In this paper, I shall defend two main claims. First, Friedman’s famous paper “On the methodology of positive economics” (“F53”) cannot be properly understood without taking into account the influence of three authors who are neither cited nor mentioned in the paper: Max Weber, Frank Knight, and Karl Popper. I shall trace both their substantive influence on F53 and the historical route by which this influence took place. Once one has understood these ingredients, especially Weber’s ideal types, (...) many of F53’s astonishing sentences like “the more significant the theory, the more unrealistic the assumptions”, make good sense. Second, I shall claim that the much-discussed question whether Friedman’s essay espouses an instrumentalist or a realist position, is the wrong question to be asked. I shall illustrate that by a comparison with examples from physics in which also unrealistic assumptions are made. Also there, the question whether these assumptions are indicators of instrumentalism or realism is not appropriate. Cleared from these misunderstandings, F53 presents itself as an interesting and reasonable but much less controversial contribution to the methodology of economics. (shrink)

Max Weber’s methodology is often treated by some as his principal contribution to social science, while his comparative sociology of religion starting with the famous Calvinist thesis is the Schwerpunkt in his work, according to others. There are several reasons to locate and analyze the conjunctions between these two interpretations. Weber’s ideal type is formulated in several places, not only in the so-called ‘Objectivity’ essay from 1904, but also for instance in the marginal utility-essay from 1908. His three (...) meta-texts for the three volumes in GARS (Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie) are also illuminating, especially in ‘Einleitung’ (‘Introduction’) and ‘Zwischenbetrachtung’ (or ‘Intermediate Reflections’). It was in the ‘Zwischenbetrachtung’ where he commented on religion in India, partly as an ‘identity giving other’, that the ideal type reappeared. Weber deals with the uniqueness of Occidental culture and his comparative religion serves as supporting evidence, much in line with J S Mill’s canons for the logic of isolating independent variables by similarities and differences -as indicated in a letter by Weber to Georg von Below. As a result Weber serves still today as a sparring partner for theorists of the Axial Age and the multi-modernity paradigm. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Copernicus, Darwin, and Freud Some Views of Humankind Scientism and the Freudian Model of Personality The Social Sciences beyond Freud Evolution and the Social Sciences Freud and Revolutions in Thought Reading List Essay Questions.

In this paper, I shall defend two main claims. First, Friedman’s famous paper “On the methodology of positive economics” (“F53”) cannot be properly understood without taking into account the influence of three authors who are neither cited nor mentioned in the paper: Max Weber, Frank Knight, and Karl Popper. I shall trace both their substantive influence on F53 and the historical route by which this influence took place. Once one has understood these ingredients, especially Weber’s ideal types, (...) many of F53’s astonishing sentences like “the more significant the theory, the more unrealistic the assumptions”, make good sense. Second, I shall claim that the much-discussed question whether Friedman’s essay espouses an instrumentalist or a realist position, is the wrong question to be asked. I shall illustrate that by a comparison with examples from physics in which also unrealistic assumptions are made. Also there, the question whether these assumptions are indicators of instrumentalism or realism is not appropriate. Cleared from these misunderstandings, F53 presents itself as an interesting and reasonable but much less controversial contribution to the methodology of economics. (shrink)

This paper grapples with two objections against Max Weber’s methodology that arise because Weber borrows some ideas from Heinrich Rickert’s neo-Kantian philosophical system. The first objection (“the contradiction argument”) is raised by Julius J. Schaaf who disagrees with Weber’s claim that historical objects are constituted through retrospectively and hypothetically applied selections of value relations and that we can understand these objects. Weber’s idea that the relating ideal type constructions are also non-arbitrary—i.e., not merely subjective—and can be rectified, Schaaf (...) maintains, contradicts his own characterization of historical objects and reality. The second objection (“the incom¬patibility argument”) was made by Gerhard Wagner and Heinz Zipprian. It focuses on the conception of objective possibility. According to this, counter¬factual chains of historical events are contrived to figure out the relevant set of causes by which a certain event can be said to necessarily occur. The critics claim that it is only based on the ontological assumption of a preexisting real object that this thought-experiment can operate. That is, the pre-emptive assumption of realism is indis¬pensable for explaining the historical individual. To refute these two objections, I clarify some foundational notions and ideas of Weber’s methodology. (shrink)

This paper aims at revealing the originality of Max Weber’s conception of the logical category of “historicity”, suggesting that in his writings on the methodology of the social sciences we can find a stimulating and forerunner contribution to the analysis of some logical and formal problems concerning the relationship between human knowledge and the chaos of reality (what we might call, ante-litteram, “science of chaos”). In particular, considering that in Weber’s conception scientific knowledge finds no facts “to grasp” in (...) the natural world, but rather a chaos of unique and infinitely divisible events, the analysis will be focused on the following aspects: (a) Weber’s separation of causal imputation from the notion of necessary (natural) law; (b) the importance attached to “probability judgments” with different degrees of certainty; (c) the proclaimed irreducibility of individual events to scientific models, laws, and (ideal)-types; (d) the effects imputed to the differentiation of the point of view of a scientific observer. (shrink)

Recent interpretations of Weber's theory of concept formation have concluded that it is seriously defective and therefore of questionable use in social science. Oakes and Burger have argued that Weber's ideas depend upon Rickert's epistemology, whose arguments Oakes finds to be invalid; by implication, Weber's theory fails. An attempt is made to reconstruct Weber's theory on the basis of his 1904 essay on objectivity. Pivotal to Weber's theory is his distinction between concept and judgment (hypothesis), (...) where the former is the interpretive means to the formation of explanatory accounts (judgments). His theory includes criteria of abstraction and synthesis in the construction of ideal-type concepts as well as criteria for their evaluation. Weber provides a reasonably coherent, if incomplete, theory of concept formation which does not depend on Rickert's epistemological arguments. (shrink)

Context: Non-dualism suggests a new way of utilizing language without the assumption of categorically extralinguistic objects denoted by language. Problem: What is the innovative potential, what is the special value of non-dualism for science? Is non-dualism a fruitful conceptual revision or just a philosophical thought experiment with no or little significance for science? Method: We provide a concise introduction to non-dualism’s central new proposals and an overview of the papers. Results: Fourteen contributors show how this way of thinking and speaking (...) can be operationalized creatively, but also address some of its boundaries. Implications: Since not all of the aspects and problems highlighted for discussion in the original Call for Papers were answered satisfactorily, further research is necessary. For example, research is needed on the relationship between dualism’s distinction between object language and metalanguage on the one hand and non-dualism’s distinction between descriptions so far and descriptions from now on on the other; or on the infinite regress allegations by non-dualism against dualism. Constructivist content: Some authors show that non-dualist thinking is anti-essentialist, in a similar way as constructivist thinking. Some also show that comparable questions arise; for example, the question of whether non-dualism denies the material world (containing extralinguistic objects). (shrink)

Context: The short history of the reception of the philosophy of non-dualism in science is a history of misunderstandings and cursory reception -- the latter especially concerns Mitterer's main work Das Jenseits der Philosophie (The Beyond of Philosophy, which still has not been translated into English). Non-dualism so far is mostly seen either as a kind of constructivism replacing the rhetoric of "construction" with a rhetoric of "description" or as an overall philosophical critique of the use of dualisms, dichotomies or (...) polarities in epistemological contexts. The core arguments of non-dualism are often completely ignored. This paper wishes to discuss them precisely and draw some conclusions. Approach: Close critical reading of Mitterer's texts, trying to avoid as many translation gaps as possible. Findings: Non-dualism reveals the infinite regress of classical philosophy of language: the categorical differentiation between language and the world leads to a systematic contradiction. While non-dualism also helps to deconstruct the pretension to speak "about reality" or to claim that "in fact" something is the case in everyday life, non-dualism refrains from giving satisfying answers to the great questions of mankind in the "metaphysical" context: questions of starting points/origins, meanings, causes, and the (implicitness of the) time arrow. Benefits: The intention of this paper is to stimulate a broader discussion -- so far limited by language -- extending it beyond German and Polish scientific circles. (shrink)

This paper examines issues of ontology and methodology in behavioral economics: the attempt to increase the explanatory and predictive power of economic theory by providing it with more psychologically plausible foundations. Of special interest is the epistemological status of neoclassical economic theory within behavioral economics, the runaway success story of contemporary economics. Behavioral economists aspire to replace the fundamental assumptions of orthodox, neoclassical economic theory. Yet, behavioral economists have gone out of their way to praise those very assumptions. Matthew (...) Rabin, for example, writes that behavioral economics “is not only built on the premise that [orthodox] economic methods are great, but also that most mainstream economic assumptions are great.” These apparently contradictory attitudes toward neoclassical theory raises the question of what, exactly, its epistemological status within behavioral economics is. This paper argues that the paradox can be resolved, and the question answered, by thinking of the epistemological status of neoclassical theory within behavioral economics in terms of Max Weber’s ideal types: analytical constructs that are not intended to be descriptively true of anything but which nevertheless can be used for a variety of theoretical purposes. The analysis is consistent with many of the insights from the philosophical literature on models in science and has important implications for the practice of economics—behavioral and neoclassical—as well as for the very nature of rationality. (shrink)

Philosophical concerns rarely force their way into the average mathematician’s workday. But, in extreme circumstances, fundamental questions can arise as to the legitimacy of a certain manner of proceeding, say, as to whether a particular object should be granted ontological status, or whether a certain conclusion is epistemologically warranted. There are then two distinct views as to the role that philosophy should play in such a situation. On the first view, the mathematician is called upon to turn to the (...) counsel of philosophers, in much the same way as a nation considering an action of dubious international legality is called upon to turn to the United Nations for guidance. After due consideration of appropriate regulations and guidelines (and, possibly, debate between representatives of different philosophical factions), the philosophers render a decision, by which the dutiful mathematician abides. Quine was famously critical of such dreams of a ‘first philosophy.’ At the opposite extreme, our hypothetical mathematician answers only to the subject’s internal concerns, blithely or brashly indifferent to philosophical approval. What is at stake to our mathematician friend is whether the questionable practice provides a proper mathematical solution to the problem at hand, or an appropriate mathematical understanding; or, in pragmatic terms, whether it will make it past a journal referee. In short, mathematics is as mathematics does, and the philosopher’s task is simply to make sense of the subject as it evolves and certify practices that are already in place. In his textbook on the philosophy of mathematics (Shapiro, 2000), Stewart Shapiro characterizes this attitude as ‘philosophy last, if at all.’. (shrink)

Philosophical concerns rarely force their way into the average mathematician’s workday. But, in extreme circumstances, fundamental questions can arise as to the legitimacy of a certain manner of proceeding, say, as to whether a particular object should be granted ontological status, or whether a certain conclusion is epistemologically warranted. There are then two distinct views as to the role that philosophy should play in such a situation.

The general area of this essay is an issue left unexplored by the tradition of commentary on Rickert's philosophy and Weber's methodology: the question of the relationship between Rickert's value theory and the validity of Weber's methodological positions. Within this area, the essay focuses on the question of the relationship between Rickert's analysis of the problem of the objectivity of values and Weber's conception of the objectivity of the cultural sciences. The thesis defended is that a (...) solution to Weber's problem of the objectivity of the cultural sciences depends upon Rickert's doctrine of the objectivity of values. In this sense, Rickert's position on the objectivity of values is essential to the validity of Weber's methodology. (shrink)

Weber’s notion of ideal-types has most frequently been rejected as incoherent or overly abstract. This article maintains that it insightfully addresses explanatory issues in social science by encompassing the agents’ subjective understanding and the need for theorists to comprehend, explain, and evaluate it. As such, ideal-types are not versions of established models in natural science or economics. Further keys are seeing ideal-types as blending interpretive understanding and causal explanation but not thereby causal generalizations, and (...) rational appraisals as consistent with value pluralism. (shrink)

In the current literature on scientific explanation unification became unfashionable in favour of causal approaches. We want to bring unification back into the picture. In this paper we demonstrate that resemblance questions do occur in scientific practice and that they cannot be properly answered without unification. Our examples show that resemblance questions about particular facts demand what we call causal network unification, while resemblance questions about regularities require what we call mechanism unification. We clarify how these (...) class='Hi'>types of unification relate to Philip Kitcher’s account, but also to causal and mechanistic accounts of explanation. (shrink)

This paper contains a novel and coherent reading of Weberian ideal type construction, based on recent philosophical approaches to conceptual engineering. This reading makes transparent the dialectics of Weber's approach, resulting in a more nuanced interpretation of his methodological work. It will become apparent that Weber, when introducing his notion of an ideal type, did not merely summarize his views on methodology in the social sciences, but, rather, presented a two-step argument in favor of these views. (...) The reconstruction will directly bear on issues in the methodology of the social sciences. Weber not only presented a methodology that is, at some level of abstraction, strikingly similar to Carnapian explication (the canonical point of reference in the contemporary debate on conceptual engineering). He also diagnosed, in a systematic fashion, types of problems we face when dealing with ordinary and scientific concepts that play a key role in the description of social reality, and he foreshadowed what is today sometimes described as “debunking” projects. From a philosophy of science perspective, I propose Weber's view (on the reconstruction proposed here) as a serious candidate for an adequate theory of concept replacement in the social sciences. (shrink)

The paper's aim is to contribute to a better understanding of Weber's methodology by clarifying the difference of Weber's concept of Verstehen from Dilthey's concept of Verstehen, and by answering the question of how Weber's claim to objectivity of his Verstehende Soziologie is compatible with his claim that the specific method of his Verstehende Soziologie, the idealtypical construction, is empirically irrefutable. My thesis is that there are three classes of ideal types in Weber: concepts (...) of 'historical individuals', concepts of 'objective possibilities' and idealtypical classifying concepts. Common to them is the end to grasp the individual character of a social phenomenon. Their different functions in realizing this end justify to describe Weber's Verstehende Soziologie as a system, in which social phenomena are presented as if they were the result of conscious human decisions. (shrink)

Used by more than one million students around the world since its original publication, this introductory philosophy text makes accessible a wide range of philosophical issues closely related to everyday life. Emphasizing personal and immediate questions, the authors approach introductory philosophy through basic human questions rather than focusing on methodology or the history of thought. The text presents vital questions of contemporary interest in an overall framework of enduring concepts, interweaving coverage of various topics in art, (...) history, and education. It covers a variety of types of philosophy in depth, and both western and eastern perspectives are represented. Ideal for students who have no background in philosophy, Living Issues in Philosophy, 9/e simplifies technical language wherever possible; unfamiliar terms are clearly defined upon first appearance and in the end-of-chapter glossaries. Additional pedagogical features include exercises, chapter summaries, and annotated bibliographies at the end of every chapter. The text also features photo biographies of major philosophers and short excerpts from philosophical classics. (shrink)

Michel Weber, Éduquer (à) l’anarchie. Essai sur les conséquences de la praxis philosophique, Louvain-la-Neuve, Les Éditions Chromatika, 2008. (978-2-930517-03-2 ; 239 p. ; 20 € ; -/- L'idéal philosophique incarné par la vie et l'œuvre d’Alfred North Whitehead (1861–1947) est, plus que jamais, d'une actualité brûlante. Il requiert que la philosophie soit une discipline vécue afin qu'elle puisse demeurer une discipline vivante. Quel posture socio-politique suggère-t-il ? Le concept d’anarchie permet de nommer à la fois l’état présent du monde globalisé (...) (le « chaos constructif » voulu par le néolibéralisme) et la réponse qui s’impose : le communautarisme libertaire, c’est-à-dire la redynamisation de la démocratie participative. Or, le monde de l’éducation se situe précisément en ce point de bifurcation : ou bien il succombe aux assauts du marché et nous nous dirigeons vers la barbarie ; ou bien il résiste et la Vie reprend ses droits. The philosophical ideal embodied by the life and works of Alfred North Whitehead (1861–1947) is, more than ever, a burning question. It requires that philosophy be a lived discipline so that it can remain a living discipline. What does this ideal entail in the socio-political sphere? The concept of anarchy allows a straightforward discussion of both the current state of affairs in a globalized world (the “constructive chaos” fostered by neoliberalism) and the necessary reaction : libertarian communautarism, which constitutes a re-energization of participative democracy. Now, the world of education lies precisely at that bifurcation point. Either it gives way beneath the attacks of the “market” and we are heading towards barbary; or it resists and Life regains its rights. (shrink)

In this paper I question the tendency within some feminist circles to criticise attempts to develop typologies that delineate different feminist theoretical perspectives. I agree that many of the criticisms are valid, but only if typologies are viewed in a particular way. This particular way is when typologies are regarded as ahistorical, all-encompassing entities containing discrete categories that are designed for the once and for all fixing of individuals and their work in one box. Reading Max Weber through Karl Mannheim's (...) work on the sociology of knowledge, I argue that typologies, as ideal-types, are indispensable, socially situated practical tools for measuring similarities, differences and developments in thought within and across time and space. Despite being noted as an “attractive” argument by at least some of those who are otherwise critical of typologies (for example, Liz Stanley and Sue Wise), I believe that the “attractiveness” of this particular position has not been granted serious consideration. (shrink)

In a recent article Professor M. C. Nahm, defending what he characterizes as an amplified version of the James' theory of the emotions, argues that teleological principles are required in any adequate definition of the emotions. Mechanistic principles may account for the physiological basis of emotional experience, it is maintained, but if we are to define the total experience, which includes a certain conscious content, we must go beyond the mechanistic hypothesis and regard the emotions as directed toward certain ends. (...) He proposes to reveal the “epistemological core” of the problem of the emotions with the evident intention of indicating the lines which the development of the theory of the emotions should follow. It is the aim of this paper to scrutinize the general problem of the emotions in the light of Mr. Nahm's arguments and to consider specifically: the alleged teleological implications of the problem, the statement of the problem of the emotions as it is given in Mr. Nahm's paper, and the present state of research as it may be relevant to the question whether Mr. Nahm's presentation makes for philosophical clarity or methodological advancement in science. (shrink)

Although it is been more than a century since the appearance of Max Weber’s famous essay about the objective character of knowledge in the field of social and political sciences, it still continues to attract the interest of researchers in the various cultural sciences. There is a whole secondary literature dedicated to concepts that Weber has not defined clearly enough, such as Idealtypus [ideal type], historisches Individuum [historical individual], Wertbeziehung [value-relation] or Werturteilsfreiheit [the freedom from value- judgement]. Our contribution (...) falls into this category; since the phrase ‘axiological memory’ appears nowhere in Weber’s work, the concept itself is present, especially in his essays dedicated to methodology in the social and political sciences. As Guy Oakes noted, Weber did not always endeavour to argue his thesis rigorously, thus leaving ample room for the interpretation and development of his ideas. (shrink)

Available from UMI in association with The British Library. ;This thesis investigates the application of the theory of Conceptual Structures to an Experience Base model, which is a question-answering system for a knowledge base of pseudo-natural language statements of everyday experience. This thesis progresses to extend the fundamental principles carried from the experience base, to develop a framework for Reasoning by Analogy. Both methodologies are implemented, and uncertainty in the models is handled using the theory of Support Logic. ;Incompleteness of (...) information, uncertainty of data and the need for a definite structure to the way in which rules and data interact, are aspects which must be dealt with if the experience base is to succeed. One more aspect is the knowledge representation which dictates the ease with which processing may be performed upon it. Conceptual graphs are used to store information used by an Experience Base. Control of the reasoning is effected by plausible inference reinforced by the theory of Support Logic for handling uncertainty. The knowledge base is a set of initially completely disparate islands of knowledge, which the system automatically clusters into coherent groups in an associative network. ;The principles evolved from research into experience bases lead to the conception, development and implementation of a computational framework for Analogical Reasoning. The reasoning is performed between domains of knowledge rather than within a single domain as in case-based reasoning, and operates on pseudo-natural language statements as for the experience base. It relies on relation-based structure mapping and includes a sophisticated mechanism for translating between the new problem and the analogue. The strong connection between this work and metaphor interpretation is also investigated, together with ideas on how to negotiate with the apparent multitude of types of analogical reasoning. (shrink)

This article has four main objectives. First, it introduces the ideal types of domination of Weber. Contrary to the received wisdom, which knows only “three ideal types” (traditional, charismatic and legal rational) I present the “fourth” type of domination, Weber called “Wille der Beherrschten” as an important correction of his ideal type of legal-rational authority. Next I make a novel, critical distinction between patrimonial and prebendal types of traditional authority. Third, I discuss various ways (...) that communist regimes tried to legitimate themselves and how they entered eventually a legitimation crisis, leading to the collapse of communism. In the next section, I explore the different ways post-communist capitalisms seek legitimacy (with various combinations of legal rational authority and patrimonialism), and finally I conclude with a trend of re-convergence of some post-communist systems (especially Russia and Hungary, but with signs for similar trends elsewhere) into an illiberal, prebendal quasi-democratic system. (shrink)

Reinhard Bendix made a major contribution to the early reception and interpretation of Max Weber's work. His classic study, Max Weber: An Intellectual Portrait (1960), developed a remarkably consistent interpretation of Weber as a comparative historical sociologist. Bendix also emulated and subtly reinterpreted in his own work key aspects of Weber's comparative method and research strategies. By searching for a middle course between `Scylla and Charybdis', between the abstractions of theoretical concepts and the richness of empirical evidence, Bendix (...) sought to reinterpret and renew the vital centre of Weber's comparative enterprise as a study of western uniqueness. In so doing, he decisively challenged Talcott Parsons's alternative methodological reading of Weber's work. Yet, curiously Bendix's status as a Weber interpreter and comparative historian profoundly influenced by Weber's legacy has often been neglected or misinterpreted. This article re-examines Bendix's classic reading of Weber's corpus, and the way in which he sought to keep alive in his substantive work the promise and spirit of Weber's comparative historical sociology. (shrink)

The focus of the article is scientific rationality. Drawing from the historical development of science, the author identifies three main types of scientific rationality: classical rationality, nonclassical rationality, and post-nonclassical rationality. They are distinguished based on such criteria as 1) features of systematic organization of the objects studied by science; 2) the system of ideals and norms used in research; 3) different types of philosophical-methodological reflection on cognitive activity. The essay discusses each of the three identified types (...) providing a thorough analysis of their main features and characteristics. (shrink)

There has recently been a great interest in models in the natural sciences. Models are used mainly for their representational functions: they help to concretize certain relationships between parameters in studying physical systems. For instance, we might be interested in representing how the planets orbit around the sun—a scale model of the solar system is an ideal tool for achieving this end. We are free to leave out one or two planets or ignore the moons which many of the (...) planets have. Alternatively, we might be interested in studying the relationship between two particular parameters—how one may be dependent on the other. Then we construct a functional model and determine the functional relationship between them. For instance, the orbital period of a planet is functionally dependent on the average distance of the planet from the sun.1 Models are rather widespread in the social sciences, especially in economics where functional models are used to study relationships between, say, supply and demand. Economics, however, also uses a different kind of model which is also used in the natural sciences: the hypothetical or as if model. Economists employ as if constructions when they assume economic agents to be perfectly rational beings who always seek to maximize their utilities. It is common knowledge that economic agents are not perfectly rational and that the assumptions of perfect rationality and optimal information are at best idealizations which do not, strictly speaking, correspond to the economic reality of how economic agents behave in the market-place. (shrink)

This paper is about the problem of explanation in anthropology. There are, broadly speaking, three theories of explanation, namely, the scientific theory, the historical theory, and finally what I have decided to call the phenomenological theory, after M. Natanson. The author argues that none of the three theories is adequate by itself to encompass the complex nature of anthropological science. The three theories correspond roughly to at least three different types of questions raised by anthropologists, and this being (...) the case the principle of methodological tolerance seems a natural and sensible principle to adopt. The paper also deals with the problem of reduction, i.e. the problem whether the three theories are different from and logically independent of one another. (shrink)

Weber’s concept of “vocation” in science implies “anti-monumentalism”: research can always be continued, and the results obtained can be used in various ways. The scientist cannot be completely aware of the final impact of their work, so they are faced with a paradox of consequences. This paradox is based on value polytheism, a concept put forward by Weber. There are two ideas central to polytheism: first, one must recognize the internal logic of value spheres and, second, one must consider their (...) fundamental incommensurability. But how does this idea emerge in Weber’s theory? Interpretations of value polytheism as a “fact” of a cultural situation and as the logical foundation of science do not allow one to answer the question of its origin. The conceptual bridge is found in Weber’s sociology of religion. Tenbruck’s, Schluchter’s, and Hennis’s models are examined to identify variations of value polytheism. However, their macro-orientation does not demonstrate the internal structure and functioning of polytheism. The present paper explicates the logical-methodological foundations of Weber’s scientific programme to clarify these points. Primarily, it investigates the problem of the consequences of an action carried out in a “vocation” mode and the boundaries of “adequate” causal explanations as presented in Weber’s works. It makes it possible to consider Weber’s value polytheism and concepts associated with it not as value metaphysics or unreasonable axioms,but as a methodologically based conceptual apparatus. (shrink)

The papers comprising Zur Farbenlehre, best known portion of Goethe's writings on color and optics, appeared between 1808 and 1810. Portions of Zur Farbenlehre, translated by the painter Charles Lock Eastlake and frequently reprinted under the title Theory of Colours, achieved immediate notoriety because of Goethe's insistent questioning of Newton's methodology. Acknowledging no mentors except Theophrastus and the physicist Robert Boyle, Goethe compared the Newtonian theory of colors--indelicately, some think--to a once proud castle still revered long after it has (...) fallen into decay. The furor aroused by this intemperate analogy has not fully subsided yet. During the twentieth century Max Planck answered the impertinence with a vigorous ad hominem attack and Rudolph Carnap followed suit. We still lack a serious analysis of Goethe's color theories or his arguments against Newton. And the early vituperation seems quaint. Questioning Newton's methodology--or even his epistemology--is a legitimate activity and has even become commonplace. The 1840 edition of Eastlake's translation enjoys a perennial popularity among artists and a few perceptual psychologists, who have been allowed to monopolize for too long a book which is primarily a highly provocative inquiry in the philosophy of science. Someday an imaginative publisher may be inspired to make available more extensive translations of Goethe's copious writings on color, complemented by the type of careful editing, annotation and analysis which I. Bernard Cohen and Alexander Koyré provide for the writings of Newton. Until then one is grateful for Eastlake.--P. S. (shrink)

Logical paradoxes – like the Liar, Russell's, and the Sorites – are notorious. But in Paradoxes and Inconsistent Mathematics, it is argued that they are only the noisiest of many. Contradictions arise in the everyday, from the smallest points to the widest boundaries. In this book, Zach Weber uses “dialetheic paraconsistency” – a formal framework where some contradictions can be true without absurdity – as the basis for developing this idea rigorously, from mathematical foundations up. In doing so, Weber directly (...) addresses a longstanding open question: how much standard mathematics can paraconsistency capture? The guiding focus is on a more basic question, of why there are paradoxes. Details underscore a simple philosophical claim: that paradoxes are found in the ordinary, and that is what makes them so extraordinary. (shrink)

This thesis focuses on the use of intelligent tutoring system for education and training of students specialized in electricity in the field of technical and vocational education. The use of modern systems in training and education will have a great positive impact in improving the level of students receiving training and education; this will improve the level of the local economy by producing students of professionals who are able to engage in society efficiently, especially for those who have specialized in (...) electricity. It is known that students in electrical specialties face many problems because of time and cost. Learning and training is not as easy as you imagine, so intelligence is how to overcome these limitations effectively. Motivating the Intelligent Tutorial System (ITS) for this type of training. This system consists of a student model, which in turn will contain lessons, exercises and examples that will be used by the student in addition to the user interface model which makes the teacher to be able to manage lessons, examples, and questions and make changes to the system. Expert System (ES) model representing the Artificial Intelligence (AI) here has been used to determine the level of the student and gives him the results, directions and levels. The program was implemented and was used by trainees to show the extent of its impact. The students expressed their surprise and admiration in this way of education as the system used focuses on individual education which can be used at any time and without restrictions. After this experience, the dedicated (ITS) system needs to be developed in several ways such as to be used on mobile systems and web systems in addition to linking some of the specialized programs in the field of electricity. (shrink)

The vision of natural kinds that is most common in the modern philosophy of biology, particularly with respect to the question whether species and other taxa are natural kinds, is based on a revision of the notion by Mill in A System of Logic. However, there was another conception that Whewell had previously captured well, which taxonomists have always employed, of kinds as being types that need not have necessary and sufficient characters and properties, or essences. These competing views (...) employ different approaches to scientific methodologies: Mill’s class-kinds are not formed by induction but by deduction, while Whewell’s type-kinds are inductive. More recently, phylogenetic kinds (clades, or monophyletic-kinds) are inductively projectible, and escape Mill’s strictures. Mill’s version represents a shift in the notions of kinds from the biological to the physical sciences. (shrink)

_Purpose._ This article discusses researching the nature and basic structure of acts of empathy. Such research first requires answering the question: are empathic acts intentional acts of our consciousness? If the answer to this question is affirmative, then there is a need to answer the following questions: what are the features of acts of empathy as intentional ones? And can such acts be qualified as opening a special and complex type of access (epistemic, social, and ethical) to "other minds"? (...) _Theoretical basis._ The research is based on the problems set by the phenomenological tradition and the developed analytical philosophy, which found their continuation in the philosophy of mind. With the tendency to naturalization, representatives of these areas have another common sphere in the research of mental reality. The changes that both traditions are undergoing can be observed in the transformation of fundamental theoretical concepts such as "intentionality". The linguistic turn gives impetus to the development of new theoretical approaches to the understanding of consciousness, which give preference to the research of language rather than the research in the structure of the Self. The change in methodological guidelines is due to a few factors. In particular, this is a noticeable progress in empirical sciences and the dominance of Behaviorism guidelines in psychology, as well as the fact that the Anglo-American tradition inherits several features intrinsic to British empiricism. Today, three main directions of understanding intentionality can be distinguished. Starting from Brentano and Husserl, we have a classical theory – mental intentionality (phenomenological). As part of analytical philosophy and philosophy of language, we can talk about linguistically interpreted intentionality. Sellars’ model of intentionality has a definite linguistic component. Also, a modern version that functions in the philosophy of consciousness: attempts to naturalize intentionality (this is, for example, the research of Galen Strawson and Daniel Dennett). _Originality._ The problem is studied not in the context of the phenomenological or analytical traditions in their isolation, but in a problematic-conceptual way, which allows us to reach a new level of generalization and reveal the theoretical advantages of combining both traditions. _Conclusions._ Empathic Acts can be defined as intentional within the classical phenomenological tradition. As intentional acts, they have their specificity in that they are directed to the "other mind" and can form the basis for the research of intersubjectivity. For the analytic tradition and early philosophy of consciousness, such statements are not obvious. However, discussions about the role of corporality and the problem concerning embodied cognition are becoming increasingly common today. In such discussions, empathy, as an element in the knowledge of others and a possibility for grounding the social sciences, seems more promising than attempts to make epistemic access to other minds possible on the basis of the argument by analogy or on the basis of the inference to the best explanation. (shrink)

Is the societal-level of analysis sufficient today to understand the values of those in the global workforce? Or are individual-level analyses more appropriate for assessing the influence of values on ethical behaviors across country workforces? Using multi-level analyses for a 48-society sample, we test the utility of both the societal-level and individual-level dimensions of collectivism and individualism values for predicting ethical behaviors of business professionals. Our values-based behavioral analysis indicates that values at the individual-level make a more significant contribution to (...) explaining variance in ethical behaviors than do values at the societal-level. Implicitly, our findings question the soundness of using societal-level values measures. Implications for international business research are discussed. (shrink)

Only a few writers have attempted to construct a comprehensive philosophy of social science, and of these Weber is the most relevant to the present. The structure of his conception places him in a close relationship to Donald Davidson. The basic reasoning of Davidson on action explanation, anomalous monism, and the impossibility of a “serious science” of psychology is paralleled in Weber. There are apparent differences with respect to their treatment of the status of the model of rational action and (...) the problem of other cultures, as well as the problem of the objectivity of values, but on examination, these turn out to be less dramatic. Weber’s use of the notion of ideal-types, though it is not paralleled as directly in Davidson, allows him to make parallel conclusions about the relation of truth and interpretation: both make the problem of intelligibility rather than correspondence with some sort of external reality central, and each addresses, though in different ways, the dependence of considerations of intelligibility on normativity and the impossibility of a theory of meaning without idealization. (shrink)

Nineteen thoughtful essays devoted to the theoretical aspects of sociological investigation: the use of ideal types, the causal concept and the concept of social change, functional analysis, the formalization of theory, and the place of values in sociology. C. Wright Mill's "On Intellectual Craftsmanship" is an engaging and informal account of how one social scientist goes about his business, with a liberal sprinkling of criticisms against the tendency to divorce methodological inquiry from the scientific investigation itself. --L. S. (...) F. (shrink)

The increasingly wide spread use of RCM, rational choice modeling, and RCT, rational choice theory, in disciplines like economics, law, ethics, psychology, sociology, political science, management facilitates interdisciplinary exchange. This is a great achievement. Yet it nurtures the hope that a unified account of rational active choice making might arise from ‘reason’ in terms of intuitively appealing axioms. Such ‘rationalist’ characterizations of rational choice neglect real human practices and empirical accounts of those practices. This is theoretically misleading and practically dangerous. (...) Searching for a wide reflective equilibrium, WRE, on RCT in evidence-oriented ways can explicate ‘rational’ without rationalism. (shrink)

The papers comprising Zur Farbenlehre, best known portion of Goethe's writings on color and optics, appeared between 1808 and 1810. Portions of Zur Farbenlehre, translated by the painter Charles Lock Eastlake and frequently reprinted under the title Theory of Colours, achieved immediate notoriety because of Goethe's insistent questioning of Newton's methodology. Acknowledging no mentors except Theophrastus and the physicist Robert Boyle, Goethe compared the Newtonian theory of colors--indelicately, some think--to a once proud castle still revered long after it has (...) fallen into decay. The furor aroused by this intemperate analogy has not fully subsided yet. During the twentieth century Max Planck answered the impertinence with a vigorous ad hominem attack and Rudolph Carnap followed suit. We still lack a serious analysis of Goethe's color theories or his arguments against Newton. And the early vituperation seems quaint. Questioning Newton's methodology--or even his epistemology--is a legitimate activity and has even become commonplace. The 1840 edition of Eastlake's translation enjoys a perennial popularity among artists and a few perceptual psychologists, who have been allowed to monopolize for too long a book which is primarily a highly provocative inquiry in the philosophy of science. Someday an imaginative publisher may be inspired to make available more extensive translations of Goethe's copious writings on color, complemented by the type of careful editing, annotation and analysis which I. Bernard Cohen and Alexander Koyré provide for the writings of Newton. Until then one is grateful for Eastlake.--P. S. (shrink)

Although Max Weber does not specifically analyze the topic of esteem, his investigation of the Protestant ethic offers interesting insights into it. The change in mentality it engendered essentially contributed to enhancing the meaning and importance of esteem in modern society. In his analysis, Weber ascertains that esteem was fundamental to being accepted and integrated into the social life of congregations. Nevertheless, he also highlights that esteem was supported by a form of self-esteem which was not simply derived from a (...) good social reputation, but also achieved through a deep and continual self-analysis as well as a strict discipline in the ethical conduct of life. The present analysis reconstructs the different aspects of the relationship between social and self-esteem and analyzes the consequences of that relationship by focusing on the exemplary case of the politician’s personality and ethic. (shrink)

Although Dilthey is increasingly recognized as a seminal philosopher whose thought finds significant expression in the works of Heidegger, Husserl, Jaspers, Mannheim, Weber, Spranger, Simmel, Troeltsch, and Buber, his writings are available in English in only the scantiest of excerpts. Book-size English commentaries on Dilthey can be counted without exhausting the fingers of one hand. The present, slim volume would, therefore, be of interest for no other reason than that it adds a reference to an all-too skimpy library. Fortunately, it (...) is of value for much better reasons. What Tuttle has attempted is the first systematic exposition of Dilthey's life-long attempt to establish an objectively valid basis for his theory of Verstehen and Nacherlebnis.. This may belie the subtitle of the book, but it can hardly be denied that the exposition is at least equal in importance to the critical analysis which follows it. The reconstruction of Dilthey's arguments consists of a description of: his concept of the special nature of human life which permits the subject and object of historical knowledge to be the same; the original descriptive psychology which Dilthey worked out as the basis for the study of history and of all the human sciences; his somewhat equivocal abandonment of psychology because of its ahistorical and law-like character in favor of an emphasis on empirical life assertions which are internalized by the method of Verstehen; his notion of human nature and the tension between its historically changing aspect and its unchanging epistemological aspect; the role of motives in Dilthey's system as causes of historical action; and his theory of ideal types as a methodological device for generalizing without having to utilize the causal explanations of natural science. The book begins and ends on the same note; namely, that Dilthey is unable to verify that the re-experience of the historian is actually a duplicate of the experience of the historical agent. But in between the opening statement and its repetition at the end, a wealth of insight into Dilthey's thought is provided.--H. B. (shrink)

In 1951 John Rawls expressed these convictions about the fundamental issues in metaethics: [T]he objectivity or the subjectivity of moral knowledge turns, not on the question whether ideal value entities exist or whether moral judgments are caused by emotions or whether there is a variety of moral codes the world over, but simply on the question: does there exist a reasonable method for validating and invalidating given or proposed moral rules and those decisions made on the basis of them? (...) For to say of scientific knowledge that it is objective is to say that the propositions expressed therein may be evidenced to be true by a reasonable and reliable method, that is, by the rules and procedures of what we may call "inductive logic"; and, similarly, to establish the objectivity of moral rules, and the decisions based upon them, we must exhibit the decision procedure, which can be shown to be both reasonable and reliable, at least in some cases, for deciding between moral rules and lines of conduct consequent to them.1 In this passage Rawls reconfigured the issue of moral objectivity and so reoriented the practice of metaethics from linguistic analysis to rational methodology. In so doing, his work has provided inspiration to philosophers as disparate in normative views as Thomas Nagel,2 Richard Brandt3, Alan Gewirth4, and David Gauthier.5 Rawls replaced the Moorean question, Do moral terms refer? with the Rawlsian question, Can moral judgments be the outcome of a rational and reliable procedure? He later gave a resoundingly positive answer to this question6 and later still, a more tentative one.7 Rawls' considered qualification of his earlier enthusiasm about the extent to which moral philosophy could be "part of the theory of rational choice"8 is a tribute to the seriousness with which he took his critics' objections. (shrink)

There is a huge number of publications devoted to civil society. Nevertheless this theme is inexhaustible, because the very subject of it is multidimensional and changing along with the evolution of society. Alongside this, one of the key problems of the civil society theory is a problem of its perception in our mind. Answering these questions, the author, at first, stresses the necessity to differ three historical types of civil society: ancient classical polis, civil communities of the Modern (...) History and contemporary civil society. They all are substantially different inter se from the axiological point of view. That is a reason not to use the ideological and methodological curves developed for historically previous types of civil society for the analysis of contemporary one. Secondly, the author focuses attention upon epistemological aspect of the civil society theory, in particular he proposes to rethink the concept of “totality” not in a formal logic way but in the “logic” of living systems in order to be able by means of this concept to express the unity of the diversity of social system. Thirdly, the author treats the concept of “citizen” in informal sense, stresses its existential, personal content and contemplates it through the dialectical relation of “totality-peculiarity-individuality.” Fourthly, the author researches the phenomenon of contemporary civil society as a counterpart of a state in the complex society the main features of which are the diversity and individuality. He comes to the conclusion that the civil society is not a society in common sense, but rather is some kind of “soil structure,” so called “social mycelium” that fertilizes social system with new opportunities. In the final part of the article author gives the example of one of the approaches to estimate the degree of maturation of civil society, proposed by the world-wide international organization “Civicus.” He stresses that the logic of power distribution in contemporary society presupposes cooperation of different actors, and one of the most influential of them is the civil society. (shrink)

A number of social theorists have contended that the essence of historical analysis is the employment of ideal types to comprehend past goings-on. But, while acknowledging that the study of history through ideal types can yield genuine insight, we may still ask if it represents the full emancipation of historical understanding from other modes of conceiving the past. This paper follows Michael Oakeshott's work on the philosophy of history in arguing that explaining the historical past by (...) means of ideal types, even though offering a coherent and fruitful enterprise, nevertheless falls short of fully embodying the characteristics that differentiate historical understanding. -/- This dispute involves fundamental issues regarding the nature of the social sciences. Furthermore, I suggest that it is of more than purely theoretical interest, in that social theorists who have accepted the Weberian view of historical inquiry will tend to be unaware of the defects inherent in all attempts to capture the nature of past events in a net of generalizations, and thus may be lead to ignore the inherent partiality of the understanding of historical happenings provided by ideal typification. (shrink)

We sometimes wonder how health is distributed in our society. We may also want to know about the efficiency of different health programmes. Which public measures promise the greatest overall improvements in health? It can be hard to know how to go about answering questions like these, in large part because the varieties of ill health are heterogeneous, as are their consequences. The solution that health economists have long adopted is to appeal to summary or generic measures of health, (...) such as the QALY, which attempt to put all types of ill health on the same scale. Daniel Hausman works from the assumption that we have reason to want a scalar measure like the QALY. He subjects existing techniques for generating such measures to a thorough critique, ultimately concluding that significant methodological changes are needed. (shrink)