When we reframe design through a discourse, designing on a meta level, we are actually designing design, as we are giving design a different meaning, changing frame to include or exclude what we do or don't consider as a part of the field. Therefore we need to frame at first what we understand in speaking about design. And it is far more complex to speak about media design, since it triggers the idea of designing media. Marshall McLuhan's thoughts on media (...) will help to explore what a media designer actually does; what he designs. However, if the digital media comes into place, the new medium, the digital medium, suddenly is the major carrier of all of society's messages. How does it change the designer's work, and does it require a different designer. (shrink)

In his famous essay "The Ethics of Belief," William K. Clifford claimed "it is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence." ). One might claim that a corollary to Clifford's Law is that it is wrong, always, everywhere, and for anyone, to withhold belief when faced with sufficient evidence. Seeming to operate on this principle, many religious philosophers—from St. Anselm to Alvin Plantinga—have claimed that non-believers are psychologically or cognitively deficient if they refuse to believe (...) in the existence of God, when presented with evidence for His existence in the form of relevant experience or religious arguments that are prima facie unassailable. Similarly, many atheists fail to see how believers can confront the problem of evil and still assert their belief in a benevolent, omnipotent, and omniscient Creator. In this paper, I propose to explain why religious arguments so often fail to persuade. In doing so, I first offer an account of persuasion and then apply it to religious arguments. I go on to argue that at least some religious arguments commit a form of question-begging, which I call "begging the doxastic question." An argument begs the doxastic question, on my account, when a subject would find the argument persuasive only if she antecedently believes the argument's conclusion. This form of question begging is not, strictly speaking, a case of circularity and thus, is not a fallacy; rather, it would explain why one coming to the argument would fail to be persuaded by it unless he already accepted its conclusion. This has the effect, when applied to religious argumentation, that religious arguments are rarely persuasive, which raises the further question: what good are religious arguments? I end by suggesting some non-persuasive functions of religious argument. Finally, I suggest that a full understanding of religious argumentation should give evidentialists pause, for religious beliefs look less like belief states that are sensitive to evidentiary states and more like framework principles or fundamental commitments. (shrink)

Background In the course of the COVID-19 pandemic, the biomedical research community’s attempt to focus the attention on fighting COVID-19, led to several challenges within the field of research ethics. However, we know little about the practical relevance of these challenges for Research Ethics Committees. Methods We conducted a qualitative survey across all 52 German RECs on the challenges and potential solutions with reviewing proposals for COVID-19 studies. We de-identified the answers and applied thematic text analysis for the extraction and (...) synthesis of challenges and potential solutions that we grouped under established principles for clinical research ethics. Results We received an overall response rate of 42%. The 22 responding RECs reported that they had assessed a total of 441 study proposals on COVID-19 until 21 April 2020. For the review of these proposals the RECs indicated a broad spectrum of challenges regarding social value, scientific validity, favourable risk–benefit ratio, informed consent, independent review, fair selection of trial participants, and respect for study participants. Mentioned solutions ranged from improved local/national coordination, over guidance on modified consent procedures, to priority setting across clinical studies. Conclusions RECs are facing a broad spectrum of pressing challenges in reviewing COVID-19 studies. Some challenges for consent procedures are well known from research in intensive care settings but are further aggravated by infection measures. Other challenges such as reviewing several clinical studies at the same time that potentially compete for the recruitment of in-house COVID-19 patients are unique to the current situation. For some of the challenges the proposed solutions in our survey could relatively easy be translated into practice. Others need further conceptual and empirical research. Our findings together with the increasing body of literature on COVID-19 research ethics, and further stakeholder engagement should inform the development of hands-on guidance for researchers, funders, RECs, and further oversight bodies. (shrink)

In spite of the fact that most university campuses are considered bastions of liberalism (in contrast to the conservative “mainstream”), it remains difficult for lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgendered faculty members and students to come out, and instances of poor treatment still occur. In addition, curricular issues related to LGBT identities and concerns continue to be met with resistance or outright hostility. In this paper, I argue that all faculty—not just LGBT faculty—have an obligation to play a more active role (...) in creating an LGBT-friendly environment on their respective campuses. I end with suggestions for achieving this goal. (shrink)

edited by Tuija Takala and Matti Häyry, welcomes contributions on the conceptual and theoretical dimensions of bioethics.

Psychologists' courtroom involvement and testimony should not be dictated solely by what the judge or court allows but also require the application of personal or professional standards. This article explores various standards that might be used to determine whether psychological evidence is ready for courtroom application, whether or which evaluative procedures should be performed prior to courtroom use, and the potential tensions between personal validation or impression and formal scientific evidence. Although determining just how tough our professional standards ought to (...) be involves complex issues, the field should take a strong stance against testimony that is based largely on personal validation and that lacks scientific support or conflicts with research evidence. Much of current testimony violates this minimal standard. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungEs ist in der Literatur weithin bekannt, dass im Gesundheitswesen auf unterschiedlichen Ebenen Allokationsentscheidungen getroffen werden. Während es auf der Makroebene um gesellschaftlich-politische Strukturfragen geht, stehen die Akteure der Mikroebene vor der Aufgabe, begrenzte Ressourcen in einer Organisation sinnvoll einzusetzen. In den ethischen Analysen der Mikro-Allokationsebene werden zumeist Entscheidungen der Healthcare Professionals thematisiert, weil sie eine unmittelbare Auswirkung auf die konkreten Patienten haben. Weniger in den Blick geraten Allokationen des Managements, welche die Rahmenbedingungen für Ressourcenzuteilungen beim Patienten betreffen. Hierbei geht (...) es nicht bloß um den Einsatz von Sachmitteln, sondern auch um den Personaleinsatz. Das Personalmanagement ist damit in wichtige Allokationsentscheidungen eingebunden und trägt eine dreifache Verantwortung: für die Gesundheit der Patienten, der Mitarbeiter und der Organisation. Der vorliegende Beitrag geht der Frage nach, welche Aspekte der Allokationsethik aus der Sicht des Personalmanagements in einem Krankenhaus zu bedenken sind, um der dreifachen Verantwortung gerecht zu werden. Dadurch zeigt sich, dass Allokationsethik in einem Krankenhaus nicht adäquat erfasst werden kann, ohne sich mit dem Personalmanagement zu beschäftigen, da das Personal die wertvollste Ressource ist, die es in einem Krankenhaus zu allozieren gilt. (shrink)

Spengler’s Untergang des Abendlandes (The Decline of the West) (1918–22) was a sensational success in its own time, but has since slipped into oblivion. In this article I attempt to restore those aspects of his doctrine which could speak to us today and alert us to a crisis of the European Geist and its survival exigencies. This involves a reorientation on several issues on which our present perspectives differ from those that were current 100 years ago, such as the precedence (...) of his philosophical approach over the historical approach; the diminished importance of his extensive analysis and depiction of defunct civilisations, which serve at best as illustrative material rather than as direct comparisons on a somewhat risky notion of “simultaneity.” I also propose more relevant criteria in justification of his Faustianism (its sources and inception), and, not least, point to a differentiation between prediction and prognosis. The intention is to highlight the rationale behind Spengler’s enquiries into history—namely to situate Western civilisation in the overall scheme of human civilisations by alerting us to a decisive crossroads. This required of its author a means of identifying the symptoms that we must be aware of in order to sustain our world without tumbling unawares into a major catastrophe. The Untergang does not compulsorily wipe our civilisation out unless we provoke this to occur; instead, our civilisation may merge or blend peacefully with whatever culture(s) may be waiting to inaugurate a new cycle. (shrink)

By using preimplantation haplotype diagnosis, prospective parents are able to select embryos to implant through in vitro fertilization. If we knew that the naturally-occurring (but theoretical) MoralKinder (MK+) haplotype would predispose individuals to a higher level of morality than average, is it permissible or obligatory to select for the MK+ haplotype? I.e., is it moral to select for morality? This paper explores the various potential issues that could arise from genetic moral enhancement.

The study of human judgment and its limitations is essential to an understanding of the processes involved in the acquisition of scientific knowledge. With that end in mind, David Faust has made the first comprehensive attempt to apply recent research on.

This article argues that, despite their distance across the colonial divide, a creolizing reading of Frantz Fanon and Paul Ricœur can yield valuable insights into decoloniality. Tracing their shared philosophical concerns with embodied phenomenology, social ontology and recognition, I argue that their respective accounts of sociogeny and hermeneutics can be productively read together as describing a shared end of mutual recognition untainted by racism or coloniality – a ‘new skin’ for humanity, as Fanon describes it. More specifically, Fanon contributes to (...) Ricœur an understanding of how divergences in social location can be overcome through liberatory action that posits a new logic of sociality; likewise, Ricœur provides Fanon with an account of how liberatory horizons are produced through this praxis, based on the imaginative connection between ideology and utopia. This article concludes by arguing that these congruent methodological and normative concerns can be read together to concretize – and potentially actualize – the utopic end of liberatory struggle in mutual recognition through fashioning this new skin. (shrink)

More powerful methods for studying and integrating the historical track record of scientific episodes and scientific judgment, or what Faust and Meehl describe as a program of meta‐science and meta‐scientific studies, can supplement and extend more commonly used case study methods. We describe the basic premises of meta‐science, overview methodological considerations, and provide examples of meta‐scientific studies. Meta‐science can help to clarify or resolve long‐standing questions in the history and philosophy of science and provide practical help to the working (...) scientist. (shrink)

In his famous essay "The Ethics of Belief," William K. Clifford claimed "it is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence." ). One might claim that a corollary to Clifford's Law is that it is wrong, always, everywhere, and for anyone, to withhold belief when faced with sufficient evidence. Seeming to operate on this principle, many religious philosophers—from St. Anselm to Alvin Plantinga—have claimed that non-believers are psychologically or cognitively deficient if they refuse to believe (...) in the existence of God, when presented with evidence for His existence in the form of relevant experience or religious arguments that are prima facie unassailable. Similarly, many atheists fail to see how believers can confront the problem of evil and still assert their belief in a benevolent, omnipotent, and omniscient Creator. In this paper, I propose to explain why religious arguments so often fail to persuade . In doing so, I first offer an account of persuasion and then apply it to religious arguments. I go on to argue that at least some religious arguments commit a form of question-begging, which I call "begging the doxastic question." An argument begs the doxastic question, on my account, when a subject would find the argument persuasive only if she antecedently believes the argument's conclusion. This form of question begging is not, strictly speaking, a case of circularity and thus, is not a fallacy; rather, it would explain why one coming to the argument would fail to be persuaded by it unless he already accepted its conclusion. This has the effect, when applied to religious argumentation, that religious arguments are rarely persuasive, which raises the further question: what good are religious arguments? I end by suggesting some non-persuasive functions of religious argument. Finally, I suggest that a full understanding of religious argumentation should give evidentialists pause, for religious beliefs look less like belief states that are sensitive to evidentiary states and more like framework principles or fundamental commitments. (shrink)

This article argues that, despite their distance across the colonial divide, a creolizing reading of Frantz Fanon and Paul Ricœur can yield valuable insights into decoloniality. Tracing their shared philosophical concerns with embodied phenomenology, social ontology and recognition, I argue that their respective accounts of sociogeny and hermeneutics can be productively read together as describing a shared end of mutual recognition untainted by racism or coloniality – a ‘new skin’ for humanity, as Fanon describes it. More specifically, Fanon contributes to (...) Ricœur an understanding of how divergences in social location can be overcome through liberatory action that posits a new logic of sociality; likewise, Ricœur provides Fanon with an account of how liberatory horizons are produced through this praxis, based on the imaginative connection between ideology and utopia. This article concludes by arguing that these congruent methodological and normative concerns can be read together to concretize – and potentially actualize – the utopic end of liberatory struggle in mutual recognition through fashioning this new skin. (shrink)

This article argues that, despite their distance across the colonial divide, a creolizing reading of Frantz Fanon and Paul Ricœur can yield valuable insights into decoloniality. Tracing their shared philosophical concerns with embodied phenomenology, social ontology and recognition, I argue that their respective accounts of sociogeny and hermeneutics can be productively read together as describing a shared end of mutual recognition untainted by racism or coloniality – a ‘new skin’ for humanity, as Fanon describes it. More specifically, Fanon contributes to (...) Ricœur an understanding of how divergences in social location can be overcome through liberatory action that posits a new logic of sociality; likewise, Ricœur provides Fanon with an account of how liberatory horizons are produced through this praxis, based on the imaginative connection between ideology and utopia. This article concludes by arguing that these congruent methodological and normative concerns can be read together to concretize – and potentially actualize – the utopic end of liberatory struggle in mutual recognition through fashioning this new skin. (shrink)

Frequently, historical comparisons are asymmetrical in the sense that they investigate one case carefully while limiting themselves to a mere sketch of the other case which serve as comparative reference point. The debate on the German Sonderweg and the rich historical literature originating from this debate can serve as examples. This article reconstructs the pros and cons within this controversial debate, reports its results and puts it into a broader historical context. It analyzes the comparative logic implied by the Sonderweg (...) thesis and argues that the interpretation of modern German history in the sense of a Sonderweg can only be maintained if related to the question why Germany turned fascist and totalitarian in the interwar period while other societies did not, and if Western countries are selected as units of comparison. The choice of comparative reference points turns out to be decisive and partly dependent on normative priorities and conventions. The article points to dangers and opportunities inherent in asymmetrical comparison. (shrink)

This paper highlights the role of Lewis’ Principal Principle and certain auxiliary conditions on admissibility as serving to explicate normal informal standards of what is reasonable. These considerations motivate the presuppositions of the argument that the Principal Principle implies the Principle of Indifference, put forward by Hawthorne et al.. They also suggest a line of response to recent criticisms of that argument, due to Pettigrew and Titelbaum and Hart, 621–632, 2020). The paper also shows that related concerns of Hart and (...) Titelbaum, 252–262, 2015) do not undermine the argument of Hawthorne et al.. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungIn den letzten Jahren wird intensiv darüber diskutiert, ob und in welcher Weise das Gewissen im Kontext der Apotheke zu schützen ist. Der Status quo in Deutschland und Österreich sieht keine gesetzliche Regelung für dieses Problem vor. Der ethische Rahmen für eine Bewältigungsstrategie im Umgang mit dem Problem der Gewissensfreiheit in der Apotheke wird deutlich gemacht. Unter Anwendung des rechtsethischen Verhältnismäßigkeitsprinzips wird das Problem mit Berücksichtigung des deutschen und österreichischen Verfassungsrechts sowie der Europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention auf individueller, korporativer und gesellschaftlicher Ebene (...) analysiert. Auf individueller Ebene sind die berechtigten Interessen und Güter des Apothekers einerseits und der Patientin andererseits durch eine grundrechtliche Verhältnismäßigkeitsprüfung zu einem schonenden Ausgleich zu bringen. Auf korporativer Ebene legitimiert das auf der Religions- und Weltanschauungsfreiheit basierende Selbstbestimmungsrecht die ideologisch profilierte Apotheke als Organisation und kann in der Binnenbeziehung der Apotheke einen Loyalitätskonflikt verursachen. Auf gesellschaftlicher Ebene stehen vier Optionen der proaktiven rechtspolitischen Gestaltung der Gewissensproblematik zur Verfügung: sozialstaatlich, libertär, professionsbezogen und kommunitär. Wie Konflikte auf individueller oder korporativer Ebene gelöst werden können, hängt von den Optionen ab, die auf gesellschaftlicher Ebene gewählt werden. Für den Fall einer Änderung des Status quo wird für zwei Lösungsansätze argumentiert: a) die Einführung einer qualifizierten Gewissensklausel für Apotheker (mit Beratungs-, Verweis-, Notfall- und Verständigungspflicht); b) die auf einen Kompromiss zwischen ideologisch profilierter pharmazeutischer Korporation (Apotheke oder Apothekervereinigung) und Sozialstaat abzielende „weiche“ kommunitäre Option. Beide Ansätze werden einem schonenden Ausgleich berechtigter Güter gerecht. (shrink)

In den letzten Jahren wird intensiv darüber diskutiert, ob und in welcher Weise das Gewissen im Kontext der Apotheke zu schützen ist. Der Status quo in Deutschland und Österreich sieht keine gesetzliche Regelung für dieses Problem vor. Der ethische Rahmen für eine Bewältigungsstrategie im Umgang mit dem Problem der Gewissensfreiheit in der Apotheke wird deutlich gemacht. Unter Anwendung des rechtsethischen Verhältnismäßigkeitsprinzips wird das Problem mit Berücksichtigung des deutschen und österreichischen Verfassungsrechts sowie der Europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention auf individueller, korporativer und gesellschaftlicher Ebene (...) analysiert. Auf individueller Ebene sind die berechtigten Interessen und Güter des Apothekers einerseits und der Patientin andererseits durch eine grundrechtliche Verhältnismäßigkeitsprüfung zu einem schonenden Ausgleich zu bringen. Auf korporativer Ebene legitimiert das auf der Religions- und Weltanschauungsfreiheit basierende Selbstbestimmungsrecht die ideologisch profilierte Apotheke als Organisation und kann in der Binnenbeziehung der Apotheke einen Loyalitätskonflikt verursachen. Auf gesellschaftlicher Ebene stehen vier Optionen der proaktiven rechtspolitischen Gestaltung der Gewissensproblematik zur Verfügung: sozialstaatlich, libertär, professionsbezogen und kommunitär. Wie Konflikte auf individueller oder korporativer Ebene gelöst werden können, hängt von den Optionen ab, die auf gesellschaftlicher Ebene gewählt werden. Für den Fall einer Änderung des Status quo wird für zwei Lösungsansätze argumentiert: a) die Einführung einer qualifizierten Gewissensklausel für Apotheker (mit Beratungs-, Verweis-, Notfall- und Verständigungspflicht); b) die auf einen Kompromiss zwischen ideologisch profilierter pharmazeutischer Korporation (Apotheke oder Apothekervereinigung) und Sozialstaat abzielende „weiche“ kommunitäre Option. Beide Ansätze werden einem schonenden Ausgleich berechtigter Güter gerecht. (shrink)

Healthcare ethics consultation has been developed, practiced, and analyzed internationally. However, only a few professional standards have evolved globally in this field that would be comparable to standards in other areas of healthcare. This article cannot compensate for this situation. It contributes to the ongoing debate on professionalization by presenting experiences with ethics consultation in Austria, though. After exploring its contexts and providing an overview of one of its primary ethics programs, the article analyzes the underlying assumptions of “ethics consultation” (...) as an essential effort on the path to professionalize ethics consultation. (shrink)

Objective Bayesian epistemology invokes three norms: the strengths of our beliefs should be probabilities, they should be calibrated to our evidence of physical probabilities, and they should otherwise equivocate sufficiently between the basic propositions that we can express. The three norms are sometimes explicated by appealing to the maximum entropy principle, which says that a belief function should be a probability function, from all those that are calibrated to evidence, that has maximum entropy. However, the three norms of objective Bayesianism (...) are usually justified in different ways. In this paper we show that the three norms can all be subsumed under a single justification in terms of minimising worst-case expected loss. This, in turn, is equivalent to maximising a generalised notion of entropy. We suggest that requiring language invariance, in addition to minimising worst-case expected loss, motivates maximisation of standard entropy as opposed to maximisation of other instances of generalised entropy. Our argument also provides a qualified justification for updating degrees of belief by Bayesian conditionalisation. However, conditional probabilities play a less central part in the objective Bayesian account than they do under the subjective view of Bayesianism, leading to a reduced role for Bayes’ Theorem. (shrink)

Varied evidence confirms more strongly than less varied evidence, ceteris paribus. This epistemological Variety of Evidence Thesis enjoys widespread intuitive support. We put forward a novel explication of one notion of varied evidence and the Variety of Evidence Thesis within Bayesian models of scientific inference by appealing to measures of entropy. Our explication of the Variety of Evidence Thesis holds in many of our models which also pronounce on disconfirmatory and discordant evidence. We argue that our models pronounce rightly. Against (...) a backdrop of failures of the Variety of Evidence Thesis, the intuitive case for the Variety of Evidence Thesis emerges strengthened. Our models do however not support the general case for the thesis since our explication of it fails to hold in certain cases. The parameter space of this failure is explored and an explanation for the failure is offered. (shrink)

This article reads Maurice Merleau-Ponty's ontology of the “flesh of the world” alongside the ontology that seems to undergird Frantz Fanon's sociodiagnostics as well as his theory of sociogeny. It argues that reading Fanonian sociogeny in terms of the ambiguity and intercorporeality of the flesh of the world renders the ethical and political imperatives of Fanon's decolonial project all the more pressing, since the “new human” is prefigured—if not totally determined—in the national consciousness obtained by “les damnés” through the decolonization (...) process. It then examines how Sylvia Wynter's Fanonian call to (re)fashion the future of humanness through (re)conceptualizing “being human as praxis,” also seems to rely on this ontology of the flesh of the world. Bringing these arguments together, the article suggests that the conceptual content of the new human can be found in the liberation struggles of les damnés across what Wynter calls the “poverty archipelagos” wrought by colonial humanism. Hence, the “new skin” for which Fanon calls is fashioned through forming international solidarity with les damnés, with the conceptual content of the new humanism emerging sociogenically—and autopoetically—from those struggles themselves. (shrink)

The intuitive Variety of Evidence Thesis states that, ceteris paribus, more varied evidence for a hypothesis confirms it more strongly than less varied evidence. Recent Bayesian analyses have raised serious doubts in its validity. Claveau suggests the existence of a novel type of counter-example to this thesis: a gradual increase in source independence can lead to a decrease in hypothesis confirmation. I show that Claveau’s measure of gradual source independence suffers from two unsuspected types of inconsistencies. I hence put forward (...) a more natural measure of gradual source independence which is not plagued by inconsistencies. Claveau’s counter-examples to the variety of evidence thesis disappear with the measure I suggest. I hence argue that my measure is preferable and that this thesis does at least not seem to be troubled by Claveau’s arguments. (shrink)

Clinical primary prevention eliminates or preempts either a susceptibility or risk (synergistically a cause) in order to avoid a specific harm. Philosophically, primary prevention gets caught in the metaphysical controversy of the “hard questions” of whether it is possible to “cause not” both through a positive action (preventive act causes no harm) or no action (avoiding something causes no harm). I examine my previously proposed four-step definition of the process of prevention, discuss its limitations in light of the “hard questions,” (...) and then offer a revised five-step process definition that eliminates the “cause not” concerns by changing the goal of prevention from avoiding harm, a negative state, to achieving optimal health, a positive state. (shrink)

This paper addresses a data integration problem: given several mutually consistent datasets each of which measures a subset of the variables of interest, how can one construct a probabilistic model that fits the data and gives reasonable answers to questions which are under-determined by the data? Here we show how to obtain a Bayesian network model which represents the unique probability function that agrees with the probability distributions measured by the datasets and otherwise has maximum entropy. We provide a general (...) algorithm, OBN-cDS, which offers substantial efficiency savings over the standard brute-force approach to determining the maximum entropy probability function. Furthermore, we develop modifications to the general algorithm which enable further efficiency savings but which are only applicable in particular situations. We show that there are circumstances in which one can obtain the model directly from the data; by solving algebraic problems; and by solving relatively simple independent optimisation problems. (shrink)