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In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:258 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY To make this theme conspicuous to the reader, the author deals with three topics in Aristotle's first philosophy: the path from beings to the primary instance of being, the study of sensible substance, and the distinction between the potential and the actual. Grene's essay on the most perplexing of Aristotle's works is the least satisfactory in her study. Though she acknowledges that the path of (...) thg Aristotelian first philosopher is not easy, her analysis of the school X67oLmakes the road more facile than it, in fact, is. For example, what is the relation between Wisdom (the science of principles and causes), the science of being-qua-being, and the science of immovable substance? How can the latter be universal and, at the same time, have as its object one kind of being? Why does Aristotle dismiss substrate in the sense of compound of form and matter as a candidate for substance? It would seem to satisfy his criteria of thisness and separability better (or at least in more instances) than substrate in the sense of form. Finally, it is hard to avoid Ross's conclusion (Aristotle's Metaphysics, Vol. 1, pp. ci) that Aristotle in Book Z moves away from the view that the primary ontological units are sensible individuals toward the view that they are pure forms. The real is either the object of definition (and this appears to be Aristotle's view for the most part in Book Z) or it is the individual (the doctrine of the Categories); it cannot, on Aristotelian grounds, be both. Grene's resolution of the difficulty will not bear scrutiny. She says (p. 205): "Definition is of the universal. But the object of definition is the real substance, the being-what-it-is of the thing. This is substance and not universal." The incompatibility of the first and third sentences in this passage constitutes what Grene refers to (p. 205) as "a very perplexing situation indeed;" and they also reflect the "double meaning" which "pervades Aristotle's whole treatment of substance" (Ross, Aristotle, p. 166). It is the doctrine of the first sentence which comes to the fore in Book Z, for there Aristotle concludes (i) that ot~r is r6 I"L~Tv e~tL and maintains (ii) that rb rl ~v rival 'will belong to nothing which is not a species of a genus' (1030"12-13). And we hardly need be reminded that an Aristotelian species is not an individual. Grene, it seems to me, relieves our perplexity somewhat, but only by blurring the oscillation in Aristotle's mind on this point, e.g., when she implies that the unambiguous doctrine of Book Z is that "as far as the perceived world goes, the naturalist's specimen, the individual of a type, the member of a class, is the prototype of the real" (p. 205). In very readable prose Grene has given us a picture of Aristotle that is at once engaging and in most respects faithful to the interests and outlook of her model. She says in a bibliographical note that her book is "meant more for the undergraduate reader or the general public than for scholars already conversant both with the text and the tradition" (p. 257). I suggest that the account Grene has given us is stimulating and refreshing also for the scholar. JosxAtt B. GOULD,JR. Glaremont Graduate School La filosofia medievale: Antologia di testi. Edited by Nicola Abbagnan0. (Bari: Editori Laterza, 1963. Pp. 440. -----Coll. del Candelaio. L. 2700.) it is the purpose of this, the second volume in the Antologia di testi filosofici to appear under the general editorship of the fine Italian scholar, Nicola Abbagnano, to provide an introduction to the history of mediaeval philosophy through the presentation of selected primary source materials in Italian translation. The book could have been a significant addition to the sparse philosophical literature of the period that is now available BOOK REVIEWS 259 to the non-Latin reader; instead, it turns out to be a sort of catalogue of opinions on a wide variety of philosophical topics held by many of the thinkers active in the period: between St... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:258 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY To make this theme conspicuous to the reader, the author deals with three topics in Aristotle's first philosophy: the path from beings to the primary instance of being, the study of sensible substance, and the distinction between the potential and the actual. Grene's essay on the most perplexing of Aristotle's works is the least satisfactory in her study. Though she acknowledges that the path of (...) thg Aristotelian first philosopher is not easy, her analysis of the school X67oLmakes the road more facile than it, in fact, is. For example, what is the relation between Wisdom (the science of principles and causes), the science of being-qua-being, and the science of immovable substance? How can the latter be universal and, at the same time, have as its object one kind of being? Why does Aristotle dismiss substrate in the sense of compound of form and matter as a candidate for substance? It would seem to satisfy his criteria of thisness and separability better (or at least in more instances) than substrate in the sense of form. Finally, it is hard to avoid Ross's conclusion (Aristotle's Metaphysics, Vol. 1, pp. ci) that Aristotle in Book Z moves away from the view that the primary ontological units are sensible individuals toward the view that they are pure forms. The real is either the object of definition (and this appears to be Aristotle's view for the most part in Book Z) or it is the individual (the doctrine of the Categories); it cannot, on Aristotelian grounds, be both. Grene's resolution of the difficulty will not bear scrutiny. She says (p. 205): "Definition is of the universal. But the object of definition is the real substance, the being-what-it-is of the thing. This is substance and not universal." The incompatibility of the first and third sentences in this passage constitutes what Grene refers to (p. 205) as "a very perplexing situation indeed;" and they also reflect the "double meaning" which "pervades Aristotle's whole treatment of substance" (Ross, Aristotle, p. 166). It is the doctrine of the first sentence which comes to the fore in Book Z, for there Aristotle concludes (i) that ot~r is r6 I"L~Tv e~tL and maintains (ii) that rb rl ~v rival 'will belong to nothing which is not a species of a genus' (1030"12-13). And we hardly need be reminded that an Aristotelian species is not an individual. Grene, it seems to me, relieves our perplexity somewhat, but only by blurring the oscillation in Aristotle's mind on this point, e.g., when she implies that the unambiguous doctrine of Book Z is that "as far as the perceived world goes, the naturalist's specimen, the individual of a type, the member of a class, is the prototype of the real" (p. 205). In very readable prose Grene has given us a picture of Aristotle that is at once engaging and in most respects faithful to the interests and outlook of her model. She says in a bibliographical note that her book is "meant more for the undergraduate reader or the general public than for scholars already conversant both with the text and the tradition" (p. 257). I suggest that the account Grene has given us is stimulating and refreshing also for the scholar. JosxAtt B. GOULD,JR. Glaremont Graduate School La filosofia medievale: Antologia di testi. Edited by Nicola Abbagnan0. (Bari: Editori Laterza, 1963. Pp. 440. -----Coll. del Candelaio. L. 2700.) it is the purpose of this, the second volume in the Antologia di testi filosofici to appear under the general editorship of the fine Italian scholar, Nicola Abbagnano, to provide an introduction to the history of mediaeval philosophy through the presentation of selected primary source materials in Italian translation. The book could have been a significant addition to the sparse philosophical literature of the period that is now available BOOK REVIEWS 259 to the non-Latin reader; instead, it turns out to be a sort of catalogue of opinions on a wide variety of philosophical topics held by many of the thinkers active in the period: between St... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 249 larger sections of the work will be translated-preferably not from the Latin, but from the Arabic original. JOSEPHL. B~u Columbia University Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle. By St. Thomas Aquinas. Trans. by John P. Rowan. (Chicago, Illinois: Henry Regnery Company, 1961. Pp. xxiii + 955.2 vols., boxed, $25.00.) Generally speaking, the two Summae of St. Thomas, long available in English translation, contain all that is (...) most personal and most profound in his philosophical thought. Nonetheless, it is quite impossible to get a fully adequate conception of St. Thomas' place in the history of western thought from a consideration of his theological writings alone. Hence, by translating St. Thomas' Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle into English, Professor J. P. Rowan has provided the non-Latin reading student of the history of philosophy an invaluable service. For it is in his r61e as Aristotelian commentator that we see St. Thomas creating for the Schoolmen a version of Aristotle which served to render the Stagirite's thought into terms which became fundamental to the philosophical defense of Christianity. Further, by keeping in mind the fully-developed notions of St. Thomas on the existence of God and the nature of being as these are given us to understand in the Summae, the reader becomes better enabled, by a critical reading of Thomas' Commentary, to grasp the sense in which the Saint's theological writings are said by his enthusiasts to represent a "completing" and "perfecting" of Aristotle's thought. Professor Rowan's translation is based upon the Turin, 1950, edition of R. M. Spiazzi. This edition is itself fundamentally the older edition of M. R. Cathala, containing but few emendations. Although the translator was obliged to check Spiazzi occasionally against the Parma and Viv6s editions of Thomas' Opera Omnia, the usefulness of such consultation was, as Professor Rowan himself states, "limited inasmuch as both the editions of Viv~s and that of Cathala use Parma as their basic text" (p. vii). Further, since the edition from which he worked was not critical, Professor Rowan found it necessary in some instances to himself emend the reading of the Spiazzi text. However, where such alterations were made, and where indeed they were not obviously required, Professor Rowan indicated his iustification for the change in a footnote. It is unfortunate that no critical edition of Thomas' work was available to his translator; still, although a final evaluation of his emendations must, of course, attend the future appearance of a critical edition of Thomas' work, so far as we were able to judge, Professor Rowan's 250 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY changes were in all instances quite reasonable and well ]ustified. Professor Rowan has wisely included a translation of that version of the Aristotelian text upon which St. Thomas (in all probability) based his commentary. As this Latin version frequently departs from such currently available English translations as those of W. D. Ross, H. Tredennik, and others which are based upon Greek sources, a good deal of confusion as to Thomas' actual point of departure would have been introduced had this inclusion not been made. The general value and utility of Professor Rowan's work is further increased by his footnoted indications of the more important variations obtaining between the Greek text (as given in Bekker), and the Latin version employed by St. Thomas. For the reader who wishes to compare the Latin version, the Greek text, and the English translations, Professor Rowan has provided the standard Bekker reference numbers at the beginning of each of Thomas' Lectiones. To further simplify the whole matter of reference and cross-reference, Professor Rowan has used the letter C, followed by a numeral, to designate sections of Thomas' Commentary. These sections are the same as those established originally by Cathala. Numbers not preceded by C designate the appropriate sections of the Latin version of Aristotle's text, and correspond with those given by Spiazzi in his revision of the Cathala edition. Thus, as example, in such a reference as (241:C345), the first number designates the section of the version of Aristotle employed by St. Thomas, and the second, the section of St. Thomas... (shrink)

I call the activity of assessing and developing improvements of our representational devices ‘conceptual engineering’.¹ The aim of this chapter is to present an argument for why conceptual engineering is important for all parts of philosophy (and, more generally, all inquiry). Section I of the chapter provides some background and defines key terms. Section II presents the argument. Section III responds to seven objections. The replies also serve to develop the argument and clarify what conceptual engineering is.

The authors developed this textbook in response to an increasing interest in ethics, and a growing number of courses on this topic that are now being offered in educational leadership programs. It is designed to fill a gap in instructional materials for teaching the ethics component of the knowledge base that has been established for the profession. The text has several purposes: First, it demonstrates the application of different ethical paradigms (the ethics of justice, care, critique, and the profession) through (...) discussion and analysis of real-life moral dilemmas that educational leaders face in their schools and communities. Second, it addresses some of the practical, pedagogical, and curricular issues related to the teaching of ethics for educational leaders. Third, it emphasizes the importance of ethics instruction from a variety of theoretical approaches. Finally, it provides a process that instructors might follow to develop their own ethics unit or course. * Part I provides an overview of why ethics is so important, especially for today's educational leaders, and describes a multiparadigm approach essential to practitioners as they grapple with ethical dilemmas. * Part II deals with the dilemmas themselves. Ethical dilemmas written by the authors' graduate students bring readers face-to-face with the kinds of dilemmas faced by practicing administrators in urban, suburban, and rural settings in an era full of complexities and contradictions. * Part III focuses on pedagogy and provides teaching notes for the instructor. The authors discuss the importance of self-reflection on the part of both instructors and students, and model how they thought through their own personal and professional ethical codes as well as reflected upon the critical incidents in their lives that shaped their teaching and frequently determined what they privileged in class. (shrink)

Moving beyond both realist and anti-realist accounts of mathematics, Shapiro articulates a "structuralist" approach, arguing that the subject matter of a mathematical theory is not a fixed domain of numbers that exist independent of each other, but rather is the natural structure, the pattern common to any system of objects that has an initial object and successor relation satisfying the induction principle.

Stewart Shapiro's ambition in Vagueness in Context is to develop a comprehensive account of the meaning, function, and logic of vague terms in an idealized version of a natural language like English. It is a commonplace that the extensions of vague terms vary according to their context: a person can be tall with respect to male accountants and not tall (even short) with respect to professional basketball players. The key feature of Shapiro's account is that the extensions of (...) vague terms also vary in the course of conversations and that, in some cases, a competent speaker can go either way without sinning against the meaning of the words or the non-linguistic facts. As Shapiro sees it, vagueness is a linguistic phenomenon, due to the kinds of languages that humans speak; but vagueness is also due to the world we find ourselves in, as we try to communicate features of it to each other. (shrink)

Two currently much discussed views about truth, truth pluralism and truth relativism, are found in Sellars’s writings. I show that his motivations for adoping these views are interestingly different from those shared by most of their recent advocates. First, I explain how Sellars comes to embrace a version of truth pluralism. I argue that his version overcomes a difficulty confronting pluralists, albeit at a serious cost. Then I argue that Sellars’s truth pluralism isn’t motivated by his interest in domains of (...) discourse beyond the “matter-of-factual.” Rather, the key to his truth pluralism, his analysis of truth as “semantical assertibility,” is motivated by the same consideration that leads him to adopt truth relativism. This is his interest in applying semantic notions to discourse that embodies conceptual structures other than ours. Despite their common motivation, I conclude that Sellars’s relativism is independent of, and indeed stands in tension with, the analysis of truth that underlies his pluralism. (shrink)

Herman Cappelen investigates how language and other representational devices can go wrong, and how to fix them. We use language to understand and talk about the world, but what if our language has deficiencies that prevent it from playing that role? How can we revise our concepts, and what are the limits on revision?

The central contention of this book is that second-order logic has a central role to play in laying the foundations of mathematics. In order to develop the argument fully, the author presents a detailed description of higher-order logic, including a comprehensive discussion of its semantics. He goes on to demonstrate the prevalence of second-order concepts in mathematics and the extent to which mathematical ideas can be formulated in higher-order logic. He also shows how first-order languages are often insufficient to codify (...) many concepts in contemporary mathematics, and thus that both first- and higher-order logics are needed to fully reflect current work. Throughout, the emphasis is on discussing the associated philosophical and historical issues and the implications they have for foundational studies. For the most part, the author assumes little more than a familiarity with logic comparable to that provided in a beginning graduate course which includes the incompleteness of arithmetic and the Lowenheim-Skolem theorems. All those concerned with the foundations of mathematics will find this a thought-provoking discussion of some of the central issues in the field today. (shrink)

The standard view of philosophical methodology is that philosophers rely on intuitions as evidence. Herman Cappelen argues that this claim is false: it is not true that philosophers rely extensively on intuitions as evidence. At worst, analytic philosophers are guilty of engaging in somewhat irresponsible use of 'intuition'-vocabulary. While this irresponsibility has had little effect on first order philosophy, it has fundamentally misled meta-philosophers: it has encouraged meta-philosophical pseudo-problems and misleading pictures of what philosophy is.

One central purpose of Experimental Philosophy (hereafter, x-phi) is to criticize the alleged reliance on intuitions in contemporary philosophy. In my book Philosophy without Intuitions (hereafter, PWI), I argue that philosophers don’t rely on intuitions. If those arguments are good, experimental philosophy has been engaged in an attack on a strawman. The goal of this paper is to bolster the criticism of x-phi in the light of responses.

Cappelen and Hawthorne present a powerful critique of fashionable relativist accounts of truth, and the foundational ideas in semantics on which the new relativism draws. They argue compellingly that the contents of thought and talk are propositions that instantiate the fundamental monadic properties of truth and falsity.

_Insensitive Semantics_ is an overview of and contribution to the debates about how to accommodate context sensitivity within a theory of human communication, investigating the effects of context on communicative interaction and, as a corollary, what a context of utterance is and what it is to be in one. Provides detailed and wide-ranging overviews of the central positions and arguments surrounding contextualism Addresses broad and varied aspects of the distinction between the semantic and non-semantic content of language Defends a distinctive (...) and explanatorily powerful combination of semantic minimalism and speech act pluralism Confronts core problems which not only run to the heart of philosophy of language and linguistics, but which arise in epistemology, metaphysics, and moral philosophy as well. (shrink)

Cappelen and Hawthorne present a powerful critique of fashionable relativist accounts of truth, and the foundational ideas in semantics on which the new relativism draws. They argue compellingly that the contents of thought and talk are propositions that instantiate the fundamental monadic properties of truth and falsity.

We examine George Boolos's proposed abstraction principle for extensions based on the limitation-of-size conception, New V, from several perspectives. Crispin Wright once suggested that New V could serve as part of a neo-logicist development of real analysis. We show that it fails both of the conservativeness criteria for abstraction principles that Wright proposes. Thus, we support Boolos against Wright. We also show that, when combined with the axioms for Boolos's iterative notion of set, New V yields a system equivalent to (...) full Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with a principle of global choice. This advances Boolos's longstanding interest in the foundations of set theory. (shrink)

This new anthology of early modern philosophy enriches the possibilities for teaching this period by highlighting not only metaphysics and epistemology, but also new themes such as virtue, equality and difference, education, the passions, and love. It contains the works of forty-three philosophers, including traditionally taught figures such as Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, and Kant, as well as less familiar writers such as Lord Shaftesbury, Anton Amo, Julien Offray de La Mettrie, and Denis Diderot. It also highlights the (...) contributions of women philosophers, including Margaret Cavendish, Anne Conway, Gabrielle Suchon, Sor Juana Inéz de la Cruz, and Emilie Du Châtelet. (shrink)

The beginning of the twenty-first century saw something of a comeback for relativism within analytical philosophy. Relativism and Monadic Truth has three main goals. First, we wished to clarify what we take to be the key moving parts in the intellectual machinations of self-described relativists. Secondly, we aimed to expose fundamental flaws in those argumentative strategies that drive the pro-relativist movement and precursors from which they draw inspiration. Thirdly, we hoped that our polemic would serve as an indirect defence of (...) a traditional and natural picture concerning truth. According to this picture, what we call ‘Simplicity’, the fundamental structure of semantic reality is best revealed by construing truth as a simple monadic property of propositions that serve as the objects of belief, assertion, meaning and agreement. Our project was not a straightforward one. So-called relativists are not uniform in their key ideology, are often sloppy, casual, obscure or confused in their self-characterization, and differ in their argumentative emphasis among themselves and over time, thereby presenting a target that is both amorphous and shifty. This is an area where parties will frequently claim not to understand each other and where certain parties will sometimes accuse others of failing to make any sense at all. In such a situation, any effort to impose order will inevitably strike some parties as tendentious and unfair. That said, we felt that we had enough of …. (shrink)

Introduction to Context-Sensitivity and Semantic Minimalism: Essays on Semantics and Pragmatics, 2007, Oxford University Press, (eds. Preyer and Peter).

Making room for character -- Pluralism and the community of moral judgment -- A cosmopolitan kingdom of ends --Responsibility and moral competence --Can virtue be taught?: the problem of new moral facts -- Training to autonomy: Kant and the question of moral education -- Bootstrapping -- Rethinking Kant's hedonism -- The scope of moral requirement -- The will and its objects -- Obligatory ends -- Moral improvisation -- Contingency in obligation.

Cappelen and Dever present a forceful challenge to the standard view that perspective, and in particular the perspective of the first person, is a philosophically deep aspect of the world. Their goal is not to show that we need to explain indexical and other perspectival phenomena in different ways, but to show that the entire topic is an illusion.

But the sort of context sensitivity exhibited in such sentences does not compromise the claim that meaning determines truth conditions, since recourse to context here is directed and restricted by conventional meaning alone. Anyone who understands sentence (2) knows that its utterances are true just in case whatever object is demonstrated in the context of utterance is nice; and he also knows that any utterance of (2) says of, or expresses about, whichever object is demonstrated that it’s nice. (Similarly, anyone (...) who understands (3) knows that any utterance of it is true just in case whoever utters it has eaten. And every utterance says of, or expresses about, the speaker that he or she has eaten.) In sum, according to the thesis that meaning determines truth conditions, (indicative) sentences divide into two classes – those with truth conditions tout.. (shrink)

The revisionary approach to semantic paradox is commonly thought to have a somewhat uncomfortable corollary, viz. that, on pain of triviality, we cannot affirm that all valid arguments preserve truth (Beall2007, Beall2009, Field2008, Field2009). We show that the standard arguments for this conclusion all break down once (i) the structural rule of contraction is restricted and (ii) how the premises can be aggregated---so that they can be said to jointly entail a given conclusion---is appropriately understood. In addition, we briefly rehearse (...) some reasons for restricting structural contraction. (shrink)