We investigated the influence of personality and culture on effects of mortality salience over cultural worldview defense. We hypothesized that CWVD reactions to MS differ between Germany and Poland because of the higher conservatism of the latter country, and that they are moderated by action vs. state orientation. In this study German and Polish, participants were exposed either to MS or to a control condition. Punishment ratings to trivial offences and serious social transgressions were measures of CWVD. Results showed that (...) social transgressions in both conditions were more strongly punished in Poland than in Germany. Additionally, compared to the control condition, under MS action oriented punished serious transgressions more strongly in Germany whereas state oriented punished serious transgressions more strongly in Poland. That is, the effects of MS on CWVD are moderated by personality and culture. We interpret the opposite pattern of punishment to serious social transgressions given by action and state orientedin in Germany and Poland, respectively, according to the higher emotional autonomy of action-oriented persons in either culture. (shrink)

Upregulation of implicit positive affect (PA) can act as a mechanism to deal with negative affect. Two studies tracked temporal changes in positive and negative affect (NA) assessed by self-report and the Implicit Positive and Negative Affect Test (IPANAT; Quirin, Kazén, & Kuhl, 2009). Study 1 observed the predicted increases in implicit PA after exposure to a threat-related film clip, which correlated positively with the speed of recognising a happy face among an angry crowd. Study 2 replicated increases in (...) implicit PA after exposition to the same film clip, and showed that such increases were enhanced by priming self-referential stimuli. The findings are discussed against the background of personality systems interaction (PSI) theory (Kuhl, 2000, 2001), which emphasises the role of the implicit self in affect regulation. (shrink)

Socio-economic decisions are commonly explained by rational cost versus benefit considerations, whereas person variables have not much been considered. The present study aimed at investigating the degree to which dispositional power motivation and affective states predict socio-economic decisions. The power motive was assessed both indirectly and directly using a TAT-like picture test and a power motive self-report, respectively. After 9 months, 62 students completed an affect rating and performed on a money allocation task. We hypothesized and confirmed that dispositional power (...) should be associated with a tendency to maximize one’s profit but to care less about another party’s profit. Additionally, positive affect showed effects in the same direction. The results are discussed with respect to a motivational approach explaining socio-economic behaviour. (shrink)

Humans are unconditionally confronted with social expectations and norms, up to a degree that they, or some of them, have a hard time recognizing what they actually want. This renders them susceptible for introjection, that is, to unwittingly or “unconsciously” mistake social expectations for self-chosen goals. Such introjections compromise an individual’s autonomy and mental health and have been shown to be more prevalent in individuals with rumination tendencies and low emotional self-awareness. In this brain imaging study, we draw on a (...) source memory task and found that introjections, as indicated by imposed tasks that are falsely recognized as self-chosen, involved the bilateral medial prefrontal cortex and the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex. Notably, reduced right MPFC activation within this condition correlated with trait scores of ruminations and reduced emotional self-awareness, but also introversion. Moreover, correct recognition of tasks as self-chosen involved the right MPFC. Accordingly, the right MPFC may play a role in supporting the maintenance of psychological autonomy and counteract introjection, which individuals with certain personality traits seem to be prone to. This research has significant implications for the study of mechanisms underlying autonomous motivation, goal and norm internalization, decision-making, persuasion, education, and clinical conditions such as depression and burnout. (shrink)

Denne artikel hedder ”Musikalske Omgangsformer”. Men den fortæller ikke så meget om, hvorledes musikalske omgangsformer tager sig ud, som den fører til et punkt, hvor musikalske omgangsformer bliver sigtbare og påtrængende. Snarere end at præsentere en teori om musikalske omgangsformer anviser den et sted, hvor en teoridannelse er påkrævet. Udgangspunktet bliver en påvisning af, hvorledes den fænomenologiske tilgang til det musikalske fænomen svigter ved tematisk og dog stiltiende at hævde musikstykket, satsen, som sin genstand. Utilstrækkeligheden påpeges inden for den fænomenologiske (...) analyses eget univers. Som sådan vil den ved artiklens afslutning yderligere omfatte formuleringen af den påpegede utilstrækkelighed. Fra dette – negative – udgangspunkt tages skridtet ind i et rum, der skal indbefatte de påviste løse ender og samtidig give plads for, at vi med positivt udgangspunkt i en praxis-orienteret filosofi kan komme til at binde de nødvendige knuder. (shrink)

Kant.--Stammler.--Critiek van Binder. Anticritiek.--Proeve van methodologische critiek aan de hand van Stammler's theorie (zuivere rechtsleer) Jellinek's "Allgemeine staatslehre.".

Friedrich Brunstäd, von Haus aus Philosoph in der Tradition Hegels, galt lange als vergessener Theologe des 20. Jahrhunderts, obwohl er zu Lebzeiten über eine grosse Wirksamkeit verfügte. Die vorliegende Studie entreisst ihn dem Vergessen und verortet ihn grundlegend in der theologisch-philosophischen Landschaft seiner Zeit. Brunstäd arbeitete an einer theologischen Hegel-Rezeption, die die programmatische Weichenstellung des Hegel'schen Ansatzes, die Philosophie der Theologie überzuordnen, bewusst nicht mitvollzog. In seinen sozialethischen Grundüberzeugungen wurde er von Reinhold Seeberg geprägt, den er in der Weimarer Republik (...) als Vordenker des christlich-sozialen Protestantismus beerbte. Brunstäd übte als Mitglied im Hauptvorstand der DNVP zeitweilig auch politisch einigen Einfluss aus. Nach 1933 galt sein Interesse der Wahrung der kirchenpolitischen und theologischen Integrität des Luthertums. Die vorliegende Studie erschliesst zum einen das hohe Reflexionsniveau seiner Hegel-Rezeption, zum anderen zeigt sie anhand seiner Person zentrale Problemstellungen im politischen Weg des deutschen Protestantismus nach 1918 auf. (shrink)

Traditionally, philosophers of mind have been guided by a brainbound approach: the mind, whatever it turns out to be, will be related to or identical with the brain. The body, under this approach, plays a merely instrumental role — it is what keeps the brain alive and healthy. Over the past few decades there has been increasing resistance to the brainbound approach, and a strongly supported push for taking a non-brainbound approach: the body is not merely instrumental, but in many (...) ways constitutive of the mind — the mind, whatever it turns out to be, is bodily in many fundamental respects. Thus, in explaining the mind, we must consider not only brain states, but also wider bodily processes. What those wider bodily processes are, and how they constitute certain mental states, are the key questions that we now face as non-brainbound philosophers of mind. -/- One avenue of investigation that many have taken in view to answering these two questions has been to look at bodily awareness and its relation to our sense of self. How does our body, and our awareness of our body more specifically, constitute our sense of self and our subjective experience of the world. A clear way of investigating this last question is to turn to pathological cases of body awareness, e.g. body dysmorphic disorder and anorexia nervosa. Anorexia nervosa is an interesting case. The DSM-5 distinguishes anorexia nervosa from body dysmorphic disorder — the former is classified as an eating disorder, while the latter is classified as a mental disorder. As I will explore in this chapter, this very manner of distinguishing among such pathologies admits of a traditional brainbound approach to separating the mind/brain from the body. Here I shall consider how a non-brainbound approach might give us different, and perhaps even better insight into cases such as anorexia nervosa, and I shall, conversely, consider how such body awareness disorders might serve to further strengthen the view that the right approach to understanding the mind is the non-brainbound approach. (shrink)

Research on bodily awareness has focused on body illusions with an aim to explore the possible dissociation of our bodily awareness from our own body. It has provided insights into how our sensory modalities shape our sense of embodiment, and it has raised important questions regarding the malleability of our sense of ownership over our own body. The issue, however, is that this research fails to consider an important distinction in how we experience our body. There are indeed two ways (...) in which we can be aware of our body: via observational awareness, which involves attending to the body as an object, and via non-observational awareness, where the body is given as the subject of experience and does not involve attention. The research to date has focused on the former—observational bodily awareness—and has left the latter—non-observational bodily awareness—in the dark. This is detrimental to ever formulating a complete account of how we are aware of our body. It is understandable, however, because of the inherent problem in studying non-observational bodily awareness: how would you instruct subjects to report on their unattended bodily awareness? In view to resolving this problem, I propose here a working hypothesis on the basis of research on interoception and the rubber hand illusion, and on the effect of meditation on awareness and attention. This working hypothesis can show us a way to begin studying non-observational bodily awareness, and finally build a complete theory of bodily awareness. (shrink)

In this qualitative study, the elements and quality of musher-sled dog relationships were investigated. In-depth interviews with a narrative design were conducted with eight mushers from northern Minnesota and northwestern Ontario. The mushers were asked to contribute ideas by sharing stories and experiences of working with dogs, as well as art or photographs. While all the participants had their own ideas about musher-sled dog relationships, six themes emerged. The mushers stated the importance of getting to know the dogs, their respect (...) for their sled dogs’ abilities, the idea of a two-way communication that takes place, the importance of trust, the notion of partnership, and what can be learned through working with sled dogs. This study supports other research suggesting that humans and animals engage in interspecies relationships and that these can be quality relationships with multiple elements. The importance of researching and teaching about dogs as subjects is discussed, as well as the significance of humans having direct experience with other animals. (shrink)

The vertebrate heart comprises a variety of cell types, the majority of which are cardiomyocytes, smooth muscle and endothelial cells. Their origin is still an intriguing research topic and the question is whether these cells derive from a common or from multiple distinct progenitor cell(s). Three recent publications not only suggest the existence of a single progenitor cell that can give rise to cardiovascular lineages but additionally uncovered, at least in part, the molecular identity of such a multipotent precursor cell.1-3 (...) These findings constitute major progress in the quest for stem-cell therapies for cardiac diseases. BioEssays 29:422–426, 2007. © 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

Formation of a multicellular organism is a complex process involving differentiation and morphogenesis. During early vertebrate development, the radial symmetric organization of the egg is transferred into a bilateral symmetric organism with three distinct body axes: anteroposterior (AP), dorsoventral, and left–right. Due to cellular movements and proliferation, the body elongates along the AP axis. How are these processes coupled? Two recent publications now indicate that cell migration as well as orientated cell divisions contribute to axis elongation. The processes are coupled (...) through the planar cell polarity pathway.1 At the same time, the AP axis is patterned independently of convergent extension. This process, however, is required for cell migration and represents a cue for polarized cell motility during gastrulation. Thus, it is AP polarity that instructs individual cells how to orientate with respect to the embryonic axis and provides positional information for the process of convergent extension.2 BioEssays 26:1272–1275, 2004. © 2004 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

In Plato's Theaetetus Socrates is portrayed as a midwife of the intellect. The comparison of Socratic questioning to midwifery had until recently been commonly attributed to Socrates himself. In 1977 M. F. Burnyeat published Socratic Midwifery, Platonic Inspiration, which transformed the way in which the dialogue has since been perceived. The author maintains that the midwife comparison is in no sense to be attributed to the historical Socrates.

Closed systems are mental artefacts whose structure can neither be explained in terms of innate dispositions nor in terms of the mechanism of natural selection and which stands in contradiction to the conditions of the possibility of information transfer. Kant takes the formal structure of pure mathematics as a guarantor for his reconstruction of a closed system of the subject's structures of knowledge a priori, thereby giving rise to the problem of a normative interface between interior system and exterior information (...) – a problem which is, in this form, not to be solved. By tracing the structure of generative grammar and formal logics back to innate modules, respectively, Chomsky and Fodor are creating the same interface problem, whose basic structure has not yet received the necessary attention. (shrink)

Our emotional states affect how we perceive the world. If I am stressed, annoyed, or irritated, I might experience the sound of children laughing and screaming as they play around the house in a negative manner — it is unpleasant, loud, piercing, and so on. Yet, if I’m in a relaxed, happy, loving mood, the very same sounds might be experienced as pleasant, playful, warm, and so on. The sounds being made by the children are the same in both cases, (...) but how they are experienced differs. The auditory experience is affected by the emotional state that I am in. I perceive the sounds differently depending on how I’m feeling. Although this might at first seem to be a trivial observation, it certainly is not. We take for granted that our perceptual experiences give rise to justified beliefs and knowledge. Thus, if my perceptual experience of an object can differ based on my emotional state, and I take my perceptual experience to justify my beliefs and even lead to knowledge, then we might have a problem. If emotions — which are not fixed and in large part uncontrolled — affect our ability to accurately perceive the world, then they may undermine the justified beliefs and knowledge gained on the basis of our perceptual experience of the world. My goal here is to explore this potential problem. -/- I consider how we might understand the effect that emotions have on the justification of our perceptual beliefs about the world, beliefs that we acquire from a variety of sensory modalities — audition, gustation olfaction, and so on. I take the problem to be associated with one of two forms of perceptual influence: penetration or multisensory integration. In any given perceptual moment there are multiple sensory modalities and mental states at play, each affecting the overall experience. Whether we understand the influence of emotion on perception as a form of non-perceptual penetration or a form of non-visual sensory perception of the inner body — interoception — the potential epistemological difficulties remain: how can we be said to acquire justified beliefs and knowledge on the basis of such influenced perceptual experience. As has been the norm, only the five exteroceptive senses of vision, audition, olfaction, taste and touch are typically discussed in the context of sensory perception. However, as I argue, there is strong reason to accept the claim that emotional experience is a form of interoception, and that interoception ought to be considered when discussing sensory perception. In this way, then, I propose that clarifying the role played by interoception in sense perception across modalities is necessary if we are to make progress on the epistemological problems at hand. (shrink)

The hard problem of consciousness lies in explaining what constitutes the subjectivity of consciousness. I argue that significant headway can be made on the problem from an embodied mind view, and particularly if we turn to William James’ theory of emotions. The challenge is one of explaining how bodily subjectivity arises from biological processes. I argue that the solution to this problem lies in our sense of interoception, and James’ theory which suggests emotional feelings are the cascade of changing bodily (...) states. Through James’ account, I show how the biological body can give rise to a bodily subjectivity in experiential consciousness, and thus move towards a solution of the hard problem. (shrink)

This paper presents a typology of human actions, based on Aristotle’s kinesis–energeia dichotomy and on a formal elaboration (with some refinement) of the Vendler–Kenny classificatory schemes for action types (or action verbs). The types introduced are defined throughout by inferential criteria, in terms of what here are referred to as “modal-temporal expressions” (‘MT-terms’). Examples of familiar categories analysed in this way are production and maintenance, but the procedure is meant to offer a basis for defining various other commonsense categories. Among (...) the more theoretical categories introduced are “Aristotelian projects”, i.e. actions defined in terms of Aristotle’s conceptions of movement/change, as well as “abstract projects”, in which the agent ensures that something changes from not being a fact to being a fact, and “conditional agency”, which involves actions that are to be performed when/if certain conditions come to be fulfilled. A category like “starting an action” is itself inferentially defined here in MT-terms, and so, inter alia, are proceeding with, finishing, stopping and interrupting an action. There is also a demonstration of how actions of one type may be converted into those of other types, where this is a matter of the way they are “seen” or described. There is also an implication to the effect that some of these distinctions may be useful for formulating certain critical insights regarding modern life. (shrink)