Monetary intelligence theory asserts that individuals apply their money attitude to frame critical concerns in the context and strategically select certain options to achieve financial goals and ultimate happiness. This study explores the dark side of monetary Intelligence and behavioral economics—dishonesty. Dishonesty, a risky prospect, involves cost–benefit analysis of self-interest. We frame good or bad barrels in the environmental context as a proxy of high or low probability of getting caught for dishonesty, respectively. We theorize: The magnitude and intensity of (...) the relationship between love of money and dishonest prospect may reveal how individuals frame dishonesty in the context of two levels of subjective norm—perceived corporate ethical values at the micro-level and Corruption Perceptions Index at the macro-level, collected from multiple sources. Based on 6382 managers in 31 geopolitical entities across six continents, our cross-level three-way interaction effect illustrates: As expected, managers in good barrels, mixed barrels, and bad barrels display low, medium, and high magnitude of dishonesty, respectively. With high CEV, the intensity is the same across cultures. With low CEV, the intensity of dishonesty is the highest in high CPI entities —the Enron Effect, but the lowest in low CPI entities. CPI has a strong impact on the magnitude of dishonesty, whereas CEV has a strong impact on the intensity of dishonesty. We demonstrate dishonesty in light of monetary values and two frames of social norm, revealing critical implications to the field of behavioral economics and business ethics. (shrink)

Monetary Intelligence theory asserts that individuals apply their money attitude to frame critical concerns in the context and strategically select certain options to achieve financial goals and ultimate happiness. This study explores the bright side of Monetary Intelligence and behavioral economics, frames money attitude in the context of pay and life satisfaction, and controls money at the macro-level and micro-level. We theorize: Managers with low love of money motive but high stewardship behavior will have high subjective well-being: pay satisfaction and (...) quality of life. Data collected from 6586 managers in 32 cultures across six continents support our theory. Interestingly, GDP per capita is related to life satisfaction, but not to pay satisfaction. Individual income is related to both life and pay satisfaction. Neither GDP nor income is related to Happiness. Our theoretical model across three GDP groups offers new discoveries: In high GDP entities, “high income” not only reduces aspirations—“Rich, Motivator, and Power,” but also promotes stewardship behavior—“Budget, Give/Donate, and Contribute” and appreciation of “Achievement.” After controlling income, we demonstrate the bright side of Monetary Intelligence: Low love of money motive but high stewardship behavior define Monetary Intelligence. “Good apples enjoy good quality of life in good barrels.” This notion adds another explanation to managers’ low magnitude of dishonesty in entities with high Corruption Perceptions Index. In low GDP entities, high income is related to poor Budgeting skills and escalated Happiness. These managers experience equal satisfaction with pay and life. We add a new vocabulary to the conversation of monetary intelligence, income, GDP, happiness, subjective well-being, good and bad apples and barrels, corruption, and behavioral ethics. (shrink)

Internalism restricts justifiers to what is "within" the subject. two main forms of internalism are (1) perspectival internalism (pi), which restricts justifiers to what the subject knows or justifiably believes, and (2) access internalism (ai), which restricts justifiers to what is directly accessible to the subject. the two forms are analyzed and interrelated, and the grounds for each are examined. it is concluded that although pi is both unacceptable and without adequate support, a modest form of ai might be defended.

The epistemology and phenomenology of contemporary society tend to be deepened, and the philosophical challenges never are minimal that we may be called to face with the kind of post-modern chaos from the rapidly changing phenomena of the global community. The ballast held on the identity of faculty members as a teacher and researcher now turns due so as to be recast with our intrinsic of routine performance. I considered their quality as bent on the intellectual strife on the method (...) and the kind of attitude, say, evaluation and consultation. In this paper, the authors have presented some thought and implications that triangulated the triad, i.e., research methodology, program evaluation and consulting illustration on the college research program rankings. The author is hoped that the discourse can help the academicians to share the attribute of different methods as well as the dimension of evaluation and consulting, perhaps essentially related with their work role in terms of teaching and researching. Keywords: Research Method, Qualitative Studies, Mixed Method, Program Evaluation, Theory and Philosophy, Program Rankings, Consulting, Journal Writing. (shrink)

This paper investigates the layoff behavior, a typical people dimension of corporate social performance, of family firms from a place-based perspective. We theorize that a place-based culture within family firms ensures that all organizational members share a deep sense of connection with the place of operations which makes them inherently care about their impact on society. Using data on layoffs of 2000 largest US firms between 1994 and 2007, we find that family firms do indeed exhibit a lower tendency to (...) lay off employees in comparison to non-family firms; this relationship is particularly strong in ‘places’ with low population where the negative social externalities related to layoffs tend to be higher. Further post hoc analyses indicate that family firms have a strong place-based culture which can provide resource-based competitive advantages. (shrink)

Abstract Bentham's utilitarianism, although castigated by Marx as a shopkeeper's rhetoric, maintained an invincible sway over its epigones particularly in their argumentations on moral and political matters. With the disappearance of the free market in the classical sense, however, it is rather J. S. Mill's revised hedonism than the orthodox Benthamite doctrine that has provided more interesting issues for moral and political contemplation. The duality of Mill's theoretical character ? liberal as well as authoritarian ? originated from his differentiation of (...) qualities in the essentially quantitative concept of utilitarian ?pleasure?. This paper concerns itself with the negative and unsuccessful aspects of Mill's deliberations. Mill developed a theory of moral rule for the purpose of generalizing high quality pleasures to society at large. Nevertheless, according to this paper, he ended up leaving us with uncertainty regarding how the ignorant mass could be led to higher quality pleasures. (shrink)

Amidst the ideology, efficiency and bitter contention of international economy, the importance of leadership or public administration had long been under-stressed as an avenue for any better solution. Nonetheless, within a changing mode of interaction in the global community, an increasing ethos for the kind of common basis of ethics or agreement, at least in the level of class administrators or noble citizenry including the academicians, business leaders, bureaucrats and so, could be congruent for the public good on the national (...) and international plane. A rapid transformation for the informative society or sharing and humanity or social justice generally is seen to enable the possibility of new openness against the divergences from various reasons. Typically, I consider the public administration other than law, inter alia, could have strands to leap for any grand promise or for any cosmopolitan public value since it tends progressive and less ideological. At the core of ambition underlie the ethics of public administrators or their responsibility for the constituents and global public. The paper deals with two illustrative cases from the experience of South Korea which matters at the negative and positive concept of liberty. They will be investigated, empirically at some extent and in view of the ethics of congressmen and public officers. I, then, turn to explore the western theories and tenets often associated with their moral standard. Finally, the context could be revisited for the global scale of transformation expanded to cover the Orient and West. (shrink)

Sang. Isŏng 1-chip - 9-chip -- Ha. Isŏng 10-chip - 19-chip.

In current epistemology, there are two different conceptions of epistemic justification. According to the first genetic conception, a justified belief is a well-formed belief. According to the second defense conception, how the belief is formed is irrelevant to the epistemic justification of the belief. What is important for the justification of the belief is whether the cognitive agent has a defense of the belief in question. ;I construct my own defense account of epistemic justification on the basis of criticizing current (...) defense accounts of epistemic justification. The gist of my account is that I am justified in believing that p only if my belief that p is stored in my memory with a proper causal connection with other psychological states of mine that are adequate grounds for the belief that p. This illuminates an interesting symmetry between the genetic conception of epistemic justification and the defense conception of epistemic justification: in the genetic conception, justified belief is well-formed belief, whereas in a defense conception justified belief is well-stored belief. ;My account is different from current defense theories of epistemic justification in two respects. First, in my account some type of causal relation between the belief and its adequate grounds is crucial for epistemic justification, while other theories deny the relevance of any causal consideration to the justification of beliefs. Their denial is a manifestation of a dogma--the Psychologistic Assumption--deeply rooted in traditional epistemology, such that epistemic justification is wholly a function of psychological states of a cognitive agent. I show that this dogma has to be abandoned. Second, other theories require the explicit representation of the belief about the evidential relation between the belief in question and its adequate grounds. In them, this explicitly represented higher-level belief constitutes the defense of the belief in question. I show that, due to this requirement of explicitly represented higher-level beliefs, current defense accounts run into numerous insuperable problems. Meanwhile, my theory does not face these problems because it does not require higher-level beliefs. (shrink)