Esta apresentação identifica os principais conceitos envolvidos na teoria semântica da informação na obra An Outline of a Semantic Theory of Information de Bar-Hillel e Carnap. Inicio indicando as influências e desdobramentos sobre a elaboração desta teoria, seguido dos principais conceitos que os autores usarão para tratar o conteúdo semânticodas sentenças. O ponto de partida são operações conjunto-teoréticas, inicialmente através das funções In e Cont. Mas a dificuldade com a adição os leva a especificar o conceito de informatividade semântica por (...) meio das funções cont e m, que avaliam o espaço lógico-probabilístico sentencial. Sendo inversamente definíveis, onde a altaprobabilidade de verdade de uma sentença implica em seu escasso conteúdo informacional. Com isto, os autores introduzem a função inf como a contribuição de uma sentença na identificação de qual descrição-de-estado possível é o caso. A partir disto, eles ajustam a teoria para tratar probabilidades experimental-indutivas entre hipótesese evidências. (shrink)

O presente artigo tem os objetivos de caracterizar a necessidade de uma discussão ética sobre a informação e apresentar a ética da informação de Luciano Floridi como uma proposta interessante para esta demanda. Para tanto, inicio salientando a relevância da informação nos dias atuais e defino o que é informação e, seguindo os passos de Floridi, como devemos elaborar nossa compreensão da informação como uma categoria onto-epistemológica. Em seguida, levanto a urgência de uma ética da informação, seguido da apresentação da (...) proposta de Floridi de compreender a infosfera, o domínio total da informação. Por fim, destaco o caráter de macroética de sua ética da informação em conjunto com os princípios éticos e normas morais no tratamento da infosfera, com especial atenção ao princípio de entropia como conceito correlato ao mal. O resultado é que apesar de sua ética da informação conter algumas questões contestáveis, ela é um empreendimento a ser perseguido e aprimorado a fim de mitigarmos os efeitos disruptivos negativos das TIC no presente e futuro próximo. (shrink)

Este artigo se divide em duas etapas. A primeira etapa tem o objetivo de apresentar, dos tópicos 1 ao 5, três métodos de prova e um de contraprova presentes nos Primeiros Analíticos de Aristóteles. Fornecendo uma notação de fácil acesso, compreensão e relativamente neutra à interpretações com o objetivo de demonstrar que a silogística preserva interessantes ferramentas de dedução e questões intuitivamente férteis para investigação filosófica, em especial, àqueles que desejam compreender leituras filosóficas à lógica de Aristóteles, como as presentes (...) em Łucasievicz e Corcoran. A segunda etapa consiste em oferecer uma interpretação inferencialista ao estilo de Robert Brandom para a silogística aristotélica. Para realizar esta tarefa, iniciaremos com a apresentação do contexto e dos elementos formais de desenvolvimento do método aristotélico de prova de argumentos chamado silogística. Em seguida, apresentarei o método direto de prova que envolve converter sentenças em silogismos imperfeitos e permutar a posição sujeito-predicado delas, de modo a obter um silogismo perfeito. Depois, apresentarei o método chamado reductio ad impossibile que se vale das regras do método direto, das relações semânticas entre sentenças categóricas e de hipóteses para provar a validade do silogismo. Por fim, apresento o método de prova chamado ekthesis, que envolve a introdução de categorias intermediárias e suas manipulações entre esquemas dedutivos a fim de provar a validade do silogismo. A segunda etapa, dos tópicos 6 ao 8, consiste na discussão da silogística como um sistema baseado em regras, inspirado nos trabalhos de Żłarnecka–Biały e Corcoran. A partir do qual exploro a possibilidade de interpretar a silogística de uma perspectiva inferencialista, como uma estratégia lógica de explicitação do “jogo de dar e pedir razões” que marcou a filosofia por cerca de dois milênios. (shrink)

Let us take an example that Bernard Williams (1981: 102) made famous. Suppose that you want a gin and tonic, and you believe that the stuff in front of you is gin. In fact, however, the stuff is not gin but petrol. So if you drink the stuff (even mixed with tonic), it will be decidedly unpleasant, to say the least. Should you choose to drink the stuff or not?

Here is a definition of knowledge: for you to know a proposition p is for you to have an outright belief in p that is correct precisely because it manifests the virtue of rationality. This definition resembles Ernest Sosa’s “virtue theory”, except that on this definition, the only virtue that must be manifested in all instances of knowledge is rationality, and no reductive account of rationality is attempted—rationality is assumed to be an irreducibly normative notion. This definition is compatible with (...) “internalism” about rationality, and with a form of “pragmatic encroachment” on the conditions of rational outright belief. An interpretation is given of this definition, and especially of the sense of ’because’ that it involves. On this interpretation, this definition entails that both safety and adherence are necessary conditions on knowledge; it supports a kind of contextualism about terms like ‘knowledge’; and it provides resources to defend safety, adherence, and contextualism, against some recent objections. (shrink)

In this paper, I apply the "conceptual role semantics" approach that I have proposed elsewhere (according to which the meaning of normative terms is given by their role in practical reasoning or deliberation) to the meaning of the term 'ought'. I argue that this approach can do three things: It can give an adequate explanation of the special connection that normative judgments have to practical reasoning and motivation for action. It can give an adequate account of why the central principles (...) of deontic logic are correct. It can give an explanation of the precise ways in which the term 'ought' is systematically context-sensitive, so that the term expresses different (but systematically related) concepts in different contexts. (shrink)

Often, when one faces a choice between alternative actions, there are reasons both for and against each alternative. On one way of understanding these words, what one “ought to do all things considered (ATC)” is determined by the totality of these reasons. So, these reasons can somehow be “combined” or “aggregated” to yield an ATC verdict on these alternatives. First, various assumptions about this sort of aggregation of reasons are articulated. Then it is shown that these assumptions allow for the (...) proof of a “Reasons Aggregation Theorem” – parallel to John Harsanyi’s 1955 “Social Aggregation Theorem”. All reasons for action are grounded in reason-providing values; and, for every such reason-providing value, there is in principle a way of measuring how strongly this value counts against each alternative. The theorem tells us that the appropriate measure of how much reason ATC there is against each alternative is simply a weighted sum of the strengths with which these values count against that alternative; the agent ought not ATC to perform an action iff there is ATC more reason against it than against some available alternative. (shrink)

This essay offers an account of the truth conditions of sentences involving deontic modals like ‘ought’, designed to capture the difference between objective and subjective kinds of ‘ought’ This account resembles the classical semantics for deontic logic: according to this account, these truths conditions involve a function from the world of evaluation to a domain of worlds (equivalent to a so-called “modal base”), and an ordering of the worlds in such domains; this ordering of the worlds itself arises from two (...) further elements – a probability function and a value function – since this ordering ranks the worlds in accordance with the expected value of certain propositions that are true at those worlds. Thus, a proposition of the form ‘Ought (p)’ is true at a world of evaluation w if and only if p is true at all the top-ranked worlds in the domain assigned to w. This domain of worlds consists of metaphysically possible worlds, while the probability function is defined over a space of epistemically possible worlds (which may include metaphysically impossible worlds, such as worlds where Hesperus is not Phosphorus). Evidence is given that this account assigns the correct truth conditions to a wide range of sentences involving ‘ought’. Since these truth conditions involve both a domain of metaphysically possible worlds and a space of epistemically possible worlds, there are two corresponding kinds of conditional involving ‘ought’, depending on which space of worlds is restricted by the conditional. Finally, some objections that might be raised against this account are answered. (shrink)

Intuitively, it seems that some belief-forming practices have the following three properties: 1. They are rational practices, and the beliefs that we form by means of these practices are themselves rational or justified beliefs. 2. Even if in most cases these practices reliably lead to correct beliefs (i.e., beliefs in true propositions), they are not infallible: it is possible for beliefs that are formed by means of these practices to be incorrect (i.e., to be beliefs in false propositions). 3. The (...) rationality of these practices is basic or primitive. That is, the rationality of these practices is not due simply to the availability, by means of some process of reasoning that relies purely on other practices, of a rational or justified belief in the reliability of these practices. -/- How can there be such practices? This paper offers an answer to that question. (shrink)

In Mind and World, John McDowell argues against the view that perceptual representation is non-conceptual. The central worry is that this view cannot offer any reasonable account of how perception bears rationally upon belief. I argue that this worry, though sensible, can be met, if we are clear that perceptual representation is, though non-conceptual, still in some sense 'assertoric': Perception, like belief, represents things as being thus and so.

Hierocles, a Stoic of the second century CE, famously deployed an image of the ‘concentric circles’ that surround each of us. The image should not be read as advocating absolute impartiality (in the style of classical utilitarianism) or as illustrating the Stoic theory of oikeiōsis. Instead, it is designed to illustrate how it is ‘appropriate to act’ in certain cases. Like other Stoics, Hierocles bases his investigation of appropriate acts on what is ‘in accordance with nature’. According to his view, (...) each of us has a duty of mutual aid towards every other human being—but a weightier duty towards those who are socially closer than those who are more distant. The fundamental principle is that each of us has the duty of being an ‘ally’ of every other human being in serving the natural purposes of all the circles to which we and that other human being both belong. (shrink)

Richard Price’s moral epistemology provides a distinctive account, not only of the sources of our moral knowledge, but also of its limits – that is, of the moral truths that we do not and even cannot know. According to this moral epistemology, the fundamental moral truths are necessary rather than contingent; if they are knowable at all, they are knowable a priori. In general, fundamental moral truths are akin to mathematical truths. Specifically, these necessary moral truths are grounded in the (...) essences of act-types, which are knowable through ‘intuition’ if knowable at all. However, Price firmly rejects utilitarianism, recognizing several different ‘branches of virtue’, which can conflict with each other. As he argues, we cannot know the truth about act-types that exemplify such conflicting branches of virtue if the competing considerations are too finely balanced. This view of moral epistemology is compared with those of several other philosophers, including W. D. Ross. It is argued that Price has a more unified view than Ross: for Price, all moral knowledge flows from a priori intuition, but this is compatible with our being ignorant of many of the fine details of the fundamental truths of morality. (shrink)

This chapter is concerned with the distinction that most contemporary epistemologists express by distinguishing between “propositional” and “doxastic” justification. The goal is to develop an account of this distinction that applies, not just to full or outright beliefs, but also to partial credences—and indeed, in principle, to attitudes of all kinds. The standard way of explaining this distinction, in terms of the “basing relation”, is criticized, and an alternative account—the “virtue manifestation” account—is proposed in its place. This account has a (...) certain kinship with the epistemological approach that is known as “reliabilism”, but it also has certain key differences—above all, it is compatible with an internalist view of rationality. (shrink)

Many philosophers nowadays believe Frege was right about belief, but wrong about language: The contents of beliefs need to be individuated more finely than in terms of Russellian propositions, but the contents of utterances do not. I argue that this 'hybrid view' cannot offer no reasonable account of how communication transfers knowledge from one speaker to another and that, to do so, we must insist that understanding depends upon more than just getting the references of terms right.

Este trabajo analiza los patrones de desambiguación de presuposiciones que se pueden considerar anafóricas y son generadas por partículas indexicales. En contraste con teorías recientes sobre la presuposición que privilegian la información lexical proponemos un análisis perspectivo de la presuposición según el cual la inferencia por defecto sobre este tipo de información hace uso de la perspectiva de los hablantes. En dos estudios exploramos el patrón de desambiguación de oraciones que contienen la palabra ‘también’ en contextos donde se usa el (...) indéxico ‘yo’. Los resultados confirman nuestra hipótesis y se discuten a la luz las principales ideas sobre presuposición y anáfora. A partir de estos resultados sugerimos algunas direcciones futuras de investigación. (shrink)

Pursuing Justice, Second Edition, examines the issue of justice by considering the origins of the idea, formal systems of justice, current global issues of justice, and ways in which justice might be achieved by individuals, organizations, and the global community. Part 1 demonstrates how the idea of justice has emerged over time, starting with religion and philosophy, then moving to the justice as a concern of the state, and finally to the concept of social justice. Part 2 outlines the very (...) different mechanisms used by various nations for achieving state justice, including systems based on common law, civil law, and Islamic law, with a separate discussion of the US justice system. Part 3 focuses on four contemporary issues of justice: war, genocide, slavery, and the environment. Finally, Part 4 shows how individuals and organizations can go about pursuing justice, and describes the rise of global justice. This updated timely book helps students understand the complexities and nuances of a society's pursuit of justice. It provides students with the foundations of global justice systems, integrating Greek philosophies and major religious perspectives into a justice perspective, and contributes to undergraduate understanding of international justice bodies, NGOs, and institutions. New edition is completely updated and revised to achieve relevance for today's students Covers concepts of justice as well as ideas for pursuing and achieving justice Examines how our modern laws began, and traces their evolution to today's laws Presents concepts and issues in justice studies as well as a comparison of several systems of law Teaching resources include discussion questions and real-world examples. (shrink)

v. 1. Inheritance and vocation.--v. 2. Philosophy and psychology.

Frege's development of the theory of arithmetic in his Grundgesetze der Arithmetik has long been ignored, since the formal theory of the Grundgesetze is inconsistent. His derivations of the axioms of arithmetic from what is known as Hume's Principle do not, however, depend upon that axiom of the system--Axiom V--which is responsible for the inconsistency. On the contrary, Frege's proofs constitute a derivation of axioms for arithmetic from Hume's Principle, in (axiomatic) second-order logic. Moreover, though Frege does prove each of (...) the now standard Dedekind-Peano axioms, his proofs are devoted primarily to the derivation of his own axioms for arithmetic, which are somewhat different (though of course equivalent). These axioms, which may be yet more intuitive than the Dedekind-Peano axioms, may be taken to be "The Basic Laws of Cardinal Number", as Frege understood them. Though the axioms of arithmetic have been known to be derivable from Hume's Principle for about ten years now, it has not been widely recognized that Frege himself showed them so to be; nor has it been known that Frege made use of any axiomatization for arithmetic whatsoever. Grundgesetze is thus a work of much greater significance than has often been thought. First, Frege's use of the inconsistent Axiom V may invalidate certain of his claims regarding the philosophical significance of his work (viz., the establishment of Logicism), but it should not be allowed to obscure his mathematical accomplishments and his contribution to our understanding of arithmetic. Second, Frege's knowledge that arithmetic is derivable from Hume's Principle raises important sorts of questions about his philosophy of arithmetic. For example, "Why did Frege not simply abandon Axiom V and take Hume's Principle as an axiom?". (shrink)

Frege, famously, held that there is a close connection between our concept of cardinal number and the notion of one-one correspondence, a connection enshrined in Hume's Principle. Husserl, and later Parsons, objected that there is no such close connection, that our most primitive conception of cardinality arises from our grasp of the practice of counting. Some empirical work on children's development of a concept of number has sometimes been thought to point in the same direction. I argue, however, that Frege (...) was close to right, that our concept of cardinal number is closely connected with a notion like that of one-one correspondence, a more primitive notion we might call just as many. (shrink)

What reasons for action do we have? What explains why we have these reasons? This paper articulates some of the basic structural features of a theory that would provide answers to these questions. According to this theory, reasons for action are all grounded in intrinsic values, but in a way that makes room for a thoroughly non-consequentialist view of the way in which intrinsic values generate reasons for aaction.

I here investigate the sense in which diagonalization allows one to construct sentences that are self-referential. Truly self-referential sentences cannot be constructed in the standard language of arithmetic: There is a simple theory of truth that is intuitively inconsistent but is consistent with Peano arithmetic, as standardly formulated. True self-reference is possible only if we expand the language to include function-symbols for all primitive recursive functions. This language is therefore the natural setting for investigations of self-reference.

Many philosophers have claimed that the intentional is normative. (This claim is the analogue, within the philosophy of mind, of the claim that is often made within the philosophy of language, that meaning is normative.) But what exactly does this claim mean? And what reason is there for believing it? In this paper, I shall first try to clarify the content of the claim that the intentional is normative. Then I shall examine a number of the arguments that philosophers have (...) advanced for this claim (and for the parallel claim that meaning is normative). As we shall see, many of these arguments are unsuccessful. However, I shall close by giving a sketch of what may be a successful argument for this claim. (shrink)

One of the earliest discussions of the so-called 'bad company' objection to Neo-Fregeanism, I show that the consistency of an arbitrary second-order 'contextual definition' (nowadays known as an 'abstraction principle' is recursively undecidable. I go on to suggest that an acceptable such principle should satisfy a condition nowadays known as 'stablity'.

El presente artículo busca analizar el papel que jugó la tradición pitagórica dentro de la propuesta copernicana. Aunque la intención inicial de Rheticus y Copérnico al invocar la tradición pitagórica fuera legitimar el modelo heliocéntrico como una propuesta digna de consideración, lo que consiguieron fue darle un nuevo significado a lo que se entendía por pitagorismo. Al ligar el pitagorismo con el heliocentrismo moderno, Copérnico construye una nueva tradición que servirá de inspiración y justificación a sus seguidores inmediatos.

This paper offers a historical analysis of contemporary practices of shopping for vegetables in the highly dynamic context of urban Hanoi during the period from 1975 to 2014. Focusing on everyday shopping practices from a food safety perspective, we assess the extent to which the policy-enforced process of supermarketization has proven to be an engine of change in daily vegetable purchasing while improving food safety. In depicting transitions in shopping practices, we combine a social practices approach with historical analysis. Providing (...) a historical analysis of a broad and complex spectrum of everyday practices of purchasing fresh vegetables, we identify the key drivers of change. We discuss different modalities of shopping and demonstrate that no single retail modernization format can be said to exist. Rather than contrasting an idealized supermarket model with the traditional modalities of food shopping, we offer a varied, more diverse set of shopping practices that displays different strategies for coping with food safety issues. When discussed from a historical perspective, food practices are shown to be highly dynamic, being constantly reinvented and reconfigured by consumers who use their established skills, routines, and social networks to sometimes resist top-down enforced supermarketization while developing the coping strategies that best suit their local circumstances. (shrink)

Substance The term “substance” has two main uses in philosophy. Both originate in what is arguably the most influential work of philosophy ever written, Aristotle’s Categories. In its first sense, “substance” refers to those things that are object-like, rather that property-like. For example, an elephant is a substance in this sense, whereas the height or … Continue reading Substance →.

Frege's intention in section 31 of Grundgesetze is to show that every well-formed expression in his formal system denotes. But it has been obscure why he wants to do this and how he intends to do it. It is argued here that, in large part, Frege's purpose is to show that the smooth breathing, from which names of value-ranges are formed, denotes; that his proof that his other primitive expressions denote is sound and anticipates Tarski's theory of truth; and that (...) the proof that the smooth breathing denotes, while flawed, rests upon an idea now familiar from the completeness proof for first-order logic. The main work of the paper consists in defending a new understanding of the semantics Frege offers for the quantifiers: one which is objectual, but which does not make use of the notion of an assignment to a free variable. (shrink)

Syntactic Reductionism, as understood here, is the view that the ‘logical forms’ of sentences in which reference to abstract objects appears to be made are misleading so that, on analysis, we can see that no expressions which even purport to refer to abstract objects are present in such sentences. After exploring the motivation for such a view, and arguing that no previous argument against it succeeds, sentences involving generalized quantifiers, such as ‘most’, are examined. It is then argued, on this (...) basis, that Syntactic Reductionism is untenable. (shrink)

En su comentario a la Isagoge, Duns Escoto se pregunta dónde se halla el universal: ¿en las cosas o en el intelecto? Caracterizando al universal como universal lógico y accidente intencional de la esencia, en su respuesta se articulan la dimensión ontológica y la dimensión semántica del universal: con el intelecto que lo causa y con la cosa que denomina. Analizaremos estas dos relaciones y las implicaciones que se siguen en el orden de la predicación a partir del ejemplo propuesto (...) por Escoto: «hombre es universal». In his Questions on Porphyry’s Isagoge, Scotus asks about the place of inherence of the universal: ¿is it in the things or in the intellect? Being established the universal as logical universal and intentional accident of the essence, in Scotus’s answer the ontological and the semantical dimensions of the universal are articulated: with the intellect which causes it and with the thing it designates. We will analyse both of these relations and their implications in the order of predication taking into account Scotus’s example «man is universal». (shrink)

En este trabajo se estudia la concepción de la filosofía y el método de la exageración propuesto por Günther Anders en su obra en dos volúmenes La obsolescencia del hombre (1956-1980). Si temáticamente el centro de la obra es la preocupación por la posible autodestrucción de la humanidad en la época atómica; Anders también propone una comprensión de la filosofía y de su método como correlato operatorio de dicha posible aniquilación. Esta revisión de la filosofía y su método constituyen la (...) justificación del tratamiento filosófico de la posibilidad de la autodestrucción de la humanidad. (shrink)

In section 10 of Grundgesetze, Frege confronts an indeterm inacy left by his stipulations regarding his ‘smooth breathing’, from which names of valueranges are formed. Though there has been much discussion of his arguments, it remains unclear what this indeterminacy is; why it bothers Frege; and how he proposes to respond to it. The present paper attempts to answer these questions by reading section 10 as preparatory for the (fallacious) proof, given in section 31, that every expression of Frege's formal (...) language denotes. (shrink)

IT es una novela de terror publicada en 1986 por el escritor estadounidense Stephen King. La historia sigue a un grupo de siete amigos, el Club de los Perdedores, mientras son aterrorizados por un ente sobrenatural. IT explota los miedos y fobias de sus víctimas para disfrazarse al cazar a sus presas. El principal objetivo de este trabajo es demostrar que el trauma infantil es el principal factor de terror en la novela, esto a través de tres tangentes distintas presentes (...) en la obra: la falta de memoria, la ansiedad excesiva y la inmadurez emocional severa. (shrink)

This article offers an overview of the various formulations of "jihad" during the first six Islamic centuries (7th-13th CE), showing them to be embedded in particular socio-historical contexts. If the essential significance of "jihad" as righteous cause (i.e., action for the sake of a moral order) is shown to have been variously altered according to the needs and conditions of the Muslim community, significant possibilities arise for a contemporary understanding of "jihad" that is relevant to the needs and circumstances of (...) the Muslim community today. Some features of the "jihad" tradition, although specific to a particular period and with little relevance today, continue to inform the current discussion on "jihad." Discussion of the "jihad" tradition, then, should take care to distinguish the historically incidental features of the tradition from those with an enduring relevancy. By doing so, the "jihad" tradition will be able to contribute to discussions on the relation of religion to the public order and political organization, even those not limited to Islam. (shrink)

This paper dates from about 1994: I rediscovered it on my hard drive in the spring of 2002. It represents an early attempt to explore the connections between the Julius Caesar problem and Frege's attitude towards Basic Law V. Most of the issues discussed here are ones treated rather differently in my more recent papers "The Julius Caesar Objection" and "Grundgesetze der Arithmetik I 10". But the treatment here is more accessible, in many ways, providing more context and a better (...) sense of how this issue relates to broader issues in Frege's philosophy. (shrink)