Search results for 'Inductivism' (try it on Scholar)

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  1. Friedel Weinert (2000). The Construction of Atom Models: Eliminative Inductivism and its Relation to Falsificationism. Foundations of Science 5 (4):491-531.score: 24.0
    Falsificationism has dominated 20th century philosophy of science. It seemed to have eclipsed all forms of inductivism. Yet recent debates have revived a specific form of eliminative inductivism, the basic ideas of which go back to F. Bacon and J.S. Mill. These modern endorsements of eliminative inductivism claim to show that progressive problem solving is possible using induction, rather than falsification as a method of justification. But this common ground between falsificationism and eliminative inductivism has not (...)
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  2. Maria Carla Galavotti (2011). On Hans Reichenbach's Inductivism. Synthese 181 (1):95 - 111.score: 18.0
    One of the first to criticize the verifiability theory of meaning embraced by logical empiricists, Reichenbach ties the significance of scientific statements to their predictive character, which offers the condition for their testability. While identifying prediction as the task of scientific knowledge, Reichenbach assigns induction a pivotal role, and regards the theory of knowledge as a theory of prediction based on induction. Reichenbach's inductivism is grounded on the frequency notion of probability, of which he prompts a more flexible version (...)
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  3. Gerhard Schurz (2008). The Meta-Inductivist's Winning Strategy in the Prediction Game: A New Approach to Hume's Problem. Philosophy of Science 75 (3):278-305.score: 18.0
    This article suggests a ‘best alternative' justification of induction (in the sense of Reichenbach) which is based on meta-induction . The meta-inductivist applies the principle of induction to all competing prediction methods which are accessible to her. It is demonstrated, and illustrated by computer simulations, that there exist meta-inductivistic prediction strategies whose success is approximately optimal among all accessible prediction methods in arbitrary possible worlds, and which dominate the success of every noninductive prediction strategy. The proposed justification of meta-induction is (...)
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  4. Ioannis Votsis, The Pessimistic Meta-Inductivist: A Sheep in Wolf's Clothing?score: 18.0
    Under what circumstances, if any, are we warranted to assert that a theory is true or at least approximately true? Scientific realists answer that such assertions are warranted only for those theories that enjoy explanatory and predictive success. A number of challenges to this answer have emerged, chief among them the argument from pessimistic meta-induction. According to this challenge, the history of science supplies ample evidence against realism in the form of successful theories that are now considered false. The main (...)
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  5. Valeriano Iranzo (2012). Inductivist Strategies for Scientific Realism. Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 101 (1):241-268.score: 18.0
    Philip Kitcher has developed a sort of inductivist-reliabilist justification for scientific realism. After distinguishing his argument from a well-known abductivist one (the "no-miracles" argument), I will argue that Kitcher's proposal cannot adequately meet the antirealist challenge. Firstly, it begs the question against the antirealists; secondly, it can hardly support a plausible - piecemeal - scientific realism. I will explore an alternative inductivist approach that exploits correlations between theoretical properties and empirical success. On my view, its prospects for avoiding the aforementioned (...)
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  6. Herman Vetter (1971). Inductivism and Falsificationism Reconcilable. Synthese 23 (2-3):226 - 233.score: 18.0
    Inductivism is understood as the explication of the degree of confirmation as conditional logical probability. Inductivism is not recommendable in the form of Carnap's λ-system, but tenable in the form of Bayesianism. Objections directed at it are either irrelevant or can be taken account of within Bayesianism.
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  7. Roger Rosenkrantz (1971). Inductivism and Probabilism. Synthese 23 (2-3):167 - 205.score: 16.0
    I I set out my view that all inference is essentially deductive and pinpoint what I take to be the major shortcomings of the induction rule.II The import of data depends on the probability model of the experiment, a dependence ignored by the induction rule. Inductivists admit background knowledge must be taken into account but never spell out how this is to be done. As I see it, that is the problem of induction.III The induction rule, far from providing a (...)
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  8. Patrick Rysiew (2000). Testimony, Simulation, and the Limits of Inductivism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (2):269 – 274.score: 15.0
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  9. Gerd Buchdahl (1971). Inductivist Versus Deductivist Approaches in the Philosophy of Science as Illustrated by Some Controversies Between Whewell and Mill. The Monist 55 (3):343-367.score: 15.0
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  10. Joseph Agassi (1994). An Inductivist Version of Critical Rationalism. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 24 (4):458-465.score: 15.0
  11. Patricia Baillie (1975). Kuhn's Inductivism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 53 (1):54 – 57.score: 15.0
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  12. John D. Norton (2011). Observationally Indistinguishable Spacetimes: A Challenge for Any Inductivist. In Gregory J. Morgan (ed.), Philosophy of Science Matters: The Philosophy of Peter Achinstein. Oxford University Press. 164.score: 15.0
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  13. Annette Karmiloff-Smith (1988). The Child is a Theoretician, Not an Inductivist. Mind and Language 3 (3):183-196.score: 15.0
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  14. Joseph Agassi (1963). Empiricism and Inductivism. Philosophical Studies 14 (6):85 - 86.score: 15.0
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  15. Aaron D. Cobb (2012). Inductivism in Practice: Experiment in John Herschel's Philosophy of Science. Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 2 (1):21-54.score: 15.0
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  16. José A. Díez (2011). On Popper's Strong Inductivism (or Strongly Inconsistent Anti-Inductivism). Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 42 (1):105-116.score: 15.0
  17. Larry Laudan (1992). Waves, Particles, Independent Tests and the Limits of Inductivism. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1992:212 - 223.score: 15.0
    This paper seeks to show that Achinstein's recent attempt to establish that both parties to the wave-particle debate in 19th-century optics were Bayesian conditionalizers forces us to ignore several of the key conceptual issues in that controversy-not least the role of the vera causa principle and, more important still, the role of positive evidence in securing acceptance for the wave theory of light.
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  18. Adolf Grünbaum (1976). Is Falsifiability the Touchstone of Scientific Rationality? Karl Popper Versus Inductivism. In. In R. S. Cohen, P. K. Feyerabend & M. Wartofsky (eds.), Essays in Memory of Imre Lakatos. Reidel. 213--252.score: 15.0
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  19. Century German Economics (2004). Karl Milford Inductivism in 19™ Century German Economics. In Friedrich Stadler (ed.), Induction and Deduction in the Sciences. Springer. 273.score: 15.0
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  20. Hannah Gay (1978). The Asymmetric Carbon Atom: (A) A Case Study of Independent Discovery; (B) An Inductivist Model for Scientific Method. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 9 (3):207-238.score: 15.0
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  21. Richard J. Blackwell (1974). The Inductivist Model of Science. Modern Schoolman 51 (3):197-212.score: 15.0
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  22. Aaron D. Cobb (2012). Is John F. W. Herschel an Inductivist About Hypothetical Inquiry? Perspectives on Science 20 (4):409-439.score: 15.0
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  23. Iap Wogu (2011). An Evaluation of "Inductivism" As the Hall Mark of Science. Sophia: An African Journal of Philosophy 11 (1).score: 15.0
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  24. Noam A. Chomsky & Jerry A. Fodor (1980). The Inductivist Fallacy. In Massimo Piattelli-Palmarini (ed.), Language and Learning: The Debate Between Jean Piaget and Noam Chomsky. Harvard University Press.score: 15.0
     
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  25. Edoardo Datteri, Hykel Hosni & Guglielmo Tamburrini (2005). Machine Learning From Examples: A Non-Inductivist Analysis. Logic and Philosophy of Science 3 (1):1-31.score: 15.0
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  26. Steve Fuller (2012). Anti-Inductivism as Worldview: The Philosophy of Karl Popper. In James R. Brown (ed.), Philosophy of Science: The Key Thinkers. Continuum Books. 112.score: 15.0
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  27. Adolf Griinbaum (1976). Is Falsifiability the Touchstone of Scientific Rationality? Karl Popper Versus Inductivism. In R. S. Cohen, P. K. Feyerabend & M. Wartofsky (eds.), Essays in Memory of Imre Lakatos. Reidel.score: 15.0
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  28. Karl Milford (2004). Inductivism in 19TH Century German Economics. In. In Friedrich Stadler (ed.), Induction and Deduction in the Sciences. Springer. 273--291.score: 15.0
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  29. Daniel Rothbart (1980). Popper Against Inductivism. Dialectica 34 (2):121-128.score: 15.0
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  30. Konrad Talmont-Kaminski (1999). In Defence of the Naive Inductivist: As Well as Some of Their Not-so-Naive Brethren. Science and Education 8 (4):441-447.score: 15.0
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  31. John S. Wilkins (forthcoming). The Salem Region: Two Mindsets About Science. In Massimo Pigliucci & Maarten Boudry (eds.), The Philosophy of Pseudoscience. University of Chicago Press.score: 9.0
    It is often noted that if someone has a tertiary degree in a scientific field who promotes an anti-science-establishment, antiscience, or pseudoscience agenda, they are very often engineers, dentists, surgeons or medical practitioners. While this does not mean that all members of these professions or disciplines are antiscience, of course, the higher frequency of pseudoscience among them is indicative of what I call the “deductivist mindset” regarding science itself. Opposing this is the “inductivist mindset”, a view that has been deprecated (...)
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  32. Georg J. W. Dorn (1991). Inductive Support. In Gerhard Schurz & Georg J. W. Dorn (eds.), Advances in Scientific Philosophy. Essays in Honour of Paul Weingartner on the Occasion of the 60th Anniversary of his Birthday. Rodopi. 345.score: 9.0
    I set up two axiomatic theories of inductive support within the framework of Kolmogorovian probability theory. I call these theories ‘Popperian theories of inductive support’ because I think that their specific axioms express the core meaning of the word ‘inductive support’ as used by Popper (and, presumably, by many others, including some inductivists). As is to be expected from Popperian theories of inductive support, the main theorem of each of them is an anti-induction theorem, the stronger one of them saying, (...)
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  33. John J. Carvalho (2006). Overview of the Structure of a Scientific Worldview. Zygon 41 (1):113-124.score: 6.0
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  34. R. S. Peters (1951). Observationalism in Psychology. Mind 60 (January):43-61.score: 6.0
  35. Axel Gelfert (forthcoming). Observation, Inference, and Imagination: Elements of Edgar Allan Poe’s Philosophy of Science. Science and Education:1-19.score: 6.0
    Edgar Allan Poe’s standing as a literary figure, who drew on (and sometimes dabbled in) the scientific debates of his time, makes him an intriguing character for any exploration of the historical interrelationship between science, literature and philosophy. His sprawling ‘prose-poem’ Eureka (1848), in particular, has sometimes been scrutinized for anticipations of later scientific developments. By contrast, the present paper argues that it should be understood as a contribution to the raging debates about scientific methodology at the time. This methodological (...)
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  36. Georg J. W. Dorn (2002). Induktion und Wahrscheinlichkeit. Ein Gedankenaustausch mit Karl Popper. In Edgar Morscher (ed.), Was wir Karl R. Popper und seiner Philosophie verdanken. Zu seinem 100. Geburtstag. Academia Verlag.score: 6.0
    Zwischen 1987 und 1994 sandte ich 20 Briefe an Karl Popper. Die meisten betrafen Fragen bezüglich seiner Antiinduktionsbeweise und seiner Wahrscheinlichkeitstheorie, einige die organisatorische und inhaltliche Vorbereitung eines Fachgesprächs mit ihm in Kenly am 22. März 1989 (worauf hier nicht eingegangen werden soll), einige schließlich ganz oder in Teilen nicht-fachliche Angelegenheiten (die im vorliegenden Bericht ebenfalls unberücksichtigt bleiben). Von Karl Popper erhielt ich in diesem Zeitraum 10 Briefe. Der bedeutendste ist sein siebter, bestehend aus drei Teilen, geschrieben am 21., 22. (...)
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  37. Georg J. W. Dorn (1997). Deductive, Probabilistic and Inductive Dependence. An Axiomatic Study in Probability Semantics. Verlag Peter Lang.score: 6.0
    This work is in two parts. The main aim of part 1 is a systematic examination of deductive, probabilistic, inductive and purely inductive dependence relations within the framework of Kolmogorov probability semantics. The main aim of part 2 is a systematic comparison of (in all) 20 different relations of probabilistic (in)dependence within the framework of Popper probability semantics (for Kolmogorov probability semantics does not allow such a comparison). Added to this comparison is an examination of (in all) 15 purely inductive (...)
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  38. Peter Achinstein (ed.) (2004). Science Rules: A Historical Introduction to Scientific Methods. Johns Hopkins University Press.score: 3.0
    Is there a universal set of rules for discovering and testing scientific hypotheses? Since the birth of modern science, philosophers, scientists, and other thinkers have wrestled with this fundamental question of scientific practice. Efforts to devise rigorous methods for obtaining scientific knowledge include the twenty-one rules Descartes proposed in his Rules for the Direction of the Mind and the four rules of reasoning that begin the third book of Newton's Principia , and continue today in debates over the very possibility (...)
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  39. Rainer Mausfeld (2012). On Some Unwarranted Tacit Assumptions in Cognitive Neuroscience. Frontiers in Cognition 3 (67):1-13.score: 3.0
    The cognitive neurosciences are based on the idea that the level of neurons or neural networks constitutes a privileged level of analysis for the explanation of mental phenomena. This paper brings to mind several arguments to the effect that this presumption is ill-conceived and unwarranted in light of what is currently understood about the physical principles underlying mental achievements. It then scrutinizes the question why such conceptions are nevertheless currently prevailing in many areas of psychology. The paper argues that corresponding (...)
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  40. Isaac Levi (2010). Probability Logic, Logical Probability, and Inductive Support. Synthese 172 (1):97 - 118.score: 3.0
    This paper seeks to defend the following conclusions: The program advanced by Carnap and other necessarians for probability logic has little to recommend it except for one important point. Credal probability judgments ought to be adapted to changes in evidence or states of full belief in a principled manner in conformity with the inquirer’s confirmational commitments—except when the inquirer has good reason to modify his or her confirmational commitment. Probability logic ought to spell out the constraints on rationally coherent confirmational (...)
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  41. Madeline M. Muntersbjorn (2003). Francis Bacon's Philosophy of Science: Machina Intellectus and Forma Indita. Philosophy of Science 70 (5):1137-1148.score: 3.0
    Francis Bacon (15611626) wrote that good scientists are not like ants (mindlessly gathering data) or spiders (spinning empty theories). Instead, they are like bees, transforming nature into a nourishing product. This essay examines Bacon's "middle way" by elucidating the means he proposes to turn experience and insight into understanding. The human intellect relies on "machines" to extend perceptual limits, check impulsive imaginations, and reveal nature's latent causal structure, or "forms." This constructivist interpretation is not intended to supplant inductivist or experimentalist (...)
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  42. Gregor Betz (2009). Underdetermination, Model-Ensembles and Surprises: On the Epistemology of Scenario-Analysis in Climatology. [REVIEW] Journal for General Philosophy of Science 40 (1):3 - 21.score: 3.0
    As climate policy decisions are decisions under uncertainty, being based on a range of future climate change scenarios, it becomes a crucial question how to set up this scenario range. Failing to comply with the precautionary principle, the scenario methodology widely used in the Third Assessment Report of the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) seems to violate international environmental law, in particular a provision of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. To place climate policy advice on a (...)
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  43. Joseph Agassi (1996). The Place of Metaphysics in the Historiography of Science. Foundations of Physics 26 (4):483-499.score: 3.0
    Legitimating the use of metaphysics in scientific research constituted a farreaching methodological revolution, invalidating the inductivist demands that science be guided by empirical information alone. Thus, science became tentative. The revolution was established when pioneering historians of science, Max Jammer among them, exhibited the working of metaphysics in scientific research. This raises many problems, since most metaphysical ideas are poor as compared with scientific ones. Yet taking science to be the effort to explain facts in a comprehensive manner, makes some (...)
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  44. James H. Fetzer (2002). Propensities and Frequencies: Inference to the Best Explanation. Synthese 132 (1-2):27 - 61.score: 3.0
    An approach to inference to the best explanation integrating a Popperianconception of natural laws together with a modified Hempelian account of explanation, one the one hand, and Hacking's law of likelihood (in its nomicguise), on the other, which provides a robust abductivist model of sciencethat appears to overcome the obstacles that confront its inductivist,deductivist, and hypothetico-deductivist alternatives.This philosophy of scienceclarifies and illuminates some fundamental aspects of ontology and epistemology, especially concerning the relations between frequencies and propensities. Among the most important (...)
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  45. Carol Cleland, Historical Science, Experimental Science, and the Scientific Method.score: 3.0
    Many scientists believe that there is a uniform, interdisciplinary method for the prac- tice of good science. The paradigmatic examples, however, are drawn from classical ex- perimental science. Insofar as historical hypotheses cannot be tested in controlled labo- ratory settings, historical research is sometimes said to be inferior to experimental research. Using examples from diverse historical disciplines, this paper demonstrates that such claims are misguided. First, the reputed superiority of experimental research is based upon accounts of scientific methodology (Baconian (...) or falsificationism) that are deeply flawed, both logically and as accounts of the actual practices of scientists. Second, although there are fundamental differences in methodology between experimental scien- tists and historical scientists, they are keyed to a pervasive feature of nature, a time asymmetry of causation. As a consequence, the claim that historical science is methodo- logically inferior to experimental science cannot be sustained. (shrink)
     
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  46. Gerhard Schurz (2009). Meta-Induction and Social Epistemology: Computer Simulations of Prediction Games. Episteme 6 (2):200-220.score: 3.0
    The justification of induction is of central significance for cross-cultural social epistemology. Different ‘epistemological cultures’ do not only differ in their beliefs, but also in their belief-forming methods and evaluation standards. For an objective comparison of different methods and standards, one needs (meta-)induction over past successes. A notorious obstacle to the problem of justifying induction lies in the fact that the success of object-inductive prediction methods (i.e., methods applied at the level of events) can neither be shown to be universally (...)
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  47. David Miller, Deductivist Decision Making.score: 3.0
    The non-justificationist deductivism (or critical rationalism) of Karl Popper constitutes the only approach to human knowledge, including of course the natural and social sciences, that is capable of overcoming all the failings, and the plain contradictions, of the traditional doctrine of inductivism and of its modern incarnation, Bayesianism.
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  48. Mario Bunge (1960). The Place of Induction in Science. Philosophy of Science 27 (3):262-270.score: 3.0
    The place of induction in the framing and test of scientific hypotheses is investigated. The meaning of 'induction' is first equated with generalization on the basis of case examination. Two kinds of induction are then distinguished: the inference of generals from particulars (first degree induction), and the generalization of generalizations (second degree induction). Induction is claimed to play a role in the framing of modest empirical generalizations and in the extension of every sort of generalizations--not however in the invention of (...)
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  49. Nicholas Maxwell (2014). Three Criticisms of Newton’s Inductive Argument in the Principia. Advances in Historical Studies 3 (1):2-11.score: 3.0
    In this paper, I discuss how Newton’s inductive argument of the Principia can be defended against criticisms levelled against it by Duhem, Popper and myself. I argue that Duhem’s and Popper’s criticisms can be countered, but mine cannot. It requires that we reconsider, not just Newton’s inductive argument in the Principia, but also the nature of science more generally. The methods of science, whether conceived along inductivist or hypothetico-deductivist lines, make implicit metaphysical presuppositions which rigour requires we make explicit within (...)
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