Research-based but highly accessible, this fresh, contemporary, and engaging volume helps students appreciate the science of psychology and understand how its principles apply to their own lives. Key features: Contemporary perspectives and references: giving careful consideration to the field's historical foundations, Psychology: Contemporary Perspectives provides a unique balance of traditional and contemporary perspectives. This approach invites students to develop a modern appraisal of psychology. Current research: the book covers the latest in evolutionary psychology and behavior genetics, ecological and evolutionary theories (...) of learning, cross-cultural work in cognition, the latest neuroscience data, and endophenotype research in the genetic causes of schizophrenia. Clear and compelling writing: exceptionally well written, Psychology: Contemporary Perspectives uses stories to help students connect with the principles of psychology. Rich pedagogy: all running features are integrated into the main body of the text, helping to maintain the flow of the narrative--and the attention of students! "Freeze Frame" snapshots underscoring the theme of each chapter tell the compelling stories of real-life individuals. "Living Psychology" applies psychology to students' everyday lives, helping them understand the benefits of what they are studying. "Critical Thinking about Psychology" sections give students the tools they need in order to effectively and objectively interpret research. "At the Forefront" highlights new and influential research in the field. Carefully selected study tools: placing an emphasis on "review, retrieve, and learn", Psychology: Contemporary Perspectives takes a "back-to-basics" approach to study tools. "In Summary" sections provide clear, concise chapter descriptions, offering students powerful tools for review. "Retrieve!" questions encourage students to test their knowledge of what they have just read. Each question includes the page numbers on which the relevant material was first presented, aiding in additional review and reinforcing learning. (shrink)

Samuelson's text was first published in 1948, and it immediately became the authority for the principles of economics courses. The book continues to be the standard-bearer for principles courses, and this revision continues to be a clear, accurate, and interesting introduction to modern economics principles. Bill Nordhaus is now the primary author of this text, and he has revised the book to be as current and relevant as ever.

In a town near mine, a small business owner used their changeable-letter sign to wage a public protest against a variety of restrictions implemented during the COVID-19 pandemic. Unlike a great man...

"First published in this translation 1955; second edition (revised) 1974; reprinted with additional revisions 1987; reissued with new Further Reading 2003; reissued with new introduction 2007"--T.p. verso.

This book is relevant for anyone involved in the practice of psychology and the social sciences more broadly: researchers, teachers, students, and practitioners. It challenges the status quo with regards to the way that psychology is done, and it offers a unified solution that encompasses both theory and methodology.

This article is a contribution to interdisciplinary scholarship addressing the presumption of innocence, especially interdisciplinary conversations between philosophers and jurists. Terminological confusion and methodological traps and errors notoriously beset academic literature addressing the presumption of innocence and related concepts, such as evidentiary presumptions, and the burden and standard of proof in criminal trials. This article is diagnostic, in the sense that its primary objective is to highlight the assumptions—in particular, the disciplinary assumptions—implicit in influential contributions to debates on the presumption (...) of innocence. It advocates a methodologically pluralistic approach, according to which definitions of the presumption of innocence are necessarily sensitive to purpose and method. These relationships and their implications are not always appreciated, and are seldom explicitly elucidated. Notably, philosophers routinely treat the presumption of innocence as epistemic, evidentiary or otherwise featuring directly in practical reasoning. This article identifies jurisprudential and practical reasons why legal scholars and practitioners concerned with criminal procedure and evidence should reject evidentiary interpretations of the presumption of innocence. By encouraging finer-grained engagement with the history and institutional details of common law procedural traditions, the article aims to show why legal scholars might think that philosophical approaches to the presumption of innocence are already methodologically-loaded and, for our purposes, address the wrong questions with deficient concepts. (shrink)

Die Frage nach den grundsätzlichen Erkenntnisgrenzen der Physik wird hier verstanden als die Frage danach, welchen Status die Aussagen der Physik über unbeobachtbare Gegenstände haben, z.B. über den Urknall, über Quarks oder über dunkle Materie. Sind die diesbezüglichen Aussagen der besten physikalischen Theorien einfach wahr oder wenigstens annähernd wahr (realistische Interpretation)? Oder wenigstens wahrscheinlich? Oder handelt es sich um bloße Modellvorstellungen, die für Vorhersagen und ggf. technische Anwendungen praktisch sind, aber keinen Wahrheitsgehalt aufweisen (instrumentalistische Interpretation)? In diesem Aufsatz werden verschiedene (...) solcher Möglichkeiten genauer vorgestellt und die wichtigsten einschlägigen Argumente für und gegen solche Positionen diskutiert. (shrink)

I defend a one category ontology: an ontology that denies that we need more than one fundamental category to support the ontological structure of the world. Categorical fundamentality is understood in terms of the metaphysically prior, as that in which everything else in the world consists. One category ontologies are deeply appealing, because their ontological simplicity gives them an unmatched elegance and spareness. I’m a fan of a one category ontology that collapses the distinction between particular and property, replacing it (...) with a single fundamental category of intrinsic characters or qualities. We may describe the qualities as qualitative charactersor as modes, perhaps on the model of Aristotelian qualitative (nonsubstantial) kinds, and I will use the term “properties” interchangeably with “qualities”. The qualities are repeatable and reasonably sparse, although, as I discuss in section 2.6, there are empirical reasons that may suggest, depending on one’s preferred fundamental physical theory, that they include irreducibly intensive qualities. There are no uninstantiated qualities. I also assume that the fundamental qualitative natures are intrinsic, although physics may ultimately suggest that some of them are extrinsic. On my view, matter, concrete objects, abstract objects, and perhaps even spacetime are constructed from mereological fusions of qualities, so the world is simply a vast mixture of qualities, including polyadic properties (i.e., relations). This means that everything there is, including concrete objects like persons or stars, is a quality, a qualitative fusion, or a portion of the extended qualitative fusion that is the worldwhole. I call my view mereological bundle theory. (shrink)

Investigations of data-centered efforts in advocacy and activism are often cast in terms of a narrative of opposition between grassroots activists working through and with data, and corporations or institutions whose actions data might expose. The boundaries are, however, not so distinct in practice. Indeed, one outcome of successful advocacy efforts for opening big data to the public is that the activists may find themselves drawn into the institutions they critique or view as impediments in order to actualize those efforts (...) from the inside. Drawing on an ongoing ethnographic investigation of urban data initiatives inside city government, we explore the productive ambivalences of activism and advocacy that arise when those with data activist ideals find themselves operating within the government structure. (shrink)

Computer programs are generating artworks of astonishing novelty and aesthetic value. By the standard definition of creativity, these programs would count as being creative. But if you still hesitate to call a program creative, that's for good reason, we argue. It's because real creativity requires AGENTS who are responsible for what they make, and it's not at all clear that these programs are agents. -/- (The title was imposed by the editor. It was supposed to be called, "ARE COMPUTERS CREATIVE?").

El objetivo de este artículo es abordar el reciente problema del nexo entre realismo y fenomenología hermenéutica desde un enfoque específico: el diálogo entre el nuevo realismo de Markus Gabriel y algunas propuestas hermenéutico-fenomenológicas alemanas que se autocomprenden en términos realistas. Afirmo la hipótesis de que es posible un diálogo productivo entre estas propuestas, basado en una comprensión mínima del realismo como fundamentación ontológica viable. Para esto, en primer lugar mostraré el sentido del actual resurgimiento del realismo en el contexto (...) de la ontología continental contemporánea, situando su recepción, crítica e integración a propósito del ámbito de la fenomenología y hermenéutica recientes. En segundo lugar, analizaré la propuesta de nuevo realismo, que está implicada en la ontología de campos de sentido de M. Gabriel. Y, en tercer lugar, reseñaré las propuestas de Günter Figal, Anton Friedrich Koch y Tobias Keiling en su fundamento realista. Mediante este trabajo comparativo, concluiré afirmando que el diálogo entre ambas corrientes comparte una comprensión realista no reductiva a la cuestión del mundo exterior, que le permite entenderlo como búsqueda de cierto criterio de objetividad para lo que aparece sensiblemente con sentido, con el propósito de esclarecer por qué las cosas reales son dependientes de la interpretación (interpretables en general), pero independientes de interpretaciones individuales. (shrink)

Like Plato, Protagoras held that young children learn virtue from fine examples in poetry. Unlike Plato, Protagoras taught adults by correcting the diction of poets. In this paper I ask what his standard of correctness might be, and what benefit he intended his students to take from exercises in correction. If his standard of correctness is truth, then he may intend his students to learn by questioning the content of poems; that would be suggestive of Plato’s program in Republic III. (...) But his standard is more likely to be the accurate use of language; in that case he would intend his students to learn to express their thoughts clearly enough that their audience would understand what they were saying. That standard would be independent of the truth of what they are saying; and that would be a precursor to modern techniques by which we try to teach speaking and writing. Truth is not so easy to escape, however, and we shall see that Protagoras’ exercise must assume that the poet is trying to tell the truth. (shrink)

The authors rightly critique existing social sciences approaches. However, they are too quick to dismiss the criticism that their proposed paradigm is atheoretical. Social and cognitive theories are indeed incommensurate, often due to the lack of a unifying framework. Without proper integration with theoretical frameworks, their proposal may merely produce a resource-intensive veneer of thoroughness without substantive improvements to understanding.

I argue that we can understand the de se by employing the subjective mode of presentation or, if one’s ontology permits it, by defending an abundant ontology of perspectival personal properties or facts. I do this in the context of a discussion of Cappelen and Dever’s recent criticisms of the de se. Then, I discuss the distinctive role of the first personal perspective in discussions about empathy, rational deference, and self-understanding, and develop a way to frame the problem of lacking (...) prospective access to your future self as a problem with your capacity to imaginatively empathize with your future selves. (shrink)

Résumé L’envoûtement médiatique est un travail de l’imagination, effectué par le consommateur, qui occupe désormais la totalité, toujours croissante, de son temps de connexion. Cet hypertravail est au fondement de la nouvelle économie capitaliste, la chronophagie, en raison de sa rentabilité sans précédent, car le consommateur produit lui-même, par son imagination, un surcroît de valeur de la marchandise, qui lui fait accepter de la payer plus cher. L’hypertravail est le premier travail payant.

Volume 2, Issue 4, December 2018, Page 355-364.

The Southern Journal of Philosophy, Volume 60, Issue 2, Page 277-303, June 2022.

Three kinds of things may be creative: persons, processes, and products. The standard definition of creativity, used nearly by consensus in psychological research, focuses specifically on products and says that a product is creative if and only if it is new and valuable. We argue that at least one further condition is necessary for a product to be creative: it must have been produced by the right kind of process. We argue furthermore that this point has an interesting epistemological implication: (...) when you judge a product to be creative--attributing creativity--you are not just judging it to be new and valuable. Even if you did not witness how it was produced, you are also making a judgement about how it was produced. (shrink)

The self can be understood in objective metaphysical terms as a bundle of properties, as a substance, or as some other kind of entity on our metaphysical list of what there is. Such an approach explores the metaphysical nature of the self when regarded from a suitably impersonal, ontological perspective. It explores the nature and structure of the self in objective reality, that is, the nature and structure of the self from without. This is the objective self. I am taking (...) a different approach. In addition to objective reality, which is usually understood and explored from an impersonal, quasi-observational and metaphysically realist perspective, we can also explore the nature and structure of subjective reality. The nature and structure of subjective reality is defined by the nature and structure of first-personal, conscious experience. Subjective reality is as real as objective reality, and a metaphysical realist such as myself can endorse the existence of both kinds of ontology. The mental states that, as experienced from the first-personal or subjective perspective, capture the nature and structure of subjective reality, are included in objective reality. The questions to explore in a subjective ontology of the self concern the nature and structure of the self from the first-personal or subjective perspective, that is, the nature and structure of the self from within. This is the subjective self. (shrink)

This paper challenges “traditional measurement-accuracy realism”, according to which there are in nature quantities of which concrete systems have definite values. An accurate measurement outcome is one that is close to the value for the quantity measured. For a measurement of the temperature of some water to be accurate in this sense requires that there be this temperature. But there isn’t. Not because there are no quantities “out there in nature” but because the term ‘the temperature of this water’ fails (...) to refer owing to idealization and failure of specificity in picking out concrete cases. The problems can be seen as an artifact of vagueness, and so doing facilitates applying Eran Tal’s robustness account of measurement accuracy to suggest an attractive way of understanding vagueness in terms of the function of idealization, a way that sidesteps the problems of higher order vagueness and that shows how idealization provides a natural generalization of what it is to be vague. (shrink)

In developing his trademark use of “consonance” to prescribe a relationship between Christian faith and the natural sciences, Ernan McMullin drew on severaldistinctly Augustinian philosophical and theological themes during his fifty years of scholarship. Particularly prominent in McMullin’s work were an emphasis placed on Augustine’s biblical hermeneutic, which prioritized both literal and non-literal interpretive techniques, and Augustine’s epistemology of divine illumination. This paper examines several elements as part of an expository account of McMullin’s contribution toward the consonance between Christian faith (...) and the natural sciences. It also outlines McMullin’s theory of retroduction and his account of scientific realism, both of which are philosophical positions that provide additional support for consonance from an epistemological perspective. I conclude that for McMullin, consonance is a differentiated term that hints at underlying metaphysical claims without necessarily delineating the nature of those claims. (shrink)

This paper challenges Putnam's claim that his internal realism is a revival of Kant's empirical realism. I agree with Putnam that there are good reasons to revive Kant's rather neglected empirical realist doctrine. However, internal realism is not the way this should be done. At the center of the following discussion lies the important difference between Putman's "real within a scheme" model and Kant's assertion of the independent existence of empirical objects. The strategy for the paper is as follows. I (...) intend to first detail the real and important connections that exist between the analyses of experience offered by Putnam and Kant. These similarities should not be discounted. In fact, I think we can distinguish the two projects only if we first appreciate the conceptual overlap that naturally gives rise to the perceived union of the two programmes. I will then develop a representative response that is invoked commonly by Kantians who disagree with Putman's identification. This will be followed by a brief discussion concerning why this standard reply fails. I will conclude by canvassing a more powerful epistemological reason for dissociating the two programmes. (shrink)

Each chapter in this volume seeks to explore, critique, and emphasize the continuing relevance of the vast contributions of Buchanan to our understanding of political economy and social philosophy.

Each chapter in this volume seeks to explore, critique, and emphasize the continuing relevance of the vast contributions of Buchanan to our understanding of political economy and social philosophy.

:The “new institutionalist revolution” in social sciences has led to a repositioning of social norms to the forefront of the pre-analytic vision in institutional theory and to the consolidation of the contextual analysis approach. That has significant epistemological, methodological, and political philosophy implications. This essay follows the logic of these developments showing: why they inherently lead to the feasibility problem, the key of applied theory, toward which both contemporary philosophy and institutional analysis converge from different venues; how feasibility is a (...) nexus of empirical, counterfactual, normative, and contextual elements, that is, something more complex than a mere matching between empirical reality and institutional design; what are the governance implications of all of the above, with an emphasis on an alternative approach and in which the public choice process is seen mainly as endogenized, socialized, and institutionalized, as opposed to formalized, intellectualized, and externalized. (shrink)

Jesuit philosopher and theologian Bernard Lonergan advocated a critical realism, in which scientific and theological knowledge are products of self-critical phenomenological analysis. Allying his thought with Thomas Aquinas in elaborating a cognitional theory to serve epistemology and metaphysics, Lonergan challenged reigning idealist and empiricist philosophies by understanding the human knower as ordered both to the known world and to divine providence. This paper will sketch four themes in which Lonergan constructs a methodical link between phenomenology and both contemporary science and (...) theology. Lonergan does not embody the frequently cited idea of a rupture in Catholic thought from pre-Vatican II to post-conciliar thought, notably in his treatment of science and religion. (shrink)