Nous présentons une étude fondée sur un corpus de transcriptions de consultations médicales, dans le cadre d’un projet interdisciplinaire qui explore la question des inégalités sociales de santé. L’objet de cet article est de montrer comment, en tant que linguistes familiers du traitement outillé des corpus, nous avons choisi d’aborder ce matériau qui fait l’objet de questionnements disciplinaires complémentaires, et quels éléments de caractérisation spécifiques nous sommes en mesure d’apporter en réponse à une demande émanant de la sphère médicale.

Nous présentons une étude fondée sur un corpus de transcriptions de consultations médicales, dans le cadre d’un projet interdisciplinaire qui explore la question des inégalités sociales de santé. L’objet de cet article est de montrer comment, en tant que linguistes familiers du traitement outillé des corpus, nous avons choisi d’aborder ce matériau qui fait l’objet de questionnements disciplinaires complémentaires, et quels éléments de caractérisation spécifiques nous sommes en mesure d’apporter en réponse à une demande émanant de la sphère médicale.

Cognitive fatigue is a problem for the safety of critical systems as it can lead to accidents, especially during unexpected events. In order to determine the extent to which it disrupts adaptive capabilities, we evaluated its effect on online and anticipatory control. Despite numerous studies conducted to determine its effects, the exact mechanism affected by fatigue remains to be clarified. In this study, we used distribution and electromyographic analysis to assess whether cognitive fatigue increases the capture of the incorrect automatic (...) response or if it impairs its suppression, and whether the conflict adaptation effect is reduced. To this end, we evaluated the evolution of the performance over time during the Simon task, a classic conflict task that elicits incorrect automatic responses. To accentuate the presence of fatigue during the Simon task, two groups previously performed a dual-task with two different cognitive load levels to create two different levels of fatigue. The results revealed that time on task impaired online control by disrupting the capacity to suppress the incorrect response but leaving unaffected the expression of the automatic response. Furthermore, participants emphasized speed rather than accuracy with time on task, with in addition more fast guesses, suggesting that they opted for a less effortful response strategy. As the implementation of the suppression mechanism requires cognitive effort, the conjunction of these results suggests that the deficits observed may be due to disengagement of effort over time rather than reflecting an incapacity to make an effort. (shrink)

Introduction -- Cosmopolitanism -- Collective self-defense -- Subsistence wars -- Humanitarian intervention -- Commodified wars -- Asymmetrical wars -- Conclusion.

This paper argues that, if one thinks that the needy have a right to the material resources they need in order to lead decent lives, one must be committed, in some cases, to conferring on the sick a right that the healthy give them some of the body parts they need to lead such a life. I then assess two objections against that view, to wit: to confer on the sick a right to the live body parts of the healthy (...) violates the bodily integrity of the latter; and constitutes too much of an interference in their life. I conclude that although the sick sometimes have a right to some of the body parts of the healthy, the latter still retain a considerable degree of autonomy. (shrink)

No presente verbete faço a revisão crítica de algumas entre as mais expressivas tentativas de resolver o chamado ‘problema da dinâmica cognitiva’. De acordo com Kaplan (1989) – que é responsável pelo próprio apelido, a questão que se coloca é: o que significa dizer de uma pessoa que expressou uma crença particular num determinado contexto de proferimento que ela reteve ou mudou de crença fora desse contexto? E caso ajustes (linguísticos, psicológicos) sejam necessários para manter a relação com o conteúdo (...) semântico original, quais são nossas intuições a respeito de casos em que um sujeito cognitivamente saudável perdeu temporariamente a noção do tempo e/ou a capacidade de rastrear objetos no espaço? Exploro diversas respostas a essas perguntas com o intuito de dizer se elas conseguem acomodar os fatos (semânticos, epistêmicos, cognitivos) aí envolvidos. Abstract: In this paper I review some of the most significant attempts to solve the so-called ‘problem of cognitive dynamics’. According to Kaplan (1989), who coined the phrase, the following questions arise – as to the topic: what does it means to say of an individual who expressed a particular belief in a given context of utterance that he/she has re tained orchanged his/her mind with respect to it once the context is left? And assuming that (linguistic or psychological) adjustments are required to keep on being related to the original semantic content, what are our intuitions about the case of a cognitively healthy subject who temporarily lost the ability to keep track of time and/or objects in space? I investigate different ways of answg those questions with a view to saying whether they accommodate all the relevant (semantic, epistemic, cognitive) facts or not. (shrink)

To Aristotle, spoken words are symbols, not of objects in the world, but of our mental experiences related to these objects. Presently there are two major strands of interpretation of Aristotle’s concept of the linguistic sign. First, there is the structuralist account offered by Coseriu (Geschichte der Sprachphilosophie. Von den Anfängen bis Rousseau, 2003 [1969], pp. 65–108) whose interpretation is reminiscent of the Saussurean sign concept. A second interpretation, offered by Lieb (in: Geckeler (Ed.) Logos Semantikos: Studia Linguistica in Honorem (...) Eugenio Coseriu 1921–1981, 1981) and Weidemann (in: Schmitter (Ed.) Geschichte der Sprachtheorie 2. Sprachtheorien der abendländischen Antike, 1991), says that Aristotle’s concept of the linguistic sign is similar to the one presented in Ogden and Richard’s (The meaning of meaning: A study of the influence of language upon thought and of the science of symbolism, 1970 [1923]) semiotic triangle. This paper starts off with an introductory outline of the so-called phýsei-thései discussion which started during presocratic times and culminated in Plato’s Cratylus. Aristotle’s concept of the linguistic sign is to be regarded as a solution to the stalemate position reached in the Cratylus. Next, a discussion is offered of both Coseriu’s and Lieb’s analysis. We submit that Aristotle’s concept of the linguistic sign shows features of both Saussure’s and Ogden and Richards’s sign concept but that it does not exclusively predict one of the two. We argue that Aristotle’s concept of the linguistic sign is based on three different relations which together evince his teleological as well empiricist point of view: one internal (symbolic) relation and two external relations, i.e. a likeness relation and a relation katà synthéken. (shrink)

Si l'invention du sens moderne du mot Etat est due a Machiavel, c'est au XVIIIe siecle que, apres la paix d'Utrecht, l'institution etatique prit franchement le visage de la modernite. Faisant suite a l'Etat baroque (1610-1652) et a l'Etat classique (1652-1715), l'Etat moderne (1715-1848) donna corps aux espoirs de paix, de justice, de bonheur et de liberte secretes par la philosophie des lumieres. Il realisa les grandes mutations juridiques qui devaient contribuer a forger l'epure de l'Idee republicaine a laquelle la (...) Revolution de France donna sa premiere forme historique. Cet ouvrage s'est voulu pluridisciplinaire. En rassemblant des contributions dont la tonalite est historique, juridique, litteraire, philosophique ou politologique, il a pour objectif d'apporter sur la periode fascinante de l'histoire occidentale ou s'est affirme l'Etat moderne, des eclairages diversifies complementaires. (shrink)

The literature on reparative justice focuses for the most part on the grounds and limits of wrongdoers' duties to their victims. An interesting but relatively neglected question is that of what - if anything - victims owe to wrongdoers. In this paper, I argue that victims are under a duty to accept wrongdoers' apologies. To accept an apology is to form the belief that the wrongdoer's apologetic utterance or gesture has the requisite verdictive, commissive and expressive dimensions; to communicate as (...) much to him; and to recognise that his apology changes one's normative status in relation to him, and to comport oneself accordingly. I then offer a Kantian argument for the duty to accept and qualify that argument in the light of some hard cases. I end the paper by addressing the objection that victims do not owe it to wrongdoers to engage in any form of reparative encounter. (shrink)

Suppose that state A attacks state D without warrant. The ensuing military conflict threatens international peace and security. State D (I assume) has a justification for defending itself by means of military force. But do third parties have a justification for intervening in that conflict by such means? To international public lawyers, the well-rehearsed and obvious answer is ‘yes’: threats to international peace and security provide one of two exceptions to the legal and moral prohibition (as set out in article (...) 2(4) of the UN Charter) on using force as a means for resolving interstate disputes. Just war theorists are not as verdictive. Compared to the ethics of humanitarian intervention and the ethics of national self-defense, the ethics of third-party military involvement in interstate conflicts remains strikingly under-developed in contemporary just war theory. This paper makes a start at filling the gap. It argues that to defend such interventions is tantamount to defending preventive military force, deterrent military force, and the resort to force in more cases than standardly thought. It then provides an account and limited defence of the deterrence argument. It shows that deterrence is morally justified in relatively few cases, and examines two problems with the argument: the problems raised by deterrence failures, and the problems raised by the level of uncertainty under which leaders who use deterrent force operate. It ends by concluding that we should take seriously the possibility that non-intervention, construed as the rejection of the direct use of military force, is the morally correct response to the most serious threats to international peace and security. (shrink)

In this paper, I discuss a view of de re thoughts that can be naturally endorsed in the wake of Russell's account. This is the view that a thought is about the very thing (res) rather than a mere characterization of it if and only if it is constitutively tied, if not to the existence, at least to the identity of its object and the thinker knows which/who the object of his/her thought is. Faced with the challenge of accommodating far (...) from uncommon cases of mistaken identity or substantial confusion on the part of the subject, I argue that the integrity of the view can be preserved and that the restrictions set on its truth by the advocates of the two-component picture and the anti-essentialists can be lifted. (shrink)

On n'a jamais fini de lire une œuvre qui s'offre selon des points de vue, des perspectives, des niveaux et des résonances multiples. C'est pourquoi lire Rousseau exige que l'on pense avec lui et que l'on retrouve le rythme rarement calme d'une méditation qui, coïncidant avec sa vie, s'élève vers les plus hautes réquisitions critiques de la raison et, tout ensemble, se trouve rongée par un tourment métaphysique. Ce livre montre que si Rousseau, pour qui " tout tient radicalement à (...) la politique ", n'a cessé de disputer à Hobbes l'honneur d'avoir, ne premier, frayé le chemin de la " science politique ", c'est en philosophe - en philosophe profond - qu'il a ouvert cette voie. En effet, sa philosophie politique, qui est d'abord une réflexion sur les " institutions politiques " propres à l'Etat du contrat, se hausse, par une intuition critique encore innomée, jusqu'à l'horizon transcendantal où elle découvre l'idéalité pure de la normativité politique. Mais, dans l'élan d'une pensée réflexive que même les " extravagances " de ses rêveries n'ont pas arrêté, Rousseau, miné par l'angoisse d'exister, cisèle aussi une politique philosophique qui renvoie au mystère ontologique de l'homme condamné à l'errance que lui inflige son historicité. Dès lors, parce que l'ambivalence et les contradictions de la réalité socio-politique taraudent la pensée de Rousseau, celle-ci, déchirée, ne trouve sa cohésion et n'atteint son unité de sens que dans une médiation douloureuse sur l'homme écartelé, incapable d'assumer sa destination dans sa destinée. Jusqu'en ses promenades solitaires, le " subtil Diogène " a, tel un Sphinx, forgé l'énigme de l'homme en ses traits métaphysiques les plus profonds. (shrink)

Dès l'aurore de la pensée, la recherche des raisons du droit a constitué une voie royale pour la philosophie juridique. Sur cette voie précisément, la raison s'est soumise à son auto-examen afin d'apurer sa propre démarche. La philosophie de Kant a, dans ce registre, donné ses lettres de créance à une critique de la raison juridique dont, malgré des divergences d'interprétation et des pluralismes parfois déroutants, l'héritage est, aujourd'hui encore, riche et vivace. Les chemins du criticisme juridique sont d'autant plus (...) escarpés qu'il existe des âges de la rationalité critique et que le philosophe, en s'engageant sur cet itinéraire, se lance dans une quête réflexive qui demeurera toujours inachevée. Il serait en effet présomptueux de croire que, même avec les nuances et les variances apportées par les philosophies contemporaines de l'argumentation et de la discussion, la philosophie critique de la raison juridique conduit à la fondation ultime et définitive des ordres de droit. On peut néanmoins reconnaître qu'elle jalonne la route au bout de laquelle brille, tel un phare, l'a priori transcendantal auquel s'accrochent le sens et la validité du droit. Dans la perspective que dessine la réflexion critique, la juridicité du droit se révèle donc comme le lieu d'excellence de l'Idéal régulateur de la raison. Il apparaît ainsi que, malgré les périls et les drames qui taraudent notre monde, le droit peut encore, dans le champ pratique où réside l'honneur de l'homme, accorder une place à l'espérance. (shrink)

Parmi toutes les pensées que nous avons sur le monde, certaines portent sur des objets particuliers de façon plus directe (ou moins lâche) que les pensées dites descriptives et sont, pour cette raison, qualifiées de singulières. La pensée exprimée par l’énoncé : « Jean Nicod est mort en 1924 » n’est, intuitivement, pas la même que celle exprimée par l’énoncé : « L’auteur de la Géométrie dans le monde sensible est mort en 1924 », ne serait-ce que parce que la (...) seconde ne porte sur l’individu particulier auquel réfère le nom propre Jean Nicod (dans le premier énoncé) qu’indirectement, via la satisfaction par ce dernier d’un ensemble de conditions descriptives. La thèse selon laquelle notre espace cognitif serait peuplé d’authentiques pensées singulières n’est pourtant pas, loin s’en faut, triviale et mérite d’être évaluée à la lumière des différentes approches possibles du phénomène. Ce livre tente de le cerner en présentant et évaluant les théories sémantiques, épistémiques et cognitives les plus significatives de la pensée singulière. Il promeut une approche intégrée qui vise à donner son juste poids aux aspects mis en lumière par ces théories. Il est assorti d’un commentaire de deux extraits de texte: l’un, de Bertrand Russell, souvent considéré comme le locus classicus de la thèse singulariste et des théories épistémiques de l’accointance; l’autre, du philosophe américain contemporain Kent Bach, sur la portée de la conception essentialiste orthodoxe des pensées de re. (shrink)

Neste artigo, tentamos mostrar que um problema comum aos capítulos XVI e XX das Observações filosóficas é o da aplicabilidade dos conceitos e «proposições» da geometria à realidade física e perceptiva (visual, em particular), e que o modo pelo qual Wittgenstein aborda esse problema nessa obra difere radicalmente, a despeito de aparentes similitudes, daquele que caracteriza as teorias semânticas do a priori visual em termos de estipulações (notadamente, o de Carnap em 1922). O esclarecimento do estatuto dos enunciados sobre os (...) objetos do espaço visual como regras de sintaxe e a abordagem do problema da aplicação de nossos conceitos geométricos à realidade perceptiva em termos de condições práticas de emprego permite a Wittgenstein dissolver, não sem alguma ambiguidade no vocabulário empregado, as falsas aparências ontológicas suscitadas pelas teorias que postulam a existência de um universo de discurso intermediário entre os corpos físicos e os números. (shrink)

Neste artigo, tentamos mostrar que um problema comum aos capítulos XVI e XXdas Observações filosóficas é o da aplicabilidade dos conceitos e «proposições» da geometriaà realidade física e perceptiva (visual, em particular), e que o modo pelo qual Wittgensteinaborda esse problema nessa obra difere radicalmente, a despeito de aparentes similitudes,daquele que caracteriza as teorias semânticas do a priori visual em termos deestipulações (notadamente, o de Carnap em 1922). O esclarecimento do estatuto dos enunciadossobre os objetos do espaço visual como regras (...) de sintaxe e a abordagem do problemada aplicação de nossos conceitos geométricos à realidade perceptiva em termos decondições práticas de emprego permite a Wittgenstein dissolver, não sem alguma ambiguidadeno vocabulário empregado, as falsas aparências ontológicas suscitadas pelas teoriasque postulam a existência de um universo de discurso intermediário entre os corpos físicose os números. (shrink)

The key to this study lies in my own identity as a researcher who specializes in the fifteenth century and Franciscan reforms, especially the confrontation in eastern Central Europe between the theory of the via media based on a return to the Martianian Constitutions, and the Observance sub vicariis brought by Giovanni of Capistrano when he crossed the Alps in 1451.2 The major aspect of this is a view on the “pre-history” of the Libellus ad Leonem, which was written in (...) 1513 by Paolo Giustiniani and Pietro Quirini in preparation of the Fifth Lateran Council. This “pre-history” concerns a century of transformations of the links between the Observant reforms, humanist culture and the.. (shrink)

Quels peuvent être les enjeux contemporains d'une philosophie des valeurs dans le contexte éducatif? Quelles sont les valeurs éducatives convoquées dans les discours sur l'éducation aujourd'hui? Sur quels modes le sont-elles? Trois grandes parties structurent cet ouvrage : Philosophie de la valeur, Repenser les valeurs et Focus sur quelques valeurs. [Source : 4e de couv.].

La question du droit naturel a, depuis vingt-cinq siecles, traverse l'histoire de la philosophie du droit en Occident. Cet ouvrage entend montrer que, malgre sa perennite, ce concept qui, pourtant, a resiste a tous les assauts que lui ont livres les positivismes scientifiques, est greve d'une lourde indecision philosophique: qu'il s'agisse d'en determiner le lieu d'ancrage, de preciser les rapports qu'entretiennent avec lui les divers systemes du droit positif ou de suivre les metamorphoses, plus ou moins pertinentes, qui ont affecte (...) la maniere de le penser, le droit naturel s'entoure d'une problematicite radicale qui fait naitre des polemiques et des malentendus. Dans ce climat de conflictualite remanente, son idee se profile neanmoins come une exigence transcendantale qui donne sens et valeur aux ordres du droit positif - ce qui explique que, si souvent decretee de mort, elle connaisse une perpetuelle resurrection. (shrink)

Les oeuvres de l'annee 1797 sont loin de porter la marque du vieillissement intellectuel de Kant; elles proposent meme une ouverture pathetique sur l'horizon ultime de la philosophie transcendantale et attestent de la sorte leur remarquable continuite avec les trois grandes Critiques qui lui ont precedees. Ciselant une conception de la sagesse dont la richesse apporte a l'idee de l'homme un eclairage eblouissant, Kant entend bien, en 1797, parachever le systeme emanant de la raison auquel il songe depuis trente annees (...) et, pour ce faire, il s'attache tout particulierement a montrer comment la liberte, la vertu et la dignite font l'honneur de l'homme. (shrink)

"À une époque où la cinéphilie n'est plus qu'une paraphilie parmi les autres, aussi estimable et inoffensive qu'une autre, en un temps où la sédition installée tient lieu d'horizon, il y a sans doute quelque naïveté à prétendre se démarquer de la modernité en se réclamant d'une "cinéphilie dissidente". Pourtant sous l'insurrection permanente, des règles intangibles et des principes incontestables demeurent, qu'il est nécessaire d'enfreindre. Derrière l'équivalence des opinions et la relativité des goûts, de nouvelles hiérarchies se sont bâties, qu'il (...) importe de renverser. Cette attitude d'opposition serait à son tour éminemment moderne s'il ne s'agissait par ce refus, de promouvoir une autre attention aux faits, une autre rapport à autrui, que ceux que notre époque favorise. Lorsque nous aurons admis que le cinéma moderne nous a dépossédés de nos mots, en y substituant les siens, qui décrivent de mille feux ce qui s'éteint, lorsque nous aurons saisi que nous ne parlons qu'en son non, ne répétons que ses désordres, ne prions que ses décalogues rafraîchis, nous aurons alors tout le temps de regretter notre silence. Dans ces conditions, c'est bien par l'écriture qu'il s'agit d'instaurer une relation cette fois intempestive avec l'image cinématographique. À travers le prisme de plus de deux cents films, mêlant la critique cinématographique et le journal intime, l'analyse et l'aphorisme, cet essai se propose de résister à la cinéphilie officielle, absolument indolore, qui n'est plus qu'une technique parmi d'autres d'embrigadement. Sous la forme d'abécédaire, de A comme Artifices à Z comme Zombies, en passant par l'Enfance, la Honte, le Messie, les Nazis ou la Pornocratie, il n'est autre qu'une tentat. (shrink)

In everyday situations, and particularly in some sport and working contexts, humans face an inherently unpredictable and uncertain environment. All sorts of unpredictable and unexpected things happen but typically people are able to skillfully adapt. In this paper, we address two key questions in cognitive science. First, how is an agent able to bring its previously learned skill to bear on a novel situation? Second, how can an agent be both sensitive to the particularity of a given situation, while remaining (...) flexibly poised for many other possibilities for action? We will argue that both the sensitivity to novel situations and the sensitivity to a multiplicity of action possibilities are enabled by the property of skilled agency that we will call metastable attunement. We characterize a skilled agent’s flexible interactions with a dynamically changing environment in terms of metastable dynamics in agent-environment systems. What we find in metastability is the realization of two competing tendencies: the tendency of the agent to express their intrinsic dynamics and the tendency to search for new possibilities. Metastably attuned agents are ready to engage with a multiplicity of affordances, allowing for a balance between stability and flexibility. On the one hand, agents are able to exploit affordances they are attuned to, while at the same time being ready to flexibly explore for other affordances. Metastable attunement allows agents to smoothly transition between these possible configurations so as to adapt their behaviour to what the particular situation requires. We go on to describe the role metastability plays in learning of new skills, and in skilful behaviour more generally. Finally, drawing upon work in art, architecture and sports science, we develop a number of perspectives on how to investigate metastable attunement in real life situations. (shrink)

The question of the Hegelian heritage within the Marxian dialectic is a classic one that is still an open one, after more than a century of fruitful and various inquiry. In order to tackle the issue from a new perspective, we must first distinguish between, on the one hand, the subjective dialectic, or logic of Marxian thought, which is clearly inherited from Hegel, and, on the other hand, the objective dialectic, or logic of reality itself, which Marx arrived at by (...) way of a frontal opposition to his master, even as he took up the latter’s “rational kernel” in order to invert it, substituting for Hegel’s idealist philosophy of creation a materialist conception of production and replacing the logic of negativity by a logic of produ-activity. Thus conceptualized by Marx, the gnoseological dialectic and dialectical materialism interact rationally. This enables us to renew the foundations of a dialectical materialism. Unrelated to stalinist « diamat », such a conception is well equipped to demonstrate its effectiveness for the knowledge and understanding of realities, both in terms of their irreducible material singularity, apprehended according to their constitutive historicity, and as elements of a certain real totality which is in process. (shrink)

Given the fact that the history of our brain is a long history of interfaces, connections and exchanges, this text aims to reveal the collective nature of the process involved by and within learning. In fact, the person who learns can only cross-learn: irrespective of the field of learning, he learns across, between and beyond.2 The cross-disciplinary approach suggested in the present study focuses on learning a foreign language.

Ramsey’s theorem asserts that every k-coloring of $[\omega ]^n$ admits an infinite monochromatic set. Whenever $n \geq 3$, there exists a computable k-coloring of $[\omega ]^n$ whose solutions compute the halting set. On the other hand, for every computable k-coloring of $[\omega ]^2$ and every noncomputable set C, there is an infinite monochromatic set H such that $C \not \leq _T H$. The latter property is known as cone avoidance.In this article, we design a natural class of Ramsey-like theorems encompassing (...) many statements studied in reverse mathematics. We prove that this class admits a maximal statement satisfying cone avoidance and use it as a criterion to re-obtain many existing proofs of cone avoidance. This maximal statement asserts the existence, for every k-coloring of $[\omega ]^n$, of an infinite subdomain $H \subseteq \omega $ over which the coloring depends only on the sparsity of its elements. This confirms the intuition that Ramsey-like theorems compute Turing degrees only through the sparsity of its solutions. (shrink)

No debate acerca da singularidade de, pelos menos, alguns de nossos pensamentos sobre o mundo, assume-se corriqueiramente que o responsável pela natureza singular do episódio mental não é o próprio episódio e, sim, a proposição singular expressa quer por um proferimento assertórico de sentença singular autônoma, quer pela cláusula complementar em um relato de atribuição de atitude proposicional. As rotas semânticas padrão assumem que a singularidade do episódio mental (conceitual) é por assim dizer “herdada” da singularidade do conteúdo. Argumento que (...) este pressuposto apresenta uma lacuna, pois desconsidera o papel desempenhado em certos atos de pensamento, chamados de episódicos, por habilidades cognitivas tais como a capacidade de perceber objetos particulares, de vivenciar (novamente) ou de projetar-se mentalmente em direção a acontecimentos particulares pessoais, diretamente responsáveis por sua singularidade. No entanto, contra a tese de que haveria capacidades episódicas aí envolvidas, argumento que a singularidade dos atos de pensar episódicos se dá pelo exercício pontual no espaço e no tempo dessas capacidades e há, portanto, um sentido não derivado em que eles podem ser qualificados como singulares. (shrink)