Con la psicoanalisi di Freud sembra davvero realizzarsi una delle aspirazioni più antiche della filosofia: quella di ricercare e mettere a disposizione degli uomini un’efficace medicina per curare i mali dell’anima e per raggiungere la felicità possibile. La riflessione e la pratica filosofica, non solo negli ambiti specifici dell’etica o dell’antropologia, hanno infatti sempre tratto la loro motivazione più profonda dall’esperienza del limite che, nelle forme del dolore, della sofferenza, dell’ingiustizia e della morte, le persone si trovano quotidianamente di fronte (...) nelle loro situazioni di vita. Il rapporto di Freud con la filosofia si è sempre nutrito di una profonda ambivalenza: da un lato la confessione di un’irresistibile attrazione; dall’altro quasi la necessità di rassicurare se stesso e gli altri su una propria «incapacità costituzionale» alla pura speculazione e sulla sua ferma volontà di sottrarsi – proprio lui, formidabile affabulatore - al fascino delle narrazioni filosofiche. Eppure, ad oggi, la creatura intellettuale di Freud, in attesa degli sviluppi di alcune sue intuizioni che sembrano promettere le neuroscienze, appare sempre più destinata a trovare riparo e conforto nel grembo ampio e inclusivo della filosofia. A ben vedere la responsabilità di quella che T.S. Szasz definisce la “palude medica” nella quale è oggi impantanata la cura delle anime è in realtà solo in parte attribuibile a Freud e al suo assillo di guadagnare una legittimazione scientifica alla psicoanalisi. Nell’opera del fondatore, molto più che nella successiva scolastica psicoanalitica, si possono anzi trovare gli antidoti alla medicalizzazione cui la pratica della cura dell’anima è andata incontro, soprattutto negli ultimi decenni. (shrink)

An introduction to the special issue of the Journal “Forum Philosophicum” that contains nine studies dealing with a cluster of metaphysical questions of cross-cultural importance: H. Watzka, “A new realistic spirit: the analytical and the existential approaches to ontology”; P. Gilbert, “Voilà pourquoi je ne suis pas ‘ontologue’; P. Favraux, “La pertinence de l’ontologie pour la théologie”; E. Charmetant, "Naturalisme contemporain et ontologie humaine : vers un essentialisme différent"; J. Bremer, "Aristotle on touch”; T. Walsh, "Bonum est causa mali: a (...) problem and an opportunity for metaphysics in the thought of Thomas Aquinas and Hegel”; A. J. Carroll, “Disenchantment, rationality and the modernity of Max Weber”; G. Karuvelil, “Religious experience: reframing the question”; L. Caruana “Universal claims”. (shrink)

In this book, T. L. Short corrects widespread misconceptions of Peirce's theory of signs and demonstrates its relevance to contemporary analytic philosophy of language, mind and science. Peirce's theory of mind, naturalistic but nonreductive, bears on debates of Fodor and Millikan, among others. His theory of inquiry avoids foundationalism and subjectivism, while his account of reference anticipated views of Kripke and Putnam. Peirce's realism falls between 'internal' and 'metaphysical' realism and is more satisfactory than either. His pragmatism is not verificationism; (...) rather, it identifies meaning with potential growth of knowledge. Short distinguishes Peirce's mature theory of signs from his better-known but paradoxical early theory. He develops the mature theory systematically on the basis of Peirce's phenomenological categories and concept of final causation. The latter is distinguished from recent and similar views, such as Brandon's, and is shown to be grounded in forms of explanation adopted in modern science. (shrink)

Controversy over providing financial incentives to research participants has a long history and remains an issue of contention in both current discussions about research ethics and for institutional review bodies/human research ethics committees which are charged with the responsibility of deciding whether such incentives fall within ethical guidelines. The arguments both for and against financial incentives have been well aired in the literature. A point of agreement for many is that inducement in the form of financial incentive is permissible when (...) the risk of harm to the individual is negligible in terms of degree and probability of occurrence. In the absence of harm to the individual, encouraging more people to participate in research would appear to be a good thing in so far as it will lead to statistically more robust research outcomes, which can then be translated into better healthcare and other practice. Whilst, on the face of it, this position seems highly defensible, I will explore the possibility that it is counterproductive – that is, providing individuals with financial incentives to become research participants may have the unintended outcome of reducing participation rates in some areas of research. In exploring this idea I will draw on empirical findings from the literature on crowding-out – the hypothesis that providing monetary incentives to people can backfire by overall reducing intrinsic motivation, in this instance intrinsic motivation to behave altruistically or undertake civic duties. (shrink)

Machiavelli, Niccolò, 1469-1527-Criticism and interpretation ; Political science-Translating.

Logic; Islamic philosophy; Islam--doctrines.

Byzantine Empire; economic and social conditions; history.

There have been many discussions on problems of logic over the past several years. While the problem of the nature of the law of contradiction, one of the laws of formal logic, has received particular attention by everyone, the question has not been posed very precisely in the arguments. Actually, the question is not whether the movement, change, and development of things can be reflected in consciousness by use of the methods of formal logic, or in distinguishing the effectiveness of (...) the law of contradiction in disputation, proofs, or theoretical systems from its effectiveness in the general process of cognition, when applied to phenomena. If the development of reality cannot at all be reflected by the use of the logical tools of formal logic, what use do they have? No one denies that formal logic does not suffice as a method of cognition. If, in disputations and proofs, or in the establishment of theoretical systems, one relies only on the logical tools of formal logic, this is also not enough. The scope of applicability of the laws of formal logic, as laws that are studied by a concrete science, is necessarily limited. It is impossible for them to be all-powerful; it is of course impossible, relying on the law of contradiction, to know and grasp the contradictions in reality — the unity and conflict of opposites. All disputations and proofs, and the establishment of theoretical systems, are, in fact, efforts to know real objects, efforts of the subjective to grasp the objective. In principle, the use of formal logic in disputations and proofs and in the establishment of theoretical systems, and its use in knowing an object, should be no different. What, then, is the question? The question should be posed as follows: can thought contravene the law of contradiction? (shrink)

On inquiring into the nature of the Charites one may be astonished at the disagreement of their compounding elements. On the one hand, they appear as the very representatives and even personification of gracefulness and charm, brightness, and joy; their name itself seems to testify this, closely allied as it is with the verb χαρειν besides the particular names of the most renowned Hesiodic trinity—Aglaia, Euphrosyne, and Thalia—that is to say, brilliancy, mirth, and florescence. Hence arose the Roman conception of (...) the Gratiae decentes; hence also the widespread neo-humanistic idea, clothed by Goethe in the well-known verse of the Classical Walpurgis Night: ‘Grace we are bringing into life ….’ But, on the other hand, we discover the incontestable kinship of Charis with Charon, the ugly and sullen ferryman of the lower world, the still more amazing relation between Eurynome, the mother of the Hesiodic trinity, and Eurynomos, the horrid demon of decay, the vulture-skinned devourer of putrefying corpses in the Delphic Nekyia of Polygnotos. (shrink)

To compare a novel to a work of philosophy is, admittedly, a risky exercise in analogy. When the novelist is Lawrence and the philosophical text is the ponderous and dialectical Being and Nothingness, such a comparison may seem willfully perverse and peculiarly open, insofar as it deals with Lawrence's great theme of sexuality, to his anathema of "sex in the head." Furthermore, modern criticism, especially in the Anglo-Saxon world, has tended to be wary of critical approaches that lean on notions (...) that are not derived from literature itself - a tendency that is being reinforced these days by the structuralist insistence on the "literariness" of the Text. Now, despite its metaphorical statement as a form of dramatic "gesture," Sartre's book is very definitely not a work of literature. T.H. Adamowski, associate professor of English at Erindale College, the University of Toronto, has written articles on English, American, and French literature. This essay is part of a larger study on progress on Lawrence's "sexual poetics.". (shrink)