Los llamados a huir del capitalismo, a “cambiar el mundo sin tomar el poder” y construir inmediatamente un afuera de las relaciones de dominación intrínsecas al primero han capturado de forma efectiva el imaginario político de los movimientos sociales en las últimas décadas. Este artículo pretende criticar lo que llamaré la “ideología de la huida”, presentándola como un ejemplo de falsa alternativa al capitalismo. Me centraré para ello en el análisis crítico de John Holloway y Raúl Zibechi como exponentes teóricos (...) de la misma, y en las llamadas “Escuelas alternativas” como una de sus expresiones prácticas, para después exponer cómo El Capital de Marx contiene una crítica de esta clase de proyectos. Se argumentará, primero, que sus defensores yerran al tratar de ubicar las potencias revolucionarias en un elemento externo al capitalismo, pues este acaba revelándose como una ficción ideológica. Posteriormente se demostrará que los intentos de buscar o construir un “más allá” de las relaciones de producción capitalistas son tan viejos como el propio capitalismo, y que la necesidad de su fracaso viene dictada por la misma naturaleza de este último, para acabar argumentando que la concepción marxiana de la política revolucionaria contiene una alternativa real a la ideología de la huida en todas sus versiones. (shrink)

Hablar del poder comunista significa estudiar el “poder” como potencia, que esconde, de hecho, una cuestión central que aleja a Marx y a la teoría materialista de las diferentes formas de idealismo político, viejas o nuevas, tanto como aleja a la teoría dialéctica de sus muchos enemigos. Y esta es precisamente la cuestión de la posibilidad, o de la correcta comprensión de la categoría de posibilidad, o la relación entre lo posible y lo imposible, posibilidades materiales y posibilidades meramente subjetivas. (...) Esto nos llevará también a la cuestión de la _contradicción, _la de la organización (como poder comunista en acto), y de la idea de negación determinada, o de la Revolución como “negación de la negación” —que es como Marx se refiere a esta tanto en los _Manuscritos de París _(1980: 164) como en _El Capital _(2013: 535). (shrink)

pt. I. Matter: 1. Philosophy as worldview ; 2. Classical matter: bodies and fields ; 3. Quantum matter: weird but real ; 4. General concept of matter: to be is to become ; 5. Emergence and levels ; 6. Naturalism ; 7. Materialism -- pt. II. Mind: 8. The mind-body problem ; 9. Minding matter: the plastic brain ; 10. Mind and society ; 11. Cognition, consciousness, and free will ; 12. Brain and computer: the hardware/software dualism ; 13. Knowledge: (...) genuine and bogus -- pt. III. Appendices: 14. Appendix A: Objects ; 15. Appendix B. Truths. (shrink)

It is part of a global trend today that new relationships are being forged between religion and society, between spirituality and materiality, giving rise to announcements that we live in a ‘postsecular’ or ‘desecularized’ world. Taking up two educational movements, the mindfulness movement in the West and the revival of Confucian education in China, this paper examines what and how postsecular orientations and sensibilities penetrate educational discourses and practices in different cultural contexts. We compare the two movements to reveal a (...) new quality of hybrid modernization in that they react, in different ways, to certain pathologies that are identified as consequences of secular modernity. Burnout syndrome, the sense of a spiritual void, but also the loss of a spiritual and cultural identity are being perceived as correlating to a one-sided push towards a modernity that emphasizes secular rationalization over mindfulness and Westernization over cultural particularity. The two case studies mark a critical insight on the present condition and limits of secularism and highlights the ongoing negotiations of values and modes of self-cultivation in schools. In an increasingly pluralistic world, the entanglement of the secular, spiritual, religious and wisdom traditions provides the opportunity to rethink education as a creative realm and an impossible possibility to re-engage the minds and lives of those in the hybrid pedagogical time. (shrink)

Let R be an o-minimal expansion of an ordered group R has no poles, R cannot define a real closed field with domain R and order R is eventually linear and every R -definable set is a finite union of cones. As a corollary we get that Th has quantifier elimination and universal axiomatization in the language with symbols for the ordered group operations, bounded R -definable sets and a symbol for each definable endomorphism of the group.

Mario Bunge, author of the monumental Treatise on Basic Philosophy, is widely renowned as a philosopher of science. In this new and ambitious work he shifts his attention to the social sciences and the social technologies. He considers a number of disciplines, including anthropology, sociology, economics, political science, law, history, and management science. Bunge contends that social science research has fallen prey to a postmodern fascination with irrationalism and relativism. He urges social scientists to re-examine the philosophy and the (...) methodology at the base of their discipline. Bunge calls for objective and relevant fact-finding, rigorous theorizing, and empirical testing, as well as morally sensitive and socially responsible policy design. (shrink)

A powerful critique of nudge theory and the paternalist policies of behavioral economics, and an argument for a more inclusive form of rationality.

We show that if G is a definably compact, definably connected definable group defined in an arbitrary o-minimal structure, then G is divisible. Furthermore, if G is defined in an o-minimal expansion of a field, k ∈ ℕ and pk : G → G is the definable map given by pk = xk for all x ∈ G , then we have |–1| ≥ kr for all x ∈ G , where r > 0 is the maximal dimension of abelian (...) definable subgroups of G. (shrink)

Criticisms à la Laudan can block the “no miracles” argument for the (approximate) truth of whole theories. Realists have thus retrenched, arguing that at least the individual claims deployed in the derivation of novel predictions should be considered (approximately) true. But for Lyons (2002) there are historical counterexamples even to this weaker “deployment” realism: he lists a number of novel predictions supposedly derived from (radically) false claims. But if so, those successes would seem unexplainable, even by Lyons’ “modest surrealism” or (...) other surrogates to realism. In fact, I argue, some of those predictions were an easy guess, or independently probable in the light of available evidence; hence, they are no counterexamples to deployment realism, for the no miracles argument wouldn’t apply to them. In other instances, pace Lyon, the prediction was actually false, and could be reinterpreted as true only by interpreting as true also the claim from which it was derived; or again, a false claim was employed in the derivation of a true prediction, but inessentially, the essential role being played by a weaker true claim. But as soon as the paradoxical air of such historical cases is explained away in any of these manners, they cease to represent counterexamples to deployment realism. If, as I suggest, all of them can be dealt with by these strategies, a theoretical claim can still be assumed to be true if it is crucial in deriving an improbable novel prediction. (shrink)

This essay addresses the relationships between prescription and description in legal rules. The analysis will focus on the culture-laden connotations of factual categories implied in all legal sentences and/or provisions. This investigation is spurred by the need to assess the impact of cultural difference in people’s understanding of legal imperatives and, symmetrically, how that impact is to be considered in the application of law. Differences in ways of categorizing the world could position the cultural pre-understanding required by law, and the (...) pluralism recognized and protected by constitutional principles and human/fundamental rights discourse, at a crossroads. Hence, even when we find an illegitimacy or an ignorance about what legal rules do not explicitly state but instead implicitly presuppose, this does not exclude that behind that ignorance there may be something worthy of legal protection. A question emerges: is it legitimate and reasonable to consider the ignorantia facti resulting from differing ways of categorizing the factual world as automatically and uncritically subject to the principle ignoratia legis non excusat? The essay continues with an assessment of the possible consequences of ignorantia facti in the administration of justice in multicultural societies and migration contexts. For this purpose, the opportunity for an intercultural use of law—including within national law—will be considered as a means of avoiding the discriminatory application of ignorantia facti. This topic will be addressed by leveraging both semiotic and cultural-anthropological analytical tools, including the well-known greimasien “contrat de véridiction”. (shrink)

In the fluid cultural context of today, where the significance of sexual difference is continually diminished, if not completely denied , the encounter with the phenomenology of E. Stein and E. Levinas can be both stimulating and fruitful. Even though they have speculative perspectives that are very different and do not always reach the same conclusions, both authors agree that sexual difference and paternity and maternity connected with it, is not exclusively biological but also anthropological and philosophical. This significant convergence (...) certainly has its origin in a common phenomenological inspiration, which continues to bear fruit, as witnessed by the recent work of J.-L. Marion and of a writer of a clearly feminist inspiration, such as F. Giardini. (shrink)

The paper explains the application of a Social Innovation Based Transformative Learning (SIBTL) pedagogical approach in an undergraduate, final year business ethics course taught at an Australian university. Using social innovation as an enabling process to extend students’ cognitive, behavioural and managerial competencies in an integrated manner, the paper describes how the SIBTL approach helps ethics teachers to promote students’ ethical action.

RESUMO: O presente artigo tem por objetivo investigar a recepção do Tratado Teológico-Político de Espinosa, bem como sua crítica da religião pelo Marquês de Sade, numa obra bastante peculiar e que desafia todas as tentativas de classificação: La Philosophie dans le Boudoir. Em seu "Quinto Diálogo", Sade insere um texto intitulado "Franceses, mais um esforço se quereis ser Republicanos". Através do emprego desse artifício metalinguístico - um livro dentro de um livro - a política é agora introduzida na alcova e (...) o leitor se dá conta de que a instrução de Eugénie não é meramente sexual, mas também uma educação filosófica e política. Por meio de sua crítica ao Cristianismo, na primeira seção do texto, Sade argumenta que a tirania e a superstição religiosa são âmbitos intimamente relacionados, e a teologia é um dos principais alicerces do poder político. ABSTRACT: This article aims to investigate the interpretation by the Marquis de Sade of Spinoza's Theological-Political Treatise. Sade's interpretation appears in a very peculiar work which defies all rigid attempts of classification: La Philosophie dans le Boudoir. In the "Fifth Dialogue", Sade inserts a pamphlet entitled "Yet another effort, Frenchmen, if you would become Republicans". Through the employment of a metalinguistic device - a book inside a book - politics is now introduced into the boudoir, and the reader becomes aware that Eugénie's education is not merely sexual, but also philosophical and political. Through his critique of Christianity in the first section of the pamphlet, Sade argues that tyranny and religious superstition are closely related and that theology is one of the main foundations of political power. (shrink)

Originally published as Scientific Research, this pair of volumes constitutes a fundamental treatise on the strategy of science. Mario Bunge, one of the major figures of the century in the development of a scientific epistemology, describes and analyzes scientific philosophy, as well as discloses its philosophical presuppositions. This work may be used as a map to identify the various stages in the road to scientific knowledge. Philosophy of Science is divided into two volumes, each with two parts. Part 1 (...) offers a preview of the scheme of science and the logical and semantical took that will be used throughout the work. The account of scientific research begins with part 2, where Bunge discusses formulating the problem to be solved, hypothesis, scientific law, and theory. The second volume opens with part 3, which deals with the application of theories to explanation, prediction, and action. This section is graced by an outstanding discussion of the philosophy of technology. Part 4 begins with measurement and experiment. It then examines risks in jumping to conclusions from data to hypotheses as well as the converse procedure. Bunge begins this mammoth work with a section entitled "How to Use This Book." He writes that it is intended for both independent reading and reference as well as for use in courses on scientific method and the philosophy of science. It suits a variety of purposes from introductory to advanced levels. Philosophy of Science is a versatile, informative, and useful text that will benefit professors, researchers, and students in a variety of disciplines, ranging from the behavioral and biological sciences to the physical sciences. (shrink)

It is well known that Frege separates drastically logic from psychology. Now, if we consider carefully which is the task Frege accords to psychology, we see three things, that is, first that in reality it consists not in one but in several tasks; second that in some cases it is just doubtful whether psychology can handle them and, finally, third that Frege, even if it seems the contrary, has said relevant things with respect to the aforementioned questions. From the latter (...) it follows that Frege’s drastic separation between logic and psychology does not contradict the fact that he has a clear conception of subjectivity which is intentional and not naturalistic. (shrink)

The ArgumentI propose a revisionist account of the production and reception of Galileo's telescopic observations of 1609–10, an account that focuses on the relationship between credit and disclosure. Galileo, I argue, acted as though the corroboration of his observations were easy, not difficult. His primary worry was not that some people might reject his claims, but rather that those able to replicate them could too easily proceed to make further discoveries on their own and deprive him of credit. Consequently, he (...) tried to slow down potential replicators to prevent them from becoming competitors. He did so by not providing other practitioners access to high-power telescopes and by withholding information about how to build them. This essay looks at the development of Galileo's monopoly on early telescopic astronomy to understand how the relationship between disclosure and credit changed as he moved from being an instrument-maker to becoming a discoverer and, eventually, a court philosopher. (shrink)

Quantum electrodynamics presents intrinsic limitations in the description of physical processes that make it impossible to recover from it the type of description we have in classical electrodynamics. Hence one cannot consider classical electrodynamics as reducing to quantum electrodynamics and being recovered from it by some sort of limiting procedure. Quantum electrodynamics has to be seen not as a more fundamental theory, but as an upgrade of classical electrodynamics, which permits an extension of classical theory to the description of phenomena (...) that, while being related to the conceptual framework of the classical theory, cannot be addressed from the classical theory. (shrink)

The many constraints of outer space experience challenge the human ability to coexist. Paradoxically, astronauts assert that on the international space station there are no conflicts or, at least, that they are able to manage their differences, behavioral as well as cognitive, in full respect of human rights and the imperatives of cooperative living. The question is: Why? Why in those difficult, a-terrestrial, and therefore almost unnatural conditions do human beings seem to be able to peacefully and collaboratively live together? (...) What is there beyond terrestrial boundary conditions that allows for such a result? And what can we learn from the astronauts’ experience about the effectiveness of human rights on Earth? My proposal is that the a-terrestrial dimension deeply alters the mind/body indexical framework and, in this way, disentangles the human inclination to semiosis from the cognitive and behavioral habits of categorization and territorialization inherent in the experience on Earth. If analyzed through the spectrum of an interdisciplinary approach involving anthropology, semiology, law, and human geography, I think that outer space enterprises can offer many insights into the cognitive and ethical/political hindrances to the effectiveness of human rights and their intercultural uses. Meanwhile the compulsive greed for a possessive territorialization of outer space and celestial bodies is growing by leaps and bounds. It haunts and imbues both astropolitics and space law. The astronauts’ semio-anthropological experience of human rights and cooperative coexistence seems to have been left in orbit. The future requires awareness and action by anthropologists, semioticians, cognitive scientists, geographers and lawyers, working all together in an interdisciplinary effort to move beyond approaching the experiential with a territorial mindset. The hope is that the “dark dream” of human exploitation/colonization of outer space will not turn from a political and legal speculation into a future reality. (shrink)

This essay, between serious and facetious, addresses an apparently secondary implication of the planetary tragedy produced by Covid-19. It coincides with the ‘problem of the veil,’ a bone of contention in Islam/West relationships. More specifically, it will address the question of why the pandemic has changed the proxemics of public spaces and the grammar of ‘living together.’ For some time—and it is not possible to foresee how much—in many countries people cannot go out, or enter any public places, without wearing (...) a sanitary mask. In short, almost all of us, by obligation or by urgent advice from the public authorities of the various countries, will not live the public sphere with our faces uncovered. The alteration of the social context affecting many Western countries will inevitably involve also the ‘local’ perception of the Islamic veil and—as a matter of equality—the consistency of the prohibition of wearing it. What will thus become of the ban on wearing it in public places established by some countries such as France and asseverated by the ECHR? If everyone can and will have to go around with their faces covered, why should only Islamic women be discriminated against? Will not the change in boundary conditions produced by Covid-19 also induce Western people to re-categorize the meaning of the veil? And will this re-categorization not directly affect the ‘fact’ of wearing the veil, that is, its empirical perception? And still, will this psycho-semantic change not show how empirical perceptions are cultural constructs rather than ‘objective facts,’ as such allegedly independent from the observer’s point of view? Consequentially, will the plurality of perceptions and cultural meanings related to the gesture of covering one’s own face not gain renewed relevance in determining the legitimacy of wearing the veil? The socio-semantic earthquake produced by Covid-19 compels us to rethink this and other issues orbiting around the translation of ‘facts’ into legal language; furthermore, it highlights the instrumentality of many ideological/partisan and ethnocentric assumptions passed off as objectivity regarding those alleged ‘facts.’ The essay will attempt to provide an answer to the above questions by proposing a semiotic-legal approach to intercultural conflicts and, indirectly, the pluralism in law. (shrink)

Reality is much more than the physical world before us. In Expanding Reality, Mario Beauregard examines a variety of phenomena investigated by the most open-minded and visionary scientists. These phenomena provide the evidence that mind, consciousness, and spirit cannot be simply reduced to electrical and chemical activity in the brain.

This provocative volume, one of the most important interpretive works on the philosophical thought of the Renaissance, has long been regarded as a classic in its field. Ernst Cassirer here examines the changes brewing in the early stages of the Renaissance, tracing the interdependence of philosophy, language, art, and science; the newfound recognition of individual consciousness; and the great thinkers of the period—from da Vinci and Galileo to Pico della Mirandola and Giordano Bruno. _The Individual and the Cosmos in Renaissance (...) Philosophy_ discusses the importance of fifteenth-century philosopher Nicholas Cusanus, the concepts of freedom and necessity, and the subject-object problem in Renaissance thought. “This fluent translation of a scholarly and penetrating original leaves little impression of an attempt to show that a ‘spirit of the age’ or ‘spiritual essence of the time’ unifies and expresses itself in all aspects of society or culture.”—_Philosophy_. (shrink)

This paper proposes that we read a late work of Georg Lukács, The Ontology of Social Being, as an indispensable contribution to ontological investigation in general and particularly to the understanding of social reality. As the ontology of Lukács tends not to be familiar even to those who have foregrounded ontological issues in recent decades, it seems to be extremely fruitful to bring it into discussion. Comparing the analysis of Lukács with the ontology of critical realism, we argue that it (...) is not only possible to identify obvious convergences but also to shed light on many questions that still demand a proper treatment from an ontological perspective. (shrink)