Classical epistemic logic describes implicit knowledge of agents about facts and knowledge of other agents based on semantic information. The latter is produced by acts of observation or communication that are described well by dynamic epistemic logics. What these logics do not describe, however, is how significant information is also produced by acts of inference— and key axioms of the system merely postulate "deductive closure". In this paper, we take the view that all information is produced by acts, and hence (...) we also need a dynamic logic of inference steps showing what effort on the part of the agent makes a conclusion explicit knowledge. Strong omniscience properties of agents should be seen not as static idealizations, but as the result of dynamic processes that agents engage in. This raises two questions: (a) how to define suitable information states of agents and matching notions of explicit knowledge, (b) how to define natural processes over these states that generate new explicit knowledge. To this end, we use a static base from the existing awareness literature, extending it into a dynamic system that includes traditional acts of observation, but also adding and dropping formulas from the current ' awareness' set. We give a completeness theorem, and we show how this dynamics updates explicit knowledge. Then we extend our approach to multi-agent scenarios where awareness changes may happen privately. Finally, we mention further directions and related approaches. Our contribution can be seen as a ' dynamification' of existing awareness logics. (shrink)

We look at two fundamental logical processes, often intertwined in planning and problem solving: inference and update. Inference is an internal process with which we uncover what is implicit in the information we already have. Update, on the other hand, is produced by external communication, usually in the form of announcements and in general in the form of observations, giving us information that might not have been available (even implicitly) before. Both processes have received attention from the logic community, usually (...) separately. In this work, we develop a logical language that allows us to describe them together. We present syntax, semantics and a complete axiom system; we discuss similarities and differences with other approaches and mention how the work can be extended. (shrink)

Donna Quesada had been teaching for about a dozen years when the first signs of burnout hit her. Rather than give in to her frustration, she reached for Buddha's teachings, the Zen wisdom that formed the basis of her own longtime spiritual practice. She survived the semester and gradually rediscovered the joy in her job that had been progressively declining. In this wise and inspirational book, she shares the lessons she learned-lessons that revealed, time and again, that no matter (...) the situation, it's always about getting your head in the right place first. Resolution begins in our own minds. Some days, some semesters, and even some years will be more challenging and more wearisome than others, she warns. But in The Inspired Teacher, Quesada offers a lasting source of encouragement and Zen. Although the book draws from Eastern teachings, the wisdom is for everyone, regardless of personal background, creed, or faith. With elements of The Last Lecture as well as Chicken Soup for the Teacher's Soul, this is the perfect gift for teachers-but also for anyone needing inspiration. (shrink)

Epistemic logic with its possible worlds semantic model is a powerful framework that allows us to represent an agent’s information not only about propositional facts, but also about her own information. Nevertheless, agents represented in this framework are logically omniscient: their information is closed under logical consequence. This property, useful in some applications, is an unrealistic idealisation in some others. Many proposals to solve this problem focus on weakening the properties of the agent’s information, but some authors have argued that (...) solutions of this kind are not completely adequate because they do not look at the heart of the matter: the actions that allow the agent to reach such omniscient state. Recent works have explored how acts of observation, inference, consideration and forgetting affect an agent’s implicit and explicit knowledge; the present work focuses on acts that affect an agent’s implicit and explicit beliefs. It starts by proposing a framework in which these two notions can be represented, and then it looks into their dynamics, first by reviewing the existing notion of belief revision, and then by introducing a rich framework for representing diverse forms of inference that involve both knowledge and beliefs. (shrink)

In this paper I will contrast the current situation concerning the explanatory relation between neuroscientific and philosophical accounts of our spatial and temporal experience. Evans’ account of “egocentric experience’ and Husserl’s analysis of temporal awareness are respectively taken to represent the philosophical side, while Pouget’s basis functions theory and Grush’s trajectory estimation theory act respectively as representatives of the neuroscientific camp. I inquire specifically about the respective chances of these representative neuroscientific theories to explain aspects of the ordinary spatial and (...) temporal phenomenology, as this phenomenology is accounted for by those well-known philosophical theories. I will argue that, in this respect, the spatial and temporal cases present a strong contrast: while in the spatial case the claim that neuroscientific theories explain some aspects of the phenomenology would be defensible, nothing of this sort is in sight in the temporal case. (shrink)

François Mauriac desarrolló fundamentalmente su producción literaria en la primera mitad del siglo pasado, un periodo marcado por las dos Guerras Mundiales en una Francia en creciente proceso de secularización. Así las cosas, con motivo del cincuenta aniversario de su fallecimiento la pretensión de este trabajo es hacer emerger la figura de Mauriac como apologeta que, desde el ámbito literario, defendió algunos de los principales postulados católicos cuestionados por el alma moderna. En efecto, el premio Nobel de literatura pertenece a (...) esa constelación de autores católicos que, profundizando en las raíces del Cristianismo, intentan dar una salida a la crisis de la Modernidad, cimentada fundamentalmente en el positivismo y el materialismo. De hecho, veremos cómo plantea el problema del mal en el mundo y la solución al mismo desde el ámbito de la caridad por medio de mártires inmolados. Asimismo, asistiremos a la crítica sistemática del novelista francés contra el antitestimonio cristiano o contra el fariseísmo religioso como elementos clave de su pedagogía apologética. (shrink)

The extent to which English law remedies injury to autonomy as a stand-alone actionable damage in negligence is disputed. In this article I argue that the remedy available is not only partial and inconsistent but also gendered and discriminatory against women. I first situate the argument within the broader feminist critique of tort law as failing to appropriately remedy gendered harms, and of law more broadly as undervaluing women’s interest in reproductive autonomy. I then show by reference to English remedies (...) law’s first principles how imposed motherhood cases—Rees v Darlington and its predecessor McFarlane v Tayside Health Board—result in gender injustice when compared with other autonomy cases such as Chester v Afshar and Yearworth v North Bristol NHS Trust: A minor gender-neutral ITA is better remedied than the significant gendered harm of imposing motherhood on the claimant; men’s reproductive autonomy is protected to a greater extent than women’s; women’s reproductive autonomy is protected by an exceptional, derisory award. Worst of all, courts refuse to recognise imposed motherhood as detriment; and the deemed, mansplained, nonpecuniary joys of motherhood are used to offset pecuniary upkeep costs, forcing the claimant into a position she sought to avoid and thus further undermining her autonomy. The recent Singaporean case ACB v Thomson Medical Pte Ltd, awarding compensation for undermining the claimant’s genetic affinity in an IVF wrong-sperm-mix-up demonstrates some improvement in comparison to English law, and some shared gender injustices in the context of reproductive autonomy. ACB’s analysis is oblivious to the nature of reproductive autonomy harm as gendered; and prioritises the father’s interest in having genetic affinity with the baby over a woman’s interest in not having motherhood imposed upon her. (shrink)

In the valley of the Trujala, Hornos and Guadalimar rivers in the Sierra de Segura, northeast of the province of Jaén, is an articulated system of preserved Andalusi structures that configure a landscape. To orient in a landscape, one needs a map that accurately represents the elements involved in its formation. The objective of this work is to reveal these points and to draw a chart that serves to understand and read into the palimpsest of the landscape. To achieve this, (...) an intensive prospecting of the territory is carried out to document the existing remains and an evaluation model based on Geographic Information Systems is elaborated. This process allowed for quantifying variables, obtaining statistically relevant data and classifying the information obtained in places where there is some Andalusi preexistence. The results supply useful parameters in the analytical reading of the landscape, provide quantitative knowledge about factors that connect the sites, and allow for the determination of settlement patterns. The results also reveal the mode of occupation in a territory -the ancientʿamal Šaqūra- as a reflection of the Andalusi organization in the rural world and the anthropic role that these settlements, which are associated with structures built of rammed-earth during the 12th century, have had in the landscape’s configuration. (shrink)

Angiogenesis plays an essential role in tumor growth, invasion and metastasis. After initial pessimism about the usefulness of the antiangiogenic therapeutic approach for cancer, interest has increased in the development of antiangiogenic compounds after the first clinical approval of an antiangiogenic therapy. The anti‐vascular endothelial growth factor (VEGF) antibody bevacizumab has recently been approved for use in combination with chemotherapy for the treatment of metastatic colorectal and non‐small cell lung cancer patients. However, no survival benefit has been demonstrated in anti‐VEGF (...) monotherapy trials, probably due to the high complexity of tumor angiogenesis regulation. Experimental and clinical data, including the approval of the multitargeted drugs sunitinib and sorafenib, indicate that exciting results, including tumor regression, can be expected from the combined targeting of different pathways in the tumor angiogenesis scenario. Several obstacles, including the high cost of new molecular targeted drugs make this therapeutic approach difficult. BioEssays 29:1159–1168, 2007. © 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

El interés de este ensayo es presentarun acercamiento a la teoría de los sueñosen Nietzsche, particularmente en su asíllamado período ilustrado, y sugerir algunasrelaciones y diferencias respecto del análisisonírico en Freud. Se pretende reconstruirla forma en que la teoría de los sueños deNietzsche fue desarrollada de la mano conuna teoría de la subjetividad que comportaelementos del análisis antropológico, de lapsicología fisiológica y de una teoría de lacultura, y que confluye en una propuestaontológica sobre el instinto y sobre sugénesis natural. En (...) el marco de esta ontologíadel instinto, se intenta reconstruir la relaciónentre el concepto de vida y el concepto devalor, planteando la pregunta sobre el valorde lo onírico para la vida.The interest of this paper is to presentan approach about theory of dreams byNietzsche, particularly in what is calledhis illustrated period, and also suggest somerelationships and differences from theanalysis of dreams made by Freud. It isintended to reconstruct how Nietzsche’stheory of dreams was developed as onesubjectivity’s theory composed by elementsfrom anthropological analysis, physiologicalpsychology and culture’s theory; all whatresult in an ontological propose aboutthe instinct and its natural history. In thecontext of this ontology of instinct, we intendto reconstruct the relationship between theconcept of life and the concept of value byraising the question about value of dreamsfor life. (shrink)

Classical epistemic logic describes implicit knowledge of agents about facts and knowledge of other agents based on semantic information. The latter is produced by acts of observation or communication that are described well by dynamic epistemic logics. What these logics do not describe, however, is how significant information is also produced by acts of inference—and key axioms of the system merely postulate “deductive closure”. In this paper, we take the view that all information is produced by acts, and hence we (...) also need a dynamic logic of inference steps showing what effort on the part of the agent makes a conclusion explicit knowledge. Strong omniscience properties of agents should be seen not as static idealizations, but as the result of dynamic processes that agents engage in. This raises two questions: (a) how to define suitable information states of agents and matching notions of explicit knowledge, (b) how to define natural processes over these states that generate new explicit knowledge. To this end, we use a static base from the existing awareness literature, extending it into a dynamic system that includes traditional acts of observation, but also adding and dropping formulas from the current ‘awareness’ set. We give a completeness theorem, and we show how this dynamics updates explicit knowledge. Then we extend our approach to multi-agent scenarios where awareness changes may happen privately. Finally, we mention further directions and related approaches. Our contribution can be seen as a ‘dynamification’ of existing awareness logics. (shrink)

Al oír el término “mujer andaluza”, automáticamente vamos a visualizar una serie de características (y no otras) que van a corresponder con un modelo de patrón ideal visual. En esta conformación, el arte tiene es un pilar fundamental. Desde distintas corrientes y esferas tales como la pintura, el cine, la música o la literatura, atendemos a la construcción de un personaje donde la esencia se reduce a un plano mítico, desechando la propia identidad de las mujeresrepresentadas. En el siguiente artículo (...) vamos a desgranar cómo la construcción de este ideal de mujer andaluza es esencialista, a partir del análisis de cuatro obras. Esto nos ayudará a entender cómo el impacto de esta mitificación no solo reside en la concepción estética,sino en la concepción cultural y por tanto su aceptación o rechazo en los diferentes planos de la vida socio política de las mujeres. Palabras clave: arte, género, mito, cultura, Andalucía. (shrink)

Through a discussion with current perspectives in philosophy of history and a rigorous reading of his oeuvre this book highlights the possibilities of the best Marx in terms of his capacity to account for the development of spatiotemporally complex societies.

La «démythologisation» est une herméneutique philosophique forgée par Hans Jonas au début de son itinéraire intellectuel, afin d'interpréter existentiellement les récits mythologiques ainsi que les textes théologiques et philosophiques de l’Antiquité tardive. Il s’agissait d’abord d’une méthodologie d’objectivation et subjectivation pour comprendre l’expérience existentielle de l’homme gnostique face à la divinité et l’être dans le monde. Dans la suite, Jonas a développé l’herméneutique de la démythologisation par l’objectivation et la subjectivation par rapport aux textes néotestamentaires. Le mot démythologisation (Entmythologisierung) est (...) utilisé par lui pour la première fois en 1930 dans une étude philosophique, «Sur la structure herméneutique du dogme», pour comprendre le problème existentiel de la liberté chrétienne. Quelques années plus tard, il a développé une phénoménologie herméneutique, également par l’objectivation et la subjectivation, afin de comprendre l’être vivant et la particularité de l’homme dans la nature. Entre-temps, Hans Jonas a aussi utilisé l’herméneutique de la démythologisation par l’objectivation et la subjectivation pour critiquer la philosophie de Martin Heidegger et la théologie de Rudolf Bultmann dans plusieurs articles philosophiques par rapport au gnosticisme, à la théologie et à la démythologisation bultmannienne, ainsi que pour rédiger Le Concept de Dieu après Auschwitz. (shrink)

The two leading theoretical approaches to tort law — economic analysis and corrective justice — are blind to distributive considerations. Moreover, even the main distributive approaches to tort law — loss-spreading and fairness — fail to emphasize egalitarianism as a distributive consideration. This article argues that egalitarianism should influence the normative evaluation of one’s conduct as negligent or not. It first explains why normatively negligence law should be sensitive to the egalitarian concern, suggesting three different accounts for this claim, based (...) on needs, equality, and desert as criteria for distribution. Second, it argues that egalitarianism is commensurate with the basic understanding of negligence law as reflecting corrective justice and notions of fault. The notion of fault is, therefore, reformulated from within, in order to accommodate egalitarianism. Third, I maintain that in order for egalitarianism to accommodate notions of corrective justice, egalitarian concerns should matter also at the stage of the standard of care. While the egalitarian concern can and should be integrated into the duty stage, I argue that such integration is insufficient. A correct and full understanding of the egalitarian concern and the tort of negligence requires a conclusion that the normative evaluation of one’s action as negligent or not cannot be separated from the distributive results that this action entails. The egalitarian concern works at the duty stage as an excuse for not imposing liability for wrongful activity. In contrast, at the standard stage, it works as a justification that turns an otherwise wrongful activity into a legitimate one. My claim is that morally we should usually expect more care from the better-off than from the disadvantaged. Findings of negligence are based on the failure to balance properly between one’s interests and those of another. In deciding to what extent the defendant should burden herself in order to prevent a loss to potential victims, one morally relevant criterion is the relative ability of the injurer and victim to bear precaution costs and expected accident loss, respectively. (shrink)

Mi ensayo ha querido explicar genealógicamente y de forma contextualizada el desencuentro entre Ernst Cassirer y Martin Heidegger en Davos, y la deriva de éste hacia el nazismo desde los presupuestos de su filosofía existencial. ¿Qué papel juega el antisemitismo espiritual en la crítica heideggeriana al neokantismo y la fenomenología trascendental? ¿Por qué la fenomenología de Edmund Husserl es "una monstruosidad"? ¿Por qué Kant se convierte en batalla y campo de batalla de la Kulturkampf? ¿Por qué se lee a Heidegger (...) como se lee? ¿Qué sentido tiene la práctica de la historia de la filosofía en el “final” de la filosofía?My essay wanted to explain genealogically and in a contextualized way the disagreement between Cassirer and Heidegger in Davos, and its drift towards Nazism from the budgets of their existential philosophy. What role does spiritual anti-Semitism play in the Heideggerian critique of neo-Kantianism and transcendental phenomenology? Why is Husserl's phenomenology "a monstrosity"? Why does Kant become the battle and battlefield of the Kulturkampf? Why do you read Heidegger as you read? What is the meaning of the practice of the history of philosophy in the “final” of philosophy? (shrink)

The debate between the amodal and the grounded views of cognition seems to be stuck. Their only substantial disagreement is about the vehicle or format of concepts. Amodal theorists reject the grounded claim that concepts are couched in the same modality-specific format as representations in sensory systems. The problem is that there is no clear characterization of format or its neural correlate. In order to make the disagreement empirically meaningful and move forward in the discussion we need a neurocognitive criterion (...) for representational format. I argue that efficient coding models in computational neuroscience can be used to characterize modal codes: These are codes which satisfy special informational demands imposed by sensory tasks. Additionally, I examine recent studies on neural coding and argue that although they do not provide conclusive evidence for either the grounded or the amodal views, they can be used to determine what predictions these approaches can make and what experimental and theoretical developments would be required to settle the debate. (shrink)

This work proposes an understanding of deductive, default and abductive reasoning as different instances of the same phenomenon: epistemic dynamics. It discusses the main intuitions behind each one of these reasoning processes, and suggest how they can be understood as different epistemic actions that modify an agent’s knowledge and/or beliefs in a different way, making formal the discussion with the use of the dynamic epistemic logic framework. The ideas in this paper put the studied processes under the same umbrella, thus (...) highlighting their relationship and allowing a better understanding of how they interact together. (shrink)

Philosophy affected the birth of Latin America in two ways. First it inspired the famous men who started the independence movements, which led to the definitive liberation from the Spanish yoke. Once the revolution was over, philosophy influenced the development of the legal and political systems that were created to organize the life of the new states.

It has been argued that neural data are an especially sensitive kind of personal information that could be used to undermine the control we should have over access to our mental states, and therefore need a stronger legal protection than other kinds of personal data. The Morningside Group, a global consortium of interdisciplinary experts advocating for the ethical use of neurotechnology, suggests achieving this by treating legally ND as a body organ. Although the proposal is currently shaping ND-related policies, it (...) is not clear what its conceptual and legal basis is. Treating legally something as something else requires some kind of analogical reasoning, which is not provided by the authors of the proposal. In this paper, I will try to fill this gap by addressing ontological issues related to neurocognitive processes. The substantial differences between ND and body organs or organic tissue cast doubt on the idea that the former should be covered by bodily integrity. Crucially, ND are not constituted by organic material. Nevertheless, I argue that the ND of a subject s are analogous to neurocognitive properties of her brain. I claim that s’ ND are a ‘medium independent’ property that can be characterized as natural semantic personal information about her brain and that s’ brain not only instantiates this property but also has an exclusive ontological relationship with it: This information constitutes a domain that is unique to her neurocognitive architecture. (shrink)

Although it has been argued that mechanistic explanation is compatible with abstraction, there are still doubts about whether mechanism can account for the explanatory power of significant abstract models in computational neuroscience. Chirimuuta has recently claimed that models describing canonical neural computations must be evaluated using a non-mechanistic framework. I defend two claims regarding these models. First, I argue that their prevailing neurocognitive interpretation is mechanistic. Additionally, a criterion recently proposed by Levy and Bechtel to legitimize mechanistic abstract models, and (...) also a criterion proposed by Chirimuuta herself aimed to distinguish between causal and non-causal explanation, can be employed to show why these models are explanatory only under this interpretation. Second, I argue that mechanism is able to account for the special epistemic achievement implied by CNC models. Canonical neural components contribute to an integrated understanding of different cognitive functions. They make it possible for us to explain these functions by describing different mechanisms constituted by common basic components arranged in different ways. (shrink)

It has been argued that the approximate number system (ANS) constitutes a problem for the grounded approach to cognition because it implies that some conceptual tasks are performed by non-perceptual systems. The ANS is considered non-perceptual mainly because it processes stimuli from different modalities. Jones (2015) has recently argued that this system has many features (such as being modular) which are characteristic of sensory systems. Additionally, he affirms that traditional sensory systems also process inputs from different modalities. This suggests that (...) the ANS is a perceptual system and therefore it is not problematic for the grounded view. In this paper, I defend the amodal approach to the ANS against these two arguments. In the first place, perceptual systems do not possess the properties attributed to the ANS and therefore these properties do not imply that the ANS is perceptual. In the second place, I will propose that a sensory system only needs to be dedicated to process modality-specific information, which is consistent with responding to inputs from different modalities. I argue that the cross-modal responses exhibited by traditional sensory systems are consistent with modality-specific information whereas some responses exhibited by the ANS are not. (shrink)

Bajo el título «Utopías, distopías y otras nostalgias», la cuarta edición del Congreso de Pensamiento Interdisciplinar, organizado por alumnos del grado de Filosofía, Política y Economía de la Alianza 4 Universidades, abordó el controvertido fenómeno woke, una supuesta mezcla de izquierda identitaria y progresismo políticamente correcto al que se acusa de promover la censura y la llamada «cultura de la cancelación». Sobre esta cuestión conversaron la escritora y filósofa Elizabeth Duval, la investigadora Ayme Román y el director académico y profesor (...) del Instituto Superior de Sociología, Economía y Política (ISSEP), Miguel Ángel Quintana Paz, en un debate moderado por dos de los alumnos organizadores del congreso, Guzmán Díez e Isabel Rodríguez. (shrink)

El trabajo presenta una revisión analítica de la literatura alrededor de los debates regionales en Argentina, Chile y Uruguay sobre familia, matrimonio y filiación suscitados en torno a la redacción de los códigos civiles en las últimas décadas del siglo XIX y sus primeras reformas, acontecidas en la primera mitad del siglo XX. Se interrogan los distintos mecanismos jurídicos – y los argumentos en que se sustentaron – a través de los cuales se establecieron y se regularon las demarcaciones entre (...) lo público y lo privado, lo político y lo íntimo, lo natural y lo social. (shrink)

The different “postmodern” philosophies that arose from the 1970s to the 1990s have often been considered as a kind of irrationalist-skeptical-relativist “ideology” or assorted amalgam, which in our time would dangerously take over the philosophical academy and western cultures, with grave risk for universalist or simply rationalist projects. Nevertheless, as the title of this article shows, a closer examination of some trends of postmodern thought would be able to perceive that they not only are uncomfortable with the label “relativist,” “irrationalist” (...) or “skeptical,” but also that they offer substantial arguments against, for example, the main theses of relativism. Naturally, none of these trends has any qualms about abominating universalism as well (the presumed mortal enemy of the relativists). Thus the most sensible conclusion would be that what really seems erroneous to authors such as those we shall approach here is the presumed dilemma (presented as inevitable) between relativism and universalism (it is curious that, at least as far as faith in the existence of such a dichotomy is concerned, these presumed irreconcilable enemies, which both the relativists and the universalists believe themselves to be, are plainly in agreement). Only if they subscribe to such a rejection of this dilemma could it be explained that important thinkers of the heterogeneous postmodern group (such as those whom I propose to have a dialogue with in this article) have scorned, on the one hand, any and all universal project of rationality, but have also strongly disallowed relativist proposals (just as, naturally, they have likewise taken advantage of the issue to deny their presumed adherence to relativism as such). This idea, however, has not been understood by a large part of the scholars involved today in epistemology and practical philosophy (the two philosophical specialties in which one most frequently faces the question of relativism). To approach this understanding, therefore, perhaps it would not be amiss to review the different arguments that some postmodern thinkers use against relativism. Specifically, we shall tale a look at the reasoning in this sense that has come from Gianni Vattimo (1936), Paul K. Feyerabend (1924-1994), and Richard Rorty (1931). All of them have too often had to suffer from the suspicion of being considered as relativists. To absolve philosophers such as these from such an accusation seems to be a sine qua non condition for understanding their true position towards the universalism versus relativism dilemma. (shrink)

Marr’s celebrated contribution to cognitive science (Marr 1982, chap. 1) was the introduction of (at least) three levels of description/explanation. However, most contemporary research has relegated the distinction between levels to a rather dispensable remark. Ignoring such an important contribution comes at a price, or so we shall argue. In the present paper, first we review Marr’s main points and motivations regarding levels of explanation. Second, we examine two cases in which the distinction between levels has been neglected when considering (...) the structure of mental representations: Cummins et al.’s distinction between structural representation and encodings (Cummins in Journal of Philosophy, 93(12):591–614, 1996; Cummins et al. in Journal of Philosophical Research, 30:405–408, 2001) and Fodor’s account of iconic representation (Fodor 2008). These two cases illustrate the kind of problems in which researchers can find themselves if they overlook distinctions between levels and how easily these problems can be solved when levels are carefully examined. The analysis of these cases allows us to conclude that researchers in the cognitive sciences are well advised to avoid risks of confusion by respecting Marr’s old lesson. (shrink)