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Mind
ISSN: 0026-4423
36 found
- Hope Under Oppression, by Katie Stockdale.Claudia Bloeser - 2024 - Mind 133 (530):610-619.Hope has been an important topic in philosophy since its beginnings. One can identify three main sources of interest in hope: Hope can be relevant in a religious framework (for example, when Thomas Aquinas discusses hope as one of the theological virtues, or when Immanuel Kant discusses the question ‘What may I hope?’ in connection with God’s existence and immortality); hope has been assigned a positive role in politics (for example, by Ernst Bloch in his monumental Marxist work The Principle (...)No categories
- The Aporetic Tradition in Ancient Philosophy, by George Karamanolis and Vasilis Politis.Robert Bolton - 2024 - Mind 133 (530):534-543.Gilbert Ryle made a point of insisting that ‘philosophy is not about isms – idealism, materialism and the like – but about problems’, problems, he held, generat.No categories
- Being and Freedom: On Late Modern Ethics in Europe, by John Skorupski.David O. Brink - 2024 - Mind 133 (530):603-610.
- Hume’s Separability Principle, his Dictum, and their Implications.Graham Clay - 2024 - Mind 133 (530):504-516.Hsueh M. Qu has recently argued that Hume’s famed ‘Separability Principle’ from the Treatise entangles him in a contradiction. Qu offers a modified principle as a solution but also argues that the mature Hume would not have needed to avail himself of it, given that Hume’s arguments in the first Enquiry do not depend on this principle in any form. To the contrary, I show that arguments in the first Enquiry depend on this principle, but I agree with Qu that (...)
- Metaphysical Exile: On J. M. Coetzee’s Jesus Fictions, by Robert Pippin.Maximilian De Gaynesford - 2024 - Mind 133 (530):578-587.No categories
- Does Non-Measurability Favour Imprecision?Cian Dorr - 2024 - Mind 133 (530):472-503.In a recent paper, Yoaav Isaacs, Alan Hájek, and John Hawthorne argue for the rational permissibility of "credal imprecision" by appealing to certain propositions associated with non-measurable spatial regions: for example, the proposition that the pointer of a spinner will come to rest within a certain non-measurable set of points on its circumference. This paper rebuts their argument by showing that its premises lead to implausible consequences in cases where one is trying to learn, by making multiple observations, whether a (...)
- Conditional and Unconditional Obligation.Kit Fine - 2024 - Mind 133 (530):377-399.I present a novel account of unconditional obligation and of its relationship to conditional obligation and bring this account to bear upon Chisholm's puzzle concerning contrary-to duty obligation.No categories
- Scope of Consent, by Tom Dougherty. [REVIEW]Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa - 2024 - Mind 133 (530):588-597.Consent, on a standard theoretical framework, is a way of giving permission or waiving a right. Dougherty’s book is about the ‘scope’ of consent: which acts are permitted by a given act of consent? Along the way, Dougherty offers a view about what consent consists in and why it does its morally transformative work. The book is an exemplar of careful analytic philosophy. Philosophers working on consent in that tradition will find it essential reading. Following are more specific reactions that (...)
- Decision Theory without Luminosity.Yoaav Isaacs & Benjamin A. Levinstein - 2024 - Mind 133 (530):346-376.Our decision-theoretic states are not luminous. We are imperfectly reliable at identifying our own credences, utilities and available acts, and thus can never be more than imperfectly reliable at identifying the prescriptions of decision theory. The lack of luminosity affords decision theory a remarkable opportunity — to issue guidance on the basis of epistemically inaccessible facts. We show how a decision theory can guarantee action in accordance with contingent truths about which an agent is arbitrarily uncertain. It may seem that (...)
- Aristotle on the Scope of Practical Reason: Spectators, Legislators, Hopes, and Evils, by Pavlos Kontos.Dhananjay Jagannathan - 2024 - Mind 133 (530):526-534.
- Conceptual Engineering: For What Matters.Sebastian Köhler & Herman Veluwenkamp - 2024 - Mind 133 (530):400-427.Conceptual engineering is the enterprise of evaluating and improving our representational devices. But how should we conduct this enterprise? One increasingly popular answer to this question proposes that conceptual engineering should proceed in terms of the functions of our representational devices. In this paper, we argue that the best way of understanding this suggestion is in terms of normative functions, where normative functions of concepts are, roughly, things that they allow us to do that matter normatively (for example, things in (...)No categories
- Why Care About What There Is?Daniel Z. Korman - 2024 - Mind 133 (530):428-451.There’s the question of what there is, and then there’s the question of what ultimately exists. Many contend that, once we have this distinction clearly in mind, we can see that there is no sensible debate to be had about whether there are such things as properties or tables or numbers, and that the only ontological question worth debating is whether such things are ultimate (in one or another sense). I argue that this is a mistake. Taking debates about ordinary (...)
- Rational Powers in Action: Instrumental Rationality and Extended Agency, by Sergio Tenenbaum.Erasmus Mayr - 2024 - Mind 133 (530):517-525.
- The World in the Wave Function: A Metaphysics for Quantum Physics, by Alyssa Ney.James Read - 2024 - Mind 133 (530):560-571.
- We Are Not Born Submissive: How Patriarchy Shapes Women’s Lives, by Manon Garcia.Sarah Richmond - 2024 - Mind 133 (530):571-578.No categories
- _The Failures of Philosophy: A Historical Essay_ , by Stephen Gaukroger.Christopher Shields - 2024 - Mind 133 (530):597-603.No categories
- Justification as Ignorance: An Essay in Epistemology, by Sven Rosenkranz. [REVIEW]Martin Smith - 2024 - Mind 133 (530):552-560.
- Emotion and Virtue, by Gopal Sreenivasan.Christine Tappolet - 2024 - Mind 133 (530):544-552.What would a person look like if she were to possess a virtue like compassion or courage? This is the question that will come to mind when contemplating the hau.No categories
- In the Shadow of Justice: Postwar Liberalism and the Remaking of Political Philosophy, by Katrina Forrester.Alan Thomas - 2024 - Mind 133 (530):619-622.Katrina Forrester’s book poses a problem for any reviewer that, I suspect, will be reflected in the experience of its readers. Unusually, the author is equally.
- Economic Statecraft: Human Rights, Sanctions, and Conditionality, by Cécile Fabre.Christian Barry - 2024 - Mind 133 (529):286-294.
- Kripke, Quine, the ‘Adoption Problem’ and the Empirical Conception of Logic.Paul Boghossian & Crispin Wright - 2024 - Mind 133 (529):86-116.Recently, there has been a significant upsurge of interest in what has come to be known as the 'Adoption Problem', first developed by Saul Kripke in 1974. The problem purports to raise a difficulty for Quine’s anti-exceptionalist conception of logic. In what follows, we first offer a statement of the problem and argue that, so understood, it depends upon natural but resistible assumptions. We then use that discussion as a springboard for developing a different adoption problem, arguing that, for a (...)
- Almost Over: Aging, Dying, Dead, by F. M. Kamm. [REVIEW]Susanne Burri - 2024 - Mind 133 (529):242-250.No categories
- Norms and Necessity, by Amie Thomasson. [REVIEW]Matthew Chrisman & Kevin Scharp - 2024 - Mind 133 (529):267-276.Imagine you’re teaching someone how to play chess. You might start by saying ‘White must move first’, where the word ‘must’ is used to convey a rule. You would.No categories
- Changing Our Logic: A Quinean Perspective.Michael Devitt & Jillian Rose Roberts - 2024 - Mind 133 (529):61-85.Can we change our logic and if so how? In ‘The Question of Logic’ (this volume), Saul Kripke takes a certain message about this from Lewis Carroll’s famous pape.No categories
- Hume on Modal Projection.Bridger Ehli - 2024 - Mind 133 (529):167-195.Hume’s claim that we project necessity onto objects we take to be causally related has been influential in contemporary discussions of modality, inspiring deflationary accounts of our modal commitments. Hume is commonly understood as holding that modal projection explains our judging that an effect must follow its cause. This misunderstands the role of projection in Hume’s discussions of causation and causal judgement. Projection is a diagnosis of a distinctively philosophical confusion: the commitment to mind-independent necessary connections. In arguing for this, (...)
- Philosophy and the Human Paradox: Essays on Reason, Truth and Identity, by Alan Montefiore.Simon Glendinning - 2024 - Mind 133 (529):276-285.No categories
- Infelicitous Conditionals and KK.John Hawthorne & Yoaav Isaacs - 2024 - Mind 133 (529):196-209.Kevin Dorst (2019) uses the ‘manifest unassertability’ of conditionals of the form ‘If I don’t know p, then p’ as a new motivation for the KK thesis. In this paper we show that his argumentation is misguided. Plausible heuristics offer a compelling and nuanced explanation of the relevant infelicity data. Meanwhile, Dorst relies on tools that, quite independently of KK, turn out to be rather poor predictors of the infelicity of indicative conditionals.
- Boolean-Valued Sets as Arbitrary Objects.Leon Horsten - 2024 - Mind 133 (529):143-166.This article explores the connection between Boolean-valued class models of set theory and the theory of arbitrary objects in roughly Kit Fine’s sense of the word. In particular, it explores the hypothesis that the set-theoretic universe as a whole can be seen as an arbitrary entity. According to this view, the set-theoretic universe can be in many different states. These states are structurally like Boolean-valued models, and they contain sets conceived of as variable or arbitrary objects.No categories
- Conditionals, Paradox, and Probability: Themes from the Philosophy of Dorothy Edgington, Lee Walters and John Hawthorne (eds.).Keith Hossack - 2024 - Mind 133 (529):294-303.No categories
- Moral Philosophy or Unphilosophic Morals?: A Critical Notice of Early Greek Ethics, edited by David Conan Wolfsdorf.T. H. Irwin - 2024 - Mind 133 (529):226-241.No categories
- Taking Frege at His Word, by Joan Weiner. [REVIEW]Junyeol Kim - 2024 - Mind 133 (529):303-312.
- Reading Wittgenstein with Anscombe, Going On to Ethics, by Cora Diamond.Michael Kremer - 2024 - Mind 133 (529):312-321.
- The Knowledge Condition on Intentional Action in Its Proper Home.Laura Tomlinson Makin - 2024 - Mind 133 (529):210-225.In this paper, I argue against recent modifications of the Knowledge Condition on intentional action that weaken the condition. My contention is that the condition is best understood in the context of Anscombe’s Intention and, when so understood, can be maintained in its strongest form.
- Review of Rebecca Stangl, Neither Heroes Nor Saints: Ordinary Virtue, Extraordinary Virtue, and Self-Cultivation. [REVIEW]Jeremy Reid - 2024 - Mind 133 (529):258-267.
- Smellosophy: What the Nose Tells the Mind, by A.S. Barwich. [REVIEW]Louise Richardson - 2024 - Mind 133 (529).
- Kant's Fantasy.Francey Russell - 2024 - Mind.Throughout his lectures and published writings on anthropology, Kant describes a form of unintentional, unstructured, obscure, and pleasurable imaginative mental activity, which he calls fantasy (Phantasie), where we ‘take pleasure in letting our mind wander about in obscurity.’ In the context of his pragmatic anthropology, Kant was concerned not only to describe this form of mental activity as a fact of human psychology, but more importantly, to criticize and discourage it. But must we share Kant’s negative evaluation? Could fantasy play (...)
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