Search results for 'Inductivism' (try it on Scholar)

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  1.  11
    Friedel Weinert (2000). The Construction of Atom Models: Eliminative Inductivism and its Relation to Falsificationism. Foundations of Science 5 (4):491-531.
    Falsificationism has dominated 20th century philosophy of science. It seemed to have eclipsed all forms of inductivism. Yet recent debates have revived a specific form of eliminative inductivism, the basic ideas of which go back to F. Bacon and J.S. Mill. These modern endorsements of eliminative inductivism claim to show that progressive problem solving is possible using induction, rather than falsification as a method of justification. But this common ground between falsificationism and eliminative inductivism has not (...)
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  2.  38
    Gerhard Schurz (2008). The Meta-Inductivist's Winning Strategy in the Prediction Game: A New Approach to Hume's Problem. Philosophy of Science 75 (3):278-305.
    This article suggests a ‘best alternative' justification of induction (in the sense of Reichenbach) which is based on meta-induction . The meta-inductivist applies the principle of induction to all competing prediction methods which are accessible to her. It is demonstrated, and illustrated by computer simulations, that there exist meta-inductivistic prediction strategies whose success is approximately optimal among all accessible prediction methods in arbitrary possible worlds, and which dominate the success of every noninductive prediction strategy. The proposed justification of meta-induction is (...)
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  3.  41
    Maria Carla Galavotti (2011). On Hans Reichenbach's Inductivism. Synthese 181 (1):95 - 111.
    One of the first to criticize the verifiability theory of meaning embraced by logical empiricists, Reichenbach ties the significance of scientific statements to their predictive character, which offers the condition for their testability. While identifying prediction as the task of scientific knowledge, Reichenbach assigns induction a pivotal role, and regards the theory of knowledge as a theory of prediction based on induction. Reichenbach's inductivism is grounded on the frequency notion of probability, of which he prompts a more flexible version (...)
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  4.  70
    Valeriano Iranzo (2012). Inductivist Strategies for Scientific Realism. Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 101 (1):241-268.
    Philip Kitcher has developed a sort of inductivist-reliabilist justification for scientific realism. After distinguishing his argument from a well-known abductivist one (the "no-miracles" argument), I will argue that Kitcher's proposal cannot adequately meet the antirealist challenge. Firstly, it begs the question against the antirealists; secondly, it can hardly support a plausible - piecemeal - scientific realism. I will explore an alternative inductivist approach that exploits correlations between theoretical properties and empirical success. On my view, its prospects for avoiding the aforementioned (...)
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  5.  52
    Ioannis Votsis, The Pessimistic Meta-Inductivist: A Sheep in Wolf's Clothing?
    Under what circumstances, if any, are we warranted to assert that a theory is true or at least approximately true? Scientific realists answer that such assertions are warranted only for those theories that enjoy explanatory and predictive success. A number of challenges to this answer have emerged, chief among them the argument from pessimistic meta-induction. According to this challenge, the history of science supplies ample evidence against realism in the form of successful theories that are now considered false. The main (...)
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  6.  18
    Herman Vetter (1971). Inductivism and Falsificationism Reconcilable. Synthese 23 (2-3):226 - 233.
    Inductivism is understood as the explication of the degree of confirmation as conditional logical probability. Inductivism is not recommendable in the form of Carnap's λ-system, but tenable in the form of Bayesianism. Objections directed at it are either irrelevant or can be taken account of within Bayesianism.
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  7.  10
    José A. Díez (2011). On Popper's Strong Inductivism (or Strongly Inconsistent Anti-Inductivism). Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 42 (1):105-116.
    It is generally accepted that Popper‘s degree of corroboration, though “inductivist” in a very general and weak sense, is not inductivist in a strong sense, i.e. when by ‘inductivism’ we mean the thesis that the right measure of evidential support has a probabilistic character. The aim of this paper is to challenge this common view by arguing that Popper can be regarded as an inductivist, not only in the weak broad sense but also in a narrower, probabilistic sense. In (...)
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  8. Joseph Agassi (1963). The Inductivist Philosophy. History and Theory 2:1-3.
    Bacon's inductivist philosophy of science divides thinkers into the scientific and the prejudiced, using as a standard the up-to-date science textbook. Inductivists regard the history of science as progressing smoothly, from facts rather than from problems, to increasingly general theories, undisturbed by contending scientific schools. Conventionalists regard theories as pigeonholes for classifying facts; history of science is the development of increasingly simple theories, neither true nor false. Conventionalism is useless for reconstructing and weighing conflicts between schools, and overemphasizes science's internal (...)
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  9. Athanasse Raftopoulos (1994). Cartesian Deductivism and Newtonian Inductivism: A Comparative Study. Dissertation, The Johns Hopkins University
    It has been a traditional claim that Newtonian inductivism sharply contradicts Cartesian deductivism, and that Newton's rejection of the method of hypothesis is intended as a criticism of the Cartesian scientific methodology. There have been some sharp attacks against the received view that Descartes aimed at the construction of a purely a priori science, but despite this two beliefs still dominate even recent interpretations of Descartes' work. The first is the belief that a significant part of Descartes' natural philosophy (...)
     
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  10.  6
    Annette Karmiloff-Smith (1988). The Child is a Theoretician, Not an Inductivist. Mind and Language 3 (3):183-196.
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  11.  34
    Nils-Eric Sahlin, Baconian Inductivism in Research on Human Decision Making.
    The paper discusses the pros and cons of inductive research methods. It is argued that, despite the profusion of good arguments against this scientific strategy, it is frequently employed, for example in psychology. A case probe taken from the realm of cognitive psychology is used as an illustration.
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  12.  16
    John D. Norton (2011). Observationally Indistinguishable Spacetimes: A Challenge for Any Inductivist. In Gregory J. Morgan (ed.), Philosophy of Science Matters: The Philosophy of Peter Achinstein. Oxford University Press 164.
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  13.  15
    Patrick Rysiew (2000). Testimony, Simulation, and the Limits of Inductivism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (2):269 – 274.
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  14.  21
    Gerd Buchdahl (1971). Inductivist Versus Deductivist Approaches in the Philosophy of Science as Illustrated by Some Controversies Between Whewell and Mill. The Monist 55 (3):343-367.
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  15.  8
    Konrad Talmont-Kaminski (1999). In Defence of the Naive Inductivist: As Well as Some of Their Not-so-Naive Brethren. Science and Education 8 (4):441-447.
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  16.  16
    Adolf Grünbaum (1976). Is Falsifiability the Touchstone of Scientific Rationality? Karl Popper Versus Inductivism. In R. S. Cohen, P. K. Feyerabend & M. Wartofsky (eds.), Essays in Memory of Imre Lakatos. Reidel 213--252.
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  17.  2
    Edoardo Datteri, Hykel Hosni & Guglielmo Tamburrini (2005). Machine Learning From Examples: A Non-Inductivist Analysis. Logic and Philosophy of Science 3 (1):1-31.
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  18.  11
    Aaron D. Cobb (2012). Inductivism in Practice: Experiment in John Herschel's Philosophy of Science. Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 2 (1):21-54.
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  19.  2
    Joseph Agassi (1963). The Inductivist Techniques. History and Theory 2:14-20.
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  20.  8
    Richard J. Blackwell (1974). The Inductivist Model of Science. Modern Schoolman 51 (3):197-212.
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  21.  5
    Century German Economics (2004). Karl Milford Inductivism in 19™ Century German Economics. In Friedrich Stadler (ed.), Induction and Deduction in the Sciences. Springer 273.
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  22.  17
    Roger Rosenkrantz (1971). Inductivism and Probabilism. Synthese 23 (2-3):167 - 205.
    I I set out my view that all inference is essentially deductive and pinpoint what I take to be the major shortcomings of the induction rule.II The import of data depends on the probability model of the experiment, a dependence ignored by the induction rule. Inductivists admit background knowledge must be taken into account but never spell out how this is to be done. As I see it, that is the problem of induction.III The induction rule, far from providing a (...)
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  23.  1
    Karl Milford (2004). Inductivism in 19TH Century German Economics. In Friedrich Stadler (ed.), Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook. Springer 273--291.
    In his The Poverty of Historicism 1 K.R. Popper and before him F. Kaufmann2 distinguish two broad classes of epistemological and methodological positions held in the social sciences: Antinaturalistic positions and pronaturalistic positions. These positions are distinguished with respect to their attitude regarding the applicability of the methods of the natural sciences, or rather what the representatives of the anti and pronaturalistic positions assume to be the method of the natural sciences. According to Popper and Kaufmann the representatives of antinaturalistic (...)
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  24.  12
    Joseph Agassi (1994). An Inductivist Version of Critical Rationalism. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 24 (4):458-465.
  25. Daniel Rothbart (1980). Popper Against Inductivism. Dialectica 34 (2):121-128.
    SummaryAfter presumably cleaning science of induction, Karl Popper claims to offer a purely noninductivist theory of science. In critically evaluating this theory, I focus on the allegedly noninductive character of this theory. First, I defend and expand Wesley Salmon's charge that Popper's dismissal of induction renders science useless for practical purposes. Without induction practitioners have no grounds for believing that the predicted event will actually take place. Second, despite Popper's demands to the contrary, his theory of science is shown to (...)
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  26.  9
    Patricia Baillie (1975). Kuhn's Inductivism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 53 (1):54 – 57.
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  27.  11
    Joseph Agassi (1963). Empiricism and Inductivism. Philosophical Studies 14 (6):85 - 86.
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  28.  7
    Larry Laudan (1992). Waves, Particles, Independent Tests and the Limits of Inductivism. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1992:212 - 223.
    This paper seeks to show that Achinstein's recent attempt to establish that both parties to the wave-particle debate in 19th-century optics were Bayesian conditionalizers forces us to ignore several of the key conceptual issues in that controversy-not least the role of the vera causa principle and, more important still, the role of positive evidence in securing acceptance for the wave theory of light.
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  29.  2
    Iap Wogu (2011). An Evaluation of "Inductivism" As the Hall Mark of Science. Sophia: An African Journal of Philosophy 11 (1).
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  30.  2
    Aaron D. Cobb (2012). Is John F. W. Herschel an Inductivist About Hypothetical Inquiry? Perspectives on Science 20 (4):409-439.
  31.  2
    Hannah Gay (1978). The Asymmetric Carbon Atom: (A) A Case Study of Independent Discovery; (B) An Inductivist Model for Scientific Method. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 9 (3):207-238.
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  32. Joseph Agassi (1963). The Standard Problems of the Inductivist Historian. History and Theory 2:7-11.
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  33. Noam A. Chomsky & Jerry A. Fodor (1980). The Inductivist Fallacy. In Massimo Piattelli-Palmarini (ed.), Language and Learning: The Debate Between Jean Piaget and Noam Chomsky. Harvard University Press
     
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  34. Steve Fuller (2012). Anti-Inductivism as Worldview: The Philosophy of Karl Popper. In James R. Brown (ed.), Philosophy of Science: The Key Thinkers. Continuum Books 112.
     
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  35. Maria Carla Galavotti (2011). On Hans Reichenbach’s Inductivism. Synthese 181 (1):95-111.
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  36. Adolf Griinbaum (1976). Is Falsifiability the Touchstone of Scientific Rationality? Karl Popper Versus Inductivism. In R. S. Cohen, P. K. Feyerabend & M. Wartofsky (eds.), Essays in Memory of Imre Lakatos. Reidel
  37. Adam Grobler (1994). Justification of the Empirical Basis: The Popperian Vs. The Inductivist Conception of Rationality. In Ulla Wessels & Georg Meggle (eds.), Analyomen / Analyomen: Proceedings of the 1st Conference "Perspectives in Analytical Philosophy". De Gruyter 299-309.
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  38. John S. Wilkins (forthcoming). The Salem Region: Two Mindsets About Science. In Massimo Pigliucci & Maarten Boudry (eds.), The Philosophy of Pseudoscience. University of Chicago Press
    It is often noted that if someone has a tertiary degree in a scientific field who promotes an anti-science-establishment, antiscience, or pseudoscience agenda, they are very often engineers, dentists, surgeons or medical practitioners. While this does not mean that all members of these professions or disciplines are antiscience, of course, the higher frequency of pseudoscience among them is indicative of what I call the “deductivist mindset” regarding science itself. Opposing this is the “inductivist mindset”, a view that has been deprecated (...)
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  39. Georg J. W. Dorn (1991). Inductive Support. In Gerhard Schurz & Georg J. W. Dorn (eds.), Advances in Scientific Philosophy. Essays in Honour of Paul Weingartner on the Occasion of the 60th Anniversary of his Birthday. Rodopi 345.
    I set up two axiomatic theories of inductive support within the framework of Kolmogorovian probability theory. I call these theories ‘Popperian theories of inductive support’ because I think that their specific axioms express the core meaning of the word ‘inductive support’ as used by Popper (and, presumably, by many others, including some inductivists). As is to be expected from Popperian theories of inductive support, the main theorem of each of them is an anti-induction theorem, the stronger one of them saying, (...)
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  40. John J. Carvalho (2006). Overview of the Structure of a Scientific Worldview. Zygon 41 (1):113-124.
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  41.  41
    Georg J. W. Dorn (2002). Induktion und Wahrscheinlichkeit. Ein Gedankenaustausch mit Karl Popper. In Edgar Morscher (ed.), Was wir Karl R. Popper und seiner Philosophie verdanken. Zu seinem 100. Geburtstag. Academia Verlag
    Zwischen 1987 und 1994 sandte ich 20 Briefe an Karl Popper. Die meisten betrafen Fragen bezüglich seiner Antiinduktionsbeweise und seiner Wahrscheinlichkeitstheorie, einige die organisatorische und inhaltliche Vorbereitung eines Fachgesprächs mit ihm in Kenly am 22. März 1989 (worauf hier nicht eingegangen werden soll), einige schließlich ganz oder in Teilen nicht-fachliche Angelegenheiten (die im vorliegenden Bericht ebenfalls unberücksichtigt bleiben). Von Karl Popper erhielt ich in diesem Zeitraum 10 Briefe. Der bedeutendste ist sein siebter, bestehend aus drei Teilen, geschrieben am 21., 22. (...)
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  42.  66
    R. S. Peters (1951). Observationalism in Psychology. Mind 60 (January):43-61.
  43.  15
    Axel Gelfert (2014). Observation, Inference, and Imagination: Elements of Edgar Allan Poe’s Philosophy of Science. Science and Education 23 (3):589-607.
    Edgar Allan Poe’s standing as a literary figure, who drew on (and sometimes dabbled in) the scientific debates of his time, makes him an intriguing character for any exploration of the historical interrelationship between science, literature and philosophy. His sprawling ‘prose-poem’ Eureka (1848), in particular, has sometimes been scrutinized for anticipations of later scientific developments. By contrast, the present paper argues that it should be understood as a contribution to the raging debates about scientific methodology at the time. This methodological (...)
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  44.  14
    Georg J. W. Dorn (1997). Deductive, Probabilistic and Inductive Dependence. An Axiomatic Study in Probability Semantics. Verlag Peter Lang.
    This work is in two parts. The main aim of part 1 is a systematic examination of deductive, probabilistic, inductive and purely inductive dependence relations within the framework of Kolmogorov probability semantics. The main aim of part 2 is a systematic comparison of (in all) 20 different relations of probabilistic (in)dependence within the framework of Popper probability semantics (for Kolmogorov probability semantics does not allow such a comparison). Added to this comparison is an examination of (in all) 15 purely inductive (...)
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  45. Carol Cleland, Historical Science, Experimental Science, and the Scientific Method.
    Many scientists believe that there is a uniform, interdisciplinary method for the prac- tice of good science. The paradigmatic examples, however, are drawn from classical ex- perimental science. Insofar as historical hypotheses cannot be tested in controlled labo- ratory settings, historical research is sometimes said to be inferior to experimental research. Using examples from diverse historical disciplines, this paper demonstrates that such claims are misguided. First, the reputed superiority of experimental research is based upon accounts of scientific methodology (Baconian (...) or falsificationism) that are deeply flawed, both logically and as accounts of the actual practices of scientists. Second, although there are fundamental differences in methodology between experimental scien- tists and historical scientists, they are keyed to a pervasive feature of nature, a time asymmetry of causation. As a consequence, the claim that historical science is methodo- logically inferior to experimental science cannot be sustained. (shrink)
     
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  46.  40
    Nicholas Maxwell (1985). Methodological Problems of Neuroscience. In David Rose & Vernon Dobson (eds.), Models of the Visual Cortex. New York: John Wiley & Sons
    In this paper I argue that neuroscience has been harmed by the widespread adoption of seriously inadequate methodologies or philosophies of science - most notably inductivism and falsificationism. I argue that neuroscience, in seeking to understand the human brain and mind, needs to follow in the footsteps of evolution.
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  47. Aaron D. Cobb (2011). History and Scientific Practice in the Construction of an Adequate Philosophy of Science: Revisiting a Whewell/Mill Debate. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 42 (1):85-93.
    William Whewell raised a series of objections concerning John Stuart Mill’s philosophy of science which suggested that Mill’s views were not properly informed by the history of science or by adequate reflection on scientific practices. The aim of this paper is to revisit and evaluate this incisive Whewellian criticism of Mill’s views by assessing Mill’s account of Michael Faraday’s discovery of electrical induction. The historical evidence demonstrates that Mill’s reconstruction is an inadequate reconstruction of this historical episode and the scientific (...)
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  48.  14
    A. Cohen (2001). On the Generic Use of Indefinite Singulars. Journal of Semantics 18 (3):183-209.
    The distribution of indefinite singular generics is much more restricted than that of bare plural generics. The former, unlike the latter, seem to require that the property predicated of their subject be, in some sense, ‘definitional’. Moreover, the two constructions exhibit different scopal behaviour, and differ in their felicity in conjunctions, questions, and expressions describing the speaker's confidence. I propose that the reason is that the two expressions, in fact, have rather different meanings. Carlson (1995) makes a distinction between inductivist (...)
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  49.  9
    Richard Dawid (2015). Turning Norton’s Dome Against Material Induction. Foundations of Physics 45 (9):1101-1109.
    John Norton has proposed a position of “material induction” that denies the existence of a universal inductive inference schema behind scientific reasoning. In this vein, Norton has recently presented a “dome scenario” based on Newtonian physics that, in his understanding, is at variance with Bayesianism. The present note points out that a closer analysis of the dome scenario reveals incompatibilities with material inductivism itself.
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  50.  67
    Nicholas Maxwell (2014). Three Criticisms of Newton’s Inductive Argument in the Principia. Advances in Historical Studies 3 (1):2-11.
    In this paper, I discuss how Newton’s inductive argument of the Principia can be defended against criticisms levelled against it by Duhem, Popper and myself. I argue that Duhem’s and Popper’s criticisms can be countered, but mine cannot. It requires that we reconsider, not just Newton’s inductive argument in the Principia, but also the nature of science more generally. The methods of science, whether conceived along inductivist or hypothetico-deductivist lines, make implicit metaphysical presuppositions which rigour requires we make explicit within (...)
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