he first institutional theory of art is outlined in a 1964 essay by Arthur Danto, “The Artworld,” which ruminates on the paradox that Andy Warhol’s Brillo Boxes is art though any of its perceptually indistinguishable twins—any stack of Brillo boxes in a grocery store—is not. Danto’s offers this solution to the paradox: “To see something as art requires something the eye cannot descry—an atmosphere of artistic theory, a knowledge of the history of art: an artworld.” Ultimately, though, it is “art (...) theory” that makes Warhol’s stack of silk screened plywood boxes into art. (shrink)
How can we experience real emotions when viewing a movie or reading a novel or watching a play when we know the characters whose actions have this effect on us do not exist? This is a conundrum that has puzzled philosophers for a long time, and in this book Robert Yanal both canvasses previously proposed solutions to it and offers one of his own. First formulated by Samuel Johnson, the paradox received its most famous answer from Samuel Taylor Coleridge, who (...) advised his readers to engage in a "willing suspension of disbelief." More recently, philosophers have argued that we are irrational in emoting toward fiction, or that we do not emote toward fiction but rather toward factual counterparts, or that we do not have real but only quasi-emotion toward fiction, generated by our playing games of make-believe. All of these proposed solutions are critically reviewed. Finding these answers unsatisfactory, Yanal offers an alternative, providing a new version of what has been dubbed "thought theory." On this theory, mere thoughts not believed true are seen as the functional equivalent of belief at least insofar as stimulating emotion is concerned. The emoter's disbelief in the actuality of components of the thoughts must be rendered relatively inactive. Such emotion is real and typically has the character of being richly generated yet unconsummated. The book extends this theory also to resolving other paradoxes arising from emotional response to fiction: how we feel suspense over what comes next in a story even when we are re-reading it for a second or third time; and how we take pleasure in narratives, such as tragedy, that excite unpleasant emotions such as fear, pity, or horror. (shrink)
How are dependent (or linked) premises to be distinguished from independent (or convergent) premises? Deductive validity, sometimes proposed as a necessary condition for depende'nce, cannot be, for the premises of both inductive and deductive but invalid arguments can be dependent. The question is really this: When do multiple premises for a certain conclusion fonn one argument for that conclusion and when do they form multiple arguments? Answer: Premises are dependent when the evidence they offer for their conclusion is more than (...) the ordinary sum of their probabilities. Ordinary sums are defined in the paper. (shrink)
arratives, fictional and factual, commonly raise in their audience suspense. A narrative lays out over time a sequence of events; and because the events of the narrative are not completely told all at once, questions arise for the audience which will be answered only later in the narrative’s telling. Will the transfigured panther-woman pounce on her rival as she walks home alone at night, hearing strange noises around her? Will Sam and Annie ever make their date at the top of (...) the Empire State Building? And the most classic question of all, Who dunnit?, or as it appears in its post-modern form, Who will do it? ‘This is the story of a murder. It hasn’t happened yet. But it will,’ Martin Amis writes at the beginning of London Fields. ‘I know the murderer, I know the murderee,’ and we’re soon told that the murderee is to be Nicola Six.1 But who will kill her? And why? (shrink)
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It also follows from what has been said that it is not thc poct’s business to relate actual cvcms, but such things as might or could happen in accordance with probability or necessity. A poet differs from a historian, not bccausc 0nc writes vcrsc and thc othcr prose (thc work of Hcrodotus could bc put imo vcrsc, but it would still remain a history, whcthcr in vcrsc 0r prose), but because thc historian relates what happcncd, thc poet what might happen. (...) That is why poetry is more akin to philosophy and is 21 bcttcr thing than history; poetry deals with general truths, history with specific cvcnts. The latter arc, for example, what Alcibiadcs did or suffered, whilc general truths arc thc kind of thing.. (shrink)
Sartre’s commentary on bad faith is the starting-point for an exploration of self-deception: what it is not, what it is, and whether it’s always wrong. The proffered analysis of selfdeception parallels a certain theory of our experience of fiction. In essence, it is argued that the self-deceiver creates a kind of fiction in which he is a character, a fiction that he nonetheless believes to be real.
In his Meditations Descartes tells us that he initially thought error might be avoided if he withheld assent “no less carefully from what is not plainly certain and indubitable than from what is obviously false.” For example, he thinks it plainly certain and indubitable that he is “sitting by the fire, wearing a winter cloak, holding this paper in my hands, and so on.” And yet even what is “plainly certain and indubitable” can be doubted. “I will suppose, then, not (...) that there is a supremely good God, the source of truth; but that there is an evil spirit, who is supremely powerful and intelligent, and does his utmost to deceive me.” Such a deceiver can spin illusions that appear indubitably real and true—of hands, fire, cloak, paper—and not only when there are none present in any particular case but even where there are none at all in any case. “I will suppose that sky, air, earth, colors, shapes, sounds and all external objects are mere delusive dreams, by means of which he lays snares for my credulity.”2 The deceiver hypothesis is the most difficult skeptical doubt Descartes must surmount in the remaining Meditations. I say the deceiver hypothesis, and for Descartes the deceiver is a mere possibility, raised so as to motivate the reconstitution of knowledge that follows. That there might be a powerful deceiver is itself a threat to knowledge for Descartes. Indeed even the possibility of an evil deceiver is so powerful a threat that Descartes must do nothing less than prove God’s existence to reestablish certainty. It is only at the end of his Meditations that Descartes can say, as if looking back on a hysterical moment, that the evil deceiver idea was “exaggerated” and “ridiculous.”3.. (shrink)
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Ronald Dworkin, beginning in about 1967, has written a series of articles attacking the dominant contemporary theory of law, the legal positivism of H. L. A. Hart. Dworkin’s articles, while largely critical, go far towards establishing his own theory of the law, a theory that while never explicitly and succinctly formulated can nonetheless be reconstructed from his critical remarks. The theory is a combination of positivism and natural law theory, and indeed has been named by one of its critics, “The (...) Third Theory of Law.”. (shrink)
George Dickie has been one of the most innovative, influential, and controversial philosophers of art working in the analytical tradition in the past twenty-five years. Dickie's arguments against the various theories of aesthetic attitude, aesthetic perception, and aesthetic experience virtually brought classical theories of the aesthetic to a halt. His institutional theory of art was perhaps the most discussed proposal in aesthetics during the 1970s and 1980s, inspiring both supporters who produced variations on the theory as well as passionate detractors (...) who thought the theory thoroughly wrongheaded. Dickie has also written widely on the history of aesthetics, and his work ranks among the best examples of analytic aesthetics. The philosophy of George Dickie continues to provoke reaction and reflection. The essays in this collection pay homage not only to Dickie's ideas but also to his influence. A brief biography of George Dickie and a bibliography of his works complete the volume. (shrink)
he most worrisome skeptical doubt Descartes raises in the first of his Meditations is the hypothesis of an evil deceiver. While it might seem plainly certain and indubitable that he is “sitting by the fire, wearing a winter cloak, holding this paper” in his hands, and so on, it is possible that all these—fire, cloak, paper, even hands—are illusions. “I will suppose, then, not that there is a supremely good God, the source of truth; but that there is an evil (...) spirit, who is supremely powerful and intelligent, and does his utmost to deceive me. I will suppose that sky, air, earth, colors, shapes, sounds and all external objects are mere delusive dreams, by means of which he lays snares for my credulity.”. (shrink)
Between Hanslick's negative thesis (music cannot portray specific feelings) and his positive thesis (the beauty of music is just the beauty of its tonal forms) lies what I call his disconnection thesis: ‘Even if it were possible for feelings to be represented by music, the degree of beauty in the music would not correspond to the degree of exactitude with which the music represented them’. In short, the beauty of a piece of music and its expressive properties are disconnected. Hanslick (...) supports this thesis with four arguments. Unfortunately for Hanslick none of these works. (shrink)
Readers of Kant’s Critique of Judgment (1790) have understandably been stumped trying to decipher Kant’s views on the relation between beauty and art.1 At §43 Kant ends his discussion of “free natural” beauties such as flowers and birds of paradise and begins to formulate a theory of fine art, according to which fine art has as its purpose the expression of “aesthetic ideas.” This theory of fine art, perhaps because it is saddled with examples of second-rate art (including a poem (...) by “the great king” Frederick) and is sketchier than the theory of beauty, has not been given the attention accorded the four “moments”. However, Kant’s theory of fine art is not as “unsophisticated” and “unenlightening” as one commentator thinks.2 It is rough and unfinished, but even so, it lays claim to being, along with Aristotle’s account of the “philosophical” implications of literature, one of the great pre-Hegelian statements on the capacity of art to express ideas. At least, the fact that the Critique of Judgment contains such a theory should stand as a warning to those who blame Kant for “neutering” the capacity of art to have any practical effect by reducing art to a contrivance for producing an enemic “disinterested” pleasure.3 On the contrary: Kant himself may in fact have thought his theory of fine art the capstone of his aesthetics. For at §51 he writes, “We may in general call beauty (whether natural or artistic) the expression of aesthetic ideas.” And here is where the puzzle begins, for it is not at all clear how or why beauty should even apply to the expression of aesthetic ideas — let alone apply in a way such that “we may in general call beauty … the expression of aesthetic ideas.”. (shrink)
Criticism of court decisions is a favored American pastime. Typically, such criticisms are grounded in extra-legal criteria such as common sense (or lack of it) and morality (or immorality). Thus Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill (1978) in which the Supreme Court halted the construction of the nearly completed Tellico Dam because it endangered the habitat of the snail darter, an action forbidden by the Endangered Species Act, was said to confound common sense; and many have called immoral Roe v. Wade (...) (1973) which said the right to abortion, at least through the first trimester, was constitutionally guaranteed. 1 However, even if such criticisms are justified, they do not address the legal issue, which is whether the court got the law wrong. (shrink)
Shouldn't we be convinced by good arguments and not by bad ones? But there are valid arguments with true premises that are not known to be true. What we minimally expect is that people follow the logic of the argument. How will they do this? Descartes advised us to perceive clearly and distinctly the steps in the argument. Aristotle looked toward the enthymeme so that the audience would draw the conclusion on their own. These 'thinking through' strategies are an aid (...) to conviction but cannot guarantee it. Do we need the fallacies and other dirty tricks of rhetoric after all? (shrink)
THEORY 0f opera ought t0 reveal how its clcmcn Ls are imcgratcd. Acting Macbeth in Kabuki costumc while the Haydn London symphonies play is at best Dada, but n0L opcra. The text in opcra is not merely a vehicle for the singer t0 vocalize 0n, like solfeggio 0r scat. The music is not incidental L0 the text, like 21 background divertimen!0 L0 dinner party convcrsation. And the other devices 0f th€21tr€—costumes, sets, lighting, gesture, and movement are not fancy embellishments L0 (...) the drama, like the frame amund Ei.. (shrink)
George Dickie has been one of the most innovative, influential, and controversial philosophers of art working in the analytical tradition in the past twenty-five years. Dickie's arguments against the various theories of aesthetic attitude, aesthetic perception, and aesthetic experience virtually brought classical theories of the aesthetic to a halt. His institutional theory of art was perhaps the most discussed proposal in aesthetics during the 1970s and 1980s, inspiring both supporters who produced variations on the theory as well as passionate detractors (...) who thought the theory thoroughly wrongheaded. Dickie has also written widely on the history of aesthetics, and his work ranks among the best examples of analytic aesthetics. The philosophy of George Dickie continues to provoke reaction and reflection. The essays in this collection pay homage not only to Dickie's ideas but also to his influence. A brief biography of George Dickie and a bibliography of his works complete the volume. (shrink)
