This article demonstrates how Adorno and Horkheimer’s turn to psychoanalytic concepts like sublimation and intra-psychic conflict strengthened critical theory. The piecemeal collective psychology they produced was used to understand fascism and anti-Semitism. But the full significance of these psychoanalytic explanations was concealed by Adorno, who elsewhere denied the possibility of psychology proper after the death of the individual. Adorno and Horkheimer’s underhanded borrowing from psychoanalysis for social analysis had the effect of filtering collective psychology through the lens of regression. To (...) amend this, the article analyzes psychoanalytic explanations from an interpretive perspective, building upon Jessica Benjamin’s psychoanalytic feminism, to contest the tactics of immanent criticism and to revitalize the project of a less dystopic collective psychology. (shrink)

During the COVID-19 pandemic, the number of patients who require intensive care treatment may outnumber the number of intensive care beds, even in industrialized nations. Consequently, triage may become necessary. In Italy, France, and Spain, age has been used as a leading parameter to decide who is admitted to the intensive care unit, and who receives palliative care. Although age is an objective and easy-to-use parameter, it is ethically not ideal to withdraw ventilator therapy from elderly people who suffer from (...) COVID-19. We have developed a simple and easy-to-use scoring system to allow for triage that is based upon scientific outcome data and, at the same time, fulfills ethical standards. (shrink)

Introduction -- 1. Transparency -- Introduction -- Photographs and transparency -- Films and transparency -- Criticisms of transparency --2. Illusionism -- Introduction -- Currie's arguments against cognitive illusionism -- Arguments against cognitive illusionism -- Currie's arguments against perceptual illusionism -- Evaluating perceptual illusionism -- 3. Perceptual realism -- Introduction -- Currie's account of perceptual realism -- Problems with resemblance theories -- 4. Summary -- 5. A new theory of the ontology of film -- Introduction -- Films as creative works of (...) art -- Conclusion. (shrink)

Research suggests that people with psychopathic traits experience fear-inducing stimuli differently from others, seeming to interpret fear as more positive and less negative. We expected that this reaction, termed fear enjoyment, would impact the effect of fear-inducing stimuli on self-report risk-taking behaviour. Risk-taking was measured before and after viewing excitement- and fear-inducing videos (N = 825). As expected from research showing that fear induction tends to reduce risk-taking tendencies, participants showed reduced risk-taking scores following a fear-inducing stimulus. Importantly, this relationship (...) was moderated by psychopathic traits. Participants who did not decrease their risk-taking tendencies following the video scored significantly higher on psychopathic traits. Also, some of the variance in the relationship between psychopathic traits and change in risk-taking was partly accounted for by fear enjoyment, suggesting that future research should examine whether fear enjoyment may play a role in the relationship between psychopathy and risk-taking. (shrink)

Representationalism in cognitive science holds that semantic meaning should be explained by representations in the mind or brain. In this paper it is argued that semantic meaning should instead be explained by an abstract theory of semantic machines -- machines with predicative capability. The concept of a semantic machine (like that of a Turing machine or of Dennett's intentional systems ) is not a physical concept -- although it has physical implementations. The predicative competence of semantic machines is defined in (...) terms of independent agreement alone (cf. independent, and yet synchronised, clocks). Abstract theories are analysed as systems of quasi-apriori rules for abstract predicates. A relatively limited number of such theories and a few fundamental dimensions (space, time, mass, etc.) are today assumed to exhaust physical reality. However, that assumption need not be in conflict with predicates that cannot be defined in physical terms – for instance the functional and intentional terms that are crucial for cognitive science. (shrink)

In this close analysis of Immanuel Kant’s aesthetics in his Critique of Judgment, Dr. Julie N. Books, explains why Kant fails to provide a convincing basis for his desired necessity and universality of our aesthetic judgments about beauty. Drawing upon her extensive background in the visual arts, art history, and philosophy, Dr. Books provides a unique discussion of Kant’s supersensible, illuminating how it cannot justify his a priori nature of our aesthetic judgments about beauty. She uses examples from the history (...) of art, including paintings by Michelangelo, Caravaggio, Rubens, and Constable, to support her views. This book will make a significant addition to courses on the philosophy of Kant, aesthetics, philosophy of art, metaphysics, the history of Western philosophy, ethics, psychology, and art history. (shrink)

Transparency is an underpinning of workplace ethics. However, most of the existing research has focused on the relationship between leader transparency and its consequences. Drawing on social and self-regulation theory research, we examine the antecedents of followers’ transparency. Specifically, we propose that followers have higher levels of transparency when they are working with peers who have a high level of transparency. We further suggest that followers’ conscientiousness and agreeableness moderate the relationship between peer transparency and followers’ transparency. Using a time-lagged (...) design, we provide support for the proposed theoretical model. We found that follower conscientiousness substitutes the social regulation effect, while follower agreeableness enhances this social regulation effect. Theoretical and practical implications of these findings are also discussed. (shrink)

(1) Intentional system: a system whose behaviour we may reliably predict via the intentional strategy, i.e., by interpreting its behaviour as a (more or less) rational consequence of its beliefs and desires. (2) Reflexive intentional system: a system that is able to interpret itself via the intentional strategy, and whose behaviour is, thus, influenced by an understanding of itself. All intentional systems behave in a meaningful way, but only reflexive intentional systems are aware of the meaning, Hence, only the latter (...) are conscious of what they are doing. (shrink)

The book, written in a clear, engaging style, contains four chapters.

This book can be seen as both, a celebration of past and present achievements of creative expression, artistic articulation, cultural contributions, and mediated movements for the sake of liberalization and democracy, and a warning against a “cultural revolution” defined by censorship, suppression of pluralist opinions, unnatural conformity in science and journalism, and the distinction between “fake news” and “fact” handled by artificial intelligence or part-time fact checkers.

Ernest Sosa’s new monograph, Epistemic Explanations, develops an important new account of epistemic evaluation, epistemic normativity, and the explanatory role of these. The first two sections of the present paper develop an interpretation of Sosa’s metaphysics of the mental states of rational agents as a version of hylomorphism. The second half of the paper uses this hylomorphic view to argue that Sosa can account for differences among the various kinds of knowledge by appeal to nothing more than differences among the (...) belief-like attitudes involved in those kinds of knowledge. My argument for this last claim will also challenge Sosa’s own argument for two of the book’s most heterodox epistemological claims, viz., that knowledge can be recognizably insecure, and that knowledge can be based on mere assumptions. (shrink)