If we want to define today's society in one word, trying to capture its meaning, it would be polarization. The interdependence between all social segments, articulated by globalization, has a double function: unpacking the identitary elements that enter in the structure of society and framing them in a relational dynamic. In this situation are Theology and Science, which, of course, maintain a number of components under their general names. Can we talk about a congruence between these two dimensions of human (...) knowledge? Or they are developing completely separately and antagonistic in social progress? According to Ian G. Barbour there are four types of relation between Science and Religion: conflict, independence, dialogue, integration. This article intends to highlight the congruence between Theology and Science in the paradigm of neo-patristic synthesis, which explores in a phenomenological, theological and philosophical way the relationship between these two. Neo-patristic synthesis is a theological movement from the 20th century, generated by the initiative of the orthodox theologian G. Florovsky. (shrink)

En este número se aborda el tema de los retos actuales de la educación inclusiva. La forma de enfocarlos es diversa: vínculo con la comunidad, neuropedagogía, evaluación, discapacidad, vulnerabilidad, etc. Veamos algunos de estos planteamientos.

An approach to music as an instrument of philosophical inquiry, seeking not so much a philosophy of music as a philosophy through music.

This book offers a critical examination of those theories and advances a new argument for punishment's justification, calling it the 'duty view'.

In this article I consider the problematic that creation ex nihilo presents for Christian metaphysicans’ speculation regarding possible being. I explore Thomas Aquinas’s doctrine of possibility and show that, while he attempts to remain faithful to a metaphysics of creation, encounters a metaphysical difficult when presenting his account in terms of imitation. Suárez, I argue, is mindful of this difficulty and offers a corrective that unites the approaches of Thomas Aquinas as well as that of Duns Scotus. In the end, (...) Suárez offers an original account of possible being that is faithful to the demands of a creation ex nihilo. (shrink)

part self-help guide, part college lecture, part confessional, part time travel adventure, On Purpose" uses a beautiful fantasy-filled graphic novel format to tell a story of self- discovery and personal growth that you'll never forget.

The Criminalization series arose from an interdisciplinary investigation into criminalization, focussing on the principles that might guide decisions about what kinds of conduct should be criminalized, and the forms that criminalization should take. Developing a normative theory of criminalization, the series tackles the key questions at the heart of the issue: what principles and goals should guide legislators in deciding what to criminalize? How should criminal wrongs be classified and differentiated? How should law enforcement officials apply the law's specifications of (...) offences? The sixth volume in the series offers a philosophical investigation of the relationship between moral wrongdoing and criminalization. Considering the justification of punishment, the nature of harm, the importance of autonomy, inchoate wrongdoing, the role of consent, and the role of the state, the book provides an account of the nature of moral wrongdoing, the sources of wrongdoing, why wrongdoing is the central target of the criminal law, and the ways in which criminalization of non-wrongful conduct might be permissible. (shrink)

This book provides a systematic, philosophically informed account of criminal responsibility. It begins by providing a general account of criminal responsibility based on the relationship between the action that the defendent has performed and their character. It then moves on to reconsider some of the central doctrines of criminal responsibility in the light of that account.

Planning of effective responses to the recent resurgence of tuberculosis in the United States, and particularly in New York City, requires review of our knowledge of the factors that led to the decline of tuberculosis in the U.S. and other countries during the nineteenth and the first three-quarters of the twentieth century, and the recent changes in these same factors and the rise of new factors that have contributed to its resurgence. Because the analysis of the impact of all of (...) these factors in both the remote and the recent past is controversial, it is important to use a well-defined framework to organize the analysis. The framework we will use is shown in Table 1. To the classic epidemiologic triad of Agent, Host and Environment it adds the category of Health Services. In this paper we redefine both the classic and new categories using current disciplines and concepts applicable to tuberculosis. (shrink)

Recent results from engineered and natural samples show that the starkly different lipids of archaea and bacteria can form stable hybrid membranes. But if the two types can mix, why don't they? That is, why do most bacteria and all eukaryotes have only typically bacterial lipids, and archaea archaeal lipids? It is suggested here that the reason may lie on the other main component of cellular membranes: membrane proteins, and their close adaptation to the lipids. Archaeal lipids in modern bacteria (...) could suggest that the last universal common ancestor (LUCA) had both lipid types. However, this would imply a rather elaborate evolutionary scenario, while negating simpler alternatives. In light of widespread horizontal gene transfer across the prokaryotic domains, hybrid membranes reveal that the lipid divide did not just occur once at the divergence of archaea and bacteria from LUCA. Instead, it continues to occur actively to this day. Also see the video abstract here https://youtu.be/TdKjxoDAtsg. (shrink)

In the light of partial understanding, we examine the thesis that concepts are individuated in terms of possession conditions and show that adherents face a fatal dilemma: Either concept-individuating possession conditions include cases of partially understood concepts or not. If yes, possession conditions do not individuate concepts. If no, the thesis is too restricted and lacks a minimally satisfactory level of generalization.

Central to Watts and Newson’s argument in their seminal paper ‘ Is there a duty to routinely reinterpret genomic variant classifications? ’ is that diagnostic laboratories are not morally obligated to actively reinterpret variants of uncertain significance (VUS) due to the superior outcomes offered by next-generation sequencing (NGS) compared with traditional methods.1 NGS technologies can identify, analyse and interpret millions of genetic variations at once. For example, ‘the use of conventional molecular assays in clinical contexts could require doing a lot (...) of assays for various mutations. Using these different assays, more tissue may be required. These targets can accurately be questioned using NGS technology in a single test.’2 If NGS-based genomic sequencing is reliable and its output outweighs the potential harm of uncertainties, then, it is plausible to say that those test providers cannot incur a moral duty to actively reinterpret VUS because there won’t be any need to do so.1 Despite its seeming reliability, diagnostic laboratories face enormous challenges in implementing NGS-based …. (shrink)

One of the most interesting questions raised in Cecile Fabre’s Cosmopolitan War concerns war for the sake of resources. Fabre argues that it is sometimes permissible to go to war for the sake of resources that the poor are entitled to. I agree with this, but I think it is true only in very restricted circumstances. I consider a number of arguments in favour of resource wars, showing many of them to fail. The most promising argument, I suggest, is that (...) those who possess resources that have unjustly been secured are complicit in posing future threats by contributing to a market for unjustly secured resources. Whilst this argument has some promise, even it, I suggest, is in no way decisive. (shrink)

This is a response to the four essays on Wrongs and Crimes.

According to a widespread, broadly Humean consensus, desires and other conative attitudes seem as such to be free from any normative constraints of rationality. However, rational subjects are also required to be attitude-coherent in ways that prima facie hold sway for desire. I here examine the plausibility of this idea by proposing several principles for coherent desire. These principles parallel principles for coherent belief and can be used to make a case for a kind of purely conative normativity. I consider (...) several objections to a principle for consistent desiring and reply to them. I conclude that, if attitude-coherence is a mark of rationality, the broadly Humean consensus must be rejected. (shrink)

What are the laws of physics? -- The stuff that kicks back -- Point-of-view invariance -- Gauging the laws of physics -- Forces and broken symmetries -- Playing dice -- After the bang -- Out of the void -- The comprehensible cosmos -- Models of reality.

We show that plane hyperbolic geometry, expressed in terms of points and the ternary relation of collinearity alone, cannot be expressed by means of axioms of complexity at most ∀∃∀, but that there is an axiom system, all of whose axioms are ∀∃∀∃ sentences. This remains true for Klingenberg's generalized hyperbolic planes, with arbitrary ordered fields as coordinate fields.

_Para/Inquiry_ represents the next generation of postmodern studies. Focusing on cultural studies religion, and literature, Victor E. Taylor provides us with a fresh look at the history and main themes of postmodernism, both in style and content. Central to the book is the status of the sacred in postmodern times. Taylor explores the sacred images in art, culture and literature. We see that the concept of the sacred is uniquely singular and resistant to an easy assimilation into artistic, cultural (...) or narrative forms. Anyone wishing to gain a new and exciting understanding of postmodernism, will read this book with great pleasure. (shrink)

This article is a defence of a differentiated offence of rape. A differentiated offence is an offence which can be completed in a number of different ways that cannot be captured in a simple definition. It is argued that such an offence would meet several concerns that have been expressed in the feminist literature about the law of rape. It would assist certainty, it would reduce the extent to which the offence focuses on the conduct of the complainant, it would (...) allow the law to express that violence is central to the offence of rape where violence is present, but it would also allow convictions of rape where there is no violence. The argument is developed through critical engagement with the law of rape as set out in the Sexual Offences Act 2003. The Sexual Offences Act, it is argued, fails adequately to meet the concerns outlined above. (shrink)

My main aims in this paper are to further clarify and defend the Duty View of punishment, outlined in my book The Ends of Harm, by responding to some objections to it, and by exploring some variations on that view. I briefly lay out some steps in the justification of punishment that I defend more completely in Chapter 12 of The Ends of Harm. I offer some further support for these steps. They justify punishment of an offender for general deterrence (...) reasons if the beneficiary of general deterrence is the victim of the crime. They do so firstly on the basis that offenders incur compensatory duties to victims. I then show that duties incurred through serious wrongdoing are not limited to the duty to provide full compensation. Because offenders incur the relevant duties, and the duties are enforceable, harming them to protect their victims does not wrong them. I then consider whether an offender can be harmed in order to protect people other than the victims of her crime. In this section, I respond to an important challenge to the general idea that we can justify punishment on the basis of duties incurred as a result of wrongdoing, a challenge that I had met only in part in The Ends of Harm. It might be argued that the duties that we incur through serious wrongdoing are owed only to victims of crime. In punishing offenders, in contrast, we aim to protect people in a society more generally, and not just crime victims. A plausible theory of punishment must demonstrate that we are justified in pursuing this aim. Hence, it might be argued, the Duty View fails. I will respond by showing that the duties incurred through wrongdoing are not limited to duties owed to victims, and hence this challenge to the Duty View can be met. (shrink)

This paper elicits a twentieth‐century American story that is deeply rooted in the legacy of American philosophical pragmatism, its impact on a particular school, and its reconstruction of American theology. The paper focuses on three generations of American theologians, and it centers on how these theologians reconstruct theology in light of the science of their day and how they maintain a true plurality of insights about human life in the world. The pragmatic theologian regards the creative exchange between theology and (...) natural science as an opportunity for renewing our understanding of religious life and appreciating the various commitments of scientists and theologians as they meet at the juncture of human interests. The first voice is that of the early Chicago School of Theology represented by Shailer Mathews, Gerald Birney Smith, and George Burman Foster. The second voice is that of Henry Nelson Wieman, a second‐generation theologian at Chicago. The final theologian discussed is James M. Gustafson, former Professor of Theological Ethics at Chicago. (shrink)

I am extremely grateful to Daniel Farrell, Hamish Stewart, Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen and Suzanne Uniacke for their careful, imaginative and probing responses to The Ends of Harm: The Moral Foundations of Criminal Law in this special issue of Criminal Law and Philosophy. It is especially gratifying that philosophers of this calibre, not all of whom have worked directly on the philosophy of punishment and the philosophy of criminal law, have engaged with Ends in this way.One of my ambitions in writing Ends (...) was to connect the philosophy of punishment more directly with a set of broader issues in normative ethics than is common in the philosophy of punishment. I hoped this would encourage others to see the justification of punishment as a small part of a more general normative theory of permissible harm. This special issue has further confirmed to me that this way of developing the philosophy of punishment is fruitful.I will not attempt to respond to all of the arguments i .. (shrink)

In Sparing Civilians, Seth Lazar claims that in war, with rare exceptions, killing noncombatants is worse than killing combatants. This paper raises some doubts about whether this is an important principle – at least, once we understand Lazar’s clarifications. It also suggests that however it is clarified, it seems false. And it suggests a related principle that more plausible. This related principle applies only to those with just aims, and it applies only to intentional killing rather than to all forms (...) of killing. (shrink)

Adherents as well as detractors of the normativity of mental content agree that its assessment crucially depends on the assessment of a principle for believing what is true. In this paper, I present an alternative principle, which is based on possession conditions for pure thinking or mere entertaining. I argue that the alternative approach has not been sufficiently emphasised in the literature and has two important merits. First, it yields a direct analysis of the normativity of mental content, which is, (...) furthermore, independent of arguably non-normative notions such as truth. Second, the approach suggests new and challenging lines of response to central non-normativist objections. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Christian Moral Life: Faithful Discipleship for a Global Society by Patricia Lamoureux, Paul J. WadellVictor Lee AustinThe Christian Moral Life: Faithful Discipleship for a Global Society Patricia Lamoureux and Paul J. Wadell Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2010. 306pp. $27.00In ten chapters, the authors provide what is in effect an introductory college textbook in Roman Catholic moral theology. They aim to ground their exposition in scripture and to (...) reach a broad audience by drawing on ecumenical and interfaith perspectives. Their organization is clear: they summarize each chapter in advance and then conclude it with a list of main points and questions for reflection. The index is extensive, the bibliography is large, and the table of contents is quite detailed. In short, the book aims to be accessible to undergraduates and helpful to more advanced students. (There is, unfortunately, no index of scriptural citations.) [End Page 201]The arc of their approach to moral theology is as follows. One should begin with discipleship and more specifically with its dynamic of call and response. Discipleship is a process in which one learns to see, particularly to see the reign of God. Sin and repentance are continually involved in discipleship. The development of the virtues is central because through them we learn to be good at being human. In the moral life, conscience is the central gift by which we learn to live by love in a Eucharistic life. Such life is informed by the resurrection as understood both “analogically and dialectically” (206), it is guided by the Spirit, and it is anchored in the shared resources and discernment of Christian community. Finally, the moral life is not private. Thus, the authors conclude with a chapter that draws out the implications for public discipleship.I venture three critiques that arise in part from my place as an Anglican moral theologian. The first deals with scripture. The authors are aware of the characteristic biases of preconciliar Roman Catholic moral theology. I am less certain that they are self-conscious of some of their own presuppositions. Commendably, they provide a verse of scripture at the head of each chapter, and they conceive of what they are doing as working from scripture throughout. Yet it is not clear to me that they present us with a moral theology that comes out of a prayerful wrestling with scripture. For example, their statement, “Jesus praises the [good] Samaritan” (46) is not strictly true. Rather, in telling that parable, Jesus holds back from stating a conclusion. Moreover, the authors are correct to say that parables are useful in transforming our vision. They make that point over eight pages (39–47), in which there are seventeen citations of secondary literature from six different authors. Yet, I would have preferred to see how the authors themselves digested, synthesized, and struggled with the parables, rather than simply discussing the conclusions of others.My second critique deals with conscience. When students start to think about how the moral life is grounded in scripture, they will at some point ask: What if my conscience tells me that something is right that scripture says is wrong (or vice versa)? This question, however, does not appear in this book. In their chapter on the centrality of conscience, it becomes clear that the authors see the primary challenge to the primacy of the conscience as coming from “church leaders.” This is, I think, a regrettable continuation of the tired struggle of Roman moral theologians with their church’s magisterium. At least to this outsider—who lives within an ecclesial context marked by extreme weakness of teaching—there seems to be a highly important and positive use of obedience, which is different from the “mystique of obedience” that these authors criticize (170–71). To be precise, “church leaders” can help us learn something about the relationship of conscience and scripture. This book does not show the place of obedience in the Christian moral life.My last point is a comment on textbooks. Although this book is quite long (I estimate it at 150,000 words), it has that textbook quality of passing lightly [End Page 202] from one thing to the next... (shrink)