"An important contribution to contemporary jurisprudential debate and to legal thought more generally, Just Interpretations is far ahead of currently available work."--Peter Goodrich, author of Oedipus Lex "I was struck repeatedly by the clarity of expression throughout the book. Rosenfeld's description and criticism of the recent work of leading thinkers distinguishes his work within the legal theory genre. Furthermore, his own theory is quite original and provocative."--Aviam Soifer, author of Law and the Company We Keep.

Successful Ageing A Survey of the Most Important Theories The issues of good and successful ageing are the subject of scientific research. Successful ageing is the attempt to achieve a state of inner satisfaction and happiness in spite of the negative effects associated with old age: loss, external and internal destabilization, etc. Successful development in old age has many forms. It can generally be defined as an attempt to achieve the greatest profit with the smallest loss. The problem is establishing (...) the universal criteria of successful ageing. It is possible to restrict the study to the observation of individual factors which are either objective or subjective, long-term or short-term, specific or universal or static versus dynamic. The problem is creating a theory that will explain all the processes and consequences of old age—none of the theories has so far succeeded in doing this. Life satisfaction as a subjective criterion of successful ageing has been most emphasized in two contradictory theories: activity theory and disengagement theory. Other theories are: growth theories, cognitive theories, dynamic theories, SOC model, cultural anthropological theories, the interaction model of longevity, etc. (shrink)

How do you keep up in the age of information when there's so much to know and so little time? Here's the ideal solution: a practical book of knowledge offering in-depth analysis, detailed interpretation, and penetrating insight into the key concepts, the most influential minds, and the major intellectual movements in history. A World of Ideas is an essential tool for anyone who wants to be fully informed and stay ahead of the curve in today's world. Now you can get (...) to the bottom of the big bang theory; find out where Freud's ideas were coming from, and where Einstein's may ultimately take us; demystify surrealism and survivalism, nature and nurture, communism and capitalism. With hundreds of in-depth entries, drawn from a wide range of fields--including religion, philosophy, psychology, economics, politics, history, art, literature, and science--A World of Ideas enables you to turn immediately to the term in question for a comprehensive description of its history, meaning, and context. - Hundreds of entries, alphabetically arranged, with key words and concepts highlighted and cross-referenced - Reviewed and approved by an academic board of leading scholars - A unique emphasis on multicultural influences and the long-neglected impact of women on the history of ideas - An extensive bibliography of further readings and resources Here are the concepts that shaped civilization . . . the minds that made history . . . the thinkers, the thoughts, and the theories--everything you need to know to fully understand the world we live in. Concise and authoritative, meticulously researched and lucidly written, this invaluable resource is sure to become a standard reference for years to come. (shrink)

This article proposes a way to disambiguate the evaluative states currently identified as “adaptive preferences” in development literature. It provides a brief analysis of Serene Khader's Deliberative Perfectionist Approach, and demonstrates that distinguishing between adaptive states has important implications for the theory and practice of development intervention. Although I support Khader's general approach and consider my project to be complementary, I argue that the term preferences be replaced with four distinct terms: beliefs, choices, desires, and values. Distinguishing among adaptive (...) states can serve to prevent inappropriate intervention and appreciate the costs of transforming inappropriate adaptations. I argue that adaptive values are especially problematic, given how central a person's values are to their sense of meaning and self. Attempts to transform adaptive values are likely to produce internal conflict, resulting in psychological distress and diminished agency. Furthermore, some values preclude deliberation and comparison given their communal status as infinitely valuable. To deliberate about sacred values is to violate them. The emotional and psychological damage that may result from value transformation is thus likely to be extensive, and must be taken into account when determining whether, and what type of, intervention is justified. (shrink)

Care ethicists have long insisted that Kantian moral theory fails to capture the partiality that ought to be present in our personal relationships. In her most recent book, Virginia Held claims that, unlike impartial moral theories, care ethics guides us in how we should act toward friends and family. Because these actions are performed out of care, they have moral value for a care ethicist. The same actions, Held claims, would not have moral worth for a Kantian because of (...) the requirement of impartiality. Although Kantian moral theory is an impartial theory, I argue that the categorical imperative in the Formulation of Humanity as an End and the duty of respect require that we give special treatment to friends and family because of their relationships with us. Therefore, this treatment does have moral value for a Kantian. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:119. THE IMPORT OF HUME'S THEORY OF TIME In this paper I examine the significance of Hume's theory of time for some of the more famous of the doctrines in the Treatise, and how it works as a basis for his peculiar brand of scepticism, a basis that is at least as important in this regard as his principle that all ideas are derived from some (...) original impression. To bring into relief some of the peculiarities of Hume's theory of time we may observe that it was not uncommon in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries to distinguish between space and extension and between time and duration, to say, as does for example Leibniz, that "in some way extension is to space as duration is to time", and perhaps also to agree with him "that duration and extension are attributes of things, but time and space are taken to be something outside of things and serve to measure them. " Duration taken as an attribute of things or substantives connotes the permanence, or perseverance, or continuation of the existence of such substantives. Thus Descartes says, "the duration of each thing is a mode [he subsequently calls it an 'attribute'] under which we consider the thing in so far as it continues to exist" (French version) or "perseveres 2 in existence" (Latin version). Or Spinoza: "Duration is the attribute under which we conceive the existence of created things in so far as they persevere in their own 3 actuality". But though duration refers to things as persevering or continuing in existence, it applies equally, as Descartes indicates, to both changing and unchanging things. In order to comprehend the duration of all things under the same measure we usually compare their duration with the duration of the greatest and most regular motions, which are those which create years and days, and these we call time.4 Spinoza's account of duration and time are much the same. Duration is the primary notion and time presupposes it. Going beyond Hume to Kant we find that in distinguishing 120. three modes of time, namely duration, succession and coexistence, Kant argues that succession presupposes duration and that all time determinations of change (or succession) presuppose substance as that which is permanent or continuant through change. In Hume, however, we find no distinction between space and extension, nor between time and duration. These are merely two pairs of synonyms. In the case of space Hume seems to prefer on the whole to talk about extension, probably because extension lends itself more easily to discussion of divisibility. In the case of time, however, which he, defines as succession, he is indeed aware of the view which we have just been considering, according to which duration is referred primarily to an object qua con-. tinuing or persevering or enduring, whether or not undergoing successive changes. This concept of duration, he says, I take to be the common opinion of philosophers as well as of the vulgar. (T37) Duration in this common philosophical and vulgar sense is not a synonym of Humean time or succession, and it is for Hume, a "fiction", something falsely attributed to objects. Why is this so? 'Tis evident, that time or duration [Hume is here taking the two terms as synonyms] consists of different parts... 'Tis also evident, that these parts are not co-existent: For that quality of the co-existence of parts belongs to extension, and is what distinguishes it from duration. Now as time is compos 'd of parts, that are not co-existent; an unchangeable object, since it produces none but co-existent impressions, produces none that can give us the idea of time; and consequently that idea must be deriv'd from a succession of changeable objects, and time in its first appearance can never be sever 'd from such a succession (T35,36) Although Hume maintains that there is no idea which is not derived from some original impression, it would appear that this is not strictly so with the idea of time [or, for that matter with the idea of space]. Rather time is the manner or way in which impressions appear to the mind, namely... (shrink)

Kendall Walton’s pretense theory, like its rivals, says that what’s true in a fiction F depends in part on the importation of background propositions into F. The aim of this paper is to present, explain, and defend a brief yet straightforward argument–one which exploits the specific mechanism by which the pretense theory says propositions are imported into fictions–for the falsity of the pretense theory.

(2009). The Importance of Number in Husserl's Early Theory of Time-Constitution. Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology: Vol. 40, Husserl's Lectures on Internal Time-Conciousness, pp. 188-206.

Recent accounts of coercion can be mapped onto two different axes: whether they focus on the situation of the coercee or the activities of the coercer; and whether or not they depend upon moral judgments in their analysis of coercion. Using this analysis, I suggest that almost no recent theories have seriously explored a non-moralized, coercer-focused approach to coercion. I offer some reasons to think that a theory in this underexplored quadrant offers some important advantages over theories confined to (...) the other quadrants. In particular I suggest that much of our interest in coercion depends on facts about the coercer, such as the sorts of powers coercers must possess to be able to coerce, and on the coercer's intention in using those powers to constrain or alter the coercee's activities. (shrink)

Recently Feferman has outlined a program for the development of a foundation for naive category theory. While Ernst has shown that the resulting axiomatic system is still inconsistent, the purpose of this note is to show that nevertheless some foundation has to be developed before naive category theory can replace axiomatic set theory as a foundational theory for mathematics. It is argued that in naive category theory currently a ‘cookbook recipe’ is used for constructing categories, (...) and it is explicitly shown with a formalized argument that this “foundationless” naive category theory therefore contains a paradox similar to the Russell paradox of naive set theory. (shrink)

The importance of economic freedom for economic development can no longer be denied. What is often denied, however, is respect for individuals’ rights and personal choices. The role of individual choice is often dismissed or set aside by the development community. In this essay, I argue that inherent to economic freedom’s economic success is the promotion and acceptance of individual choice. Development theory should include recognition of and respect for personal choices, a theory I call “Catfish Man of (...) the Woods” theory of development. (shrink)

The view that persons are entitled to respect because of their moral agency is commonplace in contemporary moral theory. What exactly this respect entails, however, is far less uncontroversial. In this book, Van der Rijt argues powerfully that this respect for persons’ moral agency must also encompass respect for their subjective moral judgments – even when these judgments can be shown to be fundamentally flawed. Van der Rijt scrutinises the role persons’ subjective moral judgments play within the context of (...) coercion and domination. His fresh, original analysis of Kant’s third formulation of the Categorical Imperative reveals how these judgments are intimately connected to a person’s dignity. The result is an insightful new account of coercion, a novel Kantian reformulation of the republican notion of non-domination and a compelling, innovative argument in favour of retributive justice. "In this admirably clear and insightful work, Van der Rijt develops an original account of coercion and dignity. On the basis of his analysis of the relation between these two concepts, he also provides an intriguing new angle on the nature of republicanism. I recommend this book to anyone interested in freedom and power and their roles in normative political theory." Ian Carter - University of Pavia "In this carefully argued and original study Jan-Willem van der Rijt offers an analysis of coercion, a broadly Kantian argument that coercion is an affront to dignity, and an illuminating contrast with Philip Pettit's republicanism. A most welcome contribution." Thomas E. Hill, Jr. - University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill "Jan-Willem van der Rijt has written a well argued, original book that will prove to be extremely helpful for the philosophical inquiry of the relationship between coercion and human dignity as well as for the assessment of republicanism and its consequences." Ralf Stoecker - University of Potsdam. (shrink)

This paper focus on the phenomenological theories of perception and intuitive acts in general, and aims to show the relevance of William James’ concept of fringe to understand them. Although Husserl claims that James’ analysis were carried on without the phenomenological reduction and were thus biased by psychological and physiological prejudices, the paper stresses the high value of those analysis: James’ intended to remain faithful to the meaning of lived experience and avoided any considerations where descriptions could be entangled with (...) uncriticized philosophical theories (e.g. about the nature of brain states). The paper also aims to show that James’ importance for Husserl could be extended beyond the explanation of acts intending singular individuals to the acts intending universal objectivities and essences. (shrink)

This is a discussion of different ways of working out the idea that the semantic paradoxes show that natural languages are somehow “inconsistent”. I take the workable form of the idea to be that there are expressions such that a necessary condition of understanding them is that one be inclined to accept inconsistent claims (an conception also suggested by Matti Eklund). I then distinguish “simple” from “complex” forms of such views. On a simple theory, such expressions are meaningless, while (...) on a complex theory they are not. I argue that complex theories are incompatible with truth conditional semantics and that simple theories are only coherent when the inconsistent claims are metalingusitic attributions of meaning. I close with a discussion of the version of the simple metalinguistic theory I have defended in “Understanding the Liar” and other papers. (shrink)

Examining homology in biological and cultural evolution is of great importance in investigations of humanity. The proposal presented in the target article retains substantial methodological weaknesses in the identification and use of “cultural traits.” However, with refined toolkits and the incorporation of recent advances in evolutionary theory, this overall endeavor can result in substantial payoffs for biological and social scientists.

The article investigates the possibility of formation of creative competencies of students within the framework of scientific personnel training. It is noted that the available training courses within the framework of general training of scientific personnel allow to prepare a specialist who is able to use existing knowledge, but such a specialist is not trained in creativity. For the formation of creative competences it is necessary to take a training course of the general theory of systems, the purpose of (...) which is to create a universal methodology of reliable representation of models of objects, based on the similarity (isomorphism) of the forms and laws of the universe. A detailed argumentation of the connection between creativity and holistic representation of being, the empirical manifestation of which is isomorphism, is given. The mechanism of knowledge translation within the framework of the mechanism of multisystem integration of human being, the mechanism of knowledge borrowing by human being from sensually comprehended forms of reality is investigated. It is stated that in order to meet the set tasks of cognition, a version of the general theory of systems, extended by the metaphysical component, is required. Further, starting from the metaphysical description of the foundations of the phenomenon of isomorphism observed in the practice of cognition, it is possible to form complete collections of patterns – typical forms, templates of objects and their relations. At present, the work on such a version of the general theory of systems is being finalized. The article concludes with a discussion of the problematics of teaching general systems theory. It emphasizes two components: the issue of positioning the training course "General Theory of Systems" in relation to other courses, as well as taking into account the specifics of the subject area of students in different specialties (directions). (shrink)

Using Rational Choice Theory to account for moral agency has always had some uncomfortable aspect to it. Economists’ attempts to include the moral dimension of behaviour either as a preference for moral behaviour or as an external constraint on self-interested choice, have been criticized for relying on tautologies or lacking a realistic picture of motivation. Homo Oeconomicus, even when conceptually enriched by all kinds of motivations, is ultimately still characterized as caring only for what lies in his interest. Amartya (...) Sen has drawn the economists’ attention to a specific blind spot in rational choice theory (henceforth RCT), i.e. the idea of commitment. By starting from the premise that the human capacity to commit is a necessary precondition for moral behaviour, our aim in this paper is twofold: first, we argue that taking the idea of commitment seriously in economics requires an enriched concept of rationality. Second, we reject a Kantian interpretation of Sen’s concept of commitment and argue that Harry Frankfurt’s views about caring can be used to develop the concept of commitment in a direction that is compatible with Rational Choice Theory. (shrink)

Some propositions are more epistemically important than others. Further, how important a proposition is is often a contingent matter—some propositions count more in some worlds than in others. Epistemic Utility Theory cannot accommodate this fact, at least not in any standard way. For EUT to be successful, legitimate measures of epistemic utility must be proper, i.e., every probability function must assign itself maximum expected utility. Once we vary the importance of propositions across worlds, however, normal measures of epistemic utility (...) become improper. I argue there isn’t any good way out for EUT. (shrink)

Belief is a species of mere conception, and is modifiable, rather than bivalent (believing or disbelieving). The attendant-impression theory of transformation of conception into belief expresses the moral dimension of one and the same thing, of which the manner-of-conception (without attendant impression) theory of the transformation refers to the epistemic dimension of that same thing. These two aspects of the transformation of conception into belief point to an ambiguity in Hume's use of the term IDEA: as act and (...) as content. The act of conception, its content, and the pedigree of that content are all mutually indeterminate. The imagination conceives, constructs contents, and transforms conception into belief. The foundation of the role of mere conception in belief is the mind's "native situation of indifference", which makes it possible for Hume to account not only for warranted but also unwarranted belief. Hume is interested not only in what should actuate the soul but what does so in fact. Hume's real innovation lies in a theory of belief unburdened by traditional representation and in the effects rather than the external foundations of certitude. (shrink)

Proof Theory of Modal Logic is devoted to a thorough study of proof systems for modal logics, that is, logics of necessity, possibility, knowledge, belief, time, computations etc. It contains many new technical results and presentations of novel proof procedures. The volume is of immense importance for the interdisciplinary fields of logic, knowledge representation, and automated deduction.

Has art theory any function and any importance? A function and importance for who? For the practising artist, theorists, writers on art? Art speak and its place in art theory, art criticism and artists’ statement. - Many tools to create an intersubjective and universal frame of reference to make sense of any art exist., for example art history, labels such as expressionism, impressionism, modern art, contemporary art, Fine art, Visual Arts, Northern Baroque Art, minimalist, post-minimalist, anti-art, anti-anti-art, New (...) Aesthetics, new media, slow art movement, etc and ‘art speak”. (shrink)

This paper argues that we should replace the common classification of theories of welfare into the categories of hedonism, desire theories, and objective list theories. The tripartite classification is objectionable because it is unduly narrow and it is confusing: it excludes theories of welfare that are worthy of discussion, and it obscures important distinctions. In its place, the paper proposes two independent classifications corresponding to a distinction emphasised by Roger Crisp: a four-category classification of enumerative theories (about which items constitute (...) welfare), and a four-category classification of explanatory theories (about why these items constitute welfare). (shrink)

Plato in his discussion of the Divided Line introduces a distinction between knowledge of the Forms in and by themselves () and . The first distinguishing characteristic of is that it ‘is compelled to employ assumptions, while knowledge of the Forms tries to advance to a certain first principle’ . The second distinguishing characteristic of is that it employs the ordinary objects of sense-perception as images . The geometer, in order to find out about ‘the Square’ and ‘the Diagonal’, draws (...) diagrams and makes models. (shrink)

This paper argues that human rights-based approaches to human security overlook the importance of caring values, relations of care, and care work in the achievement and long-term maintenance of human security. It outlines an alternative approach to the ethics of human security which combines a feminist ontological and normative position on the centrality of caring values and practices in sustaining life with a feminist account of the gendered political economy of contemporary globalisation. Moreover, it argues that a critical, feminist ethics (...) of care can provide a comprehensive ontological and normative framework for integrating economic exclusion with violence, and thus for understanding and conceptualising human security in a way that is sensitive to the role played by gender identities and other types of power relations. This, I argue, can be achieved through an interrogation of the relationship between neoliberal globalisation and hegemonic forms masculinity in the context of contemporary global governance. (shrink)

The proof theory of many-valued systems has not been investigated to an extent comparable to the work done on axiomatizatbility of many-valued logics. Proof theory requires appropriate formalisms, such as sequent calculus, natural deduction, and tableaux for classical (and intuitionistic) logic. One particular method for systematically obtaining calculi for all finite-valued logics was invented independently by several researchers, with slight variations in design and presentation. The main aim of this report is to develop the proof theory of (...) finite-valued first order logics in a general way, and to present some of the more important results in this area. In Systems covered are the resolution calculus, sequent calculus, tableaux, and natural deduction. This report is actually a template, from which all results can be specialized to particular logics. (shrink)

It has been and still is commonly believed by geologists and historians of geology alike that geological theory is an extrapolation from the empirical knowledge of the geology of a region. Abraham Gottlob Werner (1749-1817), whose theory concerning the origin of basalt and the minor role of volcanoes and the major role of water in the history of the earth's crust was eventually proven wrong in some respects, is usually cited as the prime example of a geologist who (...) had not ventured beyond the confines of his native region, Saxony, and had developed a universal geological theory based almost entirely on his observations of that region. In this essay I show that the geology of Saxony played a relatively unimportant role in the development of Werner's universal geological theory; that he became a neptunist before he had closely examined the geology of Saxony; and that his explanation of the history of the earth's crust was as reasonable, if not more reasonable, than the explanations brought forth by those of his contemporaries who opposed his views. (shrink)

There is an underappreciated disconnect between the ultimate values that lie at the heart of contemporary theories of distributive justice, and the practice of state institutions. State institutions deliver “intermediate goods” – goods such as health-care, education, housing, transportation, and the like – that are instrumental to a society being distributively just, but that do not in an of themselves constitute criteria of justice. Researchers who have emphasized the “social determinants of health” provide an insight that, when generalized, point us (...) in a direction that theorists of distributive justice should follow, that of attending not just to the instrinsic value of intermediate goods, but also to their causal contributions to realizing the values that theories of distributive justice make central. “Platforms”, which represent principle-driven attempts at designing compossible policies that attend both to the causal and to the intrinsic value of intermediate goods, should be given more importance within theories of distributive justice if such theories are to be policy-relevant, for they connect the ultimate values of these theories to the practices of state institutions. (shrink)

A fundamental tenet of Paul Feyerabend’s pluralistic view of science has it that theory proliferation, that is, the availability of theoretical alternatives, is of crucial importance for the detection of anomalies in established theories. Paul Hoyningen-Huene calls this the Anomaly Importation Thesis, according to which anomalies are imported, as it were, into well-established theories from competing alternatives. This article pursues two major objectives: (a) to work out the systematic details of Feyerabend’s ideas on theory proliferation and anomaly (...) class='Hi'>import as they are presented in his early publications and his Against Method and (b) to compare Feyerabend’s ideas on theory proliferation and anomaly import with corresponding features in Popper’s critical rationalist philosophy of science. As it turns out, neither the Principle of Proliferation nor the Anomaly Importation Thesis are necessarily incompatible with critical rationalism. In spite of Feyerabend’s general anti-Popperian attitude, I argue that theoretical pluralism can be seen as an advancement of the critical rationalist philosophy and that critical rationalism provides good arguments for pluralism. (shrink)

Claims regarding negative strong reciprocity do indeed rest on experiments lacking established external validity, often without even a small Guala's review should prompt strong reciprocity proponents to extend the real-world validity of their work, exploring the preferences participants bring to experiments. That said, Guala's approach fails to differentiate among group selection approaches and glosses over cross-cultural variability.

The goal of this article is to show that formal analysis and reconstructions may be useful to discuss and shed light on substantive meta-theoretical issues. We proceed here by exemplification, analysing and reconstructing as a case study a paradigmatic biochemical theory, the Monod-Wyman-Changeux theory of allosterism, and applying the reconstruction to the discussion of some issues raised by prominent representatives of the new mechanist philosophy. We conclude that our study shows that at least in this case mechanicism and (...) more traditional accounts are not rivals but complementary approaches. (shrink)

The first part of this article shows that oureffective means to know and modify directly thehuman genetic make-up generates singular anddifficult situations for the application offundamental medical categories. Specifically,we demonstrate that in dealing with thesesituations, some predominant views on health,such as descriptivism or that which reduces thestate of health to not having presentdisabilities, cannot provide adequate answerseither from the point of view of medicalscience or in terms of our ordinary intuitions.The second part of the article examines thereasons for the failure (...) of these views totackle the mentioned situations, proposessolutions to urgent problems and, finally,offers some foundations for an alternativetheoretical development, id est, for atheory of health able to satisfactorilyintegrate our genetic dimension. (shrink)

Focusing on the Groundwork and the Critique of Practical Reason, historical and contemporary critics of Kant's rationalist ethical theory accuse him of holding an impoverished moral psychology and an inadequate account of character and virtue. Kant's sharp contrast between duty and inclination and his claim that only action from duty possesses moral worth appear to imply that pro-moral inclination is unnecessary for, if perhaps compatible with, a good will. On traditional accounts of virtue, however, having a good will and (...) possessing virtue require pro-moral emotions and inclinations. Thus, Kant's moral psychology seems at odds with the common view that emotions and appetites are constituent elements within virtue. Kant's defenders have argued that an adequate assessment of these charges must address his theory of virtue, as it is set out in The Doctrine of Virtue, Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone, and the Lectures on Ethics. Yet the prospect for reconstructing a plausible Kantian account of virtue from these tests may appear bleak when we see that Kant conceives of virtue as moral strength of will over recalcitrant inclinations, and characterizes virtue in terms of the autocracy of pure practical reason. For autocracy may seem to require the extirpation or suppression of feelings and inclinations. Indeed, it might seem difficult to distinguish the autocratic agent from the agent who, in Aristotle's terms, is merely continent, or who, in Schiller's terms, possesses dignity, but not grace. But these objections misunderstand autocracy. In the thesis, I argue that the self-mastery constitutive of Kantian virtue involves the cultivation of sensibility according to reason and that emotions and appetites modified and regulated by a proper conception of the moral law play a constructive role within Kantian virtue. (shrink)

In this commentary, I offer an account of an error theory of biotechnology and apply it to Brian D. Earp, Olga A. Wudarczyk,Anders Sandberg, and Julian Savulescu’s (2013)ethical framework for chemical reakups.

This essay argues for the importance of developing theories of nonexistent objects. The grounds are utility and smoothness of logical theory. In the latter case a parallel with the theory of negative and imaginary numbers is exploited. The essay concludes with a counterexample to a general argument against the enterprise of developing theories of nonexistent objects, and outlining the foremost problem an adequate theory of nonexistent objects must solve.