Frankfurt argues that self-love is the purest and -- paradoxically, perhaps -- most disinterested form of love.

In their discussions of issues concerning the nature of human action, and also in their inquiries into the structure of practical reasoning, philosophers typically draw upon a more or less standard conceptual repertoire. The most familiar item in that repertoire is the indispensable, ubiquitous, and protean notion of what people want or — synonymously, at least in the usage that I shall adopt — what they desire. I believe that the elementary repertoire in which the concept of desire is so (...) centrally situated needs to be enriched by the articulation of certain additional notions. It is more or less customary to identify the point of practical reasoning or deliberation simply as a matter of figuring out how to attain whatever goal it is that we want to reach. In many instances, however, what inspires our thinking and shapes our conduct is not that we merely wantone thing or another.Often, what moves us is that there is something of which it is both more precise and more informative to say that we care about it or that we regard it as important to ourselves. In certain cases, it is appropriate to characterize what guides us in terms of a rather particular mode of caring — namely, love. It is with these concepts — what we care about, what we consider important to us, and what we love — that I shall here be concerned. (shrink)

This is the text of The Lindley Lecture for 2001, given by Harry Frankfurt, an American philosopher.

This essay consists in my replies to Professors John Martin Fischer, Patricia Greenspan, Eleonore Stump, Peter van Inwagen and Gary Watson regarding various aspects of my analysis of moral responsibility.

Le présent essai se propose d'appréhender la doctrine cartésienne selon laquelle ce qui existe ne saurait subsister sans que Dieu le soutienne dans l'être par une activité créatrice continuée. Comment Dieu soutient-il l'existence et pourquoi lui est-il nécessaire de le faire ? L'auteur analyse l'apparente contradiction, qui fait problème, entre la doctrine de la création continuée et l'affirmation par Descartes que le mouvement se poursuit à moins que n'intervienne quelque force extérieure. Il examine ensuite, pour la récuser, la thèse (défendue (...) par Gilson et par Gueroult) selon laquelle la doctrine de la création continuée impliquerait la discontinuité du temps. This essay seeks to understand Descartes's doctrine that what exists cannot continue to exist unless God sustains it by continuous creative activity. How does God sustain existence and why is it necessary for Him to do this ? The essay explores a puzzling apparent contrast between the doctrine of continuous creation and Descartes's claim that motion continues unless an external force interferes. Further, it considers and rejects the thesis (maintained by Gilson and Gueroult) that the doctrine of continuous creation entails that time is discontinuous. (shrink)

Le présent essai se propose d'appréhender la doctrine cartésienne selon laquelle ce qui existe ne saurait subsister sans que Dieu le soutienne dans l'être par une activité créatrice continuée. Comment Dieu soutient-il l'existence et pourquoi lui est-il nécessaire de le faire ? L'auteur analyse l'apparente contradiction, qui fait problème, entre la doctrine de la création continuée et l'affirmation par Descartes que le mouvement se poursuit à moins que n'intervienne quelque force extérieure. Il examine ensuite, pour la récuser, la thèse selon (...) laquelle la doctrine de la création continuée impliquerait la discontinuité du temps. This essay seeks to understand Descartes's doctrine that what exists cannot continue to exist unless God sustains it by continuous creative activity. How does God sustain existence and why is it necessary for Him to do this ? The essay explores a puzzling apparent contrast between the doctrine of continuous creation and Descartes's claim that motion continues unless an external force interferes. Further, it considers and rejects the thesis that the doctrine of continuous creation entails that time is discontinuous. (shrink)

This chapter contains section titled: “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person”.

Against the view of certain philosophers, such as Thomas Nagel, I defend the common sense belief that people are not responsible for what they do or bring about inadvertently. I consider what response we might reasonably expect from a person who inadvertently does or brings about some event or condition that is manifestly undesirable or bad; and I suggest that we might reasonably expect such a person not to feel guilty but, rather, to feel embarrassed by his or her inability (...) to prevent or avoid that condition or event. (shrink)

Against the view of certain philosophers, such as Thomas Nagel, I defend the common sense belief that people are not morally responsible for what they do or bring about inadvertently. I consider what response we might reasonably expect from a person who inadvertently does or brings about some event or condition that is manifestly undesirable or bad; and I suggest that we might reasonably expect such a person not to feel guilty but, rather, to feel embarrassed by his or her (...) inability to prevent or avoid that condition or event. (shrink)

En contra de la posición de ciertos filósofos, como Thomas Nagel, defiendo la creencia del sentido común según la cual las personas no son moralmente responsables de aquello que hacen o producen inadvertidamente. Considero qué respuesta podríamos esperar razonablemente de una persona que inadvertida..

In Portraits of American Philosophy, eight of America's most prominent philosophers offer autobiographical narratives that remind us that the life of a scholar is both a tale of personal struggle and an adventure in ideas.