BackgroundDespite the rapid global growth of biobanking over the last few decades, and their potential for the advancement of health research, considerations specific to the sharing of benefits that accrue from biobanks have received little attention. Questions such as the types and range of benefits that can arise in biobanking, who should be entitled to those benefits, when they should be provided, by whom and in what form remain mostly unanswered. We conducted a scoping review to describe benefit sharing (...) considerations and practices in biobanking in order to inform current and future policy and practice. MethodsDrawing on the Arksey and O’Malley framework, we conducted a scoping review of the literature in three online databases (PubMed, Cochrane library, and Google Scholar). We extracted and charted data to capture general characteristics, definitions and examples of benefits and benefit sharing, justification for benefit sharing, challenges in benefit sharing, governance mechanisms as well as proposed benefit sharing mechanisms.Results29 articles published between 1999 and 2020 met the inclusion criteria for the study. The articles included 5 empirical and 24 non-empirical studies. Only 12 articles discussed benefit sharing as a stand-alone subject, while the remaining 17 integrated a discussion of benefits as one issue amongst others. Major benefit sharing challenges in biobanking were found to be those associated with uncertainties around the future use of samples and in resultant benefits.ConclusionMost of the benefit sharing definitions and approaches currently in use for biobanking are similar to those used in health research. These approaches may not recognise the distinct features of biobanking, specifically relating to uncertainties associated with the sharing and re-use of samples. We therefore support approaches that allow decisions about benefit sharing to be made progressively once it is apparent who samples are to be shared with, the intended purpose and expected benefits. We also highlight gaps in key areas informing benefit sharing in biobanking and draw attention to the need for further empirical research. (shrink)

This paper analyzes the logical form of valuing. I argue that valuing a concept or property is a universal statement qua logical form, that valuing an object is an existential statement qua logical form, and, furthermore, that a correct analysis of the logical form of valuing contains doxastic operators. I show that these ingredients give rise to an interesting interplay between uniform and ununiform quantification, on the one hand, and de dicto and de re beliefs, on the other. I apply (...) this analysis to the value of political freedom. The received view is that the value of freedom lies in the value of the specific things one is free to do. But Ian Carter has recently shown that freedom has irreducible, "non-specific" value, too. I show that underlying the debate between the proponents of the received view and their critics is a disagreement about logical form: ununiform de dicto beliefs about freedom as a concept, for the received view, and uniform half-de dicto-half-de re beliefs about freedom as an object, for its critics. (shrink)

The government-opposition scheme of a two-party system does not function that clearly in a multiparty system which is the case in Belgium. To examine to what extent the opposition parties in a multi-partysystem are functional for policymaking, the period 1965-1971 was chosen for Belgium, providing a complete scale of government and opposition parties.A content analysis of all political parties' platforms in 1965 permits to determine the policy objectives, classified in policy areas, so that at the end of the six years (...) a survey could be made about the completely andpartly realised planks of the platforms according to government and opposition parties, according to the party-strength which was congruent with the duration of government participation. In Belgium a distinctioncan also be made between the traditional opposition parties and the nonelitist opposition parties, which during the given period were not accepted as possible government parties by the political elite.To obtain a correct evaluation of the realisations, the approach took successively into account the absolute number of platform-planks, the number of specific items of a party and the degree of importance andsocial repercussion of the distinct planks that could be realised.Although respectively for 6, 4 and 2 years in the government the CVP, the BSP and the PVV realise approximately the same number of planks. The non-elitist opposition party Volksunie realised a smaller butstill considerable number of objectives. So did also, but to a smaller extent the RW, KP and FDP. The interpretation of these results could be the loss of distinctiveness of the government-opposition scheme in amultiparty system, the elite-consensus in Belgium, the function of the «zweeppartij» strategy and the definition of the opposition in terms of action. (shrink)

A Meta-Philosophy exploration of immanent and non-immanent features of first-order philosophy in terms of the values of non- values or negative values of Radical Scepticism, Nihilism and Minarchy, executed to show how philosophizing is done. -/- It misleadingly seems as if there is no progress in philosophy as, like in visual art, literature and music, each original thinker re-invents the entire discipline, its aims, purposes, values, methods, etc The nature of philosophical tools, methods, techniques and skills will be investigated and (...) applied in terms of radical scepticism. -/- This approach, set of values and attitude restrict the nature and the style of the meta-philosophizing. It will for example prevent the traditional development of a general, all-encompassing and all-inclusive metaphysical system. It also demands the focus on context-specific investigation of questions and the dealing of a particular problem in a certain context. -/- These limits require the re-interpretation of any philosophical tool being employed as well as the underlying assumptions and any pre-suppositions. -/- As far as possible philosophizing as an aspect of the processes of theorizing will be adhered to and realized. In chapter THREE I illustrate many-leveled and multi-dimensional thinking, that are to me as a visual artist as well, of extreme importance. These are the types of things employed by radical skepticism and that should be the form of philosophizing instead of and replacing traditional one-leveled and one-dimensional thinking, argumentation and reasoning. (shrink)

L'oeuvre de Klong chen rab 'byams (alias Klong chen pa) a laisse une profonde empreinte dans la culture tibetaine, non seulement en raison de ses qualites proprement philosophiques, mais encore gryce ... sa dimension spirituelle et du fait ...

Que reste-il a dire sur le Menon? Quel dialogue de Platon semble mieux connu? Une methode renouvelee permet seule de montrer que les passages les plus celebres ne nous ont pas livre tous leurs secrets, et que ceux sur lesquels le regard glisse doivent au contraire retenir l'attention. L'interpretation ici proposee refuse de separer forme et contenu: si Platon a ecrit des dialogues, et non des traites, il devait avoir ses raisons. Le sens d'un dialogue ne se limite pas a (...) celui des repliques d'un seul personnage. Socrate n'est pas le porte-parole de Platon. Platon ne parle jamais en son propre nom. C'est le dialogue tout entier qui est l'enseignement, dans son plan, dans ses personnages, dans sa mise en scene. Elle refuse de supposer le sujet du dialogue: personne ne sait ce qu'est la vertu. C'est le dialogue qui doit appprendre ce qu'elle est. Elle refuse de se laisser imposer des passages classiques - la torpille, la reminiscence - entre lesquels il n'y aurait que du remplissage. Elle refuse d'expliquer les choix de Platon pour tel personnage, telle date, telle situation, par le renvoi positiviste a des faits exterieurs a la pensee reflechie du philosophe. Elle refuse d'ignorer les recentes decouvertes sur l'enseignement oral de Platon et en retrouve les principales doctrines dans le contenu, mais aussi la forme du texte. Elle demontre ainsi sur l'exemple d'un dialogue la fecondite d'une methode applicable a l'ensemble de l'oeuvre ecrite de Platon. (shrink)

Publié pour la première fois en 1945, ce texte oppose aux religions historiques la tradition unique et originelle de la connaissance ésotérique. Le monde moderne est décrit comme une monstruosité qui ne reconnaît aucune transcendance et privilégie le règne de la contingence, du quantitatif et de l'individualisme.

Il faut être "modérément moderne", et non "résolument" ; comme le préconisait Rimbaud dans un slogan aussi galvaudé que creux. Et prendre ses distances d'avec cette maladie, la "modernite". De ces fameux "Temps Modernes", que peut dire un philosophe qui a décidé de ne pas avancer masqué? Complaisante modernité, qui se clame en "rupture" avec tout! Et d'abord avec le passé pour lequel elle a inventé le nom de "Moyen Age". Alors que la modernité en vit comme un parasite, dans (...) une dialectique autodestructrice. Car au fond, qu'a-t-elle inventé? Ni la révolution technique, ni l'urbanisation, ni la société civile, ni même la personne comme sujet de libertés... Les idées modernes ne sont que des idées prémodernes, maquillées comme une marchandise volée. Avec le recul et la capacité d'analyse que lui permet sa formidable culture, Rémi Brague nous offre une série de réflexions incisives sur les notions de Modernité, de Culture, d'Histoire, de Sécularisation, de Progrès... Chemin faisant, il met en avant des penseurs qui sortent des sentiers battus, des idées qu'on avait oubliées, des rapprochements qui font avancer. Peut-on guérir de la "modernite"? C'est l'ambition de cet essai revigorant, qui n'interdit pas d'être résolument optimiste. (shrink)

According to an influential and intuitively appealing argument, morality is usually continuous, namely, a gradual change in one morally significant factor triggers a gradual change in another; the law should usually track morality; therefore, the law should often be continuous. This argument is illustrated by cases such as the following example: since the moral difference between a defensive action that is reasonable and one that is just short of being reasonable is small, the law should not impose a severe punishment (...) when the action is almost reasonable and no punishment at all when the action is reasonable. In this Article, I consider two doubts regarding this argument. First, the premise that morality is continuous in such cases is incompatible with the common view that the moral status of actions is not continuous since there is an important difference between actions that are permissible and actions that are wrong— even if this difference is due to a difference that is very small, such as the one between an action whose consequences are the best and an action whose consequences are just slightly less good. This view extends also to the overall moral status of agents given the common assumption that it depends on the moral status of their actions. This is an important challenge that the Continuity Argument should confront. However, I argue that the best account of morality is more scalar than the common view in these respects. Therefore, I conclude that the first premise of the Continuity Argument is correct in this regard, although it is based on a minority view. The second doubt concerns the scope of the second premise: since there are reasons both in favor and against legal continuity, and the applicability and force of these reasons depend not only on various moral propositions but also on contingent non-moral facts, we often lack the evidence to determine the degree to which the law, at a certain place and time, should be continuous, and specifically that it should often be continuous. (shrink)

"Repartir d'une lecture à nouveaux frais de la Métaphysique d'Aristote en essayant de prêter l'oreille à la manière dont elle parle en grec, tel est le projet de ce livre. Cela veut dire d'abord oublier ce qui nous a été transmis si longtemps dans le latin de la scolastique médiévale. C'est se donner la chance de rencontrer une pensée à même la langue. On comprend alors que le mot eidos ne peut pas se traduire par "idée" : il désigne avant (...) tout le "visage" que quelque chose ou quelqu'un tourne vers nous, de même le mot theoria renvoie, lui aussi, à la vue d'un spectacle qui s'offre à nous. Si les fameuses "catégories" d'Aristote sont dépendantes des structures de la langue grecque, ce n'est pas une limite : c'est une chance dont Aristote se saisit pour avancer dans la pensée de l'être. Ce parcours au plus près de la langue ne se réduit pas à un monologue au sein de la seule parole occidentale mais s'ouvre à une confrontation entre la Grèce et la Chine sur les pas de François Julien : comment entendre sans conflictualité un tel vis-à-vis entre une pensée non métaphysique du Grand Procès (Tao) ou de la "propension des choses", et une histoire de la métaphysique dont Aristote est une prestigieuse entame et dont le philosophe sinologue voudrait nous délivrer?"--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

Plusieurs aspects de la métaphysique, de la physique, de l'éthique et de la psychologie d’Aristote peuvent s'interpréter comme des affleurements d'un concept non-thématisé, celui d'être-dans-le-monde (l'in-der-welt-sein de heidegger). L’ensemble de la pensée grecque classique, même si elle était fascinée par l'ordre du cosmos, ne s'est guère demande ce que signifiait "être-dans-le-monde". L’expérience de la facticité, qui est un des traits fondamentaux de celle-ci, est ce qui permet à Aristote dans le protreptique, de justifier la vie philosophique ; mais il conçoit (...) celle-ci comme culminant dans la contemplation, c'est-à-dire l'accès a ce qui est au plus haut point (ch. 2). Aristote est toujours resté pris dans cette ambiguïté, qui provient de ladite transposition : son éthique révèle ses hésitations entre deux sujets de l'agir moral : le "je" à qui il incombe d'agir de par ce qu'il a d'unique, le cédé a l'homme, tel qu'il est défini par sa place parmi les autres parties de l'univers (ch. 3 & 4). Par suite, il lui faut définir l'homme comme le plus mondain des êtres sublunaires : l'homme imite l'univers grâce à son universalité, et parce qu'il est capable de saisir les réalités les plus élevées (ch. 5). Cependant, Aristote ne peut définir le topos - ce dans quoi sont les choses- sans renvoyer à notre façon particulière d'être-là, même s'il réintroduit ensuite l'idée d'univers grâce à sa théorie des dimensions du corps humain comme fondées dans la structure objective du cosmos (ch. 6). Les difficultés de la définition aristotélicienne de l'âme ainsi que celles de la doctrine de l'intellect agent proviennent de la tentative d'Aristote pour transposer ce qu'il pense implicitement comme l'ouverture même du monde à travers notre présence dans le registre de la réalité mondaine-ce qui l'oblige à réduire l'âme à la conscience de ce qui se produit parmi les choses du monde (ch. 7). Il conçoit celui-ci d'une manière telle qu'elle l'amène à exclure le mouvement spécifiquement humain au profit de la continuité absolue des corps célestes. Cependant, la contemplation de soi du premier moteur reflète l'ambiguïté non résolue de l'energeia humaine : le pur acte d'être-là et l'activité de contempler le plus haut de tous les êtres s'y fondent (ch. 8). Malgré tout, l'energeia comme concept ontologique fondamental ne peut pas se définir en dehors de l'expérience humaine de l'être-là (ch. 9). (shrink)

Does the moral status of an action provide in itself a non-instrumental, pro-tanto reason for a corresponding legal status – a reason that applies regardless of whether the law promotes a value that is independent of the law, such as preventing wrongdoing or promoting distributive or retributive justice? While the relation between morality and law is a familiar topic, this specific question is typically not considered explicitly. Yet it seems to be controversial and each of the contrasting answers to (...) this question has some appeal. The article highlights and considers this question. it concludes that the answer is negative: there is no necessary relation between morality and law in this respect. Rather, there is a reason in favor of incorporating morality into the law only when this incorporation promotes a moral value that is independent of the law. (shrink)

This book discusses in dialogue form the basic principles of mathematics and its applications including the question: What is mathematics? What does its specific method consist of? What is its relation to the sciences and humanities? What can it offer to specialists in different fields? How can it be applied in practice and in discovering the laws of nature? Dramatized by the dialogue form and shown in the historical movements in which they originated, these questions are discussed in their (...) full complexity, yet are easily comprehended. The first dialogue, whose chief actor is Socrates, leads the reader to the source of modern mathematics in Athens in the 5th Century BC. The second dialogue, featuring Archimedes, takes place during the siege of Syracuse in 212 BC and shows the birth of applied mathematics. The third dialogue occurs in the year 1633 in Rome, its chief character being Galileo Galilei who fully realized the central importance of the mathematical method in discovering the laws of nature. Intended as supplemental reading for philosophy of mathematics courses at the high school or college level it will be of interest to both specialists and non-specialists in mathematics. Alfréd Rényi was born in Budapest Hungary in 1921. He studied mathematics and physics at the University of Budapest and received his Ph. D. from the University of Szaged in 1945. Since 1950 he has been Director of the Mathematical Research Institute of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences and since 1952 a professor at the University of Budapest. Dr. Renyi was a visiting professor at Michigan State University in 1961, at the University of Michigan in 1964 and at Stanford University in 1966. His main fields of research are probability theory, mathematical statistics and information theory, and he has also worked in analytic number theory as well as in various branches of analysis, combinatorial analysis and geometry. (shrink)

Nous vivons le temps des images, et c'est accroître ses plaisirs que de s'en donner l'intelligence. En relatant comment il a lui-même appris à ouvrir les yeux, dans les grottes ornées comme dans nos salles de musée, l'auteur, idolâtre heureux et qui ne se repent pas, entend contribuer au bon usage du "stupéfiant image". Mais l'énigme qu'il interroge tout au long de ce recueil de témoignages et de réflexions, c'est celle du temps immobile. Il est des images fixes que l'on (...) peut dater par leur style ou leur technique, mais dont nous demeurons étonnamment contemporains. Les archives visuelles des civilisations éteintes restent vivantes en sorte qu'elles auraient bien tort de se croire mortelles. Les dieux et les idées meurent, non leurs statues ni leurs figures. Et les félins de la grotte Chauvet, 35 000 ans, n'ont pas d'âge, pas plus que nos plus belles photos de stars. (shrink)

La morale est une création discontinuée. Elle n'est pas codifiable dans de gros livres moralisateurs. Elle n'est rien avant qu'une conscience humaine ne la suscite par des occasions qui la font exister en singularité ici et maintenant. Cet ouvrage désigne la morale non comme une manière possible d'agir que l'on devrait ou non confirmer par l'action mais comme la réponse de principe que donne, dans un réflexe mental, tel homme en prise à tel cas de conscience.

La musique s'éprouve et se vit, et ne se laisse pas seulement analyser et comprendre. Active, dominatrice, source en même temps d'une passivité unique, elle atteint des couches profondes qui dessinent le mystérieux domaine du pré-verbal, directement en prise sur le vivant du corps. À preuve son aptitude à induire immédiatement du mouvement, dilater l'espace et donner une énergie incomparable, ou encore suspendre le temps. La musique plus que tout autre art instruit sur le "sentir", pour autant qu'on ne la (...) cantonne pas à une autonomie ou à une pureté qui l'ampute du chanter et du danser, lesquels manifestent cette part irréductible. Le sentir obéit à une autre logique que celle du sens et de la vérité. C'est un être-au-monde que les couplages traditionnels comme ceux de l'émotion et de la raison, ou de l'expression et de la forme, échouent à cerner. Sa complexité, son maillage interne, sa structuration dynamique, plaident en faveur de notions qui trouvent dans ce contexte une teneur philosophique renouvelée, comme celles de rythme et de symbole, également d'un art de narrer. L'approche phénoménologique, attentive au corps vécu, et l'orientation de la théorie critique soucieuse de toutes les formes de réification, y compris de la perception et de ses gestes, sont conjointement mobilisées pour explorer le sentir à partir de la musique. Erwin Straus d'une part, en son approche du pathique, Walter Benjamin et Theodor W. Adorno d'autre part, sont les principaux acteurs de ce croisement. Celui-ci s'ouvre à d'autres penseurs, dont André Schaeffner et Susanne Langer. Le premier, à propos de l'instrument de musique, la seconde à propos du symbole non-présentationnel, se montrent en effet particulièrement appliqués à ne pas séparer l'expérience de la musique des processus corporels et physiologiques qui sont en jeu dans le rythme et dans l'écoute."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

L'oeuvre de Roshdi Rashed se deploie selon deux directions principales: la naissance, dans les Temps Modernes, des mathematiques sociales et de la theorie des probabilites d'une part, et l'histoire des sciences exactes a l'epoque de la Renaissance de l'Islam classique d'autre part. Cette oeuvre de longue haleine n'a cesse d'elargir la connaissance que nous avons de ces dernieres, par l'edition et la traduction de textes nouveaux, la reconstitution des traditions conceptuelles dans lesquelles ces textes s'inscrivent, ainsi que par la mise (...) en resonance de ces traditions. Elle agit en meme temps comme une genealogie de certaines formes de la mathesis moderne. Sans manifeste ni discours sur la methode, les travaux de Roshdi Rashed proposent un approfondissement constant de la tradition de l'epistemologie historique illustree par Gaston Bachelard et Georges Canguilhem. C'est pourquoi ces travaux ne laissent indifferent ni l'helleniste, ni bien sur l'arabisant specialiste de champs connexes, ni le medieviste, ni les specialistes de l'histoire des sciences modernes. C'est ce dont temoigne ce recueil d'etudes, dues a d'eminents collegues de Roshdi Rashed et a ses eleves. (shrink)

The question of whether a mistake of law should negate or mitigate criminal liability is commonly considered to be pertinent to the culpability of the agent, often examined in light of the (epistemic) reasonableness of the mistake. I argue that this view disregards an important aspect of this question, namely whether a mistake of law affects the rightness of the action, particularly in light of the moral significance of the mistake. I argue that several plausible premises, regarding moral rightness under (...) uncertainty, the nature of law and the moral significance of law, entail a positive answer to this question. Specifically, I consider this argument: (1) one (subjective) sense of moral rightness depends on the (epistemically justified) belief of the agent concerning a non-moral fact that is morally significant; (2) a law is (partly) a non-moral fact; (3) a legal fact might be morally significant; (4) therefore an action that is compatible with an applicable moral standard, in light of the mistaken (justified) belief of the agent concerning a morally significant law, is (subjectively) right or less wrongful; (5) the (subjective) moral rightness of an action counts against criminal liability for this action; (6) therefore an action that is compatible with the applicable moral standard, in light of the mistaken (epistemically justified) belief of the agent, counts against criminal liability for the action if the law is morally significant. (shrink)

Parménide n'est-il que le penseur de l'Etre? La présence des multiples déesses n'est-elle que figure poétique de style? Le récit sur le cosmos ne fait-il que décrire la voie de l'illusion, à éviter absolument? En cherchant réponse à ces questions, cet ouvrage met en lumière le rôle incontournable que jouent plusieurs déesses dans la révélation et la compréhension du Vrai. Et, chemin faisant, sont éclairés les liens étroits qui relient ces divinités, l'Etre et le monde du devenir. Ainsi, c'est à (...) partir de l'ontologie fondatrice et d'une théologie inédite que le penseur de l'Etre esquisse une conception non moins originale du cosmos. (shrink)

ABSTRACT The purpose of this article is to show when and how the dialogical-discursive approach began to serve as a basis for thinking about the language acquisition process in Brazil and abroad - especially in France. This theoretical line seeks to analyze - the speech of children starting from the discursive movements found in the relationship between the child and his or her interlocutor (other), taking into account the situational contexts, the dialogism, the constitution of the subject in the speech, (...) etc. Thus a) we refer to the authors responsible for this approach, in a retrospective; b) we explain the theoretical aspects mobilized during the data analysis of children's speech; and c) we utilize the methodological aspects involved in this theoretical perspective. Our aim, therefore, is to discuss not only this other way of looking at children's language, but also the theoretical and methodological challenges that this approach brings to this specific field of investigation. (shrink)

In the literature, Weak Kleene logics are usually taken as three-valued logics. However, Suszko has challenged the main idea of many-valued logic claiming that every logic can be presented in a two-valued fashion. In this paper, we provide two-valued semantics for the Weak Kleene logics and for a number of four-valued subsystems of them. We do the same for the so-called Logics of Nonsense, which are extensions of the Weak Kleene logics with unary operators that allow looking at them as (...) Logics of Formal Inconsistency and Logics of Formal Underterminedness. Our aim with this work, rather than arguing for Suszko’s thesis, is to show that two-valued presentations of these peculiar logics enlighten the non-standard behavior of their logical connectives. More specifically, the two-valued presentations of paraconsistent logics illustrate and clarify the disjunctive flavor of the conjunction, and dually, the two-valued presentations of paracomplete subsystems of Weak Kleene logics reveal the conjunctive flavor of the disjunction. (shrink)

According to a common view, in a case involving an indivisible good and several potential beneficiaries, who are equal in every relevant respect, there is a non-instrumental reason to allocate the benefit in a way that gives each an equal chance to receive the benefit. In this paper, I argue that this view is incompatible with several plausible and widely held assumptions. I emphasize especially the assumption that the distributive role of chances is secondary to that of benefits in an (...) important sense: the value of allocating chances is related to the ways in which it is possible to allocate the relevant benefits. Specifically, chances should be allocated only when it is impossible or too costly to allocate benefits in accordance with the relative importance of the reasons in favor of allocating the relevant benefit to each potential beneficiary. Given this assumption, I argue that the fact that there is no relation between the distributive concern for chances and other distributive concerns suggests that we should reject the view that chances have a distributive role that is not merely instrumental. (shrink)

In the context of non-classical logics, many philosophers have been particularly interested in the paraconsistent logics. In addition to traditional definitions, in recent years, new ways of characterizing the notion of paraconsistency have been proposed. In all of these definitions the rule or the meta-rule of explosion is abandoned. In this article, I present those definitions and evaluate the role that the negation and the transitivity play in each of them. Finally, I propose a new definition of paraconsistency which I (...) call total paraconsistency and show that the rule of weakening plays a crucial role in all of the characterizations of such a concept. (shrink)

Après s'être intéressée aux rapports de la linguistique avec la société en 2003. avec les sciences de l'homme en 2005, avec les demandes sociales en 2007, avec les nouvelles technologies en 2009, l'Association des Sciences du Langage a souhaité. pour l'édition 2011 de son colloque biennal, élargir géographiquement la réflexion en invitant des chercheurs d'autres pays d'Europe. Ce recueil rend ainsi compte. en douze articles et en langue française, de travaux portant sur le français, l'allemand, le grec, le tchèque. le (...) roumain et le finnois. centrés sur la grammaire, l'analyse de discours, les rapports entre langue et culture et le multilinguisme. L'ouvrage permet au lecteur de prendre connaissance de ce qui se fait ailleurs en matière de recherche et d'enseignement universitaires dans le domaine des sciences du langage, en relation ou non avec ce qui se fait en France. (shrink)

Entre 2010 et 2011, une fouille d’urgence a été menée sur la pente Sud de la colline de Viklèsà l’Est de l’acropole d’Amathonte, et a révélé un type de réservoir d’eau alimenté depuis la surface ; découverte à ce jour unique à Chypre. Ce dispositif est constitué d’une citerne creusée dans le rocher et partiellement construite, reliée, par un passage voûté, à un puits d’accès servant également pour puiser. Ce réservoir, d’une capacité de 30 m 3environ, devait desservir les besoins (...) en eau non pas d’un habitat, comme c’est souvent le cas, mais des espaces funéraire, cultuel ou économique implantés sur la colline de Viklèsdans l’Antiquité. Dans cette étude est présenté le mobilier archéologique mis au jour — céramique, lithique, figurines de terre cuite et ossements — qui atteste une occupation continue du lieu, allant de la fin de l’époque archaïque à la fin de l’époque protobyzantine, date d’abandon définitif de l’utilisation de la citerne. (shrink)

This study explores the phenomenon of the so-called “third reading” of propositional attitude reports. This reading, which was originally explored in the dissertation of J. Fodor (1973) and has since become one of the significant problems in the formal semantics of natural languages, differs from the more well-known de re and de dicto readings by being an intermediate case. If the de re interpretation can be referred to as transparent specific, and the de dicto interpretation as opaque non-specific, (...) then the third reading is transparent non-specific. Fodor's standard solution has been the subject of much discussion in the literature and has given rise to a series of widely accepted counterexamples that are thought to demonstrate the limitations of Fodor's solution. At the same time, alternative approaches to the explication of these readings also suffer from formal shortcomings (for example, some of them did not satisfy the requirement of meaning compositionality, which is a basic requirement in formal semantic literature). This study points out that the analysis of all complex cases of the third reading did not fully take into account their syntactic structure. This remained unnoticed due to the ellipsis in many of these cases. It is shown that a restoration of the ellided syntactic structure makes it possible to analyze all hard cases as basic ones using the classical standard analysis proposed by Fodor supplemented by the principles of admissibility of substitution of L-equivalent expressions in intensional contexts (known since G. Frege and R. Carnap). In the final part of the work, it is demonstrated how exactly the main complex cases of the “third reading” are explicated in terms of the standard approach. (shrink)

Texte écrit sous la Ve dynastie chinoise, celle des Han (202 av. J.-C.-220 apr. J.-C.), qui présente sous un angle nouveau des connaissances déjà anciennes, montre que tout savoir se place sous le signe du tao et que l'interrogation sur le tao est préalable à tout autre. Les différents savoirs sont donc utilisés dans le cadre de cette démonstration, et non comme une fin en soi.

The sense of wonder and admiration experienced by individuals who witness a striking sight, whether natural or man-made, has long been regarded as playing a role in the acquisition of knowledge. Both Aristotle and plato regarded wonder and admiration (θαύμα), sparked by something seen, as the origin of philosophical thinking. In the Middle Ages, theological writers considered the way in which admiration and, specifically, the state of rapture it engendered, helped the Christian experience devotion to God. What happened when a (...) beholder was filled with admiration upon encountering a magnificent building was addressed in discussions of magnificent patronage from at least the thirteenth century. The present Note investigates how Alberti’s reflections on magnificence and admiration informed his theory of aesthetic design in De re aedificatoria, completed in the 1450s. It proposes that Alberti redefined what makes a building admirable or ‘magnificent’ and also understood ‘beholding in admiration’ to be an active mode of looking. Therefore, his views on magnificent architecture were subtly different from those of Pope Nicolas V, in particular. By considering Alberti’s theory of aesthetic design as a reflection on magnificence and admiration, additional light is also shed on his confidence in the protective power of beauty and his design recommendations for the temple. (shrink)

Subjective language has attracted substantial attention in the recent literature in formal semantics and philosophy of language Subjective meaning: alternatives to relativism, De Gruyter, Berlin, pp 1–19, 2016; Lasersohn in Subjectivity and perspective in truth-theoretic semantics, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2017; Vardomskaya in Sources of subjectivity, Ph.D. thesis, University of Chicago, IL, 2018; Zakkou in Faultless disagreement: a defense of contextualism in the realm of personal taste, Vittorio Klostermann, Frankfurt a. M., 2019b). Most current theories argue that Subjective Predicates, which (...) express matters of opinion, semantically differ from ordinary predicates, which express matters of fact. We will call this view “SP exceptionalism”. This paper addresses SP exceptionalism by scrutinizing the behavior of SPs in attitude reports, which, as we will argue, significantly constrains the space of analytical options and rules out some of the existing theories. As first noticed by Stephenson :487–525, 2007a; Towards a theory of subjective meaning, Ph.D. thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, 2007b), the most prominent reading of embedded SPs is one where they talk about the attitude holder’s subjective judgment. As is remarked sometimes :327–352, 2009; Pearson in J Semant 30:103–154, 2013a), this reading is not the only one: embedded SPs may also talk about someone else’s, non-local, judgment. We concentrate specifically on such cases and show that non-local judgment is possible if and only if SPs are used within a DP that is outside main predicate position and that entire DP is read de re. We demonstrate that the behavior of SPs in attitude reports does not differ from that of ordinary predicates: it follows from general constraints on intersective modification and intensional quantification Ways of scope taking, Springer, Dordrecht, pp 183–215, 1997; Musan in On the temporal interpretation of noun phrases, Garland, New York, 1997; Percus in Nat Lang Semant 8:173–229, 2000; Keshet in Good intensions: paving two roads to a theory of the de re/de dicto distinction, Ph.D. thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, 2008). We argue that this unexceptional behavior of SPs in fact has unexpected consequences for SP exceptionalism. Precisely because SPs have been argued to be semantically different from ordinary predicates, not all theories correctly predict these less-studied data: some overgenerate :691–706, 2007; Sæbø 2009) and some undergenerate Proceedings of Sinn und Bedeutung, vol 11, pp 433–447, 2007; Pearson 2013a). Out of the currently available theories, only relativist accounts :643–686, 2005; MacFarlane 2014; Bylinina in J Semant 34, 291–331, 2017; Coppock in Linguist Philos 41:125–164, 2018) predict the right interpretation, and only that interpretation. We thus present a novel empirical argument for relativism, and, more generally, formulate a constraint that has to be taken into consideration by any view that advocates SP exceptionalism. (shrink)

This chapter describes how philosophical theorizing about justice can be connected with empirical research in the social sciences. We begin by drawing on some received distinctions between ideal and non-ideal approaches to theorizing justice along several different dimensions, showing how non-ideal approaches are needed to address normative aspects of real-world problems and to provide practical guidance. We argue that there are advantages to a transitional approach to justice focusing on manifest injustices, including the fact that it enables us to set (...) aside some reasonable disagreements about justice. The ‘bottom-up’ approach we advocate, for which we borrow Wolff’s term ‘real-world political philosophy’, is an empirically-informed normative analysis that attends to specific, identifiable injustices, and thus is partial, though not isolationist. We illustrate our approach by considering how different models of the nature of disability suggest different kinds of remedy for injustices faced by persons living with disabilities. We reflect on the nature and significance of vulnerabilities, and we assess the role of public opinion in normative theorizing, suggesting a particular significance for the opinions and experiences of marginalized groups. We finally reflect on the relevance of European legal and institutional frameworks for theorizing justice in Europe. (shrink)

Many different methodological approaches have been proposed to infer the presence of consciousness in non-human systems. In this paper, a version of the theory-heavy approach is defended. Theory-heavy approaches rely heavily on considerations from theories of consciousness to make inferences about non-human consciousness. Recently, the theory-heavy approach has been critiqued in the form of Birch's (Noûs, 56(1): 133-153, 2022) dilemma of demandingness and Shevlin's (Mind & Language, 36(2): 297-314, 2021) specificity problem. However, both challenges implicitly assume an inapt characterization of (...) the theory-heavy approach. I argue that an alternative characterization of the approach, what I call a credence-based theory-heavy approach, avoids these challenges. Theorists can generate interpretations of their theory, at different levels of generality, and operationalize these into theory-informed markers. These theory-informed are assigned a likelihood and are used to assess the probability that a target system is conscious. In providing this characterization, and mapping out the possible ways in which a credence-based theory-heavy approach can be fleshed out, the aim is to situate the theory-heavy approach as a more compelling approach than it is currently being perceived as. Our attention, then, needs to towards remaining challenges such as the consensus problem and the problem of calibrating the likelihoods associated with theory-informed markers. I also explore methodological pluralism and assess how the credence-based theory-heavy approach can benefit from other methodological approaches. (shrink)

ABSTRACT In ethics, the use of empirical data has become more and more popular, leading to a distinct form of applied ethics, namely empirical ethics. This ‘empirical turn’ is especially visible in bioethics. There are various ways of combining empirical research and ethical reflection. In this paper we discuss the use of empirical data in a special form of Reflective Equilibrium (RE), namely the Network Model with Third Person Moral Experiences. In this model, the empirical data consist of the moral (...) experiences of people in a practice. Although inclusion of these moral experiences in this specific model of RE can be well defended, their use in the application of the model still raises important questions. What precisely are moral experiences? How to determine relevance of experiences, in other words: should there be a selection of the moral experiences that are eventually used in the RE? How much weight should the empirical data have in the RE? And the key question: can the use of RE by empirical ethicists really produce answers to practical moral questions? In this paper we start to answer the above questions by giving examples taken from our research project on understanding the norm of informed consent in the field of pediatric oncology. We especially emphasize that incorporation of empirical data in a network model can reduce the risk of self‐justification and bias and can increase the credibility of the RE reached. (shrink)

Although shared decision-making is a standard in medical care, unilateral decisions through process-based conflict resolution policies have been defended in certain cases. In patients who do not stand to receive proportional clinical benefits, the harms involved in interventions such as cardiopulmonary resuscitation seem to run contrary to the principle of non-maleficence, and provision of such interventions may cause clinicians significant moral distress. However, because the application of these policies involves taking choices out of the domain of shared decision-making, they face (...) important ethical and legal problems, including a recent challenge to their constitutionality. In light of these concerns, we suggest a re-conceptualization of informed non-dissent as an alternative approach in cases where the application of process-based policies is being considered. This clinician-directed communication model still preserves what is valuable in such policies and salvages professional integrity, while minimising ethical and legal challenges. (shrink)

In ethics, the use of empirical data has become more and more popular, leading to a distinct form of applied ethics, namely empirical ethics. This ‘empirical turn’ is especially visible in bioethics. There are various ways of combining empirical research and ethical reflection. In this paper we discuss the use of empirical data in a special form of Reflective Equilibrium (RE), namely the Network Model with Third Person Moral Experiences. In this model, the empirical data consist of the moral experiences (...) of people in a practice. Although inclusion of these moral experiences in this specific model of RE can be well defended, their use in the application of the model still raises important questions. What precisely are moral experiences? How to determine relevance of experiences, in other words: should there be a selection of the moral experiences that are eventually used in the RE? How much weight should the empirical data have in the RE? And the key question: can the use of RE by empirical ethicists really produce answers to practical moral questions?In this paper we start to answer the above questions by giving examples taken from our research project on understanding the norm of informed consent in the field of pediatric oncology. We especially emphasize that incorporation of empirical data in a network model can reduce the risk of self‐justification and bias and can increase the credibility of the RE reached. (shrink)

Organizations such as the EU High-Level Expert Group on AI and the IEEE have recently formulated ethical principles and (moral) values that should be adhered to in the design and deployment of artificial intelligence (AI). These include respect for autonomy, non-maleficence, fairness, transparency, explainability, and accountability. But how can we ensure and verify that an AI system actually respects these values? To help answer this question, I propose an account for determining when an AI system can be said to embody (...) certain values. This account understands embodied values as the result of design activities intended to embed those values in such systems. AI systems are here understood as a special kind of sociotechnical system that, like traditional sociotechnical systems, are composed of technical artifacts, human agents, and institutions but—in addition—contain artificial agents and certain technical norms that regulate interactions between artificial agents and other elements of the system. The specific challenges and opportunities of embedding values in AI systems are discussed, and some lessons for better embedding values in AI systems are drawn. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to critically review several interpretations of Kantian sensible intuition. The first interpretation is the recent construal of Kantian sensible intuition as a mental analogue of a direct referential term. The second is the old, widespread assumption that Kantian intuitions do not refer to mind-independent entities, such as bodies and their physical properties, unless they are brought under categories. The third is the assumption that, by referring to mind-independent entities, sensible intuitions represent objectively in the (...) sense that they represent in a relative, perspective-independent manner. The fourth is the construal of Kantian sensible intuitions as non-conceptual content. In this paper, I support the alternative view that Kantian sensible representation is to be seen as iconic de re presentation of objects without representational content. (shrink)

We investigate the notion of classical negation from a non-classical perspective. In particular, one aim is to determine what classical negation amounts to in a paracomplete and paraconsistent four-valued setting. We first give a general semantic characterization of classical negation and then consider an axiomatic expansion BD+ of four-valued Belnap–Dunn logic by classical negation. We show the expansion complete and maximal. Finally, we compare BD+ to some related systems found in the literature, specifically a four-valued modal logic of Béziau and (...) the logic of classical implication and a paraconsistent de Morgan negation of Zaitsev. (shrink)

In “Science as a Vocation,” Max Weber identifies a trajectory within modernity of increased rationalization, which results in a dangerous loss of meaning, a marginalization of religion, and a disenchanted view of the world. Weber’s misunderstanding of religion as premodern and “magical” results in his underestimating how religion can contribute to “re-enchanting” a field of knowledge, specifically medicine. This article proposes to turn to a theology of the Holy Spirit as “giver of life” for resources to “re-enchant” medicine. Re-enchantment does (...) not require returning to a magical view of the world but retrieving a real sense of God at work in the world, thereby enabling the health care worker and scientist to arrive at a deeper understanding of vocation. (shrink)

This article discusses the proof theory, semantics and meta-theory of a class of adaptive logics, called hierarchic adaptive logics. Their specific characteristics are illustrated throughout the article with the use of one exemplary logic HKx, an explicans for reasoning with prioritized belief bases. A generic proof theory for these systems is defined, together with a less complex proof theory for a subclass of them. Soundness and a restricted form of completeness are established with respect to a non-redundant semantics. It (...) is shown that all hierarchic adaptive logics are reflexive, have the strong reassurance property and that a subclass of them is a fixed point for a broad class of premise sets. Finally, they are compared to a different yet related class of adaptive logics. (shrink)

In this article I argue that, in spite of the apparently unshakable hegemony of the historical, philosophical and sociological arguments invoked by the canonical history of Europe and the world to demonstrate the uniqueness of the West and its superiority, there is room to think of a non-Occidentalist West. By that I mean a vast array of conceptions, theories, arguments that, though produced in the West by recognized intellectual figures, were discarded, marginalized or ignored because they did not fit the (...) political objectives of capitalism and colonialism at the roots of Western modernity. In the article I tackle specifically three topics: the conceptions of antiquity, modern science and a teleology of the future. Among many others who might be selected, I resort to three eccentric figures — Lucian of Samosata, Nicholas of Cusa and Blaise Pascal — to exemplify some of the paths that might guide us in the construction of a non-capitalist, non-colonialist inter-cultural dialogue. Such paths are here designated as those of learned ignorance, ecology of knowledge, wager on another possible world and artisanship of practices. (shrink)

My aim is to discuss the impact of higher-order evidence on aesthetic appreciation. I suggest that this impact is different with respect to aesthetic beliefs and to aesthetic affective attitudes (such as enjoyment). More specifically, I defend the view that higher-order evidence questioning the reliability of one’s aesthetic beliefs can make it reasonable for one to revise those beliefs. Conversely, in line with a plausible account of emotions, aesthetic affective attitudes are not directly sensitive to this type of higher-order evidence; (...) they are sensitive only to those features of objects that make such attitudes (un)fitting. Thus, I argue, there are cases of non-defective recalcitrant aesthetic attitudes where the subject has both a non-defective, fitting aesthetic affective attitude and a reasonable belief questioning the fittingness of this attitude. I further discuss whether, in this type of case, the subject has decisive reasons to try to change her recalcitrant attitudes—say by trying to modify her aesthetic affective dispositions. My answer is negative. Even granting that subjects always have aesthetic reasons to try to avoid aesthetically unfitting attitudes, these can be outweighed by further reasons not to do so—perhaps including aesthetic reasons related to the construction of valuable aesthetic identities or to the value of aesthetic engagement. (shrink)

In this article I argue that, in spite of the apparently unshakable hegemony of the historical, philosophical and sociological arguments invoked by the canonical history of Europe and the world to demonstrate the uniqueness of the West and its superiority, there is room to think of a non-Occidentalist West. By that I mean a vast array of conceptions, theories, arguments that, though produced in the West by recognized intellectual figures, were discarded, marginalized or ignored because they did not fit the (...) political objectives of capitalism and colonialism at the roots of Western modernity. In the article I tackle specifically three topics: the conceptions of antiquity, modern science and a teleology of the future. Among many others who might be selected, I resort to three eccentric figures — Lucian of Samosata, Nicholas of Cusa and Blaise Pascal — to exemplify some of the paths that might guide us in the construction of a non-capitalist, non-colonialist inter-cultural dialogue. Such paths are here designated as those of learned ignorance, ecology of knowledge, wager on another possible world and artisanship of practices. (shrink)

This article argues for a more rigorous distinction between body extensions on the one hand and incorporation of non-bodily objects into the body on the other hand. Real re-embodiment would be a matter of taking things (most often technologies) into the body, i.e. of incorporation of non-bodily items into the body. This, however, is a difficult process often limited by a number of conditions of possibility that are absent in the case of ‘mere’ body extensions. Three categories are discussed: limb (...) extensions/prostheses, perceptual extensions/prostheses and cognitive extensions/prostheses. For each category, a distinction between extensions and incorporations is proposed, and the conditions of possibility for real incorporation are discussed. These conditions of possibility differ in each category, but in general they ask for radical or fundamental alterations not only in the motor and/or sensory or cognitive constitution of a human subject, but also in his or her subjective experience. (shrink)

Depression has been linked with impaired executive control and specific impairments in inhibition of negative material. To date, only a few studies have examined the relationship between depressive symptoms and executive functions in response to emotional information. Using a new paradigm, the Affective Shift Task (AST), the present study examined whether depressive symptoms in general, and rumination specifically, are related to impairments in inhibition and set shifting in response to emotional and non-emotional material. The main finding was that depressive (...) symptoms in general were not related to inhibition. Set-shifting impairments were only observed in moderate to severely depressed individuals. Interestingly, rumination was related to inhibition impairments, specifically when processing negative information, as well as impaired set shifting as reflected in a larger shift cost. These results are discussed in relation to cognitive views on vulnerability for depression. (shrink)

This study aims to analyze what drives and prevents the purchasing of eco-friendly products across different consumer groups and develops a conceptual model embracing the positive altruistic, positive ego-centric, and negative ego-centric antecedents of eco-friendly product purchase intention and behavior. We empirically validate the conceptual model for green and non-green consumers. Data are analyzed using structural equation modeling and multi-group analysis of the two groups. The results confirm the relevance of the determining factors in the model and show significant differences (...) in eco-friendly product purchasing patterns between green and non-green consumers. Altruistic motives are more important for green than for non-green consumers. Negative ego-centric motives affect the purchase intentions of non-green consumers more than the intentions of green consumers, whereas the impact of negative motives on behavior is stronger for green than for non-green consumers. The first contribution of this paper is the development and testing of a parsimonious model of eco-friendly products purchasing that embraces both positive and negative antecedents, which have been theoretically suggested in the past but have rarely been empirically tested together. The second contribution of this study is that it develops insight into the specific antecedents of eco-friendly products purchasing for green and non-green consumers to assess potential similarities and differences in eco-friendly products purchasing process, the hypothesized antecedents, their impact on eco-friendly products purchase intention and behavior, and the intention–behavior relation. (shrink)

Demonstrative thoughts are distinguished by the fact that their contents are determined relationally, via perception, rather than descriptively. Therefore, a fundamental task of a theory of demonstrative thought is to elucidate how facts about visual perception can explain how these thoughts come to have the contents that they do. The purpose of this paper is to investigate how cognitive psychology may help us solve this metasemantic question, through empirical models of visual processing. Although there is a dispute between attentional and (...) non-attentional models concerning the best metasemantic mechanism for demonstrative thoughts, in this paper I will argue in favor of a hybrid model, which combines both types of processes. In this picture, attentional and non-attentional mechanisms are not mutually exclusive, and each plays a specific role in determining the singular content of demonstrative thoughts. (shrink)

In a century where humans and machines—powered by artificial intelligence or not—increasingly work together, it is of interest to understand human processing of multi-sensory stimuli in relation to attention and working memory. This paper explores whether and when supporting visual information with rhythmic auditory stimuli can optimize multi-sensory information processing. In turn, this can make the interaction between humans or between machines and humans more engaging, rewarding and activating. For this purpose a novel working memory paradigm was developed where participants (...) are presented with a series of five target digits randomly interchanged with five distractor digits. Their goal is to remember the target digits and recall them orally. Depending on the condition support is provided by audio and/or rhythm. It is expected that the sound will lead to a better performance. It is also expected that this effect of sound is different in case of rhythmic and non-rhythmic sound. Last but not least, some variability is expected across participants. To make correct conclusions, the data of the experiment was statistically analyzed in a classic way, but also predictive models were developed in order to predict outcomes based on a range of input variables related to the experiment and the participant. The effect of auditory support could be confirmed, but no difference was observed between rhythmic and non-rhythmic sounds. Overall performance was indeed affected by individual differences, such as visual dominance or perceived task difficulty. Surprisingly a music education did not significantly affect the performance and even tended toward a negative effect. To better understand the underlying processes of attention, also brain activation data, e.g., by means of electroencephalography, should be recorded. This approach can be subject to a future work. (shrink)

The background of the present study is Constant’s interpretation of modern freedom compared with the freedom-participation of the Ancients. In order to understand Tocqueville’s conception of political freedom one has first to explain what he meant by ‘égalité des conditions’ or ‘democracy’. What characterises the democratic era is the disappearance of distinctions of class and cast in and through a process of equalisation, which has long been at work and to which Tocqueville envisages no end. For Tocqueville, a passion for (...) equality animates modern Western societies. Hence his focus on mental mechanisms when he tries to answer the question that disturbs him: where might this passion lead us and more specifically what are the dangers to which freedom is exposed in democracy. The reason behind Tocqueville’s anxiety is his conviction that a subtle cooperation exists between individualism and administrative centralisation that leads to a new kind of despotism. This does not make him into a fatalist. He believes that it is possible to control this passion in such a manner that it becomes compatible with freedom. What we need is a resolve to safeguard freedom and a new political science that not only discovers the dangers that threaten freedom but at the same time exposes the means and remedies that democracy itself produces to control these tendencies. America is here the example.Political freedom existed there prior to the rise of equality, whereas in France freedom was first lost to absolutism, which in turn created a situation of equality that prepared the ground for despotism. Among the remedies that can safeguard freedom, the most important for Tocqueville is ‘l’esprit d’association’. In the closing part of the study, the discussion of the mediating role of this modern kind of ‘corps intermédiaires’ facilitates a comparison of Tocqueville’s conception of political freedom with that of Constant and Rousseau. (shrink)

In ethics, the use of empirical data has become more and more popular, leading to a distinct form of applied ethics, namely empirical ethics. This 'empirical turn' is especially visible in bioethics. There are various ways of combining empirical research and ethical reflection. In this paper we discuss the use of empirical data in a special form of Reflective Equilibrium (RE), namely the Network Model with Third Person Moral Experiences. In this model, the empirical data consist of the moral experiences (...) of people in a practice. Although inclusion of these moral experiences in this specific model of RE can be well defended, their use in the application of the model still raises important questions. What precisely are moral experiences? How to determine relevance of experiences, in other words: should there be a selection of the moral experiences that are eventually used in the RE? How much weight should the empirical data have in the RE? And the key question: can the use of RE by empirical ethicists really produce answers to practical moral questions? In this paper we start to answer the above questions by giving examples taken from our research project on understanding the norm of informed consent in the field of pediatric oncology. We especially emphasize that incorporation of empirical data in a network model can reduce the risk of self-justification and bias and can increase the credibility of the RE reached. (shrink)