Ce travail volumineux éclaire la notion de croyance, non pas au sens réduit de conviction de type religieux, mais au sens, très généralement psycho-noétique, de modalité subjective de l'assentiment. Suivant une méthode à la fois humble et des plus universitaire, il reprend les doctrines établies de l'histoire de la philosophie d'Orient et d'Occident, et il en médite et interprète les grands textes ; une démarche qui n'en permet pas moins à une pensée originale de "mûrir".

"Et toutes ces belles idées sur la liberté, elles sont appliquées quelque part? - Ensemble, non. Mais par petits bouts, oui. Enfin, je crois. - Hé bien, tu n'as qu'à aller voir." C'est ainsi que je fus arraché à la torpeur de ma bibliothèque. Depuis lors, je voyage à travers le monde avec une ambition simple : étudier les thèmes de philosophie politique qui me sont chers là où ils sont mis en oeuvre. Faire apparaître derrière les concepts des (...) histoires, des visages. Pour comprendre la tolérance religieuse, j'ai parcouru le Kerala, en Inde, où les grands monothéismes coexistent depuis la nuit des temps. Pour me faire une opinion sur le libre-échange, j'ai suivi dans son quotidien le directeur de l'Organisation mondiale du commerce. Pour tester la libéralisation des drogues, j'ai côtoyé les entrepreneurs de la marijuana au Colorado. Pour mieux saisir les enjeux du revenu universel, j'ai enquêté dans les villages brésiliens où il est expérimenté. Pour apprécier la réalité du micro-crédit, j'ai sillonné les bidonvilles de Lima. Et pour m'assurer des vertus de la liberté, j'ai rencontré ceux qui en sont privés, dans les "prisons ouvertes" finlandaises. Chemin faisant, j'ai perdu certains préjugés, découvert de nouvelles idées, croisé des auteurs insoupçonnés. Et j'ai acquis une conviction : les problèmes posés par la liberté se résolvent par... davantage de liberté. G.K. (shrink)

In this short text, a distinguished philosopher turns his attention to one of the oldest and most fundamental philosophical problems of all: How it is that we are able to sort and classify different things as being of the same natural class? Professor Armstrong carefully sets out six major theories—ancient, modern, and contemporary—and assesses the strengths and weaknesses of each. Recognizing that there are no final victories or defeats in metaphysics, Armstrong nonetheless defends a traditional account of universals as the (...) most satisfactory theory we have.This study is written for advanced students, but as Armstrong goes considerably beyond his earlier work on this topic, it will interest professional scholars as well. Carefully plotted and clearly written, Universals is both a paradigm of exposition and a case study on the value of careful analysis of fundamental issues in philosophy. (shrink)

Auguste Comte accorde à l’opinion publique une place centrale dans sa sociologie et, par voie de conséquence, dans la politique qu’il en déduit. Cet intérêt le distingue dans son temps comme dans la tradition sociologique. La singularité d’Auguste Comte s’affirme surtout dans l’analyse qu’il fait de l’opinion publique, lui attribuant le statut de force sociale par excellence, jouant d’abord un rôle majeur, au cours de la phase intermédiaire, dans la résistance de la société aux forces de dispersion, puis, à l’âge (...) positif, un rôle de gouvernement des affections bienveillantes et du lien social. C’est l’opinion publique organique. La tâche de défendre la société assignée par Auguste Comte à la philosophie positive, place ainsi la sociologie dans une relation symbiotique avec l’opinion publique. (shrink)

Purpose. The research is devoted to the analysis of the urgent problem of the information society: the overload of a person with information and, as a result, the impossibility of adequate formation and development of the personality; as well as the problem of "digitization" of human existence and the formation of a new reality of dataism. Theoretical basis. A lot of modern scientific works are devoted to the analysis of the information society, its problems and features. The information society is (...) a logical continuation of the scientific and technological revolution, which led to the rapid growth of scientific knowledge and the technology development. In the 20th century, technologies have touched the sphere of knowledge and information, as a result of which the formation and development of the information society, or "knowledge society", takes place. Information becomes the main resource in it, and, one way or another, a person’s life is inextricably connected with the information space. With the information society formation, the problem of information search and processing becomes one of the most urgent. It turns out that despite the abundance and availability of information, it is very difficult to determine its relevance. A lot of effort is spent on developing information retrieval algorithms. Another problem is related to the person’s inability to process large amounts of data. This situation begins to influence not only the education process and professional activity, but also the formation of a person’s personality. A person is "lost" in the information space and gradually loses his/her "I". Algorithms for data analysis come to the rescue, but gradually, instead of giving a person material for thought, they begin to make decisions on their own, and therefore, live life instead of a person. With the advent of Big Data processing algorithms, a new ideological paradigm appears – dataism, which predicts the merger of a person with the general data flow. Originality. The authors make assumptions that the dataistic future is "natural". A lot of works, including in the framework of philosophy, are focused on the problem of "dissolving" a person in the information space and finding ways to overcome it. But, in our opinion, this process is a completely logical continuation of human evolution. Conclusions. Existence of a person as a data flow is not a problem and a threat, but a new dimension of his/her being, and, therefore, requires a careful study and formulation of the main principles of this form of existence. (shrink)

(1981). Opinions of School, Academic Motivation and School Adjustment in the First Year of Secondary Education: a pilot study in West Yorkshire. Educational Studies: Vol. 7, No. 3, pp. 177-183.

L’utilitarisme de Bentham transforme profondément la doctrine antérieure de la liberté de parole en la mettant au service de la recherche de la vérité et en réfléchissant à la portée du contrôle exercé par le gouvernement. Il préserve la distinction entre les affirmations portant sur des opinions et celles portant sur des faits et accorde aux premières une moindre protection. Comme l’avait fait son père James Mill, John Stuart Mill conserve cette distinction dans ses écrits de jeunesse mais ces (...) analyses souffrent de faiblesses logiques et de naïveté politique. Dans De la liberté, John Stuart Mill cherche à dépasser ces difficultés et propose une nouvelle défense de la liberté d’expression en tant que liberté de délibération. Contrairement à la plupart des interprétations, cet article démontre que cette nouvelle approche ne remet pas en cause la distinction fondamentale entre l’expression des opinions (qui sont protégées de façon absolue) et les affirmations portant sur des faits, qui ne sont protégées que de façon contingente, ce qui laisse ouverte la possibilité de restreindre l’expression d’affirmations fausses portant sur des faits. (shrink)

Lire Spinoza au XXIe siècle en relisant une vie contemporaine? C'est se résoudre à regarder le monde sans fausses craintes ni faux espoirs. Amender les évidences, les opinions savantes et publiques. Regarder le monde en comprenant que chaque chose y est singulière. Plus les choses singulières sont intelligées, plus la nature infinie l'est. Ce thème éclaire les rapports entre imagination et connaissance, durée et éternité, ou encore écologie globale et nature de la liberté. On ne peut ni connaître ni (...) donc aimer l'infini comme tel, seulement les choses singulières connaissables, dans la proximité immense de la part d'univers de l'homme. (shrink)

Welcome to the Post-Truth era-- a time in which the art of the lie is shaking the very foundations of democracy and the world as we know it. The Brexit vote; Donald Trump's victory; the rejection of climate change science; the vilification of immigrants; all have been based on the power to evoke feelings and not facts. So what does it all mean and how can we champion truth in in a time of lies and 'alternative facts'? In this eye-opening (...) and timely book, Post-Truth is distinguished from a long tradition of political lies, exaggeration and spin. What is new is not the mendacity of politicians but the public's response to it and the ability of new technologies and social media to manipulate, polarise and entrench opinion. Where trust has evaporated, conspiracy theories thrive, the authority of the media wilt and emotions matter more than facts. Now, one of the UK's most respected political journalists, Matthew d'Ancona investigates how we got here, why quiet resignation is not an option and how we can and must fight back. (shrink)

Auguste Comte accorde à l’opinion publique une place centrale dans sa sociologie et, par voie de conséquence, dans la politique qu’il en déduit. Cet intérêt le distingue dans son temps comme dans la tradition sociologique. La singularité d’Auguste Comte s’affirme surtout dans l’analyse qu’il fait de l’opinion publique, lui attribuant le statut de force sociale par excellence, jouant d’abord un rôle majeur, au cours de la phase intermédiaire, dans la résistance de la société aux forces de dispersion, puis, à l’âge (...) positif, un rôle de gouvernement des affections bienveillantes et du lien social. C’est l’opinion publique organique. La tâche de défendre la société assignée par Auguste Comte à la philosophie positive, place ainsi la sociologie dans une relation symbiotique avec l’opinion publique.Auguste Comte puts public opinion at the heart of sociology and, as a consequence, the politics that flows from it. This sets Comte apart from his contemporaries and from mainstream sociology. Auguste Comte’s singularity can be seen above all in his analysis of public opinion. Comte sees public opinion as a social force par excellence, playing a major role first of all in the intermediate phase, as society resists dispersion forces, then, in the positive age, a governing role over benevolent affection and social networks. It is organic public opinion. The job of defending society assigned by Comte to positive philosophy means that there is a symbiotic relationship between sociology and public opinion. (shrink)

Nous nous intéressons dans cet article à la façon dont Ernst Cassirer renforce et réinvestit la méthode critique de Kant en replaçant l’imagination productrice non seulement au cœur de la théorie de la connaissance – désormais étendue au cosmos de la culture –, mais aussi au cœur d’une métaphysique renouvelée. La valorisation de la spontanéité – inséparable de ses objectivations, les formes symboliques –, traduit et sert les enjeux corrélatifs de l’idéalisme critique de Cassirer : d’une part, son combat mené (...) à travers les déductions transcendantales contre les métaphysiques dogmatiques marchandes d’illusions dualistes au sein du savoir, d’autre part, la recherche d’un sens d’ordre métaphysique-anthropologique inspirant l’alliance de la forme et de la liberté pour la totalité systématique de la culture.In the present article, we contemplated the way Ernst Cassirer reinforces and rethinks the Kant’s critical method by replacing the productive imagination not only in the heart of the epistemology – henceforth extended to culture’s cosmos – but also in the heart of a renewed metaphysics. The highlighting of the spontaneity – inseparable of the symbolic form – rejoins the interrelated issues of the critical idealism of Ernst Cassirer: on the one hand, his opposition against dogmatic metaphysics generating dualism in knowledge, and on the other hand, the study of an anthropological-metaphysical sense inspiring the connection between form and freedom for the culture’s systematic totality. (shrink)

There have in recent years been at least two important attempts to get to grips with Aristotle's conception of dialectic. I have in mind those by Martha C. Nussbaum in ‘Saving Aristotle's appearances’, which is chapter 8 of her The Fragility of Goodness, and by Terence H. Irwin in his important, though in my opinion somewhat misguided, book Aristotle's First Principles. There is a sense in which both of these writers are reacting to the work of G. E. L. Owen (...) on cognate matters, particularly his well-known paper ‘Tithenai ta phainomena’. Owen himself was in part reacting to what I suppose is the traditional view of how Aristotle regarded dialectic, as revealed in Topics I. 1. On that view dialectic is for Aristotle a lesser way of proceeding than is demonstration, the method of science. For demonstration proceeds from premises which are accepted as true in themselves and moves from them to conclusions which follow necessarily from those premises; and the middle term of such a demonstrative syllogism then provides the ‘reason why’ for the truth of the conclusion. Dialectic proceeds from premises which are accepted on a lesser basis ‘by everyone or by the majority or by the wise, i.e. by all, or by the majority, or by the most notable and reputable of them’, and proceeds deductively from them to further conclusions. (shrink)

In the recent UK debate on the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Bill, there have been conflicting claims about the extent of public support for, or opposition to, human–animal hybrids. Self-selecting polls tend to show opposition to hybrids. Representative-sample polling shows spontaneous opposition but can elicit conditional approval of research, combined with underlying unease. Public opinion is very finely divided, with people generally opposed to this research unless it is likely to lead to medical advances.

This paper examines the debate over the relationship between the public sphere and communication, which has become a focus of attention after the publication of Jürgen Habermas's Structural Transformation of Public Sphere in English in 1989, following the two volumes of his The Theory of Communicative Action in 1984 and 1987. Although the historical account of the public sphere has also received a good deal of attention, I deal mainly with the normative dimension of Habermas's theory as it led to (...) a rethinking and reassessment of public broadcasting, to the end of restructuring it as a site where 'citizens act as a public'. That is to say, a site where people assemble and unite freely, and express and publicize their opinions on matters of general interest without constraint in an age of deregulated communications. Several scholars have provided us with maps for re-organizing the media of communications in this respect, but they have failed to analyze the 'information' which feeds the 'informed citizen'. This paper addresses not only what information means today—whether it is a digit, a signal, or content—but also how it is produced within daily routine practices and how the nature of the means of its dissemination influences its character. Another serious aspect of those assessments, including that of Habermas, is the global character of communications today. Habermas is well aware of the mismatch between the global market and the absence of its corollary in politics. Yet his silence in the economics of information, even as he acknowledges the digitalization of communications and 'a world public sphere', also calls for a critical account of the relations between 'information', democratic politics and the question of scale. (shrink)

The consensus of modern opinion on the performance of this ode is that it was not a properly commissioned epinicion, but was sent spontaneously by Bacchylides in an attempt to introduce himself to Hieron. Gzella, for one, argues that many so-called epinicia were sent from poet to patron in order to impress and win commissions. Hence one finds, or so he claims, the terms , though, to be sure, commissioned epinicia were far more common.1 One could be misled here into (...) believing that these were terms used by Pindar and Bacchylides themselves. (shrink)

There have in recent years been at least two important attempts to get to grips with Aristotle's conception of dialectic. I have in mind those by Martha C. Nussbaum in ‘Saving Aristotle's appearances’, which is chapter 8 of her The Fragility of Goodness, and by Terence H. Irwin in his important, though in my opinion somewhat misguided, book Aristotle's First Principles. There is a sense in which both of these writers are reacting to the work of G. E. L. Owen (...) on cognate matters, particularly his well-known paper ‘Tithenai ta phainomena’. Owen himself was in part reacting to what I suppose is the traditional view of how Aristotle regarded dialectic, as revealed in Topics I. 1. On that view dialectic is for Aristotle a lesser way of proceeding than is demonstration, the method of science. For demonstration proceeds from premises which are accepted as true in themselves and moves from them to conclusions which follow necessarily from those premises; and the middle term of such a demonstrative syllogism then provides the ‘reason why’ for the truth of the conclusion. Dialectic proceeds from premises which are accepted on a lesser basis ‘by everyone or by the majority or by the wise, i.e. by all, or by the majority, or by the most notable and reputable of them’, and proceeds deductively from them to further conclusions. (shrink)

L'oeuvre et le concept! Tels sont bien les deux objets, par excellence, de la philosophie de l'art. L'oeuvre d'art sur laquelle " philosophe " Olivier Revault d'Allonnes n'est pas l'oeuvre achevee, celebree, sacralisee, sanctifiee, mais au contraire l'oeuvre qui, de tout temps, deroute, irrite, scandalise, dejoue le discours apprete et conciliant de l'esthetique traditionnelle. Le concept est l'autre nom de la critique, parole enfin donnee aux oeuvres, passees et presentes, afin qu'elles puissent dire non aux ordres etablis... Leur interpretation se (...) joue donc a l'infini, mais non pas dans l'indetermination, car ce qu'elles expriment, qu'il s'agisse d'un tableau de Rembrandt, d'un quatuor de Beethoven, ou d'une piece pour piano de Schonberg, est chaque fois identique, a savoir l'irreductible et " irrespectueuse " liberte de la creation artistique. Cette esthetique, a l'ecart des dogmatismes, des systemes et des modes, est ici pretexte aux reflexions et aux temoignages qui composent cet ouvrage. (shrink)

The nature of the Plague described by Thucydides in Book 2, chapter 49, has long been discussed both by medical and by classical scholars. Of numerous suggested identifications none has found general approval; and it is doubtful whether any opinion is more prevalent today than that the problem is insoluble. The classical scholar is handicapped by his ignorance of medical science; his medical colleague has often been led astray by translations deficient in exactitude if not disfigured by error. The difficulties (...) are great enough: but there is one indispensable preliminary task which can be undertaken with some prospect of success. If Thucydides' description is to be compared with modern records, it is necessary first to determine what the Greek words mean; and that can only be done by determining how far the Greek is expressed in the technical terms of contemporary medical science. It is obvious that Thucydides required a special vocabulary for this part of his work; and in fact over forty words in chapters 49 and 50 are unexampled elsewhere in his History, and a dozen more are used in meanings unexampled elsewhere. It is certain that a number of medical treatises were in circulation in Thucydides' lifetime, and that a more or less standard vocabulary had been or was being established. Now if it can be shown that the great majority of the terms employed by Thucydides in ch. 49 recur, apparently with the same meanings, as standard terms in the contemporary doctors, our second task—the comparison of Thucydides' description with modern records—will become a more rational undertaking than it was before, no longer the doubtful speculation which many of the modern doctors suppose it to be, thinking as they do that they have to deal with a layman's generalities expressed in literary language. (shrink)

Re-examination of the manuscript of John Farey's unpublished mineral survey of south-east Sutherland, together with his published opinions on the significance of fossils from the Brora Coalfield and his interpretation of the stratigraphy of that coalfield, leaves no doubt that, contrary to the accepted view, Farey did not recognise the Mesozoic age of the Brora Coalfield but thought of it as Carboniferous. Farey was a Smithian geologist, and the difficulty he had in interpreting unfamiliar evidence from Brora illustrates the difficulties (...) experienced by bio-stratigraphers in the 1810s when fossil ranges were imperfectly understood. Evidence is presented which suggests that the first geologist to recognise the Mesozoic age of the Brora beds may have been John MacCulloch. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to protest against the opinion that Catullus' Elegiacs are careless and uncouth. It will be shown that in many details his metre resembles that of the Augustan Elegists, and then it will be argued that some of the points in which Catullus differs from the Augustans are signs not of incompetence or indifference but of a deliberate adjustment of metre to content.

Objectives—To assess whether UK and US health care professionals share the views of medical ethicists about medical futility, withdrawing/withholding treatment, ordinary/extraordinary interventions, and the doctrine of double effectDesign, subjects and setting–A 138-item attitudinal questionnaire completed by 469 UK nurses studying the Open University course on “Death and Dying” was compared with a similar questionnaire administered to 759 US nurses and 687 US doctors taking the Hastings Center course on “Decisions near the End of Life”.Results–Practitioners accept the relevance of concepts widely (...) disparaged by bioethicists: double effect, medical futility, and the distinctions between heroic/ordinary interventions and withholding/ withdrawing treatment. Within the UK nurses' group a “rationalist” axis of respondents who describe themselves as having “no religion” are closer to the bioethics consensus on withholding and withdrawing treatment.Conclusions—Professionals' beliefs differ substantially from the recommendations of their professional bodies and from majority opinion in bioethics. Bioethicists should be cautious about assuming that their opinions will be readily accepted by practitioners. (shrink)

According to What Is Philosophy?, all disciplines combat opinion, but art fights most effectively because art and opinion both pertain to sensibility. Yet, this common provenance also makes the line dividing art and opinion porous. The stakes of this porosity are perhaps most visible in the relation of art to life. Although art must avoid two forms of death, ‘chaos’ and ‘opinion’, Deleuze and Guattari don't treat chaos and opinion equally. The fundamental distinction between good death and bad death, between (...) death by chaos and death by opinion, has a number of problematic consequences. Perhaps the most consequential: opinion is deadlier than death itself. (shrink)

It is argued against McCloskey (1) that the restrictions on freedom of opinion which Mill is alleged to concede are not in fact departures from his general principle; (2) that Mill's infallibility argument is not quite as McCloskey interprets it, but makes the point that it is possible to have rationally grounded opinions only in a society in which free enquiry is encouraged, and that McCloskey's counter-examples fail because they presuppose such a society; (3) that Mill attaches more importance than (...) McCloskey allows to the argument that opinions arc valueless unless rationally held and that his conception of rationality and self-development differs from McCloskey's; (4) that there is a general principle, which McCloskey has not refuted, namely that an atmosphere of free enquiry is hard to maintain, and that any suppression, even one apparently justified, will have the indirect effect of helping to destroy that atmosphere, and is consequently likely to do more harm than good. (shrink)

"L'irruption récente de la notion de "post-vérité", désignée comme mot de l'année 2016 par le dictionnaire d'Oxford, a suscité d'innombrables commentaires journalistiques, notamment sur le phénomène des fake news, mais peu de réflexions de fond. Or, cette notion ne concerne pas seulement les liens entre politique et vérité, elle brouille la distinction essentielle du vrai et du faux, portant atteinte à notre capacité à vivre ensemble dans un monde commun. En questionnant les rapports conflictuels entre politique et vérité, Myriam Revault (...) d'Allonnes déconstruit nombre d'approximations et de confusions. Elle montre que le problème majeur de la politique n'est pas celui de sa conformité à la vérité mais qu'il est lié à la constitution de l'opinion publique et à l'exercice du jugement. L'exploration du "régime de vérité" de la politique éclaire ce qui distingue fondamentalement les systèmes démocratiques, exposés en permanence à la dissolution des repères de la certitude, à la tentation du relativisme et à la transformation des "vérités de fait" en opinions, des systèmes totalitaires, où la toute-puissance de l'idéologie fabrique un monde entièrement fictif. Loin d'enrichir le monde, la "post-vérité" appauvrit l'imaginaire social et met en cause les jugements et les expériences sensibles que nous pouvons partager. Il est urgent de prendre conscience de la nature et de la portée du phénomène si nous voulons en conjurer les effets éthiques et politiques."--Page 4 de la couverture. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:109 HUME'S MISSING SHADE OF BLUE, INTERPRETED AS INVOLVING HABITUAL SPECTRA David Hume claimed that his hypothetical case of the unseen shade of blue posed no fundamental problem to his general empiricist principle. But I believe it well may show exactly what he denied it showed — viz., that his empiricism rests on a mistake. Hume says: Suppose... a person to have enjoyed his sight for thirty years, and (...) to have become perfectly well acquainted with colours of all kinds, excepting one particular shade of blue, for instance, which it never has been his fortune to meet with. Let all the different shades of that colour, except that single one, be plac'd before him, descending gradually from the deepest to the lightest; 'tis plain, that he will perceive a blank, where that shade is wanting, and will be sensible, that there is a greater distance in that place betwixt the contiguous colours, than in any other. Now I ask, whether 'tis possible for him, from his own imagination, to supply this deficiency, and raise up to himself the idea of that particular shade, tho' it had never been conveyed to him by his senses? I believe there are few but will be of opinion that he can.... Sometimes one is surprised by the colour which emerges when one mixes paints, powders or lights of different hues, in the sense that one is unable to imagine this resulting colour until one actually sees it. I often have analogous experiences when sightreading music on the trombone. If there is a large, unfamiliar interval between the note I am playing and the one to be played next, so I cannot 'hear' the next note inwardly, I bring the slide to the correct position, set my lips at approximately the right tension, and presto! the correct note appears, despite 110 my inability to predict what it was going to sound like. Only after I have heard it can I also 'hear' it, i.e, predict its occurrence in this melodic line. Cases like these are not puzzling philosophically, because in them, the note, colour, etc. arises primarily from the equipment used — e.g., paints, powders or lights, the trombone and tension of the lips, and so on — rather than from the mind of the person who uses these things. But in Hume's example, no extra-mental objects or events play a direct role in creating the imagined colour. In fact, this colour never appears at all outside the subject's mind, and he never sees it. Therefore here the imagined colour is produced entirely by the subject himself, without his having copied it from anything in the external world. Yet this contradicts the maxim Hume laid down at the beginning of the Treatise that all simple ideas arise from correspondingly simple (sense) impressions. Two points perhaps mitigate the seriousness of the problem set by the missing shade of blue. First, Hume saw clearly, as Locke did not, that "innate" does 2 not mean the same as "justified." He was not so much concerned with the question of where ideas come from, as with how these ideas can be shown to be legitimate. His answer to the latter question is that experience alone is competent to show this. Second, strictly speaking, no idea is itself a piece of knowledge, but only something with the help of which one constructs knowledge-claims; and it is necessary for a person to justify knowledge-claims which are composed of innate ideas, by checking them against experience, just as much as knowledge-claims composed of non-innate materials. For example, suppose I possess innately the idea (visual image) of blue and the idea (tactile image) of cool. To say that these ideas are innate means that they are merely triggered or activated in my Ill mind by experiences I happen to have, but are not created by these experiences, and are not necessarily copies of them. Nevertheless, in order for me to know something which involves these ideas, I first must put them together in a judgment, and then confirm that judgment by appeal to experience. For instance, I might use these ideas to make the judgment... (shrink)

Belgium, and Europe in general, has seen a strong increase in the number of refugees arriving over the past three years. At the same time we also note an increasing polarization of Belgian public opinion on this subject. Among the main actors to shape this public opinion are news media, as they contribute to or combat stereotyping of (sub)groups in the population. The purpose of the current study is to analyze to which extent media consumption and trust have an impact (...) on public opinion on two minority groups – immigrants and refugees – in a representative sample of the Belgian adult population (n = 1500). We gathered data on Belgian news media consumption and trust, and attitudes on immigrants and refugees through an online questionnaire. The results indicate that Belgian adults hold more positive attitudes on immigrants than on refugees. The reading of quality online newspapers as well as high levels of trust in television and radio are correlated with a positive attitude towards both groups, whereas the consumption of commercial television and popular newspapers go along with a negative attitude. Fear of terrorism (negative relation) and a negative evaluation of media coverage of refugees (positive relation) also have a sizeable influence. In terms of regional differences within Belgium, we find that citizens in the Brussels Capital Region hold more positive attitudes towards both groups than those in Flanders and Wallonia. (shrink)

Does South Africa need a common moral language? Many people are of the opinion that South Africa finds itself 'after Babel’ and needs a common moral language (1). The author considers some of the arguments of people who disagree with this analysis, because they do not define the problem in this way (2); because they find the language- or Babel-methaphor confusing (3); because they agree with the description of the problem, but not with the suggested solution, namely a common moral (...) language (4); or because they accept the solution, but do not regard it as the proper task of the Christian church to be involved in this search for a common moral language (5). (shrink)

In his Gallic War Caesar tells us that the Roman Senate had frequently recognized the Aedui as ‘brothers and kinsmen’. This statement, though prima facie rather odd, is fully supported by Caesar's contemporaries, Cicero and Diodorus Siculus, and a number of later authorities. Ihm was of the opinion that the Aedui were recognized as ‘fratres consanguineosque’ because they were the first tribe in Gallia Comata to enter into alliance with Rome. However, no ancient authority supports this view and it is (...) hardly sufficient to explain the notion of blood relationship implied by these titles. (shrink)

Une étude sur la virtualité toujours présente du mal politique. Pour comprendre le présent de ce mal, il faut rouvrir le passé, remonter notamment au mal radical selon Kant, ou aux liens entre le tragique et la capacité d'institution politique chez Aristote. Se dégage alors une longue tradition : celle d'une humanité dénuée de toute prétention à l'innocence, rendue au mal de sa liberté.

This paper examines the integration and unification of the philosophy and psychology of well-being. For the most part, these disciplines investigate well-being without reference to each other. In recent years, however, with the maturing of each discipline, there have been a growing number of calls to integrate the two. While such calls are welcome, what it means to integrate well-being philosophy and psychology can vary greatly depending on one’s theoretical and practical ends. The aim of this paper is to provide (...) a novel conceptual framework for thinking about integrating well-being philosophy and psychology that systematically categorizes different kinds of integration projects. We divide existing attempts in the literature into three broad categories according to the perspective from which the integration takes place: (1) top-down meta-theoretical unification; (2) psychological integration within philosophy; and (3) philosophical integration within psychology. These categories are then broken down into various further subcategories. Our aim in providing this framework is both to facilitate the assessment and comparison of existing integration attempts and to provide a roadmap for future integration attempts. For each category, we discuss one or two representative examples of the approaches. By doing so, we hope to generate interest in the wide variety of existing integration projects, as well as to generate discussion concerning the benefits and pitfalls of different approaches. (shrink)

Background. South Africa (SA) currently has a golden opportunity to legislate on human heritable genome editing (HHGE), as the country is revising its assisted reproductive technology regulations. A set of sub-regulations that deals with HHGE, which could seamlessly slot into the current regulations, has already been developed. The principles underlying the proposed set of sub-regulations are as follows: HHGE should be regulated to improve the lives of the people and should not be banned; the well-established standard of safety and efficacy (...) should be used in the regulation of HHGE; quality of life is what matters, and not preserving a ‘normal’ genome; parents’ reproductive autonomy must be respected; and equality of access to approved HHGE technology should be promoted. Objectives. To ascertain whether the proposed set of sub-regulations that deals with HHGE is aligned with public opinion in SA, and SA’s Bill of Rights. Methods. Public opinion in SA is determined with reference to a deliberative public engagement study on HHGE conducted among South Africans, and the relevant rights in the Bill of Rights are interpreted with reference to recent case law. Results. This proposed set of sub-regulations that deals with HHGE is aligned with public opinion in SA, and SA’s Bill of Rights. Conclusion. Despite the legal and ethical complexities of HHGE, the proposed set of sub-regulations provides a targeted and effective legislative approach. They fit seamlessly into the country’s existing health law framework, creating specific legal standards for HHGE that align with both public opinion and the country’s Bill of Rights. (shrink)

Teleological terms such as "function" and "design" appear frequently in the biological sciences. Examples of teleological claims include: A (biological) function of stotting by antelopes is to communicate to predators that they have been detected. Eagles' wings are (naturally) designed for soaring. Teleological notions were commonly associated with the pre-Darwinian view that the biological realm provides evidence of conscious design by a supernatural creator. Even after creationist viewpoints were rejected by most biologists there remained various grounds for concern about the (...) role of teleology in biology, including whether such terms are: 1. vitalistic (positing some special "life-force"); 2. requiring backwards causation (because future outcomes explain present traits); 3. incompatible with mechanistic explanation (because of 1 and 2); 4. mentalistic (attributing the action of mind where there is none); 5. empirically untestable (for all the above reasons). Opinions divide over whether Darwin's theory of evolution provides a means of eliminating teleology from biology, or whether it provides a naturalistic account of the role of teleological notions in the science. Many contemporary biologists and philosophers of biology believe that teleological notions are a distinctive and ineliminable feature of biological explanations but that it is possible to provide a naturalistic account of their role that avoids the concerns above. Terminological issues sometimes serve to obscure some widely-accepted distinctions. (shrink)