The authors discuss Popper's and Kuhn's theories of science and consider whether these can explain the real course taken by the history of science, that is the real behaviour of scientists seen in an historical light. It has mainly to do with the problem of what criteria influence scientists in deciding on the acceptance of one of several possible theories. The authors postulate the necessity of introducing the category of "objective technological Erkenntnisinteresse" to help solve the problem. They illustrate this (...) by analysing the various models of the structure of Benzol, proposed by Kekulé, Claus and Ladenburg. According to the authors, Popper and Kuhn cannot explain the fact that the model of Kekulé was readily accepted. It can however be explained with the category of Erkenntnisinteresse. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungEs ist in der Literatur weithin bekannt, dass im Gesundheitswesen auf unterschiedlichen Ebenen Allokationsentscheidungen getroffen werden. Während es auf der Makroebene um gesellschaftlich-politische Strukturfragen geht, stehen die Akteure der Mikroebene vor der Aufgabe, begrenzte Ressourcen in einer Organisation sinnvoll einzusetzen. In den ethischen Analysen der Mikro-Allokationsebene werden zumeist Entscheidungen der Healthcare Professionals thematisiert, weil sie eine unmittelbare Auswirkung auf die konkreten Patienten haben. Weniger in den Blick geraten Allokationen des Managements, welche die Rahmenbedingungen für Ressourcenzuteilungen beim Patienten betreffen. Hierbei geht (...) es nicht bloß um den Einsatz von Sachmitteln, sondern auch um den Personaleinsatz. Das Personalmanagement ist damit in wichtige Allokationsentscheidungen eingebunden und trägt eine dreifache Verantwortung: für die Gesundheit der Patienten, der Mitarbeiter und der Organisation. Der vorliegende Beitrag geht der Frage nach, welche Aspekte der Allokationsethik aus der Sicht des Personalmanagements in einem Krankenhaus zu bedenken sind, um der dreifachen Verantwortung gerecht zu werden. Dadurch zeigt sich, dass Allokationsethik in einem Krankenhaus nicht adäquat erfasst werden kann, ohne sich mit dem Personalmanagement zu beschäftigen, da das Personal die wertvollste Ressource ist, die es in einem Krankenhaus zu allozieren gilt. (shrink)

Spengler’s Untergang des Abendlandes (The Decline of the West) (1918–22) was a sensational success in its own time, but has since slipped into oblivion. In this article I attempt to restore those aspects of his doctrine which could speak to us today and alert us to a crisis of the European Geist and its survival exigencies. This involves a reorientation on several issues on which our present perspectives differ from those that were current 100 years ago, such as the precedence (...) of his philosophical approach over the historical approach; the diminished importance of his extensive analysis and depiction of defunct civilisations, which serve at best as illustrative material rather than as direct comparisons on a somewhat risky notion of “simultaneity.” I also propose more relevant criteria in justification of his Faustianism (its sources and inception), and, not least, point to a differentiation between prediction and prognosis. The intention is to highlight the rationale behind Spengler’s enquiries into history—namely to situate Western civilisation in the overall scheme of human civilisations by alerting us to a decisive crossroads. This required of its author a means of identifying the symptoms that we must be aware of in order to sustain our world without tumbling unawares into a major catastrophe. The Untergang does not compulsorily wipe our civilisation out unless we provoke this to occur; instead, our civilisation may merge or blend peacefully with whatever culture(s) may be waiting to inaugurate a new cycle. (shrink)

Across the world, corruption is endemic, a cause of growing inequality, and an impediment to economic growth. Many countries have attempted to curb corruption at the national level, with little success. Researchers have argued that, instead of initiate controlling corruption at national level, resisting corruption should be actively instigated within organisations. Specifically, Luo :119–154, 2005) suggests that corruption becomes entrenched in organisations through the task and institutional environments, and can therefore only be fought through changes in institutional architecture. Modification of (...) Luo’s model, by putting in place anti-corruption systems at the start, shows how anti-corruption behaviours become established and can be resisted. In this paper, we explore the successful management of organisational corruption by the Grameen Bank, a leading microfinance institute that operates in Bangladesh. For many years, this bank has stood out against the generally accepted culture of corruption in Bangladesh. Using the case study method, this research explores the impact of the anti-corruption structures and processes implemented by Grameen Bank, as a unique illustration within Bangladesh of the value of this modified version of the Luo’s model. The bank has actively introduced policies and processes that have made it difficult for corruption to become established. (shrink)

Frequently, historical comparisons are asymmetrical in the sense that they investigate one case carefully while limiting themselves to a mere sketch of the other case which serve as comparative reference point. The debate on the German Sonderweg and the rich historical literature originating from this debate can serve as examples. This article reconstructs the pros and cons within this controversial debate, reports its results and puts it into a broader historical context. It analyzes the comparative logic implied by the Sonderweg (...) thesis and argues that the interpretation of modern German history in the sense of a Sonderweg can only be maintained if related to the question why Germany turned fascist and totalitarian in the interwar period while other societies did not, and if Western countries are selected as units of comparison. The choice of comparative reference points turns out to be decisive and partly dependent on normative priorities and conventions. The article points to dangers and opportunities inherent in asymmetrical comparison. (shrink)

This paper highlights the role of Lewis’ Principal Principle and certain auxiliary conditions on admissibility as serving to explicate normal informal standards of what is reasonable. These considerations motivate the presuppositions of the argument that the Principal Principle implies the Principle of Indifference, put forward by Hawthorne et al.. They also suggest a line of response to recent criticisms of that argument, due to Pettigrew and Titelbaum and Hart, 621–632, 2020). The paper also shows that related concerns of Hart and (...) Titelbaum, 252–262, 2015) do not undermine the argument of Hawthorne et al.. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungIn den letzten Jahren wird intensiv darüber diskutiert, ob und in welcher Weise das Gewissen im Kontext der Apotheke zu schützen ist. Der Status quo in Deutschland und Österreich sieht keine gesetzliche Regelung für dieses Problem vor. Der ethische Rahmen für eine Bewältigungsstrategie im Umgang mit dem Problem der Gewissensfreiheit in der Apotheke wird deutlich gemacht. Unter Anwendung des rechtsethischen Verhältnismäßigkeitsprinzips wird das Problem mit Berücksichtigung des deutschen und österreichischen Verfassungsrechts sowie der Europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention auf individueller, korporativer und gesellschaftlicher Ebene (...) analysiert. Auf individueller Ebene sind die berechtigten Interessen und Güter des Apothekers einerseits und der Patientin andererseits durch eine grundrechtliche Verhältnismäßigkeitsprüfung zu einem schonenden Ausgleich zu bringen. Auf korporativer Ebene legitimiert das auf der Religions- und Weltanschauungsfreiheit basierende Selbstbestimmungsrecht die ideologisch profilierte Apotheke als Organisation und kann in der Binnenbeziehung der Apotheke einen Loyalitätskonflikt verursachen. Auf gesellschaftlicher Ebene stehen vier Optionen der proaktiven rechtspolitischen Gestaltung der Gewissensproblematik zur Verfügung: sozialstaatlich, libertär, professionsbezogen und kommunitär. Wie Konflikte auf individueller oder korporativer Ebene gelöst werden können, hängt von den Optionen ab, die auf gesellschaftlicher Ebene gewählt werden. Für den Fall einer Änderung des Status quo wird für zwei Lösungsansätze argumentiert: a) die Einführung einer qualifizierten Gewissensklausel für Apotheker (mit Beratungs-, Verweis-, Notfall- und Verständigungspflicht); b) die auf einen Kompromiss zwischen ideologisch profilierter pharmazeutischer Korporation (Apotheke oder Apothekervereinigung) und Sozialstaat abzielende „weiche“ kommunitäre Option. Beide Ansätze werden einem schonenden Ausgleich berechtigter Güter gerecht. (shrink)

In den letzten Jahren wird intensiv darüber diskutiert, ob und in welcher Weise das Gewissen im Kontext der Apotheke zu schützen ist. Der Status quo in Deutschland und Österreich sieht keine gesetzliche Regelung für dieses Problem vor. Der ethische Rahmen für eine Bewältigungsstrategie im Umgang mit dem Problem der Gewissensfreiheit in der Apotheke wird deutlich gemacht. Unter Anwendung des rechtsethischen Verhältnismäßigkeitsprinzips wird das Problem mit Berücksichtigung des deutschen und österreichischen Verfassungsrechts sowie der Europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention auf individueller, korporativer und gesellschaftlicher Ebene (...) analysiert. Auf individueller Ebene sind die berechtigten Interessen und Güter des Apothekers einerseits und der Patientin andererseits durch eine grundrechtliche Verhältnismäßigkeitsprüfung zu einem schonenden Ausgleich zu bringen. Auf korporativer Ebene legitimiert das auf der Religions- und Weltanschauungsfreiheit basierende Selbstbestimmungsrecht die ideologisch profilierte Apotheke als Organisation und kann in der Binnenbeziehung der Apotheke einen Loyalitätskonflikt verursachen. Auf gesellschaftlicher Ebene stehen vier Optionen der proaktiven rechtspolitischen Gestaltung der Gewissensproblematik zur Verfügung: sozialstaatlich, libertär, professionsbezogen und kommunitär. Wie Konflikte auf individueller oder korporativer Ebene gelöst werden können, hängt von den Optionen ab, die auf gesellschaftlicher Ebene gewählt werden. Für den Fall einer Änderung des Status quo wird für zwei Lösungsansätze argumentiert: a) die Einführung einer qualifizierten Gewissensklausel für Apotheker (mit Beratungs-, Verweis-, Notfall- und Verständigungspflicht); b) die auf einen Kompromiss zwischen ideologisch profilierter pharmazeutischer Korporation (Apotheke oder Apothekervereinigung) und Sozialstaat abzielende „weiche“ kommunitäre Option. Beide Ansätze werden einem schonenden Ausgleich berechtigter Güter gerecht. (shrink)

Healthcare ethics consultation has been developed, practiced, and analyzed internationally. However, only a few professional standards have evolved globally in this field that would be comparable to standards in other areas of healthcare. This article cannot compensate for this situation. It contributes to the ongoing debate on professionalization by presenting experiences with ethics consultation in Austria, though. After exploring its contexts and providing an overview of one of its primary ethics programs, the article analyzes the underlying assumptions of “ethics consultation” (...) as an essential effort on the path to professionalize ethics consultation. (shrink)

Objective Bayesian epistemology invokes three norms: the strengths of our beliefs should be probabilities, they should be calibrated to our evidence of physical probabilities, and they should otherwise equivocate sufficiently between the basic propositions that we can express. The three norms are sometimes explicated by appealing to the maximum entropy principle, which says that a belief function should be a probability function, from all those that are calibrated to evidence, that has maximum entropy. However, the three norms of objective Bayesianism (...) are usually justified in different ways. In this paper we show that the three norms can all be subsumed under a single justification in terms of minimising worst-case expected loss. This, in turn, is equivalent to maximising a generalised notion of entropy. We suggest that requiring language invariance, in addition to minimising worst-case expected loss, motivates maximisation of standard entropy as opposed to maximisation of other instances of generalised entropy. Our argument also provides a qualified justification for updating degrees of belief by Bayesian conditionalisation. However, conditional probabilities play a less central part in the objective Bayesian account than they do under the subjective view of Bayesianism, leading to a reduced role for Bayes’ Theorem. (shrink)

Varied evidence confirms more strongly than less varied evidence, ceteris paribus. This epistemological Variety of Evidence Thesis enjoys widespread intuitive support. We put forward a novel explication of one notion of varied evidence and the Variety of Evidence Thesis within Bayesian models of scientific inference by appealing to measures of entropy. Our explication of the Variety of Evidence Thesis holds in many of our models which also pronounce on disconfirmatory and discordant evidence. We argue that our models pronounce rightly. Against (...) a backdrop of failures of the Variety of Evidence Thesis, the intuitive case for the Variety of Evidence Thesis emerges strengthened. Our models do however not support the general case for the thesis since our explication of it fails to hold in certain cases. The parameter space of this failure is explored and an explanation for the failure is offered. (shrink)

The intuitive Variety of Evidence Thesis states that, ceteris paribus, more varied evidence for a hypothesis confirms it more strongly than less varied evidence. Recent Bayesian analyses have raised serious doubts in its validity. Claveau suggests the existence of a novel type of counter-example to this thesis: a gradual increase in source independence can lead to a decrease in hypothesis confirmation. I show that Claveau’s measure of gradual source independence suffers from two unsuspected types of inconsistencies. I hence put forward (...) a more natural measure of gradual source independence which is not plagued by inconsistencies. Claveau’s counter-examples to the variety of evidence thesis disappear with the measure I suggest. I hence argue that my measure is preferable and that this thesis does at least not seem to be troubled by Claveau’s arguments. (shrink)

This paper addresses a data integration problem: given several mutually consistent datasets each of which measures a subset of the variables of interest, how can one construct a probabilistic model that fits the data and gives reasonable answers to questions which are under-determined by the data? Here we show how to obtain a Bayesian network model which represents the unique probability function that agrees with the probability distributions measured by the datasets and otherwise has maximum entropy. We provide a general (...) algorithm, OBN-cDS, which offers substantial efficiency savings over the standard brute-force approach to determining the maximum entropy probability function. Furthermore, we develop modifications to the general algorithm which enable further efficiency savings but which are only applicable in particular situations. We show that there are circumstances in which one can obtain the model directly from the data; by solving algebraic problems; and by solving relatively simple independent optimisation problems. (shrink)

The maximum entropy principle is widely used to determine non-committal probabilities on a finite domain, subject to a set of constraints, but its application to continuous domains is notoriously problematic. This paper concerns an intermediate case, where the domain is a first-order predicate language. Two strategies have been put forward for applying the maximum entropy principle on such a domain: applying it to finite sublanguages and taking the pointwise limit of the resulting probabilities as the size n of the sublanguage (...) increases; selecting a probability function on the language as a whole whose entropy on finite sublanguages of size n is not dominated by that of any other probability function for sufficiently large n. The entropy-limit conjecture says that, where these two approaches yield determinate probabilities, the two methods yield the same probabilities. If this conjecture is found to be true, it would provide a boost to the project of seeking a single canonical inductive logic—a project which faltered when Carnap's attempts in this direction succeeded only in determining a continuum of inductive methods. The truth of the conjecture would also boost the project of providing a canonical characterisation of normal or default models of first-order theories. Hitherto, the entropy-limit conjecture has been verified for languages which contain only unary predicate symbols and also for the case in which the constraints can be captured by a categorical statement of quantifier complexity. This paper shows that the entropy-limit conjecture also holds for categorical statements of complexity, for various non-categorical constraints, and in certain other general situations. (shrink)

Objective Bayesianism says that the strengths of one’s beliefs ought to be probabilities, calibrated to physical probabilities insofar as one has evidence of them, and otherwise sufficiently equivocal. These norms of belief are often explicated using the maximum entropy principle. In this paper we investigate the extent to which one can provide a unified justification of the objective Bayesian norms in the case in which the background language is a first-order predicate language, with a view to applying the resulting formalism (...) to inductive logic. We show that the maximum entropy principle can be motivated largely in terms of minimising worst-case expected loss. (shrink)

In this, the second of two articles outlining a theory of communicative competence, the author questions the ability of Chomsky's account of linguistic competence to fulfil the requirements of such a theory. ?Linguistic competence? for Chomsky means the mastery of an abstract system of rules, based on an innate language apparatus. The model by which communication is understood on this account contains three implicit assumptions, here called ?monologism?, ?a priorism?, and ?elementarism?. The author offers an outline of a theory of (...) communicative competence that is based on the negations of these assumptions. In opposing the first two assumptions he introduces distinctions, respectively, between semantic universals which process experiences and those that make such processing possible, and between semantic universals which precede all socialization and those that are linked to the conditions of potential socialization. Against elementarism, he argues that the semantic content of all possible natural languages does not consist of combinations of a finite number of meaning components. Differences in systems of classification preclude this, and such differences can be seen to infect all respects of intercultural comparison. Using the notion of ?performative utterance?, the author elucidates the role of dialogue?constitutive universals as part of the formal apparatus required of a?; speaker's capacity to communicate. He then notes what would be required of a general semantics based on a theory of communicative competence; and finally points out how this theory might be used for social analysis. (shrink)

This paper addresses the problem of finding a Bayesian net representation of the probability function that agrees with the distributions of multiple consistent datasets and otherwise has maximum entropy. We give a general algorithm which is significantly more efficient than the standard brute-force approach. Furthermore, we show that in a wide range of cases such a Bayesian net can be obtained without solving any optimisation problem.

Recent work in social epistemology has shown that, in certain situations, less communication leads to better outcomes for epistemic groups. In this paper, we show that, ceteris paribus, a Bayesian agent may believe less strongly that a single agent is biased than that an entire group of independent agents is biased. We explain this initially surprising result and show that it is in fact a consequence one may conceive on the basis of commonsense reasoning.