The purpose of this paper is to clarify Prajñākaragupta’s view of mental perception ( mānasapratyakṣa ), with special emphasis on the relationship between mental perception and self-awareness. Dignāga, in his PS 1.6ab, says: “mental [perception] ( mānasa ) is [of two kinds:] a cognition of an [external] object and awareness of one’s own mental states such as passion.” According to his commentator Jinendrabuddhi, a cognition of an external object and awareness of an internal object such as passion are here equally (...) called ‘mental perception’ in that neither depends on any of the five external sense organs. Dharmakīrti, on the other hand, considers mental perception to be a cognition which arises after sensory perception, and does not call self-awareness ‘mental perception’. According to Prajñākaragupta, mental perception is the cognition which determines an object as ‘this’ ( idam iti jñānam ). Unlike Dharmakīrti, he holds that the mental perception follows not only after the sensory perception of an external object, but also after the awareness of an internal object. The self-awareness which Dignāga calls ‘mental perception’ is for Prajñākaragupta the cognition which determines as ‘this’ an internal object, or an object which consists in a cognition; it is to be differentiated from the cognition which cognizes cognition itself, that is, self-awareness in its original sense. (shrink)

How is it possible to say that truth can be of one kind at the conventional level and totally different in the ultimate plane? As Matilal ( 1971 , p. 154) points out, Kumārila (ca. 600–650), a Mīmāṃsaka philosopher, claims that the Buddhist doctrine of two truths is “a kind of philosophical ‘double-talk’.” It is Prajñākaragupta (ca. 750–810), a Buddhist logician, who tries to give a direct answer to this question posed by Kumārila from the Buddhist side. He argues that (...) even a Mīmāṃsaka cannot demonstrate the validity ( prāmāṇya ) of the Veda without accepting two truth levels. His point is this. Consider the proposition to be proved: the Veda is valid. If the Veda is already known as valid, then it is useless to prove this proposition. But if it is already known as invalid, then it is impossible to prove this proposition. Therefore in the argument to prove the proposition, the Veda is not to be regarded either as valid or as invalid. This means that at the first stage of the argument one has the concept of the Veda as neutral in validity. However, as soon as one acquires the knowledge of the Veda as valid through the argument, one has to repudiate such a conception of the Veda. The acceptance of the Veda as neutral in validity is to the acceptance of the Veda as valid as the conventional truth is to the ultimate truth. (shrink)

To find more information on Rowman & Littlefield titles, please visit us at www.rowmanlittlefield.com.

To find more information on Rowman & Littlefield titles, please visit us at www.rowmanlittlefield.com.

In conclusion I would like to forestall one potential misunderstanding. As I have described it the pacifist ideal may seem so difficult to attain that it may seem closed off from the aspirations of ordinary human beings; and there is no doubt that few people are likely to attain this ideal to any great degree. This accords with our intuition that “true,” by which I think we mean “paradigm” pacifists, are rare indeed. But ideals can be sought, as well as (...) attained, to greater or lesser degrees. So there are many ordinary people who regard themselves as pacifists because they avoid violence more scrupulously than most. On my analysis their claim might well be true. (shrink)

This article seeks to make a contribution toward the eventual construction of an adequate formulation of rule-utilitarianism by explaining some of the difficulties the notion of supererogation poses for such an enterprise, and by describing a rule-utilitarian theory of supererogation which would resolve those difficulties. I begin in Section I by considering how best to define 'supererogation'. I propose a reforming definition at the end of that section. In Section II I claim that rule-utilitarians must recognize a distinction between two (...) types of rules if they hope to avoid the difficulties mentioned above. In Section III I attempt to explain and to resolve the difficulties supererogation poses for rule-utilitarianism. (edited). (shrink)

Activities of product design and manufacturing are carried out on a worldwide scale. Operations like outsourcing and fabless manufacturing occur frequently in both design and manufacturing processes to stimulate outbreaks of the abovementioned phenomena. In this situation, manufacturing knowledge data, that have been collected and used only by the same enterprise in the same place and within the same ethnic group up to now, are not sufficient or precise enough for making a plan of ongoing manufacturing. This paper tries to (...) suggest an example of manufacturing knowledge data containing an element of production culture and to estimate a risk of manufacturing trouble that could happen between each production culture. (shrink)

Human homogamy may be caused in part by individuals’ preference for phenotypic similarities. Two types of preference can result in homogamy: individuals may prefer someone who is similar to themselves (self-referent phenotype matching) or to their parents (a sexual-imprinting-like mechanism). In order to examine these possibilities, we compare faces of couples and their family members in two ways. First, “perceived” similarity between a pair of faces is quantified as similarity ratings given to the pair. Second, “physical” similarity between two groups (...) of faces is evaluated on the basis of correlations in principal component scores generated from facial measurements. Our results demonstrate a tendency to homogamy in facial characteristics and suggest that the tendency is due primarily to self-referent phenotype matching. Nevertheless, the presence of a sexual-imprinting-like effect is also partially indicated: whether individuals are involved in facial homogamy may be affected by their relationship with their parents during childhood. (shrink)

This is an original and stimulating collection of articles by scholars trained in classics, moral philosophy, political science, literature, and intellectual history. Its principal objective is to convey to the modern reader a sophisticated understanding of Homeric and Classical Greek morality and how it differs from our own. Some of the articles focus primarily on Greek value concepts, especially the concept of arete. Others compare those concepts to modern notions of virtue and tolerance, as well as to the work of (...) contemporary literary figures and philosophers, including T.S. Eliot, Alasdair Macintyre, John Wallace, and Philippa Foot. Throughout, the juxtaposition of ancient and modern ideas and the worldviews they presuppose makes these readings both intellectually exciting and revealing. (shrink)

Apathy and depression are frequently observed as behavioral and psychological symptoms of dementia, respectively, and are important for ensuring adequate care. This study aims to explore effective non-pharmacological interventions for apathy and depression with mild cognitive impairment and dementia. Five search engines including PubMed, Scopus, CINAHL, PsycInfo, and Web of Science were used to extract relevant studies. Inclusion criteria were studies that involved participants who were diagnosed with MCI or dementia, included quantitative assessments of each symptom, and employed randomized controlled (...) trials. Twenty studies were extracted, with interventions have been conducted in care facilities, the community, and hospitals. Participants in many studies had MCI or mild-to-moderate dementia but were not diagnosed with the subtypes of dementia. Few studies had set apathy and depression as the primary outcomes of non-pharmacological interventions. The findings suggested that emotional and stimulation-oriented approaches to apathy and depression would be useful for people with MCI or mild-to-moderate dementia. It would be helpful for therapists to assess the clinical features of the target symptoms for selecting suitable interventions. Additionally, increasing the number of randomized controlled trials focusing on apathy or depression as primary outcomes would offer a more definite conclusion for future systematic reviews. (shrink)

I presented an earlier version of this paper to the Law and Philosophy Discussion Group in Los Angeles, whose members I would like to thank for their comments. In addition, I would also like to thank the following people for reading and providing written or verbal commentary on earlier drafts: Robert Mams, Rogers Albritton, G. A. Cohen, David Copp, Matthew Hanser, Craig Ihara, Brian Lee, Marc Lange, Derk Pereboom, Carol Voeller, and the Editors of Philosophy & Public Affairs. I (...) owe special thanks to Timothy Hall and Seana Shiffnn for their insightful and helpful comments. (shrink)