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Roy A. Sorensen [82]Roy Arnold Sorensen [1]
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Roy Sorensen
University of Texas at Austin
  1. Blindspots.Roy A. Sorensen - 1988 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
    Sorensen here offers a unified solution to a large family of philosophical puzzles and paradoxes through a study of "blindspots": consistent propositions that cannot be rationally accepted by certain individuals even though they might by true.
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  2. Thought Experiments.Roy A. Sorensen - 1992 - Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.
    Sorensen presents a general theory of thought experiments: what they are, how they work, what are their virtues and vices. On Sorensen's view, philosophy differs from science in degree, but not in kind. For this reason, he claims, it is possible to understand philosophical thought experiments by concentrating on their resemblance to scientific relatives. Lessons learned about scientific experimentation carry over to thought experiment, and vice versa. Sorensen also assesses the hazards and pseudo-hazards of thought experiments. Although he grants that (...)
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  3. Vagueness and Contradiction.Roy A. Sorensen - 2001 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
    Roy Sorenson offers a unique exploration of an ancient problem: vagueness. Did Buddha become a fat man in one second? Is there a tallest short giraffe? According to Sorenson's epistemicist approach, the answers are yes! Although vagueness abounds in the way the world is divided, Sorenson argues that the divisions are sharp; yet we often do not know where they are. Written in Sorenson'e usual inventive and amusing style, this book offers original insight on language and logic, the way world (...)
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  4.  4
    Thought Experiments.Roy A. Sorensen - 1992 - Oxford and New York: Oup Usa.
    In this book, Sorensen presents the first general theory of the thought experiment. He analyses a wide variety of thought experiments, ranging from aesthetics to zoology, and explores what thought experiments are, how they work, and what their positive and negative aspects are. Sorensen also sets his theory within an evolutionary framework and integrates recent advances in experimental psychology and the history of science.
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  5. Seeing Dark Things: The Philosophy of Shadows.Roy A. Sorensen - 2008 - Oxford University Press.
    The eclipse riddle -- Seeing surfaces -- The disappearing act -- Spinning shadows -- Berkeley's shadow -- Para-reflections -- Para-refractions : shadowgrams and the black drop -- Goethe's colored shadows -- Filtows -- Holes in the light -- Black and blue -- Seeing in black and white -- We see in the dark -- Hearing silence.
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  6.  80
    Thought Experiments and the Epistemology of Laws.Roy A. Sorensen - 1992 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 22 (1):15-44.
    The aim of this paper is to show how thought experiments help us learn about laws. After providing examples of this kind of nomic illumination in the first section, I canvass explanations of our modal knowledge and opt for an evolutionary account. The basic application is that the laws of nature have led us to develop rough and ready intuitions of physical possibility which are then exploited by thought experimenters to reveal some of the very laws responsible for those intuitions. (...)
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  7. Yablo's Paradox and Kindred Infinite Liars.Roy A. Sorensen - 1998 - Mind 107 (425):137-155.
    This is a defense and extension of Stephen Yablo's claim that self-reference is completely inessential to the liar paradox. An infinite sequence of sentences of the form 'None of these subsequent sentences are true' generates the same instability in assigning truth values. I argue Yablo's technique of substituting infinity for self-reference applies to all so-called 'self-referential' paradoxes. A representative sample is provided which includes counterparts of the preface paradox, Pseudo-Scotus's validity paradox, the Knower, and other enigmas of the genre. I (...)
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  8. Dogmatism, Junk Knowledge, and Conditionals.Roy A. Sorensen - 1988 - Philosophical Quarterly 38 (153):433-454.
  9.  52
    Vagueness. [REVIEW]Roy A. Sorensen - 1994 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (2):483-486.
  10.  17
    Identity and Discrimination.Roy A. Sorensen - 1992 - Philosophical Quarterly 42 (166):95-98.
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  11. Ducking Harm.Christopher Boorse & Roy A. Sorensen - 1988 - Journal of Philosophy 85 (3):115-134.
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  12. An argument for the vagueness of vague.Roy A. Sorensen - 1985 - Analysis 45 (3):134.
    The argument proceeds by exploiting the gradually decreasing vagueness of a certain sequence of predicates. the vagueness of 'vague' is then used to show that the thesis that all vague predicates are incoherent is self-defeating. a second casualty is the view that the probems of vagueness can be avoided by restricting the scope of logic to nonvague predicates.
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  13. 'P, Therefore, P' Without Circularity.Roy A. Sorensen - 1991 - Journal of Philosophy 88 (5):245-266.
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  14.  62
    Recalcitrant Variations of the Prediction Paradox.Roy A. Sorensen - 1982 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 60 (4):355 – 362.
  15.  90
    Conditional Blindspots and the Knowledge Squeeze: A Solution to the Prediction Paradox.Roy A. Sorensen - 1984 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 62 (2):126 – 135.
    (1984). Conditional blindspots and the knowledge squeeze: A solution to the prediction paradox. Australasian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 62, No. 2, pp. 126-135.
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  16.  49
    Logical Luck.Roy A. Sorensen - 1998 - Philosophical Quarterly 48 (192):319-334.
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  17.  12
    `P, Therefore, P' Without Circularity.Roy A. Sorensen - 1991 - Journal of Philosophy 88 (5):245-266.
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  18. Knowing, believing, and guessing.Roy A. Sorensen - 1982 - Analysis 42 (4):212.
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  19. Vagueness, Measurement, and Blurriness.Roy A. Sorensen - 1988 - Synthese 75 (1):45 - 82.
  20.  55
    Self-Deception and Scattered Events.Roy A. Sorensen - 1985 - Mind 94 (373):64-69.
  21. A Thousand Clones.Roy A. Sorensen - 1994 - Mind 103 (409):47-54.
  22.  17
    Ducking Harm.Christopher Boorse & Roy A. Sorensen - 1988 - Journal of Philosophy 85 (3):115-134.
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  23.  33
    Modal Bloopers: Why Believable Impossibilities Are Necessary.Roy A. Sorensen - 1996 - American Philosophical Quarterly 33 (3):247 - 261.
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  24.  16
    Thought Experiments and the Epistemology of Laws.Roy A. Sorensen - 1992 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 22 (1):15-44.
    The aim of this paper is to show how thought experiments help us learn about laws. After providing examples of this kind of nomic illumination in the first section, I canvass explanations of our modal knowledge and opt for an evolutionary account. The basic application is that the laws of nature have led us to develop rough and ready intuitions of physical possibility which are then exploited by thought experimenters to reveal some of the very laws responsible for those intuitions. (...)
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  25. Symposium: Vagueness and Sharp Boundaries: A Thousand Clones.Roy A. Sorensen - 1994 - Mind 103 (409):47-54.
  26.  28
    Sharp Boundaries for Blobs.Roy A. Sorensen - 1998 - Philosophical Studies 91 (3):275-295.
  27. A Definite No-No.Roy A. Sorensen - 2004 - In J. C. Beall (ed.), Liars and Heaps: New Essays on Paradox. Clarendon Press.
     
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  28. Moral Dilemmas, Thought Experiments, and Conflict Vagueness.Roy A. Sorensen - 1991 - Philosophical Studies 63 (3):291 - 308.
  29. Mirror Notation: Symbol Manipulation Without Inscription Manipulation.Roy A. Sorensen - 1999 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 28 (2):141-164.
    Stereotypically, computation involves intrinsic changes to the medium of representation: writing new symbols, erasing old symbols, turning gears, flipping switches, sliding abacus beads. Perspectival computation leaves the original inscriptions untouched. The problem solver obtains the output by merely alters his orientation toward the input. There is no rewriting or copying of the input inscriptions; the output inscriptions are numerically identical to the input inscriptions. This suggests a loophole through some of the computational limits apparently imposed by physics. There can be (...)
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  30.  32
    Vagueness: An Investigation Into Natural Languages and the Sorites Paradox.Roy A. Sorensen - 1994 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (2):483-486.
  31.  28
    Vagueness Implies Cognitivism.Roy A. Sorensen - 1990 - American Philosophical Quarterly 27 (1):1 - 14.
  32.  45
    Vagueness Within the Language of Thought.Roy A. Sorensen - 1991 - Philosophical Quarterly 41 (165):389-413.
  33.  33
    Self-Strengthening Empathy.Roy A. Sorensen - 1998 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (1):75-98.
    Stepping into the other guy's shoes works best when you resemble him. After all, the procedure is to use yourself as a model: in goes hypothetical beliefs and desires, out comes hypothetical actions and revised beliefs and desires. If you are structurally analogous to the empathee, then accurate inputs generate accurate outputs-just as with any other simulation. The greater the degree of isomorphism, the more dependable and precise the results. This sensitivity to degrees of resemblance suggests that the method of (...)
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  34.  16
    Rationality as an Absolute Concept: Roy A. Sorensen.Roy A. Sorensen - 1991 - Philosophy 66 (258):473-486.
    My thesis is that ‘rational’ is an absolute concept like ‘flat’ and ‘clean’. Absolute concepts are best defined as absences. In the case of flatness, the absence of bumps, curves, and irregularities. In the case of cleanliness, the absence of dirt. Rationality, then, is the absence of irrationalities such as bias, circularity, dogmatism, and inconsistency.
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  35. Was Descartes's Cogito a Diagonal Deduction?Roy A. Sorensen - 1986 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 37 (3):346-351.
    Peter Slezak and William Boos have independently advanced a novel interpretation of Descartes's "cogito". The interpretation portrays the "cogito" as a diagonal deduction and emphasizes its resemblance to Godel's theorem and the Liar. I object that this approach is flawed by the fact that it assigns 'Buridan sentences' a legitimate role in Descartes's philosophy. The paradoxical nature of these sentences would have the peculiar result of undermining Descartes's "cogito" while enabling him to "disprove" God's existence.
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  36.  45
    The Iterated Versions of Newcomb's Problem and the Prisoner's Dilemma.Roy A. Sorensen - 1985 - Synthese 63 (2):157 - 166.
  37.  27
    Blindspotting and Choice Variations of the Prediction Paradox.Roy A. Sorensen - 1986 - American Philosophical Quarterly 23 (4):337 - 352.
  38. The Egg Came Before the Chicken.Roy A. Sorensen - 1992 - Mind 101 (403):541-2.
    Vagueness theorists tend to think that evolutionary theory dissolves the riddle "Which came first, the chicken or the egg?". After all, 'chicken' is vague. The idea is that Charles Darwin demonstrated that the chicken was preceded by borderline chickens and so it is simply indeterminate as to where the pre-chickens end and the chickens begin.
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  39.  47
    Pure Moorean Propositions.Roy A. Sorensen - 1985 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 15 (3):489 - 505.
    This paper is devoted to a solution to Moore's problem. After explaining what Moore's problem is and after considering the main approaches toward solving the problem, I provide a definition of Moorean sentences in terms of pure Moorean propositions. My solution to Moore's problem essentially involves a description of how one can contradict oneself without uttering a contradiction, and a set of definitions that exactly determines which sentences are Moorean and which are close relatives of Moorean sentences.
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  40.  20
    Rationality as an Absolute Concept.Roy A. Sorensen - 1991 - Philosophy 66 (258):473 - 486.
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  41.  8
    Self-Strengthening Empathy.Roy A. Sorensen - 1998 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 58 (1):75-98.
    Stepping into the other guy's shoes works best when you resemble him. After all, the procedure is to use yourself as a model: in goes hypothetical beliefs and desires, out comes hypothetical actions and revised beliefs and desires. If you are structurally analogous to the empathee, then accurate inputs generate accurate outputs-just as with any other simulation. The greater the degree of isomorphism, the more dependable and precise the results. This sensitivity to degrees of resemblance suggests that the method of (...)
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  42.  11
    Symposium: Vagueness and Sharp Boundaries.Roy A. Sorensen - 1994 - Mind 103 (409):47-54.
  43.  56
    The Metaphysics of Precision and Scientific Language.Roy A. Sorensen - 1997 - Philosophical Perspectives 11:349-374.
  44.  39
    Transitions.Roy A. Sorensen - 1986 - Philosophical Studies 50 (2):187 - 193.
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  45.  32
    A Strengthened Prediction Paradox.Roy A. Sorensen - 1986 - Philosophical Quarterly 36 (145):504-513.
  46.  22
    Are Enthymemes Arguments?Roy A. Sorensen - 1987 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 29 (1):155-159.
  47.  94
    Is Epistemic Preferability Transitive?Roy A. Sorensen - 1980 - Analysis 41 (3):122 - 123.
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  48.  49
    Commentary: The Epistemic Conception of Vagueness.Roy A. Sorensen - 1995 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 33 (Supplement):161-170.
  49.  48
    Pseudo-Problems: How Analytic Philosophy Gets Done.Roy A. Sorensen - 1993 - Routledge.
    In the twentieth century, philosophers tackled many of the philosophical problems of previous generations by dissolving them--attacking them as linguistic illusions and showing that the problems, when closely inspected, were not problems at all. Roy A. Sorensen takes the most important and interesting examples from one hundred years of analytic philosophy to consolidate a different theory of dissolution. Pseudo-Problems offers a fascinating alternative history of twentieth century analytic philosophy. It seeks to outline a unified account of dissolution that can consolidate (...)
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  50. Pseudo-Problems: How Analytic Philosophy Gets Done.Roy A. Sorensen - 1993 - Routledge.
    First published in 1993. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.
     
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