Consistent with numerous electrophysiological studies, we recently reported that conscious perception is associated with a widely distributed modulation of the P3 component . We also showed that correct objective performance in the absence of subjective awareness is associated with a spatially more restricted modulation of the P3. The relatively late occurrence of the P3 along with lack of control for post-perceptual processes suggests that this component might reflect processes related to stimulus evaluation or confidence rather than to visual awareness or (...) objective performance. The main aim of the current study was to test this hypothesis. While EEG was recorded, participants performed a forced-choice localization task and reported their subjective perception of the target on a 3-level scale that also indexed their confidence. The results showed that our previous findings are replicated when confidence is controlled for. (shrink)

Many researchers, including Clarke and Beck, describe the human numerical system as unitary. We offer an alternative view – the coexistence of several systems; namely, multiple systems existing in parallel, ready to be activated depending on the task/need. Based on this alternative view, we present an account for the representation of rational numbers.

Introduction: Falls are the leading cause of fatal and nonfatal injuries among older adults. Studies showed that older adults can reduce the risk of falls after participation in an unexpected perturbation-based balance training, a relatively novel approach that challenged reactive balance control. This study aims to investigate the effect of the practice schedule on reactive balance function and its transfer to proactive balance function. Our primary hypothesis is that improvements in reactive balance control following block PBBT will be not inferior (...) to the improvements following random PBBT.Methods and Analysis: This is a double-blind randomized controlled trial. Fifty community-dwelling older adults will be recruited and randomly allocated to a random PBBT group or a block PBBT group. The random PBBT group will receive eight training sessions over 4 weeks that include unexpected machine-induced perturbations of balance during hands-free treadmill walking. The block PBBT group will be trained by the same perturbation treadmill system, but only one direction will be trained in each training session, and the direction of the external perturbations will be announced. Both PBBT groups will receive a similar perturbation intensity during training, the same training period, and the same concurrent cognitive tasks during training. The generalization and transfer of learning effects will be measured by assessing the reactive and proactive balance control during standing and walking before and after 1 month of PBBT, for example, step and multiple steps and fall thresholds, Berg balance test, and fear of falls. The dependent variable will be rank transformed prior to conducting the analysis of covariance to allow for nonparametric analysis.Discussion: This research will explore which of the balance retraining paradigms is more effective to improve reactive balance and proactive balance control in older adults over 1 month. The research will address key issues concerning balance retraining: older adults’ neuromotor capacities to optimize training responses and their applicability to real-life challenges.Clinical Trial Registration: Helsinki research ethics approval has been received. (shrink)

It is a common view among philosophers of science that theoretical virtues (also known as epistemic or cognitive values), such as simplicity and consistency, play an important role in scientific practice. In this article, I set out to study the role that theoretical virtues play in scientific practice empirically. I apply the methods of data science, such as text mining and corpus analysis, to study large corpora of scientific texts in order to uncover patterns of usage. These patterns of usage, (...) in turn, might shed some light on the role that theoretical virtues play in scientific practice. Overall, the results of this empirical study suggest that scientists invoke theoretical virtues explicitly, albeit rather infrequently, when they talk about models (less than 30%), theories (less than 20%), and hypotheses (less than 15%) in their published works. To the extent that they are mentioned in scientific publications, the results of this study suggest that accuracy, consistency, and simplicity are the theoretical virtues that scientists invoke more frequently than the other theoretical virtues tested in this study. Interestingly, however, depending on whether they talk about hypotheses, theories, or models, scientists may invoke one of those theoretical virtues more than the others. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to contribute to the debate over the nature of scientific progress in philosophy of science by taking a quantitative, corpus-based approach. By employing the methods of data science and corpus linguistics, the following philosophical accounts of scientific progress are tested empirically: the semantic account of scientific progress, the epistemic account of scientific progress, and the noetic account of scientific progress. Overall, the results of this quantitative, corpus-based study lend some empirical support to the epistemic (...) and the noetic accounts over the semantic account of scientific progress, for they suggest that practicing scientists use the terms ‘knowledge’ and ‘understanding’ significantly more often than the term ‘truth’ when they talk about the aims or goals of scientific research in their published works. But the results do not favor the epistemic account over the noetic account, or vice versa, for they reveal no significant differences between the frequency with which practicing scientists use the terms ‘knowledge’ and ‘understanding’ when they talk about the aims or goals of scientific research in their published works. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that, contrary to common opinion, a counterexample against a philosophical theory does not amount to conclusive evidence against that theory. Instead, the method of counterexamples allows for the derivation of a disjunction, i.e., ‘either the theory is false or an auxiliary assumption is false’, not a negation of the target theory. This is so because, whenever the method of counterexamples is used in an attempt to refute a philosophical theory, there is a crucial auxiliary assumption (...) that needs to be taken into account. The auxiliary assumption is that making intuitive judgments in response to hypothetical cases about the subject matter in question (e.g., knowledge or proper names) is a good method for finding out truths about that subject matter. Without good reasons to think that this assumption is warranted, the negation of a philosophical theory whose content is alleged to be in conflict with the content of an intuition cannot be justifiably derived using an argument that employs the method of counterexamples. (shrink)

It is generally accepted among philosophers of science that hypothesis testing is a key methodological feature of science. As far as philosophical theories of confirmation are con...

In this paper, I argue that appeals to intuition in Analytic Philosophy are not compelling arguments because intuitions are not the sort of thing that has the power to rationally persuade other professional analytic philosophers. This conclusion follows from reasonable premises about the goal of Analytic Philosophy, which is rational persuasion by means of arguments, and the requirement that evidence for and/or against philosophical theses used by professional analytic philosophers be public (or transparent) in order to have the power to (...) rationally persuade other professional analytic philosophers. Since intuitions are not public (or transparent) evidence, it follows that appeals to intuition are not compelling arguments for and/or against philosophical theses because they lack the power to rationally persuade other professional analytic philosophers. (shrink)

I’m grateful to Aleta Quinn and Studies in History and Philosophy of Science for hosting this book forum for my book, The Relativity of Theory (Springer, 2020). I’m also grateful to Margaret Greta Turnbull and Joseph Martin for their commentaries. In what follows, I address their comments as I understand them.

COVID-19 Lockdown was particularly challenging for most mothers of people with intellectual disabilities, including those with Rett syndrome, leading to feelings of abandonment from healthcare services of their children. Within those days, telerehabilitation has represented a valid alternative to support physical activity and treatment, supporting parents in structuring their children’s daily routine at home. This article aims to describe the well-being level of two groups of mothers of girls and women with RTT who were involved in a home-based remotely supervised (...) motor rehabilitation program, respectively, before and during the COVID-19 Italian lockdown. Forty participants with classic RTT were recruited before the lockdown and randomly assigned to two groups that performed the intervention immediately before and during the lockdown, respectively. The intervention included an individualized daily physical activity program carried out for 12 weeks by participants’ parents and fortnightly supervised throughout Skype contacts to plan, monitor, and accommodate individual activities in the participant’s life at home. The short form Caregivers Well-Being Scale was collected for the mothers in each group 12 weeks before intervention, at intervention initiation, immediately after intervention termination, as well as at 12 weeks after intervention termination. Mothers of participants in the Group 1 showed a stable level of well-being across all four evaluations with a slight improvement during the lockdown, without significant change. Similarly, the well-being level of mothers in the Group 2 showed a statistically significant increase in their well-being between T2 and T3 and its reduction to the pre-intervention level between T3 and T4. The results suggest that the lockdown did not negatively affect the participants’ mothers’ well-being, leading to its improvement. Moreover, the proposed intervention could have supported the mothers in managing the new daily routine at home, positively affecting maternal well-being. (shrink)

In this paper, I propose that applying the methods of data science to “the problem of whether mathematical explanations occur within mathematics itself” (Mancosu 2018) might be a fruitful way to shed new light on the problem. By carefully selecting indicator words for explanation and justification, and then systematically searching for these indicators in databases of scholarly works in mathematics, we can get an idea of how mathematicians use these terms in mathematical practice and with what frequency. The results of (...) this empirical study suggest that mathematical explanations do occur in research articles published in mathematics journals, as indicated by the occurrence of explanation indicators. When compared with the use of justification indicators, however, the data suggest that justifications occur much more frequently than explanations in scholarly mathematical practice. The results also suggest that justificatory proofs occur much more frequently than explanatory proofs, thus suggesting that proof may be playing a larger justificatory role than an explanatory role in scholarly mathematical practice. (shrink)

The purpose of the present paper is to present new methods of blowing up the power of a singular cardinal κ of cofinality ω. New PCF configurations are obtained. The techniques developed here will be used in a subsequent paper to construct a model with a countable set which pcf has cardinality ℵ1.

The “received wisdom” in contemporary analytic philosophy is that intuition talk is a fairly recent phenomenon, dating back to the 1960s. In this paper, we set out to test two interpretations of this “received wisdom.” The first is that intuition talk is just talk, without any methodological significance. The second is that intuition talk is methodologically significant; it shows that analytic philosophers appeal to intuition. We present empirical and contextual evidence, systematically mined from the JSTOR corpus and HathiTrust’s Digital Library, (...) which provide some empirical support for the second rather than the first hypothesis. Our data also suggest that appealing to intuition is a much older philosophical methodology than the “received wisdom” alleges. We then discuss the implications of our findings for the contemporary debate over philosophical methodology. (shrink)

A vagueza é comumente representada pela adoção de significados imprecisos na linguagem natural. Ela é analisada como um caso limítrofe e formalizada de diversas maneiras pelas suas teorias “clássicas”. Este trabalho propõe uma abordagem diferente do tema através da adoção do conceito de Racionalidade Soft ( Soft Rationality ), elaborado por Marcelo Dascal, e da sua interpretação como o uso da “semelhança” ao invés da “análise” para a compreensão dos termos da linguagem natural. Aqui será feita a sugestão de que (...) a Racionalidade Soft (branda), enquanto teoria sobre a vagueza, permanece no domínio da ‘intensionalidade’ ao invés de buscar uma explicação formalizada e ‘extensional’ para o tema. DOI:10.5007/1808-1711.2011v15n2p349. (shrink)

Vagueness is commonly presented as natural language imprecise meaning that is analyzed as borderline cases and formalized in various ways by ‘classical’ theories of vagueness. A different approach to vagueness is presented here, adopting Dascal’s notion of ‘soft rationality’ and interpreting it as the use of ‘similarity’ rather than ‘analysis’ for the understanding of natural language terms. Soft rationality is suggested as a theory of vagueness that remains within the realm of intensionality, rather than seeking a formalized extensional explanation to (...) vagueness. (shrink)

We prove from suitable large cardinal hypotheses that the least weakly compact cardinal can be unfoldable, weakly measurable and even nearly θ\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\theta}$$\end{document}-supercompact, for any desired θ\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\theta}$$\end{document}. In addition, we prove several global results showing how the entire class of weakly compactcardinals, a proper class, can be made to coincide with the class of unfoldable cardinals, with the class of weakly measurable cardinals or (...) with the class of nearly θκ\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\theta_\kappa}$$\end{document}-supercompact cardinals κ\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\kappa}$$\end{document}, for nearly any desired function κ↦θκ\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\kappa\mapsto\theta_\kappa}$$\end{document}. These results answer several questions that had been open in the literature and extend to these large cardinals the identity-crises phenomenon, first identified by Magidor with the strongly compact cardinals. (shrink)

Given the profound influence of social media and emerging evidence of its effects on human behavior and health, bioethicists have an important role to play in the development of professional standards of conduct for health professionals using social media and in the design of online systems themselves. In short, social media is a bioethics issue that has serious implications for medical practice, research, and public health. Here, we inventory several ethical issues across four areas at the intersection of social media (...) and health: the impact of social networking sites on the doctor‐patient relationship, the development of e‐health platforms to deliver care, the use of online data and algorithms to inform health research, and the broader public health consequences of widespread social media use. In doing so, we review discussions of these topics and emphasize the need for bioethics to focus more deeply on the ways online technology platforms are designed and implemented. We argue that bioethicists should turn their attention to the ways in which consumer engagement, bias, and profit maximization shape online content and, consequently, human behavior and health. We also offer a set of recommendations and suggest future directions for addressing ethical challenges in these domains. (shrink)

Two linked studies explored whether students’ perceptions differentiate between teachers’ autonomy support and control when presenting mastery goals, and the outcomes of these two practices, in terms of students’ internalization of mastery goals and their behavioral engagement. In two phases, Study 1 sought to validate a new instrument assessing students’ perceptions of teachers’ autonomy support and control when presenting mastery goals. Study 2 demonstrated that at both within- and between-classroom levels, perceptions of teachers’ autonomy support for mastery goals were related (...) to students’ mastery goals’ endorsement and behavioral engagement. These relations were mediated by students’ autonomous reasons to pursue learning activities. Perceptions of teachers’ control predicted disengagement through controlled reasons for learning, but only at the within-classroom level. This research joins a growing body of work demonstrating that combining achievement goal theory with SDT can further our understanding of the underpinnings of achievement motivation. It suggests that if teachers want their students to endorse mastery goals, they need to use more autonomy supportive practices and less controlling ones. (shrink)

The author presents an updated version of J.B. Conant's vision of the inclusion of hands-on experiences and self-contained historical case studies in introductory philosophy of science course. The experiential component is often neglected in philosophy of science courses. Students are usually given scientific facts, concepts, and practices as their formal introduction to the material, which prohibits them from engaging with the question of the nature of science in general. Student finish courses without adequate experience of the concepts or objects that (...) are essential for understanding the philosophical foundations of science. This paper outlines a series of pedagogical tools that highlight vital experiential components of the scientific enterprise, such as an emphasis on observation and the problem solving and creative aspects of scientific inquiry. The author contends that these components help confront common misconceptions on the nature of science which many students hold in introductory philosophy of science courses. These tools also help students engage with the scientific literature and incite discussion among students. (shrink)

We show the consistency, relative to a supercompact cardinal, of the least measurable cardinal being both strongly compact and fully Laver indestructible. We also show the consistency, relative to a supercompact cardinal, of the least strongly compact cardinal being somewhat supercompact yet not completely supercompact and having both its strong compactness and degree of supercompactness fully Laver indestructible.

Description: The main purpose of writing this book is not only to explain, but also to interpret, the three phases of development of Buddhist thought in India, and how and in what manner it spread out to countries as far away from the land of its origin as Japan. Though the subject may be vast, a conscious effort has been made of explaining the complexity of Buddhist philosophical thought in as concise terms as possible. The first five hundred years, which (...) constitute the initial phase of development, is that of consolidation. The form of Buddhism that developed during this phase is at present known as Theravada, and is prevalent in countries that lie to the south of India. On account of this geographical location of Theravada countries, it is also known as the Southern Buddhism. The second phase of Buddhism is characterised by the emergence of Mahayana. All those religious features were brought into Buddhism with the inception of Mahayana that are constitutive of folk religiosity. One of the important religious elements that crept into the Buddhist fold was the doctrine of Bodhisattva. Henceforward it would be the Bodhisattva ideal that would catch the imagination of a Buddhist believer. At the philosophical level two most important schools were established, namely, the Madhyamika and the Yogacara-Vijnanavada. Great strides, in the realm of art, were also made, particularly in architecture, sculpture and painting. The final phase of development is represented by the emergence of Tantricism. At this phase of development archaic religious elements, in the shape of magic, became part and parcel of Buddhist practice. Thus begins the process of degeneration of the ideals that the Buddha had enunciated at the time of his Enlightenment. This story of rise and fall, of development and degeneration, tells its own story, which needs to be told in terms that are understandable. (shrink)

Historical and theoretical perspectives on Yoga and Tantrism.

On the concept of salvation in the Yoga school on Hindu philosophy and Tantric Buddhism.

In this paper, I propose that the debate in epistemology concerning the nature and value of understanding can shed light on the role of scientific idealizations in producing scientific understanding. In philosophy of science, the received view seems to be that understanding is a species of knowledge. On this view, understanding is factive just as knowledge is, i.e., if S knows that p, then p is true. Epistemologists, however, distinguish between different kinds of understanding. Among epistemologists, there are those who (...) think that a certain kind of understanding—objectual understanding—is not factive, and those who think that objectual understanding is quasi-factive. Those who think that understanding is not factive argue that scientific idealizations constitute cognitive success, which we then consider as instances of understanding, and yet they are not true. This paper is an attempt to draw lessons from this debate as they pertain to the role of idealizations in producing scientific understanding. I argue that scientific understanding is quasi-factive. (shrink)

In this paper, I consider the pessimistic induction construed as a deductive argument (specifically, reductio ad absurdum) and as an inductive argument (specifically, inductive generalization). I argue that both formulations of the pessimistic induction are fallacious. I also consider another possible interpretation of the pessimistic induction, namely, as pointing to counterexamples to the scientific realist’s thesis that success is a reliable mark of (approximate) truth. I argue that this interpretation of the pessimistic induction fails, too. If this is correct, then (...) the pessimistic induction is an utter failure that should be abandoned by scientific anti-realists. (shrink)

There is an ongoing methodological debate in philosophy of science concerning the use of case studies as evidence for and/or against theories about science. In this paper, I aim to make a contribution to this debate by taking an empirical approach. I present the results of a systematic survey of the PhilSci-Archive, which suggest that a sizeable proportion of papers in philosophy of science contain appeals to case studies, as indicated by the occurrence of the indicator words “case study” and/or (...) “case studies.” These results are confirmed by data mined from the JSTOR database on research articles published in leading journals in the field: Philosophy of Science, the British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (BJPS), and the Journal for General Philosophy of Science (JGPS), as well as the Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association (PSA). The data also show upward trends in appeals to case studies in articles published in Philosophy of Science, the BJPS, and the JGPS. The empirical work I have done for this paper provides philosophers of science who are wary of the use of case studies as evidence for and/or against theories about science with a way to do philosophy of science that is informed by data rather than case studies. (shrink)

In this paper, I present the results of an experimental study on intuitions about moral obligation (ought) and ability (can). Many philosophers accept as an axiom the principle known as “Ought Implies Can” (OIC). If the truth of OIC is intuitive, such that it is accepted by many philosophers as an axiom, then we would expect people to judge that agents who are unable to perform an action are not morally obligated to perform that action. The results of my experimental (...) study show that participants were more inclined to judge that an agent ought to perform an action than that the agent can perform the action. Overall, participants said that an agent ought to perform an action even when they said that the agent cannot do it. I discuss the implications of these results for the debate over OIC. (shrink)

A model in which strongness ofκ is indestructible under κ+ -weakly closed forcing notions satisfying the Prikry condition is constructed. This is applied to solve a question of Hajnal on the number of elements of {λ δ |2 δ <λ}.

Experimental philosophers have challenged friends of the expertise defense to show that the intuitive judgments of professional philosophers are different from the intuitive judgments of nonphilosophers, and the intuitive judgments of professional philosophers are better than the intuitive judgments of nonphilosophers, in ways that are relevant to the truth or falsity of such judgments. Friends of the expertise defense have responded by arguing that the burden of proof lies with experimental philosophers. This article sketches three arguments which show that both (...) and are probably false. If its arguments are cogent, then shifting the burden of proof is a futile move, since philosophical training makes no difference so far as making intuitive judgments in response to hypothetical cases is concerned. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that the ultimate argument for Scientific Realism, also known as the No-Miracles Argument (NMA), ultimately fails as an abductive defence of Epistemic Scientific Realism (ESR), where (ESR) is the thesis that successful theories of mature sciences are approximately true. The NMA is supposed to be an Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE) that purports to explain the success of science. However, the explanation offered as the best explanation for success, namely (ESR), fails to yield independently (...) testable predictions that alternative explanations for success do not yield. If this is correct, then there seems to be no good reason to prefer (ESR) over alternative explanations for success. (shrink)

According to the antirealist argument known as the pessimistic induction, the history of science is a graveyard of dead scientific theories and abandoned theoretical posits. Support for this pessimistic picture of the history of science usually comes from a few case histories, such as the demise of the phlogiston theory and the abandonment of caloric as the substance of heat. In this article, I wish to take a new approach to examining the ‘history of science as a graveyard of theories’ (...) picture. Using JSTOR Data for Research and Springer Exemplar, I present new lines of evidence that are at odds with this pessimistic picture of the history of science. When rigorously tested against the historical record of science, I submit, the pessimistic picture of the history of science as a graveyard of dead theories and abandoned posits may turn out to be no more than a philosophers’ myth. (shrink)

Philosophy is often divided into two traditions: analytic and continental philosophy. Characterizing the analytic-continental divide, however, is no easy task. Some philosophers explain the divide in terms of the place of argument in these traditions. This raises the following questions: Is analytic philosophy rife with arguments while continental philosophy is devoid of arguments? Or can different types of arguments be found in analytic and continental philosophy? This paper presents the results of an empirical study of a large corpus of philosophical (...) texts mined from the JSTOR database (n = 53,260) designed to find patterns of argumentation by type. Overall, the results suggest that there are no significant differences between the types of arguments advanced in analytic and continental philosophy journal articles. The findings, therefore, provide no empirical support to the hypothesis that the divide between analytic and continental philosophy has to do with the place of argument in these traditions. (shrink)

In this article, I argue that arguments from the history of science against scientific realism, like the arguments advanced by P. Kyle Stanford and Peter Vickers, are fallacious. The so-called Old Induction, like Vickers's, and New Induction, like Stanford's, are both guilty of confirmation bias—specifically, of cherry-picking evidence that allegedly challenges scientific realism while ignoring evidence to the contrary. I also show that the historical episodes that Stanford adduces in support of his New Induction are indeterminate between a pessimistic and (...) an optimistic interpretation. For these reasons, these arguments are fallacious, and thus do not pose a serious challenge to scientific realism. (shrink)

How do people gather samples of evidence to learn about the world? Adults often prefer to sample evidence from diverse sources—for example, choosing to test a robin and a turkey to find out if something is true of birds in general. Children below age 9, however, often do not consider sample diversity, instead treating non‐diverse samples (e.g., two robins) and diverse samples as equivalently informative. The current study (N = 247) found that this discontinuity stems from developmental changes in standards (...) for evaluating evidence—younger children chose to learn from samples that best approximate idealized views of what category members are supposed to be like (e.g., the fastest cheetahs), with a gradual shift across age toward samples that cover more within‐category variation (e.g., cheetahs of varying speeds). These findings have implications for the relation between conceptual structure and inductive reasoning, and for the mechanisms underlying inductive reasoning more generally. (shrink)