Internalism restricts justifiers to what is "within" the subject. two main forms of internalism are (1) perspectival internalism (pi), which restricts justifiers to what the subject knows or justifiably believes, and (2) access internalism (ai), which restricts justifiers to what is directly accessible to the subject. the two forms are analyzed and interrelated, and the grounds for each are examined. it is concluded that although pi is both unacceptable and without adequate support, a modest form of ai might be defended.
The epistemology and phenomenology of contemporary society tend to be deepened, and the philosophical challenges never are minimal that we may be called to face with the kind of post-modern chaos from the rapidly changing phenomena of the global community. The ballast held on the identity of faculty members as a teacher and researcher now turns due so as to be recast with our intrinsic of routine performance. I considered their quality as bent on the intellectual strife on the method (...) and the kind of attitude, say, evaluation and consultation. In this paper, the authors have presented some thought and implications that triangulated the triad, i.e., research methodology, program evaluation and consulting illustration on the college research program rankings. The author is hoped that the discourse can help the academicians to share the attribute of different methods as well as the dimension of evaluation and consulting, perhaps essentially related with their work role in terms of teaching and researching. Keywords: Research Method, Qualitative Studies, Mixed Method, Program Evaluation, Theory and Philosophy, Program Rankings, Consulting, Journal Writing. (shrink)
Abstract Bentham's utilitarianism, although castigated by Marx as a shopkeeper's rhetoric, maintained an invincible sway over its epigones particularly in their argumentations on moral and political matters. With the disappearance of the free market in the classical sense, however, it is rather J. S. Mill's revised hedonism than the orthodox Benthamite doctrine that has provided more interesting issues for moral and political contemplation. The duality of Mill's theoretical character ? liberal as well as authoritarian ? originated from his differentiation of (...) qualities in the essentially quantitative concept of utilitarian ?pleasure?. This paper concerns itself with the negative and unsuccessful aspects of Mill's deliberations. Mill developed a theory of moral rule for the purpose of generalizing high quality pleasures to society at large. Nevertheless, according to this paper, he ended up leaving us with uncertainty regarding how the ignorant mass could be led to higher quality pleasures. (shrink)
Amidst the ideology, efficiency and bitter contention of international economy, the importance of leadership or public administration had long been under-stressed as an avenue for any better solution. Nonetheless, within a changing mode of interaction in the global community, an increasing ethos for the kind of common basis of ethics or agreement, at least in the level of class administrators or noble citizenry including the academicians, business leaders, bureaucrats and so, could be congruent for the public good on the national (...) and international plane. A rapid transformation for the informative society or sharing and humanity or social justice generally is seen to enable the possibility of new openness against the divergences from various reasons. Typically, I consider the public administration other than law, inter alia, could have strands to leap for any grand promise or for any cosmopolitan public value since it tends progressive and less ideological. At the core of ambition underlie the ethics of public administrators or their responsibility for the constituents and global public. The paper deals with two illustrative cases from the experience of South Korea which matters at the negative and positive concept of liberty. They will be investigated, empirically at some extent and in view of the ethics of congressmen and public officers. I, then, turn to explore the western theories and tenets often associated with their moral standard. Finally, the context could be revisited for the global scale of transformation expanded to cover the Orient and West. (shrink)
In current epistemology, there are two different conceptions of epistemic justification. According to the first genetic conception, a justified belief is a well-formed belief. According to the second defense conception, how the belief is formed is irrelevant to the epistemic justification of the belief. What is important for the justification of the belief is whether the cognitive agent has a defense of the belief in question. ;I construct my own defense account of epistemic justification on the basis of criticizing current (...) defense accounts of epistemic justification. The gist of my account is that I am justified in believing that p only if my belief that p is stored in my memory with a proper causal connection with other psychological states of mine that are adequate grounds for the belief that p. This illuminates an interesting symmetry between the genetic conception of epistemic justification and the defense conception of epistemic justification: in the genetic conception, justified belief is well-formed belief, whereas in a defense conception justified belief is well-stored belief. ;My account is different from current defense theories of epistemic justification in two respects. First, in my account some type of causal relation between the belief and its adequate grounds is crucial for epistemic justification, while other theories deny the relevance of any causal consideration to the justification of beliefs. Their denial is a manifestation of a dogma--the Psychologistic Assumption--deeply rooted in traditional epistemology, such that epistemic justification is wholly a function of psychological states of a cognitive agent. I show that this dogma has to be abandoned. Second, other theories require the explicit representation of the belief about the evidential relation between the belief in question and its adequate grounds. In them, this explicitly represented higher-level belief constitutes the defense of the belief in question. I show that, due to this requirement of explicitly represented higher-level beliefs, current defense accounts run into numerous insuperable problems. Meanwhile, my theory does not face these problems because it does not require higher-level beliefs. (shrink)