This paper presents the story of an isiXhosa traditional healer, Nomzi Hlathi, as told to the first author. Nomzi was asked about how she came to be an igqirha and the narrative focuses on those aspects of her life story that she understood as relevant to that developmental process. The material was obtained from a series of semi-structured interviews with Nomzi, with some collateral from her cousin, and synthesised into a chronological narrative presented in Nomzi’s own words. The aim of (...) the study was to examine her account of her unfolding experience within three hermeneutic frames. The first is the isiXhosa traditional account of what it is to become an igqirha, a process initiated by intwaso, an illness understood to be a call from the ancestors, and guided by messages from the ancestors in dreams and other symbolic communications. The second is the perspective of Western Clinical Psychology on the cognitive, emotional and behavioural disturbances that characterise intwaso. The third is the perspective of transpersonal psychology on the nature and development of shamanic healing gifts, as understood from observations of such practices in traditional societies across the world. As the narrative of Nomzi’s story is quite long, this paper presents her narrative as well as the methodology which gave rise to it. The interpretative review of the material from each of the three perspectives is presented in a second paper. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Yoga for Women? The Yoga Body as ‘Capital’ Yoga as a Beauty Practice Conclusion: Yoga for Everybody.

This article explores the Foucauldian notions of practices of the self and care of the self, read via Deleuze, in the context of Iyengar yoga (one of the most popular forms of yoga currently). Using ethnographic and interview research data the article outlines the Iyengar yoga techniques which enable a focus upon the self to be developed, and the resources offered by the practice for the creation of ways of knowing, experiencing and forming the self. In (...) particular, the article asks whether Iyengar yoga offers possibilities for freedom and liberation, or whether it is just another practice of control and management. Assessing Iyengar yoga via a ‘critical function’, a function of ‘struggle’ and a ‘curative and therapeutic function’, the article analyses whether the practice might constitute a mode of care of the self, and what it might offer in the context of the contemporary need to live better, as well as longer. (shrink)

For serious yoga practitioners curious to know the ancient origins of the art, Stephen Phillips, a professional philosopher and sanskritist with a long-standing personal practice, lays out the philosophies of action, knowledge, and devotion as well as the processes of meditation, reasoning, and self-analysis that formed the basis of yoga in ancient and classical India and continue to shape it today. In discussing yoga's fundamental commitments, Phillips explores traditional teachings of hatha yoga, karma yoga, (...) _bhakti_ yoga, and tantra, and shows how such core concepts as self-monitoring consciousness, karma, nonharmfulness, reincarnation, and the powers of consciousness relate to modern practice. He outlines values implicit in _bhakti_ yoga and the tantric yoga of beauty and art and explains the occult psychologies of _koshas_, _skandhas_, and _chakras_. His book incorporates original translations from the early Upanishads, the _Bhagavad Gita_, the _Yoga Sutra_, the _Hatha Yoga Pradipika_, and seminal tantric writings of the tenth-century Kashmiri Shaivite, Abhinava Gupta. A glossary defining more than three hundred technical terms and an extensive bibliography offer further help to nonscholars. A remarkable exploration of yoga's conceptual legacy, _Yoga, Karma, and Rebirth_ crystallizes ideas about self and reality that unite the many incarnations of yoga. (shrink)

Ethical becoming represents a novel framework for teaching engineering ethics. This framework insists on the complementarity of pragmatism, care, and virtue. The dispositional nature of the self is a central concern, as are relational considerations. However, unlike previous conceptual work, this paper introduces additional lenses for exploring ethical relationality by focusing on indebtedness, harmony, potency, and reflective thought. This paper first reviews relevant contributions in the engineering ethics literature. Then, the relational process ontology of Alfred North Whitehead is described and (...) identified as the foundation of the ethical becoming concept. Following this, ethical becoming is imagined as comprising five components: relationality and indebtedness, harmony and potency (i.e., beauty), care, freedom and reflective thought, and ethical inquiry. Each component will be unpacked and knit together to argue that (1) becoming in all its forms is relational and, therefore, whatever becomes is indebted to all to which it relates; (2) one’s ethical engagement must be directed toward the creation of harmony and potency; (3) care practices are necessary to ensure that multiplicity is valued and safeguarded in the meeting of needs; (4) the capacity for reflective thought is necessary to fashion one’s self and others in the direction of harmony, potency, and care; and (5) ethical thought and action must operate through a cycle of ethical inquiry. This paper will close with a brief exploration of how ethical becoming could be utilized in engineering education contexts. (shrink)

Start your day with these peaceful, empowering words of wisdom. All of these words are interwoven with meditative, inspiring images of celebration. Each page is designed to increase positive thinking and improve your mental health. Life-changing mindful meditations. Strengthen your mindset with these empowering words of wisdom that are referenced as essential advice for how to grow spirituality and mentally strong. Meditation practices are essential to building mindfulness. Go Slowly, Breathe and Smile is a unique convergence of wisdom and art, (...) a beautiful tribute from a dedicated student to her teacher. Absorb Thich Nhat Hanh's words of wisdom and meditate on Rashani Réa's inspirational collages, and allow these pages to illuminate your heart and mind, inspire mindfulness, and reduce stress levels. (shrink)

Introduction: What is criticism? (a preliminary dialogue) -- The critic as artist and vice versa -- The eye of the beholder -- Self-criticism (a further dialogue) -- Lost in the museum -- The trouble with critics -- Practical criticism (another dialogue) -- How to be wrong -- The critical condition -- The end of criticism (a final dialogue) -- Afterword.

"Interplanetary travel is very tempting and exciting because the sky is filled with unlimited globes of varying qualities. the desire to travel to other planets can be fulfilled by the process of yoga, which serves as a means by which one can transfer oneself to whatever planet one likes - possibly to planets where life is not only eternal and blissful but where there are multiple varieties of enjoyable energies. Anyone who can attain the freedom of the spiritual planets (...) need never return to this miserable land of birth, old age, disease and death." --Back cover. (shrink)

"Aptavani 2" is the second in a series of spiritual books titled "Aptavani". In this series, Gnani Purush (embodiment of Self knowledge) Dada Bhagwan addresses age-old unanswered questions of spiritual seekers. Dadashri offers in-depth answers to questions such as: "What is religion?", "What are the benefits of the different types of religion?", "How do I understand spirituality vs. religion?", "What is spirituality?", "What are the different types of yoga, and how are they relevant to spirituality and practice?", "How (...) can I experience a spiritual awakening, and attain spiritual enlightenment?", "How can I lead a spiritual life?"Dadashri also provides spiritual clarification on the topics of: "What is the meaning of ignorance?", "Who am I?", "How can I experience my own pure Soul?", and "What is moksha, or liberation?"Ultimately, Dadashri describes that knowledge of Self is the primary goal of all seeking, and the beginning of true spirituality. Having attained Self knowledge, spiritual development begins, after which one may attain ultimate liberation, or moksha. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Journal of Aesthetic Education 37.2 (2003) 1-18 [Access article in PDF] Aesthetic Inquiry in Education:Community,Transcendence, and the Meaning of Pedagogy Hanan A. Alexander What does it mean to understand education as an art, to conceive inquiry in education aesthetically, or to assess pedagogy artistically? Answers to these queries are often grounded in Deweyan instrumentalism, neo-Marxist critical theory, or postmodern skepticism that tend to fall prey to the paradoxes (...) of radical relativism and extreme subjectivism. 1 This essay offers an alternative, communitarian account of education as an art and a neo-Kantian approach to aesthetic inquiry in education that avoids these difficulties.I begin by examining the emergence of aesthetic inquiry in education in the context of the larger qualitative revolution in educational research. The struggle to justify the qualitative turn in educational thought was initially framed in terms of two influential doctrines: that cognition and affect on the one hand, and truth, beauty, and goodness on the other, can be clearly distinguished from one another. Qualitative methods were conceived as an alternative research paradigm — a new epistemology — in keeping with Thomas Kuhn's influential book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. 2 Qualitative research, on this account, is a cognitive endeavor aimed at discovering a form of knowledge no less valid and reliable than that produced by quantitative methodologies. This way of framing the discussion led to the dichotomizing of positivist and postpositivist epistemologies, one embracing absolutism, objectivism, and rationalism, the other relativism, subjectivism, and romanticism. 3 This approach succeeded in pointing to some serious flaws in the prevailing positivist account of social research, yet it left qualitative inquiry dependent on versions of epistemological relativism and subjectivism that philosophers of knowledge have shown to be self-contradictory and incoherent. 4 [End Page 1]Conceiving of pedagogy in aesthetic terms challenges the prevailing positivist epistemology on a deeper level because it questions the accepted distinctions between thinking and feeling, and between truth, beauty, and goodness. If art can be conceived as a form of cognitive inquiry in addition to affective expression, then the appreciation and assessment of education as art requires not merely a new research paradigm or an alternative epistemology. Rather, it entails a reshuffling of our very conception of the relations between science, art, and ethics.These concepts can be reconceived to avoid the paradoxes of radical relativism and extreme subjectivism if we recognize with Iris Murdoch that sovereignty belongs to communal conceptions of a transcendent good. Educational arts empower people to express, appreciate, and critique collective conceptions of goodness, and artistic criticism of pedagogy celebrates a sacred dimension in educational thought and practice. 5 This approach occasions a fresh look not only at the practice, appreciation, and assessment of pedagogy, but also at the very meaning of the concept of education and the sorts of inquiry that can fruitfully inform its practice. Two Dogmas of Educational Research Two dogmas have dominated educational research for most of this century: the idea that there exists a clear disjunction between the cognitive and affective domains; and the supposed radical independence from one another of truth, beauty, and goodness. 6 According to a popular view rooted in these doctrines, the search for truth is a cognitive affair governed by science, while ethics and the arts are tied to the emotions and the humanities. Inquiry into the former is objective — reliability depends on method not researcher — and into the latter, subjective — results can vary according to interpreter. In this attitude, the cognitive domain dominates the public arena through the influence and prestige of science and measurement. 7Until the middle 1970s, behavioral and social research in education expressed these dichotomies in the distinction made between quantitative and qualitative research. The former was thought to be scientific and objective, the latter, humanistic and subjective. As qualitative inquiry came into its own in the 1980s, its proponents sought justification and legitimization in accord with cognitive dominance. 8 First, they argued that qualitative research methods had checks against error as rigorous as its quantitative counterparts. 9 Later, the cognitive domain... (shrink)

As society progresses with newer technology choices and greater materialistic welfare, we also witness more incidences of aggression and violence among the youth and adolescents. This is partly due to the mental stress that they undergo. There has been a renewed interest to understand the causes of aggression and violence. More importantly, there is an interest to identify methods to manage these. This article is an attempt to showcase the usefulness of yoga in addressing this aspect. The present study (...) was conducted to find out the effect of 4 weeks’ yoga practice on 158 normal healthy adolescents’ attitude towards violence in comparison to practice of physical exercises. The study showed that both yoga and PE groups demonstrated significant reduction in their positive ATV strategies and increased positive use of non-violent strategies. Boys in the yoga group showed significant improvement, whereas the control group showed non-significant improvement. Girls in the yoga also displayed significant progress over the control group. Thus, the study points to the usefulness of introducing yoga to the adolescents in their formative years through a structured curriculum. This is likely to provide numerous benefits both for the individual and the society at large. (shrink)

This collection of original essays on Yoga in honour of Professor Gerald James Larson provides fascinating new insights into the yoga traditions of India as a ...

There are different narratives on mathematics as part of our world, some of which are more appropriate than others. Such narratives might be of the form ‘Mathematics is useful’, ‘Mathematics is beautiful’, or ‘Mathematicians aim at theorem-credit’. These narratives play a crucial role in mathematics education and in society as they are influencing people’s willingness to engage with the subject or the way they interpret mathematical results in relation to real-world questions; the latter yielding important normative considerations. Our strategy is (...) to frame current narratives of mathematics from a virtue-theoretic perspective. We identify the practice of mathematizing, put forward by Freudenthal’s ‘Realistic mathematics education’, as virtuous and use it to evaluate different narratives. We show that this can help to render the narratives more adequately, and to provide implications for societal organization. (shrink)

Using theoretical analysis of self-consciousness concept and experimental evidence on the brain default mode network (DMN) that constitutes the neural signature of self-referential processes, we hypothesized that the anterior and posterior subnets comprising the DMN should show differences in their integrity as a function of meditation training. Functional connectivity within DMN and its subnets (measured by operational synchrony) has been measured in ten novice meditators using an electroencephalogram (EEG) recording in a pre-/post-meditation intervention design. We have found that while the (...) whole DMN was clearly suppressed, different subnets of DMN responded differently after 4 months of meditation training: The strength of EEG operational synchrony in the right and left posterior modules of the DMN decreased in resting post-meditation condition compared to a pre-meditation condition, whereas the frontal DMN module on the contrary exhibited an increase in the strength of EEG operational synchrony. These findings combined with published data on functional–anatomic heterogeneity within the DMN and on trait subjective experiences commonly found following meditation allow us to propose that the first-person perspective and the sense of agency (the witnessing observer) are presented by the frontal DMN module, while the posterior modules of the DMN are generally responsible for the experience of the continuity of ‘I’ as embodied and localized within bodily space. Significance of these findings is discussed. (shrink)

Yoga is believed to have beneficial effects on cognition, attenuation of emotional intensity and stress reduction. Previous studies were mainly performed on eastern experienced practitioners or unhealthy subjects undergoing concomitant conventional therapies. Further investigation is needed on the effects of yoga per se, as well as its possible preventive benefits on healthy subjects. We investigated the effects of yoga on memory and psychophysiological parameters related to stress, comparing yoga practice and conventional physical exercises in healthy (...) men . Memory tests, salivary cortisol levels and stress, anxiety, and depression inventories were assessed before and after 6 months of practice. Yoga practitioners showed improvement of the memory performance, as well as improvements in psychophysiological parameters. The present results suggest that regular yoga practice can improve aspects of cognition and quality of life for healthy individuals. An indirect influence of emotional state on cognitive improvement promoted by yoga practice can be proposed. (shrink)

Like yoga before it, the Buddhist mindfulness practice is sweeping across North America. As only one example, Time magazine, discussing the Center for Disease Control's recent report on mindfulness in the workplace, led its story with the claim that "the American workforce is becoming more mindful."1 A growing number of Americans are now just as likely, it seems, to meditate as they are to pray, and the Four Noble Truths have, for some, surpassed the Ten Commandments as the (...) foundation for a life of meaning and purpose.The above picture is, no doubt, a caricatured portrait. But it captures, we believe, an evolving trend that needs further attention. In this paper, we seek to explore some of these changes in North... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Resisting Structural Evil: Love as Ecological-Economic Vocation by Cynthia Moe-LobedaKiara A. JorgensonReview of Resisting Structural Evil: Love as Ecological-Economic Vocation CYNTHIA MOE-LOBEDA Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2013. 309 pp. $22.00The factors that have contributed to today’s perilous global economy and ecology originate in structures that predate recent implosions of international banks or measurements of rising climates. These structures—systemic and social while also personal—are the focus of Moe-Lobeda’s work, Resisting (...) Structural Evil: Love as Ecological-Economic Vocation. Convinced that sin and violence is “uncreating” the beauty of God’s interdependent community and can only be countered and alleviated by a moral vision structured around “justice-seeking love,” Moe-Lobeda provides a compelling theological critique and reconstruction of the Christian concept of love by way of a fresh retrieval of the classical Christian doctrine of vocation.The book’s argument consists of a tapestry of sobering statistics, theological analysis, and narrative prose. Early on Moe-Lobeda takes great care to explain how the moral crises of today relate to the embedded social structures of yesterday. Here her attention to the globalization of economies and subsequent ecological injustice is particularly helpful since few contemporary texts make explicit this critical connection. In a chapter titled “Countering Moral Oblivion” she also devotes attention to why seemingly good people, particularly good Christians, passively and ignorantly participate in systems of oppressive power. This portion of her book, coupled with her discussion of how Christian theology can be a resource of hope, is empowering and particularly attentive to the role of biblical theology in the ecological conversation. Unlike many other theoretical books on the topic, Moe-Lobeda’s book can be appropriated as a tool for lifestyle appraisal useful to the academician, pastor, and lay reader alike. Indeed, Moe-Lobeda can evoke discomfort with her compelling vision and challenging call for a change in our current practices.Pivoting her argument on the promise of hope, the second half of Resisting Structural Evil discusses what can and must be realized. And it is here that Moe-Lobeda’s voice makes a contribution not only to Christian ecological ethics but also to Christian social ethics at large. Vocation, she argues, encompasses more than what traditional renderings of vocare have sought to connote. The human call to life is a call to love in compassion and justice both the neighbor [End Page 208] and the self, and must be made manifest in the public sphere. What is more, one must fulfill one’s vocation not only for the sake of the human other but also for the benefit of the oikos (household) present within all economic and ecological communities. To this end, Moe-Lobeda’s attention to love as vocation uniquely characterizes her approach to ecological ethics, thereby transcending traditional deontolological or teleological classifications. Unique within Protestant work on ecological ethics, Resisting Structural Evil provides a fresh depiction of character ethics wherein the pursuit of moral aptitude is fundamentally rooted in biotic community.This very strength may also foster some critique since Moe-Lobeda’s schema is so thoroughly corporate in scope that it affords little time and attention to what some virtue and character ethicists would call the inward journey. Yet Moe-Lobeda, aligned with the liberal and feminist traditions from which she hails, views love and power as inseparable. “What is needed,” she argues, “is a realization that power without love is reckless and abusive and that love without power is sentimental and anemic” (169). Hence, on a very fundamental level Resisting Structural Evil is a book arguing for a radically new paradigm, one where the enormity of today’s crises is met with an equally comprehensive dose of transformative loving power.Kiara A. JorgensonLuther SeminaryCopyright © 2015 Society of Christian Ethics... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy and Literature 25.2 (2001) 353-356 [Access article in PDF] Book Review The Metaphysical Club The Metaphysical Club, by Louis Menand; xii & 546 pp. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2001, $27.00. "They didn't just want to keep the conversation going; they wanted to get to a better place" (p. 440). So much for the most prominent contemporary pragmatist, Richard Rorty, who remains unmentioned except in the acknowledgments. (...) That better place is participatory democracy (a phrase that does not appear in the book), which "means that everyone is equally in the game, but it also means that no one can opt out" (p. 441). The true name of the game is skeptical tolerance. There are no unquestionable duties or inalienable rights, no immutable natural laws, no absolute moral rules, no highest principles, no inherent virtues, no absolute standards, no stasis, no absolutely certain truth. There are no individual destinies, because the social comes before the individual, and the individual is embedded within and cannot exist without society. Scientific knowledge is always probabilistic, not necessarily because nature is indeterministic, but because we can never know enough to calculate its regularities if they exist. To wit, there are no Platonic Ideas or unchanging universals. All is change, nothing that happens is ever repeated, our general ideas and laws of nature are merely tools for getting along in the world. Above all, ideas do not refer to things, only to other ideas. What expedites our thinking is true. What expedites our acting is right. Whenever we act according to principle, rule, or law, we are making a bet that events will turn out the way [End Page 353] we think they will. If we keep this always in mind, we will never succumb to violence or war in the name of belief or principle. Whatever we believe, it could be otherwise. Such is a general summary of pragmatism as it has filtered down to the textbooks. It is (again befittingly) more or less accurate. The can-do American seeks out cash value in practical life.Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., William James, Charles Saunders Pierce, and John Dewey crafted the only indigenous philosophy that has so far been produced in America. Its roots are in Laplacean probability theory, Darwinian evolutionism, and Chauncey Wright's indeterminism. While James hoped to save a place for religion (if it works, go with it) and Pierce a place for God (he thought there had to be a designing intelligence to account for order), the pragmatic result is profoundly skeptical and secular. Neither Holmes nor Dewey thought that individuals imbedded in societies had any need of absolutes. Holmes said that people first decide on the basis of experience, then they deduce. Dewey said that people first behave commonsensically, then they rationalize.There is nothing as condensed as the above in Louis Menand's beautiful book on the ideas, personalities, and influence of Holmes, James, Pierce, and Dewey. I know of no clearer exposition of their ideas, and few biographers have made them come so alive. In particular, Menand's coverage of peripheral (but by no means insignificant) figures is very rich. He describes the development of graduate universities in America in detail from their autocratic beginnings to the institution of academic freedom as we know it today. University presidents, trustees, and administrators are presented luxuriously as the villains, and the professors gloriously as the heroes. Menand remarks with slight amazement that society bought the concept that professors were beholden to the public at large and not to the state or private university owners. He could have commented further on the fact that the concept of academic freedom has become virtually irrelevant in today's corporate research universities."It is a remarkable fact about the United States," Menand begins his book, "that it fought a civil war without undergoing a change in its form of government" (p. ix). This is a breathtaking fact, and I don't suppose Menand had any intent to explain it. "The Civil War swept away the slave civilization of the South, but it swept away almost the whole intellectual... (shrink)

The notion of "relevance" in philosophy is ultimately determined by a notion of "utility" that has been present in American culture from very early on. In Democracy in America, Tocqueville stated that "Democratic nations... prefer the useful to the beautiful, and... require that the beautiful should be useful". Today, the issues of utility and relevance are motivations for a congress which threatens to drastically cut funding for humanities programs around the country. At a time when employment in the academy is (...) sporadic at best, how might one respond philosophically in light of the current congressional threat? John Lachs responds by criticizing what he calls, "the professionalization of philosophy". Rather than focusing inquiries on the problems and concerns of everyday life, philosophers "linger over abstract details of technique". Ultimately, Lachs' concern is that such hyperspecialization will only alienate the practice of philosophy from the rest of society: "so long as philosophers talk about philosophical texts to other philosophers in a mysterious philosophical language, they cannot keep faith with their mission. Isolated and irrelevant, we will become the butt of jokes, and our departments will be marked... for eradication". In contrast to such "professionalization," Lachs provides us with a book of essays that are "united by the belief that philosophical reflection can yield results and by the desire to harness them to the service of improving life". Lest the reader too quickly assume the facile distinction between "history of philosophy" and "original philosophy," it must be noted that Lachs brings a wealth of knowledge regarding historical figures to bear on the problems which he addresses. One finds Aristotle, Hegel, Mill, James, Peirce, Santayana, Dewey and others, all being invoked in the interest of elucidating and understanding issues such as dogmatism, violence, alienation, technology, education, law, and euthanasia Lachs' overriding concern, however, is that of "mediating relations" "in which individuals perform actions on behalf of others". While such relations may be necessary in order to allow people to perform specialized societal roles more efficiently, they also separate people from the other specialized roles in which they do not take part. The unfortunate consequence is that most people do not have "even an elementary understanding of social life, economic reality, the interplay of activity and happiness, or the structure and needs of our bodies," because "the mediated world denies them the opportunity to learn by direct experience". Relevant philosophy must clear away the abstract and specialized language, which alienates the normal reader and draws philosophers away from learning by direct experience. It is not surprising, therefore, that Lachs' prose is extremely clear and accessible. Such prose works exceptionally well in "Life And Death", where Lachs engages the difficult questions regarding the constitution of a human life, the viewing of death as "a natural and appropriate end to a satisfying life", and the termination of the "lives" of beings who--like the hydroencephalic child --cannot develop into actual human beings, but remain only as "human forms". Whether one agrees with Lachs' positions on these issues or not, his straightforward and unmediated prose bespeaks a courage which is admirable. (shrink)

Matthews discusses the role of our ability to make a judgment of taste (judgment of beauty) within Kant's notion of the structure of the mind. In doing this she does not simply rely upon what we can learn from the first part of the third critique, the 'Critique of Aesthetic Judgment', but draws upon Kant's philosophy as a whole, including the first two critiques and the second part of The Critique of Judgment, the 'Critique of Teleological Judgment'. She looks (...) at how the ability to judge beauty links to other aspects of the mind: in particular to our ability to make moral judgments and to our ability to cognize experience, the latter involving a selection of those aspects of nature which lend themselves to the kind of ordering of which our minds are predisposed. Matthews identifies a link in Kant's thinking between creativity and aesthetic judgment. That is, she understands Kant to be saying that aesthetic judgment makes revolutionary ways of thinking possible (p.71). However, in her introduction she writes 'Beauty need not lead to knowledge or moral activity in order to have value in our lives' (p.1). Matthews points out that her aim in this book is to show that the feeling of beauty serves a larger purpose for Kant. The relevant feature of the experience of beauty is its 'ability to orient rational beings in a sensible world'. Her book is dedicated to explaining how the experience of beauty does this. The feeling of beauty, she writes, 'acts as a mediating link between theoretical and practical reason' (p.1). (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:In Memoriam:Benjamin Lee Wren (1931–2006)Peter A. HuffAlmost a year after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita devastated his beloved New Orleans, Benjamin Wren, longtime member of the history department at Loyola University–New Orleans, died on July 20, 2006. Wren joined the Loyola faculty in 1970 and taught popular courses in Chinese history, Japanese history, and world history. He is best remembered for his unprecedented courses in Zen and the unique campus (...) zendo where he taught them. His courses integrated meditation practice, philosophical reflection, historical investigation, and a bit of group therapy into what many students have described as life-changing experiences.Wren was the son of an American Marine and a Hong Kong native who met in Tientsin, China. Growing up in the American South during the Great Depression and World War II, he encountered firsthand the racism and xenophobia that defined the Bible Belt as a distinct cultural region in the first half of the twentieth century. He entered the Society of Jesus when he was seventeen years of age and earned degrees from Spring Hill College, Saint Louis University, and the University of Arizona. Nearly fifty years later, he left the Jesuits and married Patricia Wren.Wren's professional life did not follow the path of the conventional academic career. For several years he taught in Jesuit high schools. After discovering a book on the Japanese art of flower arranging in a Texas public library, he pursued graduate studies in Asian religion and history. Like many of his generation, he was influenced by Jean Dechanet's Christian Yoga and Dom Aelred Graham's Zen Catholicism. He studied Zen with Yamada Roshi in Kamakura and ikebana with Sofu Teshigahara of the Sogetsu School in Tokyo. He initiated his Zen courses at Loyola partially in response to student unrest in the wake of the Kent State massacre.Wren published very little and did not easily negotiate the tenure process. His Zen among the Magnolias (1999) represents more personal testimony than scholarly argument. He did, however, have the extraordinary ability to stretch his students' imaginations and aspirations beyond the formal limitations of higher education and professional expectations. I saw this dimension of his [End Page 137] work very clearly when he served as the keynote speaker for Centenary College's 2004 one-day conference on "The Dharma in Dixie," a program featuring leaders and practitioners from Louisiana's Hindu and Buddhist communities. Wren's animated talk, fusing a whirlwind tour of Chinese history with a riveting critique of contemporary American culture, was by all accounts the highlight of the event.In Zen among the Magnolias, Wren wrote, "The two symbols used to write the word Zen are the symbols for God and warfare. For us who come out of a Judaic/ Christian background, we have the tradition of Jacob fighting with God and emerging from the fight with a new name, Israel (He who has fought with God)" (p. 7). By the time he spoke at my institution, Wren was already engaged in his final battle with cancer. During the chaos of Hurricane Katrina, we lost track of each other. Then I heard of the memorial service to be held in his honor at an Episcopal church in a New Orleans suburb."Zen Ben" Wren's brand of personal passion and intellectual integrity is a rare commodity in today's corporate academy. "The best teachers," he said, "never lose their student IDs, and they also bring out the master in their respective students" (p. 16). Loyola's zendo once housed an unforgettable teacher. [End Page 138]Peter A. HuffCentenary College of LouisianaCopyright © 2007 The University of Hawai'i Press... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Utility and Morality: Adam Smith's Critique of Hume Marie A. Martin Reading Smith's Theory ofMoral Sentiments one cannot help but note that, in spite ofthe obvious similarities between Smith and Hume and the equally obvious borrowings and adaptions Smith makesofportions of Hume's theory, the two differ substantially on the role of utility in morality. The difference is, in fact, practically diametrical opposition. Hume believed that utility was the "foundation (...) of the chief part of morals." Smith, on the other hand, believed that, while utility may contribute an additional beauty to virtue, it is never the source oftheir virtue and rarely the source of moral approbation. Given their agreement in so many other respects, why the difference regarding utility? To answer this question I shall examine both Smith's specific criticisms ofHume regarding the role ofutility in morals and his more general objections to any theory that makes an appeal to utility a foundation ofmoral approval. I shall show that, while Smith does raise anumber ofgenuine difficulties for Hume's theory, he does not succeed in his most serious criticism, that is, that Hume's theory does not adequately capture the essentially social nature ofmorality. Hume's View ofthe Role ofUtility AccordingtoHume, the sentimentofmoral approbation arisesfrom the perception ofqualities ofcharacter or mind which are either useful or agreeable to ourselves or others. Examples of qualities agreeable to ourselves include cheerfulness, confidence, self-respect, and taste. Examples of qualities agreeable to others include manners, wit, eloquence, andmodesty. But themajorityofourmoral sentiments arise from the perception of the usefulness of qualities, that is, "from reflexions on their tendency to the happiness of mankind, and of particularpersons."2 Utility or usefulness is nothing but a tendency to a certain end. But, Hume claims, "itis acontradictioninterms, thatany thingpleases as means to an end, where the end itself no wise affects us" (E 219). Thus, ifwe approve ofthose qualities thathave a tendency to promote the happiness or well-being of either the possessor or others, it must be eitherbecause we value theirhappinessin itselforbecause we value it as a means to our own interests. Volume XVI Number 2 107 MARIE A. MARTIN Hume rejects the second alternative as contrary to experienced fact. The "selfish systems" which attempt to reduce all moral approbation to self-interest cannot account for our praise and admiration ofthe courage and fortitude ofour enemies even when their consequences thwart our own interests. Neither can such systems account for the fact that "[w]e frequently bestow praise on virtuous actions, performed in very distant ages and remote countries; where the utmost subtilty ofimagination would not discover any appearance ofself-interest" (E 215-16). If it is not self-interest that leads us to approve useful qualities, thenitis clear that"[w]e must adopt amore public affection, and allow, that the interests ofsocietyare not, even on their own account, entirely indifferent to us" (E 219). We approve of qualities that promote the well-being of others because we have a natural concern for their welfare. In general, it is certain, that, wherever we go, whatever we reflect on or converse about, every thing still presents us with the view of human happiness or misery, and excites in our breast a sympathetic movement of pleasure or uneasiness. (E 221) Thus, our approval of useful qualities rests on their tendency to promote the happiness of those who possess or are affected by them, and this, in turn, rests on sympathy, the communication of passions, whereby we "feel" for others—happiness for theirjoys, sorrow for their miseries. So, althoughtheutilityofqualitiesofcharacteris notthe solecause ofour approbation, it is the most extensive and important one. It appears tobe matter offact, that the circumstance oíutility, in all subjects, is a source ofpraise and approbation: That it is constantly appealed to in all moral decisions concerning the merit and demerit ofactions: That it is the sole source ofthat high regard paid to justice, fidelity, honour, allegiance, and chastity: That it is inseparable from all the other social virtues, humanity, generosity, charity, affability, lenity, mercy, and moderation: And, in a word, that it is the foundation ofthe chief part of morals, which has a reference to mankind and our fellow-creatures. (E... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Utility and Morality: Adam Smith's Critique of Hume Marie A. Martin Reading Smith's Theory ofMoral Sentiments one cannot help but note that, in spite ofthe obvious similarities between Smith and Hume and the equally obvious borrowings and adaptions Smith makesofportions of Hume's theory, the two differ substantially on the role of utility in morality. The difference is, in fact, practically diametrical opposition. Hume believed that utility was the "foundation (...) of the chief part of morals." Smith, on the other hand, believed that, while utility may contribute an additional beauty to virtue, it is never the source oftheir virtue and rarely the source of moral approbation. Given their agreement in so many other respects, why the difference regarding utility? To answer this question I shall examine both Smith's specific criticisms ofHume regarding the role ofutility in morals and his more general objections to any theory that makes an appeal to utility a foundation ofmoral approval. I shall show that, while Smith does raise anumber ofgenuine difficulties for Hume's theory, he does not succeed in his most serious criticism, that is, that Hume's theory does not adequately capture the essentially social nature ofmorality. Hume's View ofthe Role ofUtility AccordingtoHume, the sentimentofmoral approbation arisesfrom the perception ofqualities ofcharacter or mind which are either useful or agreeable to ourselves or others. Examples of qualities agreeable to ourselves include cheerfulness, confidence, self-respect, and taste. Examples of qualities agreeable to others include manners, wit, eloquence, andmodesty. But themajorityofourmoral sentiments arise from the perception of the usefulness of qualities, that is, "from reflexions on their tendency to the happiness of mankind, and of particularpersons."2 Utility or usefulness is nothing but a tendency to a certain end. But, Hume claims, "itis acontradictioninterms, thatany thingpleases as means to an end, where the end itself no wise affects us" (E 219). Thus, ifwe approve ofthose qualities thathave a tendency to promote the happiness or well-being of either the possessor or others, it must be eitherbecause we value theirhappinessin itselforbecause we value it as a means to our own interests. Volume XVI Number 2 107 MARIE A. MARTIN Hume rejects the second alternative as contrary to experienced fact. The "selfish systems" which attempt to reduce all moral approbation to self-interest cannot account for our praise and admiration ofthe courage and fortitude ofour enemies even when their consequences thwart our own interests. Neither can such systems account for the fact that "[w]e frequently bestow praise on virtuous actions, performed in very distant ages and remote countries; where the utmost subtilty ofimagination would not discover any appearance ofself-interest" (E 215-16). If it is not self-interest that leads us to approve useful qualities, thenitis clear that"[w]e must adopt amore public affection, and allow, that the interests ofsocietyare not, even on their own account, entirely indifferent to us" (E 219). We approve of qualities that promote the well-being of others because we have a natural concern for their welfare. In general, it is certain, that, wherever we go, whatever we reflect on or converse about, every thing still presents us with the view of human happiness or misery, and excites in our breast a sympathetic movement of pleasure or uneasiness. (E 221) Thus, our approval of useful qualities rests on their tendency to promote the happiness of those who possess or are affected by them, and this, in turn, rests on sympathy, the communication of passions, whereby we "feel" for others—happiness for theirjoys, sorrow for their miseries. So, althoughtheutilityofqualitiesofcharacteris notthe solecause ofour approbation, it is the most extensive and important one. It appears tobe matter offact, that the circumstance oíutility, in all subjects, is a source ofpraise and approbation: That it is constantly appealed to in all moral decisions concerning the merit and demerit ofactions: That it is the sole source ofthat high regard paid to justice, fidelity, honour, allegiance, and chastity: That it is inseparable from all the other social virtues, humanity, generosity, charity, affability, lenity, mercy, and moderation: And, in a word, that it is the foundation ofthe chief part of morals, which has a reference to mankind and our fellow-creatures. (E... (shrink)

En 1968 ocurrieron dos hechos sobre los cuales cabe hacer una reflexión orientada por la bioética: la llamada Revolución del 68 y la aparición de la Carta encíclica Humanae Vitae. El Concilio Vaticano II, que fue presentado como una actualización de la Iglesia católica al mundo moderno, fue el escenario de los estudios previos a la redacción del documento pontificio, donde Pablo VI dejó clara la postura del Magisterio de la Iglesia sobre la moral sexual y anticipa los errores prácticos (...) que se seguirían a planteamientos conceptuales antropológicos erróneos o equivocados sobre esa temática. Hay necesidad de rehabilitar la Humanae vitae para volver a percibir el acto conyugal en su “verdad inalterable”, donde no se puede separar el bien y la belleza de la donación mutua de los cónyuges, que redunda en el bien común de la sociedad para defender su célula básica y nuclear que es la familia. In 1968, two events occurred on which it is worth reflecting on bioethics: the so-called Revolution of 1968 and the appearance of the Encyclical Letter Humanae Vitae. The Second Vatican Council, which was presented as an update of the Catholic Church to the modern world, was the scene of the studies prior to the drafting of the pontifical document, where Paul VI made clear the position of the Magisterium of the Church on sexual morality and it anticipates the practical errors that would follow erroneous or mistaken anthropological conceptual approaches on this subject. There is a need to rehabilitate Humanae vitae in order to re-perceive the conjugal act in its "unalterable truth", where good and beauty cannot be separated from the mutual donation of the spouses, which results in the common good of society to defend its basic and nuclear cell which is the family. (shrink)

It is a common mistake, especially, perhaps, among students of the religions and philosophies of India, to assume that the word prakṛti, best known as the ultimate material principle in the Sāṃkhya and Yoga systems of religious thought, the material cause of the world in Hindu theologies and, as such, an epithet of the goddesses in Hinduism, always refers to an ultimate principle. Even in Sāṃkhya and Yoga texts the word prakṛti is used in various ways. Prakṛti does (...) not always refer to the ultimate principle. Translators often leave the word prakṛti untranslated and mislead the reader to assume that the ultimate principle is referred to, when it is not. This article discusses the use of prakṛti in the Sāṃkhya-Yoga texts the Yogasūtra and the Vyāsabhāṣya and criticises some translation practices. (shrink)

It is a common mistake, especially, perhaps, among students of the religions and philosophies of India, to assume that the word prakti, best known as the ultimate material principle in the Sākhya and Yoga systems of religious thought, the material cause of the world in Hindu theologies and, as such, an epithet of the goddesses in Hinduism, always refers to an ultimate principle. Even in Sākhya and Yoga texts the word prakti is used in various ways. Prakti does (...) not always refer to the ultimate principle. Translators often leave the word prakti untranslated and mislead the reader to assume that the ultimate principle is referred to, when it is not. This article discusses the use of prakti in the Sākhya-Yoga texts the Yogastra and the Vyāsabhāya and criticises some translation practices. (shrink)

It is a common mistake, especially, perhaps, among students of the religions and philosophies of India, to assume that the word prakṛti, best known as the ultimate material principle in the Sāṃkhya and Yoga systems of religious thought, the material cause of the world in Hindu theologies and, as such, an epithet of the goddesses in Hinduism, always refers to an ultimate principle. Even in Sāṃkhya and Yoga texts the word prakṛti is used in various ways. Prakṛti does (...) not always refer to the ultimate principle. Translators often leave the word prakṛti untranslated and mislead the reader to assume that the ultimate principle is referred to, when it is not. This article discusses the use of prakṛti in the Sāṃkhya-Yoga texts the Yogasūtra and the Vyāsabhāṣya and criticises some translation practices. (shrink)

The article is devoted to identifying the value of the phenomenon of aesthetic value and beauty of mathematical knowledge and the beauty of mathematical theory of teaching mathematics. The aesthetic potential of mathematical knowledge allows the use of theater technology in the educational process with the active dialogic interaction between teacher and students. The criteria of beauty in mathematical theories are distinguished: the realization of beauty as the unity of the whole, and in the disclosure of (...) the complex through the elementary; methodological interpretation of the beauty in the community of mathematical structures and optimal information content of the meta-language of mathematics; the practical embodiment of beauty in the formalization of the infinite through the finite. The beauty of mathematics is the force that permeates all the ‘layers of knowledge‘ not along, and across, although the effectiveness of mathematical activity due to aesthetic laws, which do not always lend themselves to unambiguous interpretation. In the article it is stated that, depending on the educational goals of communicative impact on the audience, in fact, ‘mathematical lectures theatricality‘ can have different characteristics, the most important of which are teachers artistry and artistic director’s work of a teacher. This cultural phenomenon that includes the theatrical talent, helps create an atmosphere of cooperation needed in varying degrees of activity for pedagogical interaction. The author believes that such approach, developed on the basis of the Stanislavsky system, allows university professors of mathematics significantly improve mathematical lectures. (shrink)

Despite their ubiquity and widespread acceptance in contemporary education, formal grading systems are relatively recent innovations in the history and philosophy of education. Far from innocuous tools which aid the student’s academic development, grades and grading systems developed as ad hoc tools for ranking students against one another in academic competitions. This article examines the history of assessment, grades, and grading in light of the longer tradition of education and suggests alternative practices could better orient students toward the true, good, (...) beautiful, holy, healthy, and beneficial. By understanding how and why contemporary approaches to grades developed, classical educators will be equipped to mitigate the unintended and often unseen adverse consequences grades have on their students. Ultimately, this article seeks to liberate teachers and students to pursue the intrinsic goods of learning over against the fleeting and extrinsic rewards of making the grade. (shrink)

Advocates of an environmental ethic frequently claim that what makes an ethical theory truly and uniquely environmental is its commitment to the principle that environmental wholes such as species, ecosystems, and biotic communities are morally considerable. The prevailing view is that our primary duty towards these wholes is to respect their integrity, stability, and beauty, and that the best way to do this is to leave them alone, not interfere with them, and let nature follow its own course. But (...) is that correct? Why should be refrain from interfering with nature?There are two ways an environmentalist might try to justify an exceptionaless, prima facie principle of noninterference. First, she might claim that there is a contingent but universal connection between human interference and ecosystemic harm. There is also an epistemic variant of this view. When faced with a decision concerning whether to interfere with an ecosystem, there will always be overwhelming reasons for thinking that interference will be harmful, regardless of the specific circumstances. Send, there might be some conceptual connection between interference and harm to ecosystems. For example, if the well-being of an ecosystem is identified with its wildness, and wildness is understood as the absence of human intervention or manipulation, then any human interference necessarily detracts from an ecosystem's wildness and thereby has a detrimental effect on its well-being. In this paper I examine these justifications in detail and argue that none can support an exceptionaless principle of noninterference. (shrink)

* Hatha yoga is commonly thought to be a pure, ancient Indian spiritual discipline that transcends cultural, temporal and spatial boundaries or a spiritual discipline corrupted by Indians (for export) or Westerners (for import) to accommodate Westerners. Calling these beliefs into question, Max Popov's Radiant Bodies shows how hatha yoga was transformed from sacred practice into a health and fitness regime for middle-class Indians in India in the early and mid-20th century. Popov tells the story of this (...) transformation through the lives and accomplishments of eleven key figures: six Indian yogis (Shri Yogendra, Swami Kuvalayananda, S. Sundaram, T. Krishnamacharya, Swami Sivananda and B. K. S. Iyengar), an Indian bodybuilder (K. V. Iyer), a rajah (Bhavanarao Shrinivasrao), an Indian diplomat (Apa Pant), an American-born English journalist (Louise Morgan), and a Russian-born yogi trained in India (Indra Devi).Their accomplishments are placed within the context of such Western trends as the physical culture movement, the commodification of exercise, militant nationalism, post-World War I anxiety, the mystique of science, jazz age popular entertainment, and the quest for youth and beauty. Through a series of biographical narratives placed in a rich cultural context, Popov not only brings to life the formation of modern hatha yoga as an exercise system in the early 20th century but also its transformation over the course of the 20th century into an embodied spiritual practice. Popov draws on extensive research from rare primary sources to present a cutting edge interpretation of the history of modern hatha yoga. Radiant Bodies is a thoughtful book for the educated general reader that would also be of special interest for religion scholars and yoga professionals and practitioners. (shrink)

Yoga 365 presents a year's worth of daily readings that invite yoga lovers of every skill level to bring the inspiration they experience on their mats into their everyday lives. Each entry explores a mind-body theme such as balance, strength, and resilience in a short, illuminating paragraph that can be enjoyed in the morning or at bedtime, incorporated into a yoga session, or read on the go. Featuring a serenely beautiful hardcover and a spacious, color-washed interior, the (...) package is as calming in the hand as the readings are to the eye. Yogis will find it to be a motivating tool for personal growth and a lighthearted, gift-worthy way to share the joys of their practice with others. (shrink)

In this, the second of two papers, three interpretative investigations are undertaken of Nomzi’s story of her troubled childhood, her dreams of ancestors calling her to become an igqirha, her training by experienced healers, various rituals that were performed at different stages of her life, and her eventual graduation as an igqirha at the age of 61. The narrative cannot be understood apart from the framework of the isiXhosa traditional understanding of intwaso, the initiatory illness, the role of the ancestors, (...) and the manner in which clairvoyant abilities of divination and healing are developed under their guidance. Nomzi’s account, however, reflects a considerable modification of the tradition, several features of which she does not seem to understand herself. From a clinical psychological perspective, Nomzi’s behavioural disturbances in childhood, as well as her lifelong suspiciousness and paranoia, can be understood as a consequence of an unstable childhood in which there was no secure attachment, nor any adult guidance on emotional regulation of the kind needed to form the basis of a stable adult personality. From the perspective of transpersonal psychology, it seems likely that Nomzi was endowed with a degree of natural clairvoyance, but her development as a healer was impaired by displacement of her paranoid ideation into the role of witch-finder, and her chronic social alienation. (shrink)

Where does our sense of beauty come from? Traditional interest in evolutionary aesthetics has proceeded by an almost exclusive focus on Darwin’s Descent of Man, which theorizes the origin of the human aesthetic sense as an instrumental feature of sexual desire. But what if the Descent only gives us half of the story? I argue that we have overlooked a key element in Darwin’s aesthetics that is more readily available in On the Origin of Species, a form of aesthetic (...) experience he associates with “cultivated men.” Instead of an explicit scientific theory of aesthetic pleasure, the Origin provides evidence of this “cultivated” beauty as a narrative practice of aesthetic judgment with specific reference to an evolutionary phenomenon Darwin calls “coadaptation.” I conclude by addressing the demands this new evidence makes on any valid understanding of evolutionary aesthetics and suggest a preliminary model of aesthetic education that could facilitate collaborative dialogue in an increasingly recalcitrant two-cultures debate. (shrink)

Philosophy’s essence depicted by Socrates lies in its role as pedagogy for living, yet its traditional treatment of ‘body’ as a hindrance to ‘knowledge’ in fact severs it from life, transforming it into ‘an escape from life’.The philosophy/life dichotomy is thus an inherent flaw preventing philosophy as traditionally taught and engaged in, from fulfilling its original goal. Recent rejections of the Cartesian nature of Western curriculum, such as O’Loughlin’s ‘Embodiment and Education: Exploring creatural existence’, constitute an important theoretical paradigm shift, (...) yet still fail to translate to substantial pedagogies which explore the ‘body’ and its relation to ‘mind’ directly. This article suggests a reorientation of philosophy teaching from its present disembodied pedagogy, towards an embodied-lived-philosophicalpractice. By the description and exemplification of modern postural yoga I will depict the twofold role of the ‘body’ in philosophy teaching: 1) The ‘body’ as pedagogical vehicle serving the emergence of philosophical discourse, and 2) The body as yielding livingness to mean embodied-lived-philosophy as opposed to disembodied-lofty-philosophical escape from life. It will thus be suggested that yoga be incorporated as an integral part of philosophy teaching reclaiming its educational ethos. (shrink)

Environmental education usually appeals to the students’ knowledge and rational understanding. Even though this is needed, there is a neglected aspect of learning ecologically fruitful action; that of the lived-body. This paper introduces the lived-body as an important site for learning ecological action. An argument is made for the need of a biophilia revolution, in which refined experience of the body and enhanced capabilities for sensing are seen as important ways of complementing the more common, knowledge-based environmental education. Alienation from (...) the physical environment is seen as one key element in producing environmental devastation. Consequently, human alienation from nature is seen as closely related to alienation from one's body. It is claimed that through overcoming the dualist alienation of human consciousness from its lived body, we can decrease the alienation of human beings from their environment. Methods of contemplative pedagogy are introduced for addressing alienation. By getting in touch with the tangible lived-body in yoga or mindfulness meditation we reconnect to the material world of nature. Contemplative pedagogy cultivates the body and its senses for learning intrinsic valuation and caring for the environment. Lived-body experience is challenging to conceptualise; we use Maurice Merleau-Ponty's concept of the flesh in our attempt to do so. Finally, this paper suggests some contemplative practices of the lived-body for environmental education. Experiencing the flesh of oneself and the world as one and the same is an environmentally conducive experience that gives value and meaning to the flourishing of all life, human and non-human. (shrink)

Environmental education usually appeals to the students’ knowledge and rational understanding. Even though this is needed, there is a neglected aspect of learning ecologically fruitful action; that of the lived-body. This paper introduces the lived-body as an important site for learning ecological action. An argument is made for the need of a biophilia revolution, in which refined experience of the body and enhanced capabilities for sensing are seen as important ways of complementing the more common, knowledge-based environmental education. Alienation from (...) the physical environment is seen as one key element in producing environmental devastation. Consequently, human alienation from nature is seen as closely related to alienation from one's body. It is claimed that through overcoming the dualist alienation of human consciousness from its lived body, we can decrease the alienation of human beings from their environment. Methods of contemplative pedagogy are introduced for addressing alienation. By getting in touch with the tangible lived-body in yoga or mindfulness meditation we reconnect to the material world of nature. Contemplative pedagogy cultivates the body and its senses for learning intrinsic valuation and caring for the environment. Lived-body experience is challenging to conceptualise; we use Maurice Merleau-Ponty's concept of the flesh in our attempt to do so. Finally, this paper suggests some contemplative practices of the lived-body for environmental education. Experiencing the flesh of oneself and the world as one and the same is an environmentally conducive experience that gives value and meaning to the flourishing of all life, human and non-human. (shrink)

Environmental education usually appeals to the students’ knowledge and rational understanding. Even though this is needed, there is a neglected aspect of learning ecologically fruitful action; that of the lived-body. This paper introduces the lived-body as an important site for learning ecological action. An argument is made for the need of a biophilia revolution, in which refined experience of the body and enhanced capabilities for sensing are seen as important ways of complementing the more common, knowledge-based environmental education. Alienation from (...) the physical environment is seen as one key element in producing environmental devastation. Consequently, human alienation from nature is seen as closely related to alienation from one's body. It is claimed that through overcoming the dualist alienation of human consciousness from its lived body, we can decrease the alienation of human beings from their environment. Methods of contemplative pedagogy are introduced for addressing alienation. By getting in touch with the tangible lived-body in yoga or mindfulness meditation we reconnect to the material world of nature. Contemplative pedagogy cultivates the body and its senses for learning intrinsic valuation and caring for the environment. Lived-body experience is challenging to conceptualise; we use Maurice Merleau-Ponty's concept of the flesh in our attempt to do so. Finally, this paper suggests some contemplative practices of the lived-body for environmental education. Experiencing the flesh of oneself and the world as one and the same is an environmentally conducive experience that gives value and meaning to the flourishing of all life, human and non-human. (shrink)

Orphaned in her early teens and shuttled between abusive foster homes, Tatiana Forero Puerta found herself in her early twenties in New York City, haunted by the memories of her tumultuous youth and suicidal. Following emergency hospitalization, she was advised by her doctor to take up yoga. Over days, weeks, months, and then years, she embraced yoga's honesty and discipline--delving more deeply into its wisdom, literature, and, vitally, its practice. In so doing, yoga healed her scars, (...) opened her soul to forgiveness, and allowed her to reconcile herself with a past that had threatened to snuff out her life. Yoga for the Wounded Heart is an unsparingly honest memoir of a childhood lost and of courage and resilience gained. It's also an exploration of the fundamentals of yoga: as a technology that focuses our awareness; as a practical application of mindfulness and attention to what is really going on in our lives and bodies; and as a vehicle for the body to guide the mind and heart toward healing. (shrink)

This article identifies a prevalent strand of feminist writing on beauty and aesthetic surgery and explores some of the contradictions and inconsistencies inscribed within it. In particular, we concentrate on three central feminist claims: that living in a misogynist culture produces aesthetic surgery as an issue predominantly concerning women; that pain - both physical and psychic - is a central conceptual frame through which aesthetic surgery should be viewed; and that aesthetic surgery is inherently a normalizing technology. Engaging with (...) these ‘myths’, we explore the tensions uncovered through a historical analysis of the practices of aesthetic surgery as well as the challenges to feminist claims offered by post-feminism. In particular we seek to destabilize the connection in feminist writing between beauty and passivity. We argue that through aesthetic references to denigrated black and working-class bodies, young women may mobilize aesthetic surgeries to reinscribe active sexuality on the feminine body. (shrink)

The philosophy of Epictetus, a freed slave in the Roman Empire, has been profoundly influential on Western thought: it offers not only stimulating ideas but practical guidance in living one's life. A. A. Long, a leading scholar of later ancient philosophy, gives the definitive presentation of the thought of Epictetus for a broad readership. Long's fresh and vivid translations of a selection of the best of Epictetus' discourses show that his ideas are as valuable and striking today as they were (...) amost two thousand years ago. This is a book for anyone interested in what we can learn from ancient philosophy about how to live our lives. (shrink)

A path to personal and community liberation through yoga philosophy on service from yoga teacher, activist, and accessible yoga advocate Jivana Heyman. Yoga is now a mainstream form of exercise across the West, and it is time to address the dissonance between the superficial way yoga is currently being practiced and the depth of yoga's ancient universal spiritual teachings. In this clarion call to action, Jivana Heyman shares the ways that yoga is truly (...) revolutionary--creating an inner revolution in our heart and mind, as well as an outer revolution in the form of service and social justice. He provides us with a framework he calls "Rainbow Mind" to bridge this gap and share a new vision of what yogic enlightenment can look like. Having a Rainbow Mind requires open -heartedness, courage, and a fierce commitment to inclusivity and accessibility. It is about tackling the challenge that Arjuna faces in the Bhagavad Gita--"Should I act?"--and cultivating a state of mind that helps us figure out one of the hardest challenges of life: when to speak up and when to step back. In Yoga Revolution, you will be introduced to the yogic mandate of seva--or acts of service that see, care for, and uplift those around us--as a way to serve the world without losing your way or making it about yourself-all while still maintaining your own self-care. Through practice prompts such as "Failure as a Practice" and stories from yoga teachers who are implementing seva, including Michelle Cassandra Johnson, Octavia Raheem, and Amber Karnes, Heyman shows you what it means to serve, how to serve, and how to reject white supremacy through your service. Our job is not to clear our mind through yoga practice, but rather to expand it so widely that it can embrace the entire universe. (shrink)

Mussar Yoga is a spiritual practice that engages the whole self in the process of spiritual transformation. It bridges the Jewish spiritual practice of self-study, and the cultivation and discipline of ethical behavior known as Mussar ("instruction" in Hebrew) with the Eight Limbs of Yoga, the ancient Indian eight-fold path for creating union between mind, body and spirit. Mussar provides the structure and focus of the journey of self-inquiry, while yoga offers a means for embodying (...) it. In this clear and structured introduction to Mussar Yoga, you will learn how to explore the physical dimension of soul traits--ethical behaviors and attitudes--such as humility, generosity, enthusiasm and gratitude through yoga poses and the yogic practice of breath work. Intended for the novice as well as the yoga expert, each exercise is accompanied by step-by-step instructions, helpful photographs, mantras and journaling exercises. With practice, Mussar Yoga can help free you from established negative patterns of being, increase your capacity for compassion and acts of goodness, and help you develop a more fulfilling, meaningful life. (shrink)

"At its core, Yoga invites practitioners to live fully in the midst of hardship while staying open to the possibility of being transformed by life experiences of all kinds. A seasoned Yoga teacher and writer, the author confronts the ways in which modern Yoga has strayed from its original purposes, challenging current perspectives of practice, balance and peace. Drawing on the foundations of Yoga philosophy, this book provides guideposts for living a resilient life through deepening (...) the understanding and experience of Yoga. To redefine the popular understanding of Yoga, chapters provide practical and applicable tools to reclaim practice as a way to be fully alive and aware, thereby unpacking the resistance, judgment and impatience that stand in the way of living a resilient life."-Provided by publisher. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 41.1 (2003) 121-122 [Access article in PDF] Harold Tarrant. Plato's First Interpreters. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000. Pp. viii + 263. Cloth, $55.00. This is Tarrant's third book on the ancient Platonist tradition, following his Scepticism or Platonism? (1985) and Thrasyllan Platonism (1993). In those earlier volumes his focus was on the first centuries bc and ad. Here his scope is much (...) wider. Stating that "Platonic interpretation is today at a crossroads," he has written a book that explores "ancient attempts to wrestle with this corpus," with the ultimate objective "to encourage a fresh, almost primitive reading of Plato himself" (vii).He begins engagingly by confronting the ancients with questions any modern reader of Plato must ask: What kind of text is this? Are there doctrines here? Where do I look for Plato's doctrines? The second part of his book is a historical survey, taking us from Plato, the early Academy and Aristotle, through the Hellenistic and early Roman Imperial period, and concluding with the principal Neoplatonist interpreters. In the third and longest part, he focuses on the interpretation of specific dialogues, giving most space to the Gorgias and Theaetetus, but also dealing in particular detail with the Meno, Parmenides, and Philebus. Something is said about every dialogue, but Tarrant writes only briefly about such major works as the Republic and Timaeus. He explains his selectivity (not very convincingly) as due to his wish to "discuss issues of meta-interpretation, with emphasis on the period before Plotinus" (198).Taking his book as a whole, one realizes that few strands of modern interpretation were not prefigured to quite a large extent in antiquity. The two most obvious exceptions are the chronological and developmental approach (Early, Middle, and Late), at present under strong attack from some quarters, and the theological, numerological, and allegorical readings practiced by Neoplatonists. Plato's ancient interpreters were doctrinal unitarians, but they implicitly anticipated our tendency to distinguish "Socratic dialogues," which some of them called "gymnastic" and "inquisitive," from such "canonical" works as the Phaedo,Republic, Symposium, and Timaeus, to which they applied the labels "dogmatic" and "expository." And they recognized that both types of characteristics could be found in the same dialogue, as in the Meno and Theaetetus. Plato himself, they proposed, spoke primarily through the voices of Socrates, Timaeus, and the Eleatic and Athenian strangers; but other characters, such as Pausanias in the Symposium, or Protagoras in the dialogue of that name, utter thoughts with some philosophical value. In explaining difficult passages of one dialogue, they would typically refer to passages from other parts of the corpus. An especially intriguing instance is the strategy of the Anonymous Commentator on the Theaetetus, who reads the Meno into the dialogue on which he is officially commenting.Ancient scholars, just like ourselves, asked questions about the unifying themes of complex dialogues. Hence the sub-titles given to certain works: "On the soul" for the Phaedo, and "On justice" for the Republic, etc. For Olympiodorus (whose commentary on the Gorgias Tarrant has recently co-edited [Leiden, 1998]), earlier interpreters have seriously erred by giving too limited an account of that dialogue's scope. It is not, he says, simply about rhetoric, nor about justice and injustice; nor is its theme the divine demiurge (as some Neoplatonists had strangely proposed, on the basis of the concluding myth). Rather, the subject of the Gorgias is "the ethical principles that lead to constitutional well-being" (125). [End Page 121] However, Olympiodorus's eminently "sensible" reading (as Tarrant calls it) is deeply embedded in the Neoplatonic contrast between the "purificatory virtues" of the Phaedo and the "constitutional virtues" of Republic4.Strong or weak scepticism, esotericism, unwritten doctrines, spurious versus genuine, a canon of central dialogues, dramatic considerations, and the philosophical importance or non-importance of the dialogues' prologues—all of these are interpretive approaches that Tarrant surveys in this immensely learned book, and all of them continue to resonate for us. Modern scholars, who emphasize the literary and philosophical unity of each dialogue, are walking... (shrink)

In this book, I will discuss three main topics: the roots and aims of scientific knowledge, scientific knowledge in society, and science and values I understand scientific knowledge as being a planned and continuous production of the general and common knowledge of scientific communities. I begin my discussion with a brief analysis of the main differences between sciences, on the one hand, and everyday experience, philosophies, religions, and ideologies, on the other. I define the concept of science as a set (...) of family resemblances (in Wittgenstein's sense). The sciences can be distinguished along three lines, in terms of the difference between empirical and non-empirical sciences, differences in degrees of theoretical and methodological structure among individual sciences and scientific disciplines. Scientific knowledge is based upon some grounds, paradigmatic knowledge bases. Scientific knowledge is founded on a unified paradigmatic knowledge base. The latter includes fundamental theories, basic facts, generally accepted empirical regularities (laws), scientific research methods, scientific explanations, and established relations to other sciences. Scientific knowledge in general is defined well in classical terms by the definition that knowledge is a true and rationally-justified belief. In this connection, scientific truth is relative, depending on the given paradigmatic knowledge base and on the precision and accessibility of the measurements and observations involved. In the book's first part, I consider the production and testing of scientific hypotheses, scientific explanations, the structure of scientific theories, and the problem of scientific realism. I consider explanation an integral part of a wider nexus of heuristic and theoretical activities in science like giving reasons, understanding, clarification, and founding. Continuous production of scientific explanations is a necessary condition for the systematic reproduction of scientific knowledge. Accordingly, it does not suffice to describe them in terms of the logical structure of the arguments on which they are based, but rather, scientific explanations ought to be given complete with an epistemic and pragmatic context of the explanation. I consider especially deductive-nomological, inductive-statistical, dispositional, teleological-functional, and genetic explanations. I emphasize the ever-increasing importance of explanations by analogy and by model. Orthogonal to these distinctions lies the distinction between causal and epistemic explanation. Epistemic explanations relate scientific discoveries to epistemic progress, and causal explanations are these epistemic explanations that relate scientific discoveries to reality too. Causal explanations inform us that certain changes occur in the world as agents of other changes, or rather, that certain changes are real consequences of other changes. Thus, by having explanations of causes, we can intervene in the world to induce by design certain changes in some course of phenomena. I consider scientific theories as logically and epistemically ordered wholeness of scientific knowledge in a realm of research that enables us to construct useful models of reality. After the discussion of different 'statement' views on theories and different interpretations of the theory-experience relation, I introduce the 'model' theoretical (non-statement) views on theories, especially the structural theory of science. The model views on theories transcend the realism-antirealism dualism by introducing models between theory and reality. Therefore, the question of scientific realism is not merely whether and, if so, which element(s), of scientific theories represent reality, but rather which conditions suffice to infer from a theory that one of its models truly expresses reality. In other words, under which conditions do models of a theory represent models of reality? Generally, models are just as much images of reality in a theory as they are images of a theory in reality. The actual problem of scientific realism doesn't originate in the observable-unobservable distinction (even if this distinction is otherwise theoretically loaded), but rather in ontological quandaries, of the sort especially encountered in modern physical theories such as quantum mechanics, relativity theory, and cosmological theories, although they are known to arise in other sciences as well. Scientific theories may be real, even if they describe nothing about the world. However, such theories can be given this status only if their formal, mathematical postulates exhibit some formal homology between reality and mathematical forms. The very fact that it is possible to describe reality with the help of mathematics even in cases, where every (representational, conceptual) language and thought fall short, would indicate that even mathematics itself is, in some sense, a part of reality, although 'outside' of the empirical world. It follows we have to distinguish the non-empirical reality and the empirical world. Formal objectivity and non-arbitrariness of theories do not emerge from either our language or thoughts, or from the world of facts, causes, and effects, but rather from non-empirical reality, which frames the world as some kind of objective transcendental condition for the possibility of the existence of the world, thoughts, and language. In the second part of the book, I consider the incorporation of scientific work and scientific knowledge into modern society and its relations to values and ethics. Production of scientific knowledge goes on as a parallel distributed process of a special kind of social (shared) cognition. The central part of this cognition is the presentation of parts of the world by scientific (theoretical) models which are warranted by the shared and public practice of justification, and in reflective acting in the world as it would. I consider various formal concepts of collective propositional knowledge (distributed, mutual, common knowledge). Scientific knowledge is an achievement to be ascribed to a scientific community or, indirectly, to all those who apply or expand it, rather than to individuals per se. It presents the continuous and partially planned production of non-trivial common knowledge of the research communities in modern societies. However, besides common knowledge, shared dispositional knowledge (knowledge how of scientific teams) and shared knowledge by acquiring (knowledge of fundamental similarities and differences in scientific teams) are parts of the real body of scientific knowledge. Scientific common knowledge implies the projection into idealized universal knowledge of all real or potentially rational and well-informed individuals. The respect of scientific knowledge thus presents the norm of rationality. Science as the intensively shared and socially distributed kind of cognition enters into modern society as a special kind of work (general work), as a productive force (social invention drive), and as a form of capital (human, social, cultural, informational, etc.). However any of these categories can adequately represent the socio-economical role of science in modern societies, and we are still waiting for a more adequate general concept that would theoretically cover the 'scientification' of modern societies. My thesis is that the most important general effect of scientification is (and will be) the growth of social processes that structurally resemble parallel distributed shared social cognition of science, and not so much the rise of the use of scientific knowledge and scientifically based information in all kinds of production. Scientification of modern societies inevitably includes a much stronger need for moral and social responsibility of scientists for their work and its effects in their local society and the global world. This need comes in contradiction with the quite large accepted idea (and even the 'norm') on value-free research. I discuss to some degree different arguments for the absence of non-epistemic values and ethical reasoning from science and find them non-convincing. The sound idea of value-free research lies in the need for the absence of categorical value statements from scientific explanations and theoretical deductions. Values and ethical judgment have, and sometimes they even have to play an important role in another part of research and its application in science or outside it. Not the value-loudness of research is a danger for science but its blind, non-reflective use. It leads to the ideologization and politicization of science. A similar danger lies in the purely value-neutrality of research. It leads to the instrumentalization of science to the technical or bureaucratic means for 'any' aims. (shrink)