosa Ernest (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Blackwell. pp. 72--84.
  11. Skeptical Arguments.Jonathan Vogel - 2004 - Philosophical Issues 14 (1):426–455.
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    Judgement and Justification.Jonathan Vogel - 1993 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (1):233-236.
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  13. Tracking, Closure, and Inductive Knowledge.Jonathan Vogel - 1987 - In Luper-Foy Steven (ed.), The Possibility of Knowledge: Nozick and His Critics. Rowman & Littlefield. pp. 197--215.
  14. Internalist Responses to Skepticism.Jonathan Vogel - 2008 - In John Greco (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Skepticism. Oxford University Press.
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  15. Putting Skeptics in Their Place: The Nature of Skeptical Arguments and Their Role in Philosophical Inquiry.Jonathan Vogel - 2000 - Mind 113 (451):552-555.
  16.  30
    Empirical Knowledge.Jonathan Vogel - 1988 - Philosophical Review 101 (2):428-430.
    This remarkably clear and comprehensive account of empirical knowledge will be valuable to all students of epistemology and philosophy. The author begins from an explanationist analysis of knowing—a belief counts as knowledge if, and only if, its truth enters into the best explanation for its being held. Defending common sense and scientific realism within the explanationist framework, Alan Goldman provides a new foundational approach to justification. The view that emerges is broadly empiricist, counteracting the recently dominant trend that rejects that (...)
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    The New Relevant Alternatives TheorY.Jonathan Vogel - 1999 - Noûs 33 (s13):155-180.
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  18. Luminosity and Indiscriminability.Jonathan Vogel - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):547-572.
  19. Cartesian Skepticism and the Inference to the Best Explanation.Jonathan Vogel - 1998 - In Alcoff Linda (ed.), Epistemology: The Big Questions. Blackwell. pp. 352--9.
  20. Externalism Resisted.Jonathan Vogel - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 131 (3):729-742.
  21. Dismissing Skeptical Possibilities.Jonathan Vogel - 1993 - Philosophical Studies 70 (3):235 - 250.
  22. The Problem of Self-Knowledge in Kant’s “Refutation of Idealism”.Jonathan Vogel - 1993 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (4):875-887.
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    Sklar on Methodological Conservatism.Jonathan Vogel - 1992 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (1):125-131.
  24. BonJour on Explanation and Skepticism.Jonathan Vogel - 2010 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 41 (4):413-421.
    Laurence BonJour, among others, has argued that inference to the best explanation allows us to reject skeptical hypotheses in favor of our common-sense view of the world. BonJour considers several skeptical hypotheses, specifically: our experiences arise by mere chance, uncaused; the simple hypothesis which states merely that our experiences are caused unveridically; and an elaborated hypothesis which explains in detail how our unveridical experiences are brought about. A central issue is whether the coherence of one’s experience makes that experience more (...)
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  25.  54
    Skepticism and Foundationalism.Jonathan Vogel - 1997 - Journal of Philosophical Research 22:11-28.
    Michael WiIliams maintains that skepticism about the extemal worId is vitiated by a commitment to foundationalism and epistemological realism. (The latter is, approximately, the view that there is such a thing as knowledge of the extemal world in general, which the skeptic can take as a target). I argue that skepticism is not encumbered in the ways Williams supposes. What matters, first of all, is that we can’t perceive the difference between being in an ordinary environment and being in the (...)
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    Skepticism and Foundationalism: A Reply to Michael Williams.Jonathan Vogel - 1997 - Journal of Philosophical Research 22:11-28.
    Michael WiIliams maintains that skepticism about the extemal worId is vitiated by a commitment to foundationalism and epistemological realism.. I argue that skepticism is not encumbered in the ways Williams supposes. What matters, first of all, is that we can’t perceive the difference between being in an ordinary environment and being in the sort of situation the skeptic describes. This point can be upheld without embracing any substantial foundationalist tenet, such as the existence of basic beliefs, the availabiIity of something (...)
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    The Exorcist's Nightmare: A Reply to Crispin Wright.Thomas Tymoczko & Jonathan Vogel - 1992 - Mind 101 (403):543-552.
    Crispin Wright tried to refute classical 'Cartesian' skepticism contending that its core argument is extendible to a reductio ad absurdum (_Mind, 100, 87-116, 1991). We show both that Wright is mistaken and that his mistakes are philosophically illuminating. Wright's 'best version' of skepticism turns on a concept of warranted belief. By his definition, many of our well-founded beliefs about the external world and mathematics would not be warranted. Wright's position worsens if we take 'warranted belief' to be implicitly defined by (...)
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    Speaking of Knowledge.Jonathan Vogel - 2004 - Philosophical Issues 14 (1):501–509.
  29. Causation and Subjectivity.Jonathan Vogel - 1999 - In Robert Stern (ed.), Transcendental Arguments: Problems and Prospects. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
  30.  25
    Judgement and Justification.Jonathan Vogel - 1993 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (1):233-236.
  31.  24
    Evidence and Inquiry: Towards Reconstruction In Epistemology.Jonathan Vogel - 1995 - Philosophical Review 104 (4):621-623.
    For some time, it seemed that one had to choose between two sharply different theories of epistemic justification, foundationalism and coherentism. Foundationalists typically held that some beliefs were certain, and, hence, basic. Basic beliefs could impart justification to other, non-basic beliefs, but needed no such support themselves. Coherentists denied that there are any basic beliefs; on their view, all justified beliefs require support from other beliefs. The divide between foundationalism and coherentism has narrowed lately, and Susan Haack attempts to synthesize (...)
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    The Problem of Self-Knowledge in Kant’s “Refutation of Idealism”: Two Recent Views.Jonathan Vogel - 1993 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (4):875-887.
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    Review: Externalism Resisted. [REVIEW]Jonathan Vogel - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 131 (3):729 - 742.
  34. Accident, Evidence, and Knowledge.Jonathan Vogel - 2017 - In Peter Klein, Rodrigo Borges & Claudio Almeida (eds.), explaining knowledge: new essays on the Gettier problem. Oxford UK: Oxford University Press. pp. 117-133.
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