Léon Brunschvicg's contribution to philosophical thought in fin-de-siècle France receives full explication in the first English-language study on his work. Arguing that Brunschvicg is crucial to understanding the philosophical schools which took root in 20th-century France, Pietro Terzi locates Brunschvicg alongside his contemporary Henri Bergson, as well as the range of thinkers he taught and influenced, including Lévinas, Merleau-Ponty, de Beauvoir, and Sartre. Brunschvicg's deep engagement with debates concerning spiritualism and rationalism, neo-Kantian philosophy, and the role of mathematics in (...) philosophy made him the perfect supervisor for a whole host of nascent philosophical ideas which were forming in the work of his students. Terzi outlines Brunchvicg's defence of neo-Kantian judgement, historical analysis and the inextricability of the natural and humanist sciences to any rigorous system of philosophy, with wide-ranging implications for contemporary scholarship. (shrink)

Léon Brunschvicg's contribution to philosophical thought in fin-de-siècle France receives full explication in the first English-language study on his work. Arguing that Brunschvicg is crucial to understanding the philosophical schools which took root in 20th-century France, Pietro Terzi locates Brunschvicg alongside his contemporary Henri Bergson, as well as the range of thinkers he taught and influenced, including Lévinas, Merleau-Ponty, de Beauvoir, and Sartre. Brunschvicg's deep engagement with debates concerning spiritualism and rationalism, neo-Kantian philosophy, and the role of mathematics in (...) philosophy made him the perfect supervisor for a whole host of nascent philosophical ideas which were forming in the work of his students. Terzi outlines Brunchvicg's defence of neo-Kantian judgement, historical analysis and the inextricability of the natural and humanist sciences to any rigorous system of philosophy, with wide-ranging implications for contemporary scholarship. (shrink)

The chapter explores comparatively the attention to the practical dimension that—each in his own way—Michel Foucault, Friedrich Nietzsche, and the classic pragmatist thinker William James pay when confronted with the challenge of providing a non-skeptical response to the relativist stance on truth that arose in the post-Kantian age. Particular focus will be given to the extent to which these three authors conceived of the practical framework as the only one that allows us to meaningfully address and determine truth.

In recent years, the family of algorithms collected under the term ``deep learning'' has revolutionized artificial intelligence, enabling machines to reach human-like performances in many complex cognitive tasks. Although deep learning models are grounded in the connectionist paradigm, their recent advances were basically developed with engineering goals in mind. Despite of their applied focus, deep learning models eventually seem fruitful for cognitive purposes. This can be thought as a kind of biological exaptation, where a physiological structure becomes applicable for a (...) function different from that for which it was selected. In this paper, it will be argued that it is time for cognitive science to seriously come to terms with deep learning, and we try to spell out the reasons why this is the case. First, the path of the evolution of deep learning from the connectionist project is traced, demonstrating the remarkable continuity, and the differences as well. Then, it will be considered how deep learning models can be useful for many cognitive topics, especially those where it has achieved performance comparable to humans, from perception to language. It will be maintained that deep learning poses questions that cognitive sciences should try to answer. One of such questions is the reasons why deep convolutional models that are disembodied, inactive, unaware of context, and static, are by far the closest to the patterns of activation in the brain visual system. (shrink)

How should we choose on behalf of people with different attitudes to risk? Simon Blessenohl has recently argued that this question poses a dilemma: it seems that sometimes we must choose either acts that everyone disprefers or else acts that are sure to turn out worse than some other act. In this article, I offer a complaints-centered account of how to take people’s attitudes to risk into consideration in our decision-making, and then I show that it provides a way out (...) of Blessenohl’s dilemma. (shrink)

This paper aims at comparing and relating belief revision and argumentation as approaches to model reasoning processes. Referring to some prominent literature references in both fields, we will discuss their (implicit or explicit) assumptions on the modeled processes and hence commonalities and differences in the forms of reasoning they are suitable to deal with. The intended contribution is on one hand assessing the (not fully explored yet) relationships between two lively research fields in the broad area of defeasible reasoning and (...) on the other hand pointing out open issues and potential directions for future research. (shrink)

Drawing from field theory, Gestalt therapy conceives psychological suffering and psychotherapy as two intentional field phenomena, where unprocessed and chaotic experiences seek the opportunity to emerge and be assimilated through the contact between the patient and the therapist (i.e., the intentionality of contacting). This therapeutic approach is based on the therapist’s aesthetic experience of his/her embodied presence in the flow of the healing process because (1) the perception of beauty can provide the therapist with feedback on the assimilation of unprocessed (...) experiences; (2) the therapist’s attentional focus on intrinsic aesthetic diagnostic criteria can facilitate the modification of rigid psychopathological fields by supporting the openness to novel experiences. The aim of the present manuscript is to review recent evidence from psychophysiology, neuroaesthetic research, and neurocomputational models of cognition, such as the free energy principle (FEP), which support the notion of the therapeutic potential of aesthetic sensibility in Gestalt psychotherapy. Drawing from neuroimaging data, psychophysiology and recent neurocognitive accounts of aesthetic perception, we propose a novel interpretation of the sense of beauty as a self-generated reward motivating us to assimilate an ever-greater spectrum of sensory and affective states in our predictive representation of ourselves and the world and supporting the intentionality of contact. Expecting beauty, in the psychotherapeutic encounter, can help therapists tolerate uncertainty avoiding impulsive behaviours and to stay tuned to the process of change. (shrink)

Les Méditations sur le bonheur (1763), dont le destin éditorial se mêle étroitement à celui des Délits et des peines de Beccaria (1764), inaugurent la carrière littéraire de Verri. Synthèse de sa formation intellectuelle nourrie de la philosophie politique et morale du XVIIIe siècle européen, de Locke à Helvétius, de Hutcheson à Rousseau, elles sont aussi un vivier d'idées et de thèmes qui vont forger l'identité de l'École de Milan, l'un des grands foyers italiens des Lumières. Ce petit traité offre (...) une leçon d'humanité mue par un idéal égalitaire. Assignant la quête du bonheur, fondée sur un travail d'analyse de soi et de connaissance des autres, comme objectif de la vie sociale, de la politique et de la législation, l'auteur expose les prémisses de sa pensée réformatrice et progressiste, qui traversa le siècle jusqu'aux lendemains de la Révolution. C'est l'avènement de l'économie politique comme science du bonheur public. (shrink)

This chapter explores Nietzsche’s and Wittgenstein’s views on language and knowledge, establishing a philosophical dialogue between two different positions, which are based on a similar anti-essentialist and instrumentalist concern. The chapter will first focus on Nietzsche’s conception of language as the expression of valuational perspectives developing through the natural and cultural history of mankind. It will then consider Wittgenstein’s account of language as the inherited background of our practical engagement with the world. Finally, by bringing Nietzsche’s and Wittgenstein’s views together, (...) the last section reflects on the crucial strategic move they make in their respective battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language. -/- . (shrink)

This article examines the ethics of ambiguity formulated by existentialist authors in the 1940s, linking it to turn-of-the-century debates on ethics between philosophy and the social sciences. The underlying thesis is that, rather than representing a radical conceptual novelty, the ethical thought of Jean-Paul Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir, strained between freedom and situation, constitutes a revisiting and updating of philosophical positions from the landscape of the Third Republic. To demonstrate this, the thought of Frédéric Rauh is examined. Indeed, anticipating (...) what de Beauvoir would later call “ambiguity”, Rauh sought to develop an ethics of action that would constitute a third way between sociological objectivism and the empty abstractions of idealism and rationalism. By reconstructing the transitions from one generation and historical context to the next, the article shows how, and through which mediators, the existentialists were well aware of this debate and, in their own way, developed a philosophy of action, of ethical experience, similar to Rauh’s. (shrink)

Discursive pluralism, recently fostered by anti-representationalist views, by stating that not all assertions conform to a descriptive model of language, poses an interesting challenge to representationalism. Although in recent years alethic pluralism has become more and more popular as an interesting way out for this issue, the discussion also hosts other interesting minority approaches in the anti-representationalist camp. In particular, the late stage of contemporary expressivism offers a few relevant insights, going from Price's denunciation of “placement problems” to Brandom's inferentialism. (...) This paper attempts to show how these expressivist ideas combine well together, composing a unitary and metaphysically sober metaphilosophical framework. (shrink)

Creating an integrated design space can be successful only if researchers agree on how to define and measure a certain phenomenon of interest. Adversarial collaborations and mathematical modeling can aid in reaching the necessary level of agreement when researchers depart from different theoretical perspectives.

We present a logic of evidence that reduces agents’ epistemic idealisations by combining classical propositional logic with substructural modal logic for formulas in the scope of epistemic modalities. To this aim, we provide a neighborhood semantics of evidence, which provides a modal extension of Fine’s semantics for relevant propositional logic. Possible worlds semantics for classical propositional logic is then obtained by defining the set of possible worlds as a special subset of information states in Fine’s semantics. Finally, we prove that (...) evidence is a hyperintensional and non-prime notion in our logic, and provide a sound and complete axiomatisation of our evidence logic. (shrink)

Les premiers Séminaires de Jacques Lacan (1953-1959) offrent une élaboration systématique des notions de l’Imaginaire et du Symbolique, mais font référence de façon seulement sporadique à la notion du Réel. Malgré la rareté des références, la conception du Réel que l’on peut en déduire est précise et cohérente, et confirmée par les séminaires successifs – au moins jusqu’au Séminaire XI (1964). Le Réel est à comprendre comme une matière indéterminée qui, tout en pâtissant du signifiant, lui résiste. Ceci constitue une (...) innovation, de la part de Lacan, par rapport au concept philosophique classique de la matière (du moins tel qu’on le trouve chez Aristote, pour qui la matière n’offre aucune résistance à sa propre mise en forme) et prépare la base pour la théorie de l’objet a en tant que signifiant de la castration du sujet opérée par le langage, telle qu’elle est élaborée à la fin du Séminaire VI (1958-1959) et dans le Séminaire X (1962-1963). (shrink)

En la actualidad el pensamiento de Maquiavelo ha estado ligado a una praxis política que se juzga como mala desde el punto de vista ético. El secretario florentino, alejándose de la tradición estoica que marcó la filosofía política de la antigüedad y gran parte del medioevo, separa la política de la moral planteando un realismo político que evalúa los actos como eficientes o ineficientes, útiles o inútiles, fructíferos o infructíferos, tomando distancia de aquella calificación de bueno o malo. Sin embargo, (...) este simple acto, que no es más que la teorización y la explicitación de algo que se ha hecho desde siempre en la historia política, le valió ser tildado de hereje o que incluso su apellido se transformase en un término que hasta el día de hoy tiene una carga negativa en términos morales. Este artículo se adentra en aquellas interpretaciones, elementos históricos, teológicos y filosóficos del pensamiento de Maquiavelo, que con o sin intención, llevaron a que el secretario florentino fuera entendido como un pensador que hace apología de las malas praxis, acercándolo incluso a ideas heréticas. Palabras clave_: _Maquiavelo– Antimaquiavelismo - Realismo político – Herejía. (shrink)

(English:) This contribution attempts a first non-normative approach to the problem of the classic, its definition and its meaning in an age of globalization. It reviews a series of common representations of the classic (and other analogous or contrary terms), stressing the programmatic-ideological aspect that generally characterizes them. Classic, actually, tends to be a foundational category, and therefore rests on delimitations that determine its exclusiveness as opposed to something else. This paper, in particular, criticizes the last boundary of the exclusivity (...) of the classic, that is, its normative opposition to fashion and actuality. On the contrary, it is argued that there is a substantial link between classic, actuality and fashion. On the basis of this connection, two deflationary definitions of the classic are proposed: the first regards it as part of the broader process of construction of historical identity by concrete individuals. The second, on the other hand, conceives it as a product of art, and, therefore, of a formative process of abilities, skills, taste, by which the classic becomes the object of technical, aesthetic and teleological judgments. -/- (Spanish:) En esta contribución se intenta una primera aproximación no normativa al problema del clásico, su definición y su significado en una era de globalización. Se revisa una serie de representaciones comunes sobre lo clásico (y otros términos análogos o contrarios), se destaca el aspecto programático-ideológico que por lo general las caracteriza. Clásico, en efecto, tiende a ser una categoría fundacional, por lo cual se apoya en delimitaciones que determinan su exclusividad por oposición a otra cosa. En este trabajo, en particular, se critica la última frontera de la exclusividad de lo clásico, es decir, su oposición normativa a la moda y la actualidad. Por el contrario, se argumenta que existe un vínculo sustancial entre el clásico, la actualidad y la moda. A partir de esta conexión, se proponen dos definiciones deflacionarias del clásico: la primera lo considera parte del proceso más amplio de construcción de la identidad histórica por parte de individuos concretos. El segundo, en cambio, lo concibe como un producto del arte, y, por tanto, de un proceso de formación de competencias, habilidades, gusto, por el cual el clásico se convierte en objeto de juicios técnicos, estéticos y teleológicos. (shrink)

Wilfrid Sellars’ denunciation of the Myth of the Given was meant to clarify, against empiricism, that perceptual episodes alone are insufficient to ground and justify perceptual knowledge. Sellars showed that in order to accomplish such epistemic tasks, more resources and capacities, such as those involved in using concepts, are needed. Perceptual knowledge belongs to the space of reasons and not to an independent realm of experience. Dan Hutto and Eric Myin have recently presented the Hard Problem of Content as an (...) ensemble of reasons against naturalistic accounts of content. In a nutshell, it states that covariance relations—even though they are naturalistically acceptable explanatory resources—do not constitute content. The authors exploit this move in order to promote their preferred radical enactivist and anti-representationalist option, according to which, basic minds—the lower stratum of cognition—do not involve content. Although it is controversial to argue that the Hard Problem of Content effectively dismisses naturalistic theories of representation, a central aspect of it—the idea that information as covariance does not suffice to explain content—finds support among the defenders of classical cognitive representationalism, such as Marcin Miłkowski. This support—together with the acknowledgment this remark about covariance is a point already made by Sellars in his criticism of the Myth of the Given—has a number of interesting implications. Not only is it of interest for the debates about representationalism in cognitive science, where it can be understood as an anticipatory move, but it also offers some clues and insights for reconsidering some issues along Sellarsian lines—a conflation between two concepts of representation that is often assumed in cognitive science, a distinction between two types of relevant normativities, and a reconsideration of the naturalism involved in such explanations. (shrink)

This study shows how Grosseteste’s Commentary on the Posterior Analytics adopts a peculiar criterion to structure arguments developed by Aristotle about the science of demonstration. Grosseteste places his commentary in the framework of the ratio disserendi by Cicero and Boethius; yet, the arguments he develops are summarised in conclusiones. After reviewing past and recent scholarship on the meaning of these ‘conclusions’ and their relationship to Aristotle’s arguments, the study proposes to consider them as an application of Euclid’s geometrical method.

The paper explores a general framework for thinking about the idea of the just price. The approach is grounded in a basic aspect of the nature of exchange, namely, that the latter usually occurs when both parties believe they will be better off as a result. Put differently, an exchange is normally performed because both parties stand to gain something from it. The distributive question that arises from this observation is how one ought to divide such gains. The connection with (...) the idea of the just price is not necessarily an obvious one, yet it is relatively straightforward. Assuming that an exchange involves money, the price at which two agents transact will correspond to a specific division of the gains from the transaction. Conversely, any specification of a fair division of the gains from exchange individuates a specific price as the just or fair price. The paper analyzes the main features of this approach to the determination of the just price, explains one of its main virtues, defends it against an alleged weakness and criticizes as inadequate two of its traditional interpretations. The upshot of the discussion is that while the idea that the just price of a transaction depends on how the latter divides the gains from exchange does not suffer from general flaws and is in fact characterized by an important good making feature, the two principal ways in which it has been deployed are implausible. (shrink)

Stephen Turner’s anti-normativism is based on the idea that the normative can be explained away by social science. Exploiting the idea fostered by the sociology of scientific knowledge that reasons can be understood naturalistically as the causes of the beliefs of scientists and endorsing a non-normative conception of rationality, Turner has argued that normative accounts are better understood as “Good Bad Theories” (GBT). GBT are understood as false accounts that play a role in social coordination like magical or religious rituals (...) in primitive societies (e.g. Tabu and the like). According to Turner, “norms,” “obligations,” “reasons,” and “commitments” are like Tabu and can be explained away as GBT. Hence, Turner expected normative accounts to disappear completely in a fully disenchanted world. Turner focuses on the idea, widespread among philosophers, that the normative does not reduce to the causal: his main claim is that social science succeeds in the reduction of the normative in causal terms, overcoming normative/causal dualism. Furthermore, this success is presented as creating a serious challenge for normativism. By focusing on certain (supposedly normative) features of beliefs like those involved in belief change dynamics, I will point out some interesting implications and problems for Turner’s anti-normativism. (shrink)

L’articolo intende proporre una lettura del _Breve trattato sulle cause che possono far abbondare li regni d’oro e d’argento_ di Antonio Serra incentrata su una storia delle arti di governo. Ricostruendo il dibattito napoletano sulle cause della crisi monetaria degli inizi del XVII secolo e focalizzando l’attenzione sul problema delle pratiche di governo della moneta, l’obiettivo del saggio è quello di sottrarre il trattato di Serra all’ipoteca di una retrospettiva sulla scienza economica per inquadrarlo all’interno dei problemi politici del proprio (...) tempo. (shrink)

La complessità della tradizione letteraria sui primi secoli della vita di Roma è ormai nota, e proverbiale è quella sulla biografia romulea, imperniata su informazioni ambigue e contrastanti che, tra luci e ombre, rendono affascinante lo studio della sua figura, fin dall’antichità. Non da meno il caso della sua scomparsa, che presenta due varianti principali: in effetti, se in una il primo sovrano di Roma era assunto in cielo tra gli dei, nell’altra era brutalmente smembrato dalla furia dei patres. Nel (...) presente contributo, che si colloca solo in coda a una lunga storia di studi storiografici, attraverso una prospettiva prettamente politica, si è cercato di comprendere le motivazioni sottostanti alla presenza di queste due, non solo diverse, ma diametralmente opposte tradizioni sulla scomparsa di Romolo. Il taglio politico conferito intende giustificare tale doppia esistenza partendo dallo sfruttamento del mito di Romolo all’interno dell’evoluzione e degli sconvolgimenti politici del I secolo a.C., divenendo oggetto centrale nel dibattito politico repubblicano: nella lotta tra le fazioni o negli scontri tra gli imperatores che dominarono la scena. (shrink)

The paper provides both a description of conspiracy beliefs and an insight into their cultural significance. On one side, it highlights their specific formal features, on the other, and this constitutes its peculiarity in the recent literature on the topic, it considers them within the broader genre of general conceptual beliefs, whose main characteristics are weak methodology and logical structure, strong affective and dispositional constraints, epistemic closure and mauvaise foi, and whose main function is practical and self-representative (not epistemic). The (...) paper also claims that political theory and social sciences had some influence in legitimizing certain ideas and stereotypes that are exacerbated in conspiracy beliefs, while other te(le)ological conceptions, such as finalism and providence, may be an important source of ideas that turn out to be widely spread in contemporary criticism towards those same beliefs. (shrink)

The knowledge of truth, in Plato, is an experience that calls for conversion of the soul (μεταστροφή, περιστροφή). The basic feature of this experience consists in some sort of connection, which is constantly at work, between rational arguments and their non-rational conditions, briefly, lógos and páthos. How does this connection show up in Plato? Its crucial importance emerges many times at both narrative (récit) and theoretical level. In the three parts of my contribution, I show how logos-pathos intertwines with Plato's (...) notion of conversion considered as a double-sided phenomenon, as both "process" of moral education and "noetic event". (shrink)

During the second decade of the 20th century Hans Kleinpeter, an Austrian scholar devoted to the development of the modern science, published some brief papers on Nietzsche’s thought. Kleinpeter has been one of the main upholders of Mach’s epistemology and probably the first who connected his ideas with the philosophy of Nietzsche. In his book on Der Phänomenalismus (1913) he described a new world view that arose in the 19th century, a perspective that ‒ according to him ‒ completely contrasted (...) the mechanistic and metaphysical world view of the old school of scientific inquiry. The main outcome of the scientists whose name was related with this perspective (e.g. Clifford, Maxwell, Kirchoff and, obviously, Mach himself) has been the refusal of the absolute value of any “truth”. Kleinpeter’s statements on this topic are a good example of the rising of a Scientific Philosophy, whose development involved many scientists and thinkers that later set up the Verein Ernst Mach and the Wiener Kreis. On the other hand, his interest on Nietzsche is a relevant case of reception of the latter’s thought, that Kleinpeter puts into the context of the contemporary epistemology. In fact, he considers Nietzsche as one of the main upholders of the phenomenalistic world view, and states that he «took part at the same renewal of philosophical investigation that arose from the latest results of scientific inquiry» during the 19th century. A renewal whose main outcomes has been presented by John Stallo in his book on The Concepts and Theories of Modern Physics (1881), which Kleinpeter translated in German and published in 1901. According to Kleinpeter, in Nietzsche’s writings (mostly unpublished) one can find a theory of knowledge quite close to the one presented by both Mach and the new born Pragmatism, i.e. the complete refusal of an absolute truth and, therefore, the development of an antimetaphysical world view. In my paper I’ll discuss the main statements presented by Kleinpeter on this topic and show which of Nietzsche’s ideas has actually been in compliance with the main outcomes of late 19th century science. Thus, I’ll carry out a reconstruction of an unfamiliar side of the first period of reception of the philosophy of Nietzsche and its relevance to the development of a new (scientific) world view. (shrink)