The article deals with the concept of the court’s fault in the action for damages against a state suffered due to infringement of European Union law. The author searches for the right position of the criterion in the system of the conditions of state liability and discusses whether European Union law establishes a uniform standard of fault, or at least the guidance on the application of the criterion that would enable uniform national judicial practices concerning state liability for the infringements (...) attributable to the courts of last instance. The article also analyses national legal regulation and jurisprudence of several Member States such as France, Belgium and Italy, providing the definitions of different forms of fault and (or) examples of their practical implementation. (shrink)

L'approche historique des films souffre en France d'une double myopie : soit on sauve selon des critères cinéphiliques hérités de la « politique des auteurs » quelques chefs-d'œuvre qui transcendent leur époque ; soit on évalue les films selon des critères politiques ou idéologiques exogènes, comme « reflets » des débats de l'heure. Nous avons tenté d'élaborer des hypothèses à partir de ce dont parlent la plupart des films de fiction en France : les relations entre les hommes et les (...) fe... (shrink)

L'approche historique des films souffre en France d'une double myopie : soit on sauve selon des critères cinéphiliques hérités de la « politique des auteurs » quelques chefs-d'œuvre qui transcendent leur époque ; soit on évalue les films selon des critères politiques ou idéologiques exogènes, comme « reflets » des débats de l'heure. Nous avons tenté d'élaborer des hypothèses à partir de ce dont parlent la plupart des films de fiction en France : les relations entre les hommes et les (...) fe... (shrink)

O presente texto não pretende ser um artigo analítico sobre Bourdieu mas um ensaio escrito da perspectiva de uma cientista política sobre as possibilidades abertas pela teoria desenvolvida pelo sociólogo francês para o estudo dos fenômenos da política. Com este propósito trabalharei com as noções de campo e capitais.

Trata-se de relato de experiência sobre a rede de atençao psicossocial com populaçoes vulneraveis, populaçoes de imigrantes africanos e estrangeiros em geral que vivem no contexto francês através do Centro de Acolhimento a Refugiados. A reflexao busca estabelecer um eixo de consideraçao sobre a realidade do nordeste brasileiro com as perspectivas da epistemologia da Terapia Comunitaria criada pelo professor e médico psiquiatra Adalberto Barreto, e consideraçoes da pedagogia de Paulo Freire a fim de exercer o cuidado em saude mental para (...) pessoas expostas a extremas violências de ordem étnica, cultural, psiquica, econômica, social e moral. O relato revela que os conhecimentos e experiência brasileira estao sendo aprofundados e desenvolvidos por profissionais da saude mental no contexto francês através da clinica da antropologia médica, junto ao Polo de Pesquisa Médica Psicologica Associaçao Minkoviska em Paris com apoio do Ministerio da Saude da França. (shrink)

Les deux auteurs qui nous ont déjà donné en 1996, sur un sujet similaire, La Drôle de guerre des sexes du cinéma français : 1930-1956 (dont Brigitte Rollet a rendu compte dans Clio HFS, n°7) se livrent là à un exercice difficile qui représente un vrai tour de force : faire en 128 pages un bilan des approches genrées dans les études cinématographiques, une étude comparée entre la France et les États-Unis et une mise au point sur des films tournés (...) des années 1930 au plus contemporain. Ce bilan... (shrink)

Dernier ouvrage en date de l'excellente série dirigée par Michel Marie de l'Université de Paris III, le livre de Noël Burch et de Geneviève Sellier marque à bien des égards un moment important dans la recherche sur le cinéma en France. Bien que le cinéma de cette période trouble et troublée de l'histoire contemporaine ait déjà été traitée par d'autres (voir Jacques Siclier et François Garçon par exemple), l'approche méthodologique adoptée par les auteurs renouvelle radicalement le disc..

Dernier ouvrage en date de l'excellente série dirigée par Michel Marie de l'Université de Paris III, le livre de Noël Burch et de Geneviève Sellier marque à bien des égards un moment important dans la recherche sur le cinéma en France. Bien que le cinéma de cette période trouble et troublée de l'histoire contemporaine ait déjà été traitée par d'autres (voir Jacques Siclier et François Garçon par exemple), l'approche méthodologique adoptée par les auteurs renouvelle radicalement le disc...

L’ouvrage de Delphine Chedaleux, tiré d’une thèse soutenue en 2011, présente bien des attraits. Son auteure propose de revisiter le cinéma des « années noires » à la croisée des stars studies et des études sur les rapports sociaux de genre. Dans le sillage de Noël Burch et de Geneviève Sellier (La Drôle de guerre des sexes du cinéma français, Nathan, 1996), l’auteure exhume des films populaires, délégitimés par la culture dominante, qu’elle érige en observatoires des imaginaires sociaux de (...) la... (shrink)

Introduction: representationalismMost theorists of cognition endorse some version of representationalism, which I will understand as the view that the human mind is an information-using system, and that human cognitive capacities are representational capacities. Of course, notions such as ‘representation’ and ‘information-using’ are terms of art that require explication. As a first pass, representations are “mediating states of an intelligent system that carry information” (Markman and Dietrich 2001, p. 471). They have two important features: (1) they are physically realized, and so (...) have causal powers; (2) they are intentional, in other words, they have meaning or representational content. This presumes a distinction between a representational vehicle—a physical state or structure that has causal powers and is responsible for producing behavior—and its content. Consider the following characterization of a device that computes the addition functionReaders will recognize the similarity t. (shrink)

Much of computational cognitive science construes human cognitive capacities as representational capacities, or as involving representation in some way. Computational theories of vision, for example, typically posit structures that represent edges in the distal scene. Neurons are often said to represent elements of their receptive fields. Despite the ubiquity of representational talk in computational theorizing there is surprisingly little consensus about how such claims are to be understood. The point of this chapter is to sketch an account of the nature (...) and function of representation in computational cognitive models. (shrink)

In epistemology the nagging voice of the sceptic has always been present, whispering that 'You can't know that you have hands, or just about anything else, because for all you know your whole life is a dream.' Philosophers have recently devised ingenious ways to argue against and silence this voice, but Bryan Frances now presents a highly original argument template for generating new kinds of radical scepticism, ones that hold even if all the clever anti-sceptical fixes defeat the traditional (...) sceptic. Sharp, witty, and fun to read, Scepticism Comes Alive will be highly provocative for anyone interested in knowledge and its limits. (shrink)

Frances Kamm sets out to draw and make plausible distinctions that would show how and why it is, in some circumstances, permissible to kill some to save many more, but is not so in others. To do so she draws on a famous, and famously artificial, example of Judith Thomson, which illustrates the fact that people intutitively reject some instances of such killings but not others. The irrationality, implausibility and in many cases the self-defeating nature of such distinctions I (...) had attempted to expose in my 'The Survival Lottery' over 25 years ago. I still think these distinctions irrational and implausible and I will try, in this response, to show why this remains the case and why doctrines of additional effects, to however many powers they are taken, remain unhelpful in ethics. (shrink)

Frances Tustin's classic text _Autistic States in Children_ put forward convincing clinical evidence that some forms of childhood autism are psychogenic and respond to methods of treatment very different from the behavioural techniques often adopted without success. Her pioneering work with such children has gained ground since the book was first published and she herself has revised her understanding of the aetiology of psychogenic autism. This revised edition of the book incorporates her new thinking based on recent infant observational (...) studies and her own clinical experience. (shrink)

In their important paper “Autonomous Agents”, Floridi and Sanders use “levels of abstraction” to argue that computers are or may soon be moral agents. In this paper we use the same levels of abstraction to illuminate differences between human moral agents and computers. In their paper, Floridi and Sanders contributed definitions of autonomy, moral accountability and responsibility, but they have not explored deeply some essential questions that need to be answered by computer scientists who design artificial agents. One such question (...) is, “Can an artificial agent that changes its own programming become so autonomous that the original designer is no longer responsible for the behavior of the artificial agent?” To explore this question, we distinguish between LoA1 (the user view) and LoA2 (the designer view) by exploring the concepts of unmodifiable, modifiable and fully modifiable tables that control artificial agents. We demonstrate that an agent with an unmodifiable table, when viewed at LoA2, distinguishes an artificial agent from a human one. This distinction supports our first counter-claim to Floridi and Sanders, namely, that such an agent is not a moral agent, and the designer bears full responsibility for its behavior. We also demonstrate that even if there is an artificial agent with a fully modifiable table capable of learning* and intentionality* that meets the conditions set by Floridi and Sanders for ascribing moral agency to an artificial agent, the designer retains strong moral responsibility. (shrink)

Among the cognitive capacities of evolved creatures is the capacity to represent. Theories in cognitive neuroscience typically explain our manifest representational capacities by positing internal representations, but there is little agreement about how these representations function, especially with the relatively recent proliferation of connectionist, dynamical, embodied, and enactive approaches to cognition. In this talk I sketch an account of the nature and function of representation in cognitive neuroscience that couples a realist construal of representational vehicles with a pragmatic account of (...) mental content. I call the resulting package a deflationary account of mental representation and I argue that it avoids the problems that afflict competing accounts. (shrink)

Nicholas Shea offers Varitel Semantics as a naturalistic account of mental content. I argue that the account secures determinate content only by appeal to pragmatic considerations, and so it fails to respect naturalism. But that is fine, because representational content is not, strictly speaking, necessary for explanation in cognitive science. Even in Shea’s own account, content serves only a variety of heuristic functions.

The computational theory of mind construes the mind as an information-processor and cognitive capacities as essentially representational capacities. Proponents of the view claim a central role for representational content in computational models of these capacities. In this paper I argue that the standard view of the role of representational content in computational models is mistaken; I argue that representational content is to be understood as a gloss on the computational characterization of a cognitive process.Keywords: Computation; Representational content; Cognitive capacities; Explanation.

This paper presents results found through searching publicly available U.S. data sources for information about how to handle incidental fndings (IF) in human subjects research, especially in genetics and genomics research, neuroimaging research, and CT colonography research. We searched the Web sites of 14 federal agencies, 22 professional societies, and 100 universities, as well as used the search engine Google for actual consent forms that had been posted on the Internet. Our analysis of these documents showed that there is very (...) little public guidance available for researchers as to how to deal with incidental fndings. Moreover, the guidance available is not consistent. (shrink)

As software developers design artificial agents , they often have to wrestle with complex issues, issues that have philosophical and ethical importance. This paper addresses two key questions at the intersection of philosophy and technology: What is deception? And when is it permissible for the developer of a computer artifact to be deceptive in the artifact’s development? While exploring these questions from the perspective of a software developer, we examine the relationship of deception and trust. Are developers using deception to (...) gain our trust? Is trust generated through technological “enchantment” warranted? Next, we investigate more complex questions of how deception that involves AAs differs from deception that only involves humans. Finally, we analyze the role and responsibility of developers in trust situations that involve both humans and AAs. (shrink)

In this article I am concerned with whether it could be morally significant to distinguish between doing something 'in order to bring about an effect' as opposed to 'doing something because we will bring about an effect'. For example, the Doctrine of Double Effect tells us that we should not act in order to bring about evil, but even if this is true is it perhaps permissible to act only because an evil will thus occur? I discuss these questions in (...) connection with a version of the so-called Trolley Problem known as the Loop Case. I also consider how these questions may bear on whether a rational agent must aim at an event which he believes is causally necessary to achieve an end he pursues. (shrink)

A common kind of explanation in cognitive neuroscience might be called functiontheoretic: with some target cognitive capacity in view, the theorist hypothesizes that the system computes a well-defined function (in the mathematical sense) and explains how computing this function constitutes (in the system’s normal environment) the exercise of the cognitive capacity. Recently, proponents of the so-called ‘new mechanist’ approach in philosophy of science have argued that a model of a cognitive capacity is explanatory only to the extent that it reveals (...) the causal structure of the mechanism underlying the capacity. If they are right, then a cognitive model that resists a transparent mapping to known neural mechanisms fails to be explanatory. I argue that a functiontheoretic characterization of a cognitive capacity can be genuinely explanatory even absent an account of how the capacity is realized in neural hardware. (shrink)

What personal truths reside in biological ties that are absent in adoptive ties? And why do we think adoptive and biological ties are essentially different when it comes to understanding who we are? At a time when interest in DNA and ancestry is exploding, Frances Latchford questions the idea that knowing one's bio-genealogy is integral to personal identity or a sense of family and belonging. Upending our established values and beliefs about what makes a family, Steeped in Blood examines (...) the social and political devaluation of adoptive ties. It takes readers on an intellectual journey through accepted wisdom about adoption, twins, kinship, and incest, and challenges our naturalistic and individualistic assumptions about identity and the biological ties that bind us, sometimes violently, to our families. Latchford exposes how our desire for bio-genealogical knowledge, understood as it is by family and adoption experts, pathologizes adoptees by posing the biological tie as a necessary condition for normal identity formation. Rejecting the idea that a love of the self-same is fundamental to family bonds, her book is a reaction to the wounds families suffer whenever they dare to revel in their difference. A rejoinder to rhetoric that defines adoptees, adoptive kin, and their family intimacies as inferior and inauthentic, Steeped in Blood's view through the lens of critical adoption studies decentres our cultural obsession with the biological family imaginary and makes real the possibility of being family in the absence of blood. (shrink)

Phenomenology is a well‐founded qualitative methodology that is frequently used by nurse researchers and considered of value when addressing research questions in nursing practice and nurse education. However, at present, nurse researchers using phenomenology tend to divide phenomenological methodology into the descriptive and interpretive formats. The nursing literature suggests that there is a deep divide between researchers following the methodological underpinnings and basic precepts pertaining to these two camps. If we are to reach a clearer understanding of the theory underlying (...) phenomenological methods it would be more helpful if we started to recognise that there are also important associations between transcendental and interpretive phenomenology. One such association is that a paradigm of movement exists that is not unique to transcendental and interpretive phenomenology but is common to them, as well as being inherent within a variety of fields of study. If we consider the universality of such imagery, looking to examples through parallel texts, we can obtain insights into phenomenology and its transposition into a workable scientific method that can be of use to the nurse researcher. (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to investigate how cultural meanings associated with the left ventricular assist device inform acceptance and experience of this innovative technology when it is used as a destination therapy. We conducted open-ended, semistructured interviews with family caregivers and patients who had undergone LVAD-DT procedures at six U.S. hospitals. A grounded theory approach was used for the analysis. Thirty-nine patients and 42 caregivers participated. Participants described a sense of obligation to undergo the procedure because of its (...) promise for salvation. However, once the device was implanted, patients described being placed into a liminal state of being neither sick nor healthy, with no culturally scripted role. Consideration of end-of-life decisions was complicated by the uncertainties about how patients with LVADs die. Pre-implantation communications among patient, family, and clinicians should take into account the impact of the technology on meaning, identity, and patient experience. (shrink)

Researchers in the health sciences regularly discover information of potential health importance unrelated to their object of study in the course of their research. However, there appears to be little guidance available on what researchers should do with this information, known in the scientific literature as incidental findings. The study described here was designed to determine the extent of guidance available to researchers from public sources. This empirical study was part of a larger two-year project funded by the National Human (...) Genome Research Institute to generate guidance on how incidental findings should be managed in human subjects research, especially genetics, genomics, and imaging research. We generated empirical analysis of publicly available guidance and consent forms to help guide a multidisciplinary Working Group of experts in their formulation of normative recommendations reported in this symposium. (shrink)

Many people with religious beliefs, pro or con, are aware that those beliefs are denied by a great number of others who are as reasonable, intelligent, fair-minded, and relatively unbiased as they are. Such a realization often leads people to wonder, “How do I know I’m right and they’re wrong? How do I know that the basis for my belief is right and theirs is misleading?” In spite of that realization, most people stick with their admittedly controversial religious belief. This (...) entry examines the epistemology of such belief retention, addressing issues of disagreement, agnosticism, skepticism, and the rationality of reflective religious belief. (shrink)

Hunger continues to be one of humanity's greatest challenges despite the existence of a more-than-adequate global food supply equal to 2,800 kilocalories for every person every day. In measuring progress, policy-makers and concerned citizens across the globe rely on information supplied by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), an agency of the United Nations. In 2010 the FAO reported that in the wake of the 2007–2008 food-price spikes and global economic crisis, the number of people experiencing hunger worldwide since 2005–2007 (...) had increased by 150 million, rising above 1 billion in 2009. However, in itsState of Food Insecurity in the World 2012(SOFI 12) the FAO presented new estimates, having revamped its methods and reinterpreted its hunger data back to 1990. The revised numbers for the period 1990–1992 to 2010–2012 reverse the trend to a steadily falling one. Based on the FAO's new calculations, extreme undernourishment peaked in 1990 at a record-breaking one billion, followed by a significant decline through 2006, when progress stalled but did not reverse (see chart below). (shrink)

Mohan Matthen has failed to understand the position I develop and defend in “How to Think about Mental Content.” No doubt some of the fault lies with my exposition, though Matthen often misconstrues passages that are clear in context. He construes clarifications and elaborations of my argument to be “concessions.” Rather than dwell too much on specific misunderstandings of my explanatory project and its attendant claims, I will focus on the main points of disagreement.RepresentationalismMy project in the paper is to (...) argue for a particular construal of the role of representational content in computational models of cognition. The view is committed to two kinds of representational content—mathematical content, which characterizes the mathematical function computed by a device and subsumes both biological and artifactual computers, and cognitive content. The latter is determined in part by external, so-called ‘naturalistic’ factors (for example, visual mechanisms represent such distal pro. (shrink)

Debating Single-Sex Education provides both practitioners and policymakers with a timely, detailed, and focused compilation of the issues surrounding single-sex education. It includes qualitative case studies and quantitative evidence of the effects of single-sex education on student achievement.