Leopold first discusses the conservation of natural resources in the southwestern United States in economic tenns, stressing, in particular, erosion and aridity. He then concludes his analysis with a discussion of the moral issues involved, developing his general position within the context of P. D. Ouspenky’s early philosophy of organism.

Gathers the pre-Sand Country Almanac writings of Aldo Leopold, showing that he was not born an ecologist, but evolved over time through experimentation and thought.

Introduction: having it all -- The sustainable society -- Pursuing the good -- The value of moderation -- Marshmallows and treadmills -- The joy of missing out.

This article outlines three conceptions of culture: The normative, the anthropological, and the pragmatist. I advocate a pragmatist conception of culture as practices using the conceptual resources found in John Dewey's pragmatism. I argue that culture is not to be thought of as a distinct, non-natural ontological realm, but is nature as it directs itself intelligently through historically evolved social practices. In Dewey's pragmatism, culture is another name for human experience as a practical process. I further argue that we can (...) only have cultures if we presuppose the reality of certain moral values like truthfulness, justice, and respect for ritual. Finally, I argue that the deepest understanding of culture is a kind of practical rather than cognitive understanding. 2012 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)

Summary The critique of C. H. Ratschow and Knud E. Løgstrup against the existential theology of Bultmann serves as starting point for asking the question about the possibility of thinking metaphysically within theology. Various forms of critique of metaphysics are mentioned, in particular the one of Jürgen Habermas, who’s characterisation of Martin Luther’s theology as „fideistic“ is rejected. After a short presentation of the concept of time in Luther’s De servo aritrio the creation philosophy of Løgstrup is presented as a (...) plausible theological metaphysics. (shrink)

We examine the necessary physical underpinnings for setting up the cosmological standard model with a global cosmic time parameter. In particular, we discuss the role of Weyl's principle which asserts that cosmic matter moves according to certain regularity requirements. After a brief historical introduction to Weyl's principle we argue that although the principle is often not explicitly mentioned in modern standard texts on cosmology, it is implicitly assumed and is, in fact, necessary for a physically well-defined notion of cosmic time. (...) We finally point out that Weyl's principle might be in conflict with the wide-spread idea that the universe at some very early stage can be described exclusively in terms of quantum theory. (shrink)

The cosmological constant problem arises at the intersection between general relativity and quantum field theory, and is regarded as a fundamental problem in modern physics. In this paper we describe the historical and conceptual origin of the cosmological constant problem which is intimately connected to the vacuum concept in quantum field theory. We critically discuss how the problem rests on the notion of physically real vacuum energy, and which relations between general relativity and quantum field theory are assumed in order (...) to make the problem well-defined. (shrink)

In this manuscript we initiate a systematic examination of the physical basis for the time concept in cosmology. We discuss and defend the idea that the physical basis of the time concept is necessarily related to physical processes which could conceivably take place among the material constituents available in the universe. As a consequence we motivate the idea that one cannot, in a well-defined manner, speak about time ‘before’ such physical processes were possible, and in particular, the idea that one (...) cannot speak about a time scale ‘before’ scale-setting physical processes were possible. It is common practice to link the concept of cosmic time with a space-time metric set up to describe the universe at large scales, and then define a cosmic time t as what is measured by a comoving standard clock. We want to examine, however, the physical basis for setting up a comoving reference frame and, in particular, what could be meant by a standard clock. For this purpose we introduce the concept of a `core' of a clock and we ask if such a core can - in principle - be found in the available physics contemplated in the various `stages' of the early universe. We find that a first problem arises above the quark-gluon phase transition where there might be no bound systems left, and the concept of a physical length scale to a certain extent disappears. A more serious problem appears above the electroweak phase transition believed to occur at $\sim 10^{-11}$ seconds. At this point the property of mass disappears and it becomes difficult to identify a physical basis for concepts like length scale, energy scale and temperature - which are all intimately linked to the concept of time in modern cosmology. This situation suggests that the concept of a time scale in `very early' universe cosmology lacks a physical basis or, at least, that the time scale will have to be based on speculative new physics. (shrink)

Western philosophy has been greatly influenced by visual metaphors. Knowing something has commonly, yet implicitly, been conceptualized as seeing something clearly, learning has been framed as being visually exposed to something, and the mind has been understood as a ‘mirror of nature’. A whole ‘epistemology of the eye’ has been at work, which has had significant practical implications, not least in educational contexts. One way to characterize John Dewey’s pragmatism is to see it as an attempt to replace the epistemology (...) of the eye with an epistemology of the hand. This article develops the epistemology of the hand on three levels: A level of embodiment and metaphors, of craftsmanship and social practices, and of schooling and education. (shrink)

Given the apparent nondisplaceability and noncancellability of the derogatory content of slurs, it may appear puzzling that non-derogatory uses of slurs exist. Moreover, these uses seem to be in general available only to in-group speakers, thereby exhibiting a peculiar kind of context-sensitivity. In this paper the author argues that to understand non-derogatory uses we should consider slurs in terms of the kind of social practice their uses instantiate. A suitable theory of social practices has been proposed by McMillan. In typical (...) uses the practice is one of bigotry and discrimination. Non-derogatory uses are only possible to the extent that they consitute acts of an alternative, non-derogatory practice. In the core cases it must be a subversive practice of satire or reappropriation. The social identity of speakers is not an ultimately decisive factor but it is an important constitutive condition: most non-derogatory practices of slur-use can only be performed by a member of the target group. (shrink)

The relationship between religion and politics has received increased attention in recent time. For religious traditions, this increased attention has been cause to reflect on their position regarding political life. Is it permissible for a religious person to engage in political life at all? Should he or she attempt to impose his religious views on the entire society? This book deals with Luther’s reflections on the relation between his religious views and politics. Luther understands political authority as a reflecting a (...) God-given natural order. Christians are called to practice neighborly love also in political life. In Luther’s view, politics consists in the conversion of love into power. Can this idea still be defended today? (shrink)

The article deals with the relationship between theological ethics and moral philosophy. The former is seen as a theoretical reflection on Christian ethics, the latter as one on secular ethics. The main questions asked are: Is there one and only one pre-theoretical knowledge about acting rightly? Does philosophy provide us with the theoretical framework for understanding both Christian and secular ethics? Both questions are answered in the negative. In the course of argument, four positions are presented: theological unificationism, philosophical unificationism, (...) theological separationism and Lutheran dualism. It is argued that the latter position is most convincing. It is dual in the sense of being both a theory of Christian ethics and of including a recognition of natural law. Hence, it unites a particularistic and a universalistic point of view. In the last section a reformulation of the Lutheran position is attempted in making use of the ethical theory of Knud E. Løgstrup''s The Ethical Demand. (shrink)

This collection of papers is from the Ninth European Conference on the Philosophy of Religion held at the University of Aarhus, Denmark in August 1992. The theme of the conference was theism and its modern alternatives. Why alternatives? There is no agreement on the answer to that question. Before outlining the nature of the disagreements, there is a need to distinguish theism, where it means some belief in God, and theism as a certain kind of philosophical response to that belief. (...) If theism is to be spoken of in both contexts, the following question arises -- is philosophical theism an adequate response to religious theism? (shrink)

The good (Aristotle) -- Dignity (Kant) -- The promise (Nietzsche) -- The self (Kierkegaard) -- Truth (Arendt) -- Responsibility (Løgstrup) -- Love (Murdoch) -- Forgiveness (Derrida) -- Freedom (Camus) -- Death (Montaigne).

There are various sources of the human conceptual system that pertain to causation. According to the realism of René Thom the attention network is attuned to existing patterns of singularities in space/time. According to cognitive linguistics the conceptual system is determined by the neural wiring and the embodied experience of the cognizer. Our concepts do therefore not necessarily reflect objective properties of space and time. In this paper I discuss the two positions and their relation. Following Len Talmy, I present (...) a comparison between how causation is conceived in language and how it is conceived in science. Finally, the notion of agency and its relation to a basic causative sequence is discussed in more detail. (shrink)

"For at kunne leve og virke og for at kunne planlægge vort eget liv på længere sigt, må vi tage stilling til livets tre hovedproblemer: Hvad kan vi vide? Hvad tør vi håbe? Og hvad skal vi gøre? Det er netop disse problemer, de store filosoffer har tænkt igennem langt mere dybtgående og grundigt, end man sædvanligvis har mulighed for at gøre det." I en vis forstand er vi alle sammen filosoffer, for vi har alle et bestemt livssyn, om vi (...) er klar over det eller ej. Professor i filosofi Svend Erik Stybes bog beskriver ikke blot forskellige livssyn, som er opstået gennem filosofihistorien i løbet af de sidste mange århundreder. Han giver også en definition af begrebet livssyn, som de fleste vil kunne relatere til og få til at give mening i forhold til deres eget liv. Bogen "De store tænkere og vort livssyn" fra 1963 henvender sig til enhver, der har interesse for livets store og små spørgsmål og forskellige filosoffer og idéhistorikeres tilgang dertil. Svend Erik Stybe (1919-1995) var en dansk idéhistoriker og forfatter, der udgav et væld af bøger om både dansk og europæisk filosofi- og idéhistorie gennem de sidste mange hundrede år. Han skrev blandt andet bøger til brug i undervisning i idéhistorie på gymnasiet og universitetet, opslagsværker om filosofi og idéhistorie samt bøger om specifikke filosoffer som Jean-Jacques Rousseau, John Locke og Baruch de Spinoza. Svend Erik Stybe blev udnævnt til professor i filosofi ved Københavns Universitet i 1970, hvor han forblev frem til sin pension i 1989. (shrink)

Consciousness and Qualia is a philosophical study of qualitative consciousness, characteristic examples of which are pains, experienced colors, sounds, etc.

The article presents an interpretation of certain aspects of John Dewey’s psychological works. The interpretation aims to show that Dewey’s framework speaks directly to certain problems that the discipline of psychology faces today. In particular the reflexive problem, the fact that psychology as an array of discursive practices has served to constitute forms of human subjectivity in Western cultures. Psychology has served to produce or transform its subject-matter. It is shown first that Dewey was aware of the reflexive problem, and (...) found that it needed to be addressed. Next, three concepts of Dewey’s psychology are drawn in: subjectivity, habit and morality. Dewey is interpreted as articulating what we today would call a practice-orientated approach to psychology, in which moral and practical reasoning is seen as a dimension of all knowledge and action. Subjectivity is understood as a function emerging with complex interaction. Finally, a Deweyan approach to how psychology and other social sciences can cope with, and make positive use of, the reflexive problem, is outlined. By acknowledging their existence in the world they study, i.e. by becoming moral sciences that realize their moral and political implications, the social sciences can become problem-solving instruments that serve to help create a democratic public, a community as an actual social idea. It is pointed out that Dewey had an attractive view both of psychology – the subject-matter and of Psychology – the discipline and its practices – and ventured on the rare attempt at explicating how they are connected in what he called Great Societies, what we today would call post- or late-modernity, and how Psychology can help to constitute Great Communities in which human beings might flourish. (shrink)

Leopold Flam (1912-1995) woont voor een groot deel van zijn jeugd in een kelder in Antwerpen. Zijn ouders, Joodse mensen die uit Lublin naar België emigreerden, kunnen lezen noch schrijven, en proberen aan de kost te komen met leuren en bedelen. Op zijn dertiende begint Flam met het bijhouden van een even openhartig als meedogenloos dagboek. Socrates indachtig heeft hij het vaste voornemen zichzelf te leren kennen. Het mag een klein mirakel heten dat Leopold Flam in zijn opzet (...) is geslaagd. Hij overleefde de Holocaust en hij, de bedelaarszoon, werd hoogleraar filosofie. Hij publiceerde artikelen en boeken, maar zijn dagboeken - voor zover bewaard - behoren tot zijn sterkste werk. Ze vormen een aangrijpend epos dat ons de mens Flam laat zien, eerder dan de filosoof. Tegelijkertijd bieden ze een verhelderend tijdsdocument, met onder meer concrete informatie over zijn hulp aan Joden tijdens de Duitse bezetting en notities gemaakt terwijl hij gevangenzat in Buchenwald. Ondanks de vooroordelen en vervolging waarmee hij had af te rekenen, bleef hij geloven in zijn weg uit de duisternis naar het licht."--Publisher information. (shrink)

This paper offers a general model of the semantics of lexicalized social meanings, i.e. semiotic properties of certain expressions in a socio-political context. Examples include slurs, problematically charged expressions such as inner city, as well as terms such as mother, which also carry implicit ideological associations. Insofar as their linguistic properties are concerned, social meanings can be construed as context-structuring devices: without introducing specific at-issue contents, they evoke background assumptions which shape the context of conversation. An inferentialist model of discourse (...) is developed to account for this effect, in which the discursive significance of an utterance is defined as the set of inferences it licenses relative to a discursive context. A discursive context is a set of propositions that can serve as auxiliary premises in material inferences, together with a salience ranking that makes some of these propositions more readily available and therefore more relevant to determining discursive significance. Social meanings are defined as functions on discursive contexts that modify the salience ranking, increasing the salience of certain assumptions and stereotypes. As a result, they impact the discursive significance of utterances indirectly and independently of at-issue contents. They are also largely independent of speaker intentions in virtue of the ideological nature of discursive contexts. (shrink)

In order to contribute to the consolidation in the field ofPositive Psychology, we reinvestigated the factor structure of top 10 positive emotions of Barbara Fredrickson. Former research in experimental settings resulted in a three-cluster solution, which we tested withexploratoryandconfirmatorymethodology against different factor models. Within our non-experimental data (N= 312), statistical evidence is presented, advocating for a single factor model of the 10 positive emotions. Different possible reasons for the deviating results are discussed, as well as the theoretical significance to various (...) subfields inPositive Psychology(e.g., therapeutical interventions). Furthermore, the special role ofawewithin the study and its implications for further research in the field are discussed. (shrink)

Most accounts of the derogatory meaning of slurs are semantic. Recently, Nunberg proposed a purely pragmatic account offering a compelling picture of the relation between derogatory content and social context. Nunberg posits that the semantic content of slurs is identical to that of neutral counterparts, and that derogation is a result of the association of slur use with linguistic conventions of bigoted speakers. The mechanism responsible for it is a special kind of conversational implicature. However, this paper argues that Nunberg’s (...) proposal suffers from technical and conceptual problems regarding the application of the concepts of implicature and convention. It is proposed that the implicature mechanism should be replaced by expressive commitment attribution. The account advocated here preserves crucial insights of Nunberg’s analysis, 25–48, 2013a, Analytic Philosophy 54, 350–363, 2013b; Bolinger Nous, 51, 439–462, 2017), giving them a firmer conceptual basis. It supports a distinction between derogation and offensiveness of slurs that improves on the one proposed by Hom and May, 293–313 2013), and sheds light on puzzling borderline cases: the use of slurs by ignorant speakers and controversies surrounding the status of some words as potentially slurs. (shrink)