Determining appropriate authorship recognition in student-faculty collaborative research is a complex task. In this quantitative study, responses from 1346 students and faculty in education and some social science disciplines at 36 research-intensive institutions in the United States were analyzed to provide a description of current and recommended practices for authorship in student-faculty collaborative research. The responses revealed practices and perceptions that are not aligned with ethical guidelines and a lack of consensus among respondents about appropriate practice. Faculty and student (...) respondents agreed that students deserve more authorship recognition than they get in common practice but they did not agree on the appropriate authorship arrangement for several of the collaborative scenarios described in the study or on the relative value of various contributions to research projects. The misalignment with ethical codes and lack of consensus among the respondents is problematic because student-faculty collaborative research is common and authored publications are powerful indicators of research competency. With these detailed results, students and faculty can better anticipate areas where their perspectives are likely to differ and faculty can work to clarify ambiguous expectations. (shrink)

In this paper we deal with the extension of Nash bargaining theory to nonconvex problems. By focussing on the Social Welfare Ordering associated with a bargaining solution, we characterize the symmetric Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS). Moreover, we obtain a unified method of proof of recent characterization results for the asymmetric single-valued NBS and the symmetric multivalued NBS, as well as their extensions to different domains.

Winds of change, from the political perspective in Mexico, invite us to reformulate the methodological vision for the direction of public policy in the field of social development, directing their actions towards the construction of a methodological proposal that allows us to direct ourselves towards achieving higher levels of Well-being Social in our country, as a desirable objective of public policy and which is expected to be inclusive, participatory and democratic. -/- In this sense, it is important to (...) recognize that the current debate, in the academic and political sphere, questions what is being well? What is the life that is worth living? And that, additionally, the recognition of the satisfaction of life goals, at an individual and collective level, which invites us to reflect, if the current economic and social policy and strategy has produced results in what we envision as social welfare? Is a new approach necessary to solve the problem? What strategy should it be to consider the new methodological approach that seeks social welfare? And what components should be considered in the measurement of social welfare? This document is an invitation to review the concept of social welfare, as a proposal whose purpose is to correct the deficiencies or historical deficiencies suffered by the population, in the elemental enjoyment of social rights, a situation that causes social backwardness, marginalization, and that it is aimed at the impossibility of participating in the social decisions of the community and in collective decisions, such as: speaking, proposing, being heard and demanding compliance with fundamental human rights such as: health, food, housing, employment and security, among others. These deficiencies in the enjoyment of social and human rights are seen in the presence of social exclusion, and that together these social deficiencies explain the degree of multidimensional poverty suffered by the population in rural and urban areas. It is here that he invites us to reflect: what is the problem that social welfare seeks to solve? Multidimensional poverty, social exclusion, social backwardness or social inequality? And consequently, how to define the components to identify social welfare? -/- The document is made up of three sections: i) Social welfare: A retrospective look; ii) Social Welfare, an integrative view: The contribution of Sen, Naussbam, Rawls, Actis Di Pasquale and Keyes; and iii) Social Welfare: The recognition of limits in economic development -/- The first section presents a review of the proposals, which in the area of economic development have been presented since 1968 in the Human Condition Project, until the 2015 proposal of Sustainable Development Goals. -/- In the second section, the contributions of (Rawls, 1995), (Sen, 1982), (Nussbaum, 2011), (Keyes, 1998) , (Actis Di Pasquale, 2015) and (Actis Di Pasquale, 2017) are presented in order to present an integrative approach to the concept of social welfare. And finally, the third section presents the recognition of limits in development, as well as an invitation for action from a transdisciplinary and interdisciplinary perspective in the study of social welfare. -/- August 2020 DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.24147.20006/1 LicenseCC BY-SA 4.0 -/- . (shrink)

This article reviews empirical research on social security and social welfare law. It identifies the efforts needs to be carried out to promote empirical research in this area of law and outlines an empirical research agenda of topics that should be given priority. The UK defines social security as based on five key benefits viz. social/contributory, categorical/universal, tax-based, and occupational/means-tested. This article focuses on the primary model of administrative justice. It is a three-fold: bureaucratic rationality/accuracy (...) and efficiency; professional treatment/service; and moral judgment/fairness, each pair in the order of a model and its corresponding legitimizing values, respectively. Research on social security fraud identifies a two-fold basis—reflexivity: reflection/introspection on fraudulent acts, anxiety: the extent of guilt and insecurity, post-action, and anticipation of conviction. Accordingly, based on a relative synthesis of both elements, there is a four-fold categorization which goes as follows: subversive, desperate, fatalistic, and unprincipled. (shrink)

After the three families divided up the state of Jin and the Tian family took over Qi, the political situation in the fourth century B.C.E. appeared even more chaotic. Wei conquered Chu's Luyang and Qin's Xihe, Qin defeated Wei at Shimen , and again at Shaoliang , and Wei moved its capital to Daliang. During the mid-Warring States period, Qin became dominant in the west, Qi in the east, Chu in the south, and Wei in the center. Rapid changes occurred (...) one after another; trickery and conflict were rampant. However, the shi , the intelligentsia, actually managed to expand their spheres of existence and activity accordingly in this state of tension between countries, states, and men. A few major states assembled quite a number of literati; and those men of the villages, who had in earlier times merely waited passively for opportunities to fall into their laps, crisscrossed the various feudal states; literati who previously had no cause to use military force became, one by one, the honored guests of the feudal lords. With the breakdown of the previously simple and obvious order, the gradually dismantling of the common body of the ancestral clan of the past, and the increasing complexities of social relationships after the dissolution of blood ties, social order became a matter of concern. Or, to reword this most practical issue: How could this universally chaotic society go from disorder to order? (shrink)

In order to define ‘radical humanism’ the paper builds on two strands of thinking: first, that human needs must be understood in relation to the constitutive characteristics of the human species; s...

Globalization and knowledge economy nowadays have brought changes in social structure and living style and cause the occurrence of social problems, proposing new requirements to the conceptions and application of social welfare. A scholar named Midgley responses this by his conception of the developmental perspective in social welfare. This article addresses on the comparison between the value of developmental social welfare and the value of social work, in order to achieve a (...) clear view on the similarity and difference of the two conceptions and provide references for the improvement on the prospects and methodologies. (shrink)

The aim of the present paper is to provide an axiomatic analysis of incomplete social judgments. In particular, we clarify the underlying power structure of Arrovian collective choice rules when social preferences are allowed to be incomplete. We propose the concept of quasi-decisiveness and investigate the properties of the collection of quasi-decisive sets associated with an Arrovian collective choice rule. In the course of this, we offer a series of applications.

Aging brings about the ordeal of coping. Younger people also cope, but for those in old age, the ordeal is so often elegiac, forced upon the self by changing functions within the body and by the outside social world, with its many impediments to the continuity of former roles, pursuits, and self‐identities. Coping with change can be affirming, but when what is being forgone seems more valuable than what lies ahead, it is travail. For most, the coping is managed (...) more moderately by a sense of resignation. This is especially true for those who survive into profound old age, when one is viewed as if being old is one’s essential identity and nature. We must recognize and affirm difference and change without stigmatizing or losing sight of the specific capabilities and circumstances of the individual. This is what I think the often‐used, but less often clearly defined, notion of a “person‐centered” orientation should signify.Individuals age, but so do societies, not simply because they have a large population over age sixty‐five, but in the sense that societies as a whole are also buffeted by significant disruption in orders of meaning. Aging has a public as well as a private manifestation, a social as well as a personal embodiment, and how it is paid attention to in culture, politics, and policy makes a great difference to how aging is concretely experienced in human lives. In this essay, I explore how the moral imagination nurtured by the practices of solidarity and care—and nurturing them in turn—can come of age—and how these practices can take their rightful place in an ethically mature political culture. (shrink)

While temporality has been addressed in the context of child welfare, the temporal dimensions of differentiation and othering remain unacknowledged. This article draws on material from a Swedish child welfare agency and is theoretically inspired by postcolonial and queer theories and critical childhood studies. It is based on an analytical juxtaposition of care order applications recommending immediate child welfare interventions versus interventions that are recommended after long ongoing assessments. Such recommendations are addressed as unequal in terms of (...) timing. The article discusses temporal themes related to permanency versus temporary, which guide assessments of changeability. I show how immediate interventions respond to chronicity—the temporality of incurability, permanency, and underdevelopment. However, social problems in long ongoing assessments are assessed as permanent only after long ongoing observations or passage of time. The article discusses how ideas about change reproduce wider societal and intersecting inequalities. This becomes visible when considering time as allocated to parents and their potential to bring about change. I argue that even though permanency differs from chronicity, it still limits a discussion about change as societal, and the detection of problems remains within a developmentalist and neoliberal framework. In the concluding remarks, I offer an alternative reading of allocated time that can maneuver developmentalist logics, while balancing responsibilisation between the individual and the society. (shrink)

For centuries, philosophers and scholars have debated the role of the state in forming and distributing well-being, a concept now termed the ‘welfare state’. An ideal welfare state is one that protects and promotes the economic and social well-being of its citizens, based on the principles of equal opportunity and equitable distribution of wealth. In order to create such a welfare state, there must be a balance between a society’s demands and the market’s needs. In this (...) paper, I argue for the need for equal and just welfare state reform based on the current needs and demands of both society and the labour market in Kuwait. Moreover, I discuss unemployment as a result of disequilibrium between society and market needs. Finally, I propose education reform as a solution to the unemployment problem. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 10.1 (2003) 99-102 [Access article in PDF] Living with Contested Knowledge and Partial Jennifer Clegg and Richard Lansdall-Welfare THESE CAREFUL AND CONSTRUCTIVE comments bring grist to our mill. Before responding to them, we observe first that they offer no substantive challenge to our thesis: ambiguities associated with meaning in the disabled life make it more likely that professional service providers will make dogmatic responses (...) to bereavement, and perhaps other essentially contested topics, responses that are defended by isolationism.Some welcome ideas came from left field to refresh our thinking, such as Colman's observations on the gendered nature of care. She reminded us that although the audit from which these cases came was established to investigate bereavement in general among adults with intellectual disability, its rough and ready sampling failed to ensure the expected range of bereavement types. Somehow the bereavements constructed as relevant for audit all transpired to concern the death of mothers. Moreover, of the six relatives who agreed to be interviewed concerning these bereavements, two were stepfathers and four were sisters. Colman underlines the invisibility of care work usually done by female family members: how wise or less wise decisions create the conditions for bereavement reactions, and how changes to care arrangements following bereavement fall most heavily on them. Traustadottir (2002) discussed the way new care initiatives often put pressure on female family members and staff to do more unpaid work. For example, Circles of Support encourages them to include people with intellectual disability in their personal social networks, without considering the personal costs. Such observations have yet to emerge from the umbrella of feminist research. Separatism has served feminism well, but issues of women and care do need to find their place in mainstream reviews.Another useful reminder from Colman is that the person with intellectual disability is not the only concern to families, although only a few adult services manage to hold wider systemic factors in mind (Clegg and Burnham 2000). If the person may make naïve comments at a funeral that would devastate family members whose needs take priority, the person will be excluded.The potency of bereavement was discussed twice. Casenave suggests that because "disability is a loss experience" bereavement resonates with it, casting some doubt onto the suggestion that our thesis generalizes to other contested topics. Reinders criticizes clinicians for being purblind to the tragic. The anonymous reviewer who questioned [End Page 99] the relevance of our discussion of the quality of "presence," a quality Reinders considers highly relevant, illustrates the point better than we can. Recognizing the way clinicians have little "patience with the notion of the tragic" encourages reflection on what other human experiences fail to capture our attention.Although these are all potentially valuable directions, we focus here on comments that may enhance our ability to work without dogma. Since at least the 1980s, clinicians in intellectual disability have criticized the discipline for using linear and univariate rather than complex and multivariate theories, and for a naïve search for magic answers (reviewed in Clegg 1993). It is our contention that little has changed, and that uncertain meaning and normalization combine to create ideal conditions for dogma. Reinders' exposition of the various uses of meaning in our article and in different linguistic and historical traditions develops a vital but neglected topic in intellectual disability, which we consider in some detail. We conclude by arguing that developments require us to distance ourselves from the universality and commonality inherent to normalization, and create new ways to appreciate particularity and diversity.The gist of Reinders' complex argument appears to be that the problems we identify in managing bereavement in intellectual disability stem from a modernist understanding of meaning that is erroneous. Implicitly, those who eschew its pursuit demonstrate the greater wisdom, because neither dialogue nor activities such as reflection can generate meaning that is unattainable. If we understand his position correctly, he contrasts two principal understandings of meaning: comprehension and apprehension.Comprehension is the illusory modernist idea that humans are agents who make sense of themselves... (shrink)

The purpose of the present contribution is to explore how the ECJ seeks to respect the principles underpinning national welfare systems, notably social solidarity, whilst ensuring that Member States comply with the substantive law of the European Union, in particular with the Treaty provisions on the fundamental freedoms and EU citizenship. It is submitted that in order to reconcile those two interests the ECJ has taken the view that nationals of the host Member State must show a certain (...) degree of financial solidarity with the nationals of other Member States who have established a ‘genuine or real link’ with the society of that State. With a view to establishing the existence of such a link, national authorities of the host Member State must engage in a case-by-case assessment of the personal circumstances of the EU citizen claiming social benefits. However, Förster is an important exception to the individual application of the ‘genuine or real link’ test. Although Förster does not overrule Bidar as a matter of principle, it exempts the host Member State from examining the personal situation of economically inactive students who apply for maintenance grants or student loans but have not yet completed a five-year period of residence. (shrink)

Most accounts of welfare aggregation in the tradition of Arrow's and Sen's social-choice-theoretic frameworks represent the welfare of an individual in terms of a single welfare ordering or a single scalar-valued welfare function. I develop a multidimensional generalization of Arrow's and Sen's frameworks, representing individual welfare in terms of multiple personal welfare functions, corresponding to multiple 'dimensions' of welfare. I show that, as in the one-dimensional case, the existence of attractive aggregation procedures (...) depends on certain informational assumptions, specifically about the measurability of welfare and its comparability not only across individuals but also across dimensions. I state several impossibility and possibility results. Under Arrow-type conditions, insufficient comparability across individuals leads to dictatorship of a single individual, while insufficient comparability across dimensions leads to dominance of a single dimension. Given sufficient comparability both across individuals and across dimensions, a range of possibilities emerges. I discuss the substantive implications of the results. (shrink)

In the present world order unbridled forces of free market capitalism are frequently cited for much of the social injustice, inequity, and disparity of wealth between the rich and the poor. Although history''s verdict in favor of the free markets could hardly be harsher or clearer, it is clear that after the initial wave of triumph, the free market paradigm has developed some cracks in its façade. What marks the trail of such sustained and pronounced move toward free markets (...) in terms of ethics, morality, social welfare and social justice? How does one keep a social score in this seemingly relentless and irreversible move all over the world toward free market capitalism?In this paper we shall attempt to address these and related questions. Drawing on concepts from organization theory and social philosophy and using publicly available financial information, we shall illustrate how, amidst the myriad and mixed noises, some sense of order and signal can be discerned in addressing issues of equity and social justice. Toward this end, first, we provide a broad contrast between two models of financial markets: the command model and the free market model and proceed to examine publicly available financial information and analyze the trends and patterns with graphical representations using publicly available data from Handbook of International Economic Statistics. Next, we explore the implications of financial performance measures for social welfare and social justice and discuss the social perils of free markets using the Mexican and Asian Financial crises as the focal points. Finally, we present a set of recommendations for smoother structural transition. (shrink)

The social welfare functional approach to social choice theory fails to distinguish a genuine change in individual well-beings from a merely representational change due to the use of different measurement scales. A generalization of the concept of a social welfare functional is introduced that explicitly takes account of the scales that are used to measure well-beings so as to distinguish between these two kinds of changes. This generalization of the standard theoretical framework results in a (...) more satisfactory formulation of welfarism, the doctrine that social alternatives are evaluated and socially ranked solely in terms of the well-beings of the relevant individuals. This scale-dependent form of welfarism is axiomatized using this framework. The implications of this approach for characterizing classes of social welfare orderings are also considered. (shrink)

We examine individuals’ distributional orderings in a number of contexts. This is done by using a questionnaire-experiment that is presented to respondents in any one of seven “flavors” or interpretations of the basic distributional problem. The flavors include inequality, risk, social welfare and justice.

Tsui and Weymark (Economic Theory, 1997) have shown that the only continuous social welfare orderings on the whole Euclidean space which satisfy the weak Pareto principle and are invariant to individual-specific similarity transformations of utilities are strongly dictatorial. Their proof relies on functional equation arguments which are quite complex. This note provides a simpler proof of their theorem.

Social choice theory is the study of collective decision processes and procedures. It is not a single theory, but a cluster of models and results concerning the aggregation of individual inputs (e.g., votes, preferences, judgments, welfare) into collective outputs (e.g., collective decisions, preferences, judgments, welfare). Central questions are: How can a group of individuals choose a winning outcome (e.g., policy, electoral candidate) from a given set of options? What are the properties of different voting systems? When is (...) a voting system democratic? How can a collective (e.g., electorate, legislature, collegial court, expert panel, or committee) arrive at coherent collective preferences or judgments on some issues, on the basis of its members' individual preferences or judgments? How can we rank different social alternatives in an order of social welfare? Social choice theorists study these questions not just by looking at examples, but by developing general models and proving theorems. (shrink)

In preference aggregation a set of individuals express preferences over a set of alternatives, and these preferences have to be aggregated into a collective preference. When preferences are represented as orders, aggregation procedures are called social welfare functions. Classical results in social choice theory state that it is impossible to aggregate the preferences of a set of individuals under different natural sets of axiomatic conditions. We define a first-order language for social welfare functions and we (...) give a complete axiomatisation for this class, without having the number of individuals or alternatives specified in the language. We are able to express classical axiomatic requirements in our first-order language, giving formal axioms for three classical theorems of preference aggregation by Arrow, by Sen, and by Kirman and Sondermann. We explore to what extent such theorems can be formally derived from our axiomatisations, obtaining positive results for Sen’s Theorem and the Kirman-Sondermann Theorem. For the case of Arrow’s Theorem, which does not apply in the case of infinite societies, we have to resort to fixing the number of individuals with an additional axiom. In the long run, we hope that our approach to formalisation can serve as the basis for a fully automated proof of classical and new theorems in social choice theory. (shrink)

The article reconstructs the premises of the reception of analytic philosophy in jurisprudence and shows that the development of a method for clarifying the meanings of legal concepts is not least connected with the problem of legitimizing law enforcement. The article analyzes H.L.A. Hart’s approach to the problem of correlation between the “letter” and “spirit” of the law in the process of interpreting legal norms. The article argues that the process of interpretation is determined teleologically. In its limit, the interpretation (...) of legal norms presupposes the re-creation of the desired image of society, the reconstruction of such social ontology that is most consistent with the ideal of achieving social welfare. The article examines the collision of the “ideal of order” and the “ideal of justice” as two regulations of law enforcement. The author believes that the interpretation of this collision within the analytical tradition was characterized by a gradual movement from the ideal of “mechanical” law enforcement, which minimizes the creative role of the interpreter, to the ideal of flexible interpretation focused on achieving legal goals in a changing environment. It is noted that, according to analytic approach, a theoretical solution to this conflict was proposed due to the development of the ideas of an “open texture” of law. The author demonstrates that the development of the analytic tradition in jurisprudence has shown that the criticism of language and the interpretation of meanings are not technical tasks, but it presupposes the construction of a metaphysics of law. In this regard, the author concludes: the development of the ideas of the analytic tradition in jurisprudence demonstrates that the thesis about the absence of a positive program in analytic philosophy, put forward in the first article of the discussion, can be challenged. (shrink)

Social justice is a concept we take for granted. We assume that it means using state structures to ensure equality and fairness. But is that true? Or, do state structures of social order actually inhibit creativity, freedom, social welfare, and belonging? This collection broadens the boundaries of the ways we think about what constitutes criminality and interrogates issues of social justice and power in new, innovative and critical ways. The essays examine a wide variety of (...) themes, including the deconstruction of concepts of freedom and equality, notions of criminality and deviance, state regulation of social order, and various aspects of feminist criminology. (shrink)

For several decades, theorists interested in Kant’s discussion of welfare have puzzled over Kant’s position on the issue of the redistribution of goods in society. They have done this both in order to clarify his position and as a source of inspiration for current conceptual problems faced by contemporary political philosophers who attempt to reconcile the ideal of equal freedom with the asymmetric interference necessary for redistribution and social provision. In this paper, I start with Kant’s brief discussion (...) of welfare in Rechtslehre and I identify four claims that Kant clearly asserts as characteristic for his view. I then outline five main interpretative directions in the literature, I evaluate and rank them. The most accurate view of Kant’s justification of welfare, which I call the “genuinely Kantian” position is, however, unable to explain the nature of the duty of welfare that it asserts. By going back to Kant’s text, I suggest one solution. This solution, together with some further questions, can be seen as initiating a new interpretative direction in the literature. (shrink)

With this concise and tightly constructed account of Kant’s views on social welfare, Alexander Kaufman has filled a gap in the growing literature on Kant’s political philosophy. Kaufman’s purpose is two-fold: first, to explicate the philosophical basis of Kant’s views of social welfare; and second, to reconstruct Kant’s views on political judgment in order to link his abstract philosophical ideas to public policy.

With this concise and tightly constructed account of Kant’s views on social welfare, Alexander Kaufman has filled a gap in the growing literature on Kant’s political philosophy. Kaufman’s purpose is two-fold: first, to explicate the philosophical basis of Kant’s views of social welfare; and second, to reconstruct Kant’s views on political judgment in order to link his abstract philosophical ideas to public policy.

The legitimacy of the dominant intensive meat production system with respect to the issue of animal welfare is increasingly being questioned by stakeholders across the meat supply chain. The current meat supply is highly undifferentiated, catering only for the extremes of morality concerns (i.e., conventional vs. organic meat products). However, a latent need for compromise products has been identified. That is, consumer differences exist regarding the trade-offs they make between different aspects associated with meat consumption. The heterogeneity in consumer (...) demand could function as a starting point for market segmentation, targeting and positioning regarding animal welfare concepts that are differentiated in terms of animal welfare and price levels. Despite this, stakeholders in the meat supply chain seem to be trapped in the dominant business model focused on low cost prices. This paper aims to identify conflicting interests that stakeholders in the meat supply chain experience in order to increase understanding of why heterogeneous consumer preferences are not met by a more differentiated supply of meat products produced at different levels of animal welfare standards. In addition, characteristics of the supply chain that contribute to the existence of high exit barriers and difficulty to shift to more animal-friendly production systems are identified. Following the analysis of conflicting interests among stakeholders and factors that contribute to difficulty to transform the existing dominant regime, different routes are discussed that may help and motivate stakeholders to overcome these barriers and stimulate the creation of new markets. (shrink)

Consumer action is leading to increasing debate over on-farm activities in New Zealand. Both animal welfare activists and government organizations frequently refer to the importance of welfare standards in order to secure overseas markets, as well as in response to local concerns. This article explores rural and urban people’s views of welfare of animals kept on farms for commercial purposes in response to a 2008 survey commissioned by the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry. It compares and contrasts (...) these recent findings with those of an earlier survey, to demonstrate how understanding of—and the impetus for—changing farm practices have developed. The article also looks at the global context of the animal welfare issue and discusses how overseas trends impact the New Zealand situation. The view that animal welfare is purely about physical well-being is among those challenged at home and abroad, and farmers are now forced to defend and amend industry standards. (shrink)

Several areas of welfare economics seek to evaluate states of affairs as a function of interpersonally comparable individual utilities. The aim is to map each state of affairs onto a vector of individual utilities, and then to produce an ordering of these vectors that can be represented by a mathematical function assigning a real number to each. When this approach is used in intertemporal contexts, a central theoretical question concerns the evaluative weight to be applied to utility coming at (...) different times. This question concerns the rate of pure time preference, which is one key determinant of the social discount rate. This article argues that the standard philosophical account of pure time preference is mistaken, because it ascribes to economists a methodological commitment they need not, and often do not, accept. This in turn undercuts the most common philosophical objection to pure time preference, which traces at least to Rawls’s A Theory of Justice. The article then evaluates three further objections to pure time preference, concluding that it might still be defensible under certain circumstances. The article closes by articulating a final argument that is suggested by the “Social, Economic and Ethical Concepts and Methods” chapter of the most recent Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change report. If this further argument is sound, it would constitute a decisive objection to pure time preference as it currently figures in much intertemporal welfare economics. (shrink)

Liberal egalitarians tend to be committed both to generous asylum policies and generous, universal welfare states. Yet there may be political, social and economic reasons why there is a conflict in realising both. Asylum seekers may create economic pressures to the welfare state, or undermine national solidarity supposedly necessary to support redistribution. In this paper, I discuss how political theorists should approach these empirical concerns. I take issue with the view that theorists can simply move between ‘realism’ (...) and ‘idealism’ by accepting more or less of reality. Instead, political theorists should seek to offer a critical description of the conflict, which can reveal structures of power that ought to be subject to normative scrutiny. To this end, I discuss two accounts of how the welfare state may justify asylum restrictions in relation to the case of Sweden, a universal welfare state that has recently introduced restrictions on asylum to protect the welfare state. I argue along these accounts that the welfare state is both an important source of political and social order and a foundation of the personal moral experience. Yet a critical analysis also illustrates how these claims weaken as underlying methodological nationalism and bias towards existing power structures are brought to light. Asylum restrictions cannot be justified if they contribute to perpetuating these power structures, which cause some of the conflict with the welfare state in the first place. (shrink)

Justice, Care, and the Welfare State explores contemporary welfare state reform from a moral and philosophical perspective. It offers detailed arguments about the nature of justice in the areas of family policy, education, health care, old age pensions and long-term care, disability, and employment and poverty support. Challenging the ideal nature of much contemporary political philosophy, Engster applies political philosophy to public policy issues in order to generate concrete policy recommendations for better supporting social justice.

Liberal political theory is all too familiar with the divide between classical and welfare-state liberals. Classical liberals, as we all know, insist on the importance of small government, negative liberty, and private property. Welfare-state liberals, on the other hand, although they too stress civil rights, tend to be sympathetic to “positive liberty,” are for a much more expansive government, and are often ambivalent about private property. Although I do not go so far as to entirely deny the usefulness (...) of this familiar distinction, I think in many ways it is misleading. In an important sense, most free-market liberals are also “welfare-state” liberals. I say this because the overwhelming number of liberals, of both the pro-market and the pro-government variety, entertain a welfarist conception of political economy. On this dominant welfarist view, the ultimate justification of the politico-economic order is that it promotes human welfare. Traditional “welfare-state liberals” such as Robert E. Goodin manifestly adopt this welfarist conception. But it is certainly not only interventionists such as Goodin who insist that advancing welfare is the overriding goal of normative political economy. J. R. McCulloch, one of the great nineteenth-century laissez-faire political economists, was adamant that “freedom is not, as some appear to think, the end of government: the advancement of public prosperity and happiness is its end.” To be sure, McCulloch would have disagreed with Goodin about the optimal welfare-maximizing economic policy: the welfarist ideal, he and his fellow classical political economists believed, would best be advanced by provision of a legal and institutional framework — most importantly, the laws of property, contract, and the criminal code — that allows individuals to pursue their own interests in the market and, by so doing, promote public welfare. In general, what might be called the “classical-liberal welfare state” claims to advance welfare by providing the framework for individuals to seek wealth for themselves, while welfarists such as Goodin insist that a market order is seriously flawed as a mechanism for advancing human welfare and, in addition, that government has the competency to “correct market failures” in the provision of welfare. (shrink)

One new form of liberalism is a doctrine that might be called Constitutional Welfare Liberalism. It stands in some continuity with the varieties of welfare and equality oriented liberalism that emerged in the Nineteenth Century and which found expression in the U.S. in political movements like the New Deal of F.D.R. and the Great Society of L.B.J. Constitutional Welfare Liberalism differs somewhat from earlier versions of Welfare Liberalism in that it claims to be solidly grounded in (...) the fundamentals of the liberal tradition and of the American Constitution. Advocates of Constitutional Welfare Liberalism would replace what they call the “negative-liberties model” of the Constitutional order with a “benefits model.” They rest their case on an analysis of rights that denies the meaningfulness of the common distinction between negative and positive rights. Some advocates of Constitutional Welfare Liberalism also base their claims on the positive empowerments and ends of government as expressed in the Preamble to the Constitution. It is shown here via an analysis of the negative/positive rights distinction that the distinction is indeed meaningful when understood more accurately than Constitutional Welfare Liberalism theorists do. Likewise it is shown that neither the general character of the Constitution as an empowerment of government, nor the particular goals stated in the Preamble imply the benefits model. (shrink)

In contrast to members of other developed, capitalist societies, Germans still attach some positive connotations to collectivism. In particular, they see the welfare state as a guarantor of collective security and social harmony, and as an agent of national interests by means of macroeconomic planning. The combination of collectivist social goals and statist means can be traced back to the Protestant Reformation in Germany, when the political vacuum left by the defeat of Roman internationalism was filled by (...) local, secular governments which took over responsibility for the collective welfare of their subjects. The welfare state began in Germany as a stringent moral order; it was acceptable to the emerging middle class because public welfare was associated with the suppression of idiosyncratic desire. The maintenance of public welfare was viewed as a precondition for economic and military viability, encouraging the growth of state power in the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The collective public good became associated with the enlargement of dynastic glory. When unification finally came in the late nineteenth century, the authoritarian state was well entrenched in Germany. Bourgeois individualism in the form of social corporatism was considerably weaker than state corporatism. Competing interest groups sought to impose their visions upon the state, which symbolized society as a whole. Nazism, too, successfully exploited the German yearning for a state that would express the nation's collective energies in the form of a?higher?; community, the Volksgemeinschaft. It was only in the aftermath of the catastrophe, when the Federal Republic succeeded in building solid economic and political foundations around collectivist impulses, that a viable?social state?; emerged, one that seemed to offer both universal social security and a large sphere for private initiative. State corporatism played a large role after 1945 in diffusing social conflict and maintaining the social contract, the presupposition of which was continuing prosperity. Since the Conservatives regained power in 1982, however, economic hardship among the lower third of society, in glaring contrast to the opulence of the upper third, has begun to jeopardize the social harmony which the welfare state was supposed to ensure. The potential cost of social programs to rectify this situation and to meet the needs of the new eastern states has called forth neoliberal criticism of the idea that there is a? German model?; in which the negative aspects of collectivism can be successfully transformed into a positive collaboration between state and society. (shrink)

This paper explores citizens’ views about the welfare of farmed fish and the mental abilities of fish with a large survey data sample from Finland (n = 1,890). Although studies on attitudes towards animal welfare have been increasing, fish welfare has received only limited empirical attention, despite the rapid expansion of aquaculture sector. The results show that the welfare of farmed fish is not any great concern in the Finnish society. The analysis confirms the distinct character (...) given to farmed fish compared to traditional farmed animals. Salmon are rated low in their mental abilities, including the capacity to feel pain, which may weaken ethical concerns for fish welfare. When analyzing the social determinants surrounding the rating of the welfare of farmed fish, it was shown that fish welfare attitudes follow general animal welfare attitudes regarding age and place of residence as fish welfare tends to be rated more negatively among younger age groups and among urban residents. However, no clear connection could be identified between gender and the rating of fish welfare, which may suggest that the distinct cultural categorization of fish diminishes the typical gender difference identified in animal attitudes. It is concluded that in order to improve awareness about fish welfare, there is a need to increase dissemination of scientific knowledge about fish and their welfare. Moreover, further research should be directed toward studying the moral positioning of fish and the distinct moral categorization they receive. (shrink)

The sudden growth and glorification of the penal state in the United States after the mid-1970s (and in Western Europe two decades later) is not a response to the evolution of crime, but a reaction to—and a diversion from—the social insecurity produced by the fragmentation of wage labor and the destabilization of ethnoracial hierarchies following the discarding of the Fordist-Keynesian compact. It partakes of a new government of poverty wedding restrictive “workfare” and expansive “prisonfare,” which ensnares the precarious fractions (...) of the postindustrial proletariat in a carceral-assistential net designed to steer them towards deregulated employment or to contain them in their dispossessed neighborhoods and in the booming prisons that have become their satellites. This policy of penalization of urban marginality guided by moral behaviorism partakes of a broader reengineering and remasculinizing of the state that has rendered obsolete the traditional scholarly and policy division between welfare and crime. It must be grasped, not under the narrow rubric of repression, but under the generative category of production, as it has spawned new state agencies, social types, knowledges and experts. It makes the study of incarceration an essential chapter in the sociology of the state and social stratification in the era of triumphant neoliberalism. (shrink)

The sudden growth and glorification of the penal state in the United States after the mid-1970s (and in Western Europe two decades later) is not a response to the evolution of crime, but a reaction to—and a diversion from—the social insecurity produced by the fragmentation of wage labor and the destabilization of ethnoracial hierarchies following the discarding of the Fordist-Keynesian compact. It partakes of a new government of poverty wedding restrictive “workfare” and expansive “prisonfare,” which ensnares the precarious fractions (...) of the postindustrial proletariat in a carceral-assistential net designed to steer them towards deregulated employment or to contain them in their dispossessed neighborhoods and in the booming prisons that have become their satellites. This policy of penalization of urban marginality guided by moral behaviorism partakes of a broader reengineering and remasculinizing of the state that has rendered obsolete the traditional scholarly and policy division between welfare and crime. It must be grasped, not under the narrow rubric of repression, but under the generative category of production, as it has spawned new state agencies, social types, knowledges and experts. It makes the study of incarceration an essential chapter in the sociology of the state and social stratification in the era of triumphant neoliberalism. (shrink)

This paper deals with three topics: types of rights, the development of the terminology of rights, and the question of the primacy of welfare rights. Because these topics are interrelated, my exposition does not observe rigid boundaries among them. There is no pretence at all that any of these subjects is fully covered here; nor is it proposed, except for one writer, to touch upon the contemporary literature on rights, as noteworthy as some of that literature is. In order (...) to gain entrance into the field, on which the writing has grown to massive proportions, I shall begin with an interesting historical phenomenon, some of whose philosophical import I want to explore. I should say at the outset, however, that the general motivation of this paper is the problem of the significance of the language of “rights.” Does it really make a difference, for instance, to speak of the “rights of man” rather than the “common duties of humanity”? Does the term “rights” add anything of special significance or is its only significance rhetorical and ideological? Can we dispense with the language of rights and still say everything we need to say about our moral relations? I confess to a moderate skepticism about the necessity of the language of rights in the last analysis. At any rate, this paper is intended as a contribution, however small, to this problem. The historical phenomenon with which I am going to begin will enable us to bring into focus the issue of the meaning of “rights.”. (shrink)

Population ethics contains several principles that avoid the repugnant conclusion. These rules rank all possible alternatives, leaving no room for moral ambiguity. Building on a suggestion of Parfit, this paper characterizes principles that provide incomplete but ethically attractive rankings of alternatives with different population sizes. All of them rank same-number alternatives with generalized utilitarianism.

We study a principle of ‘Non-Interference’ in social welfare judgements. Non-Interference captures aspects of liberal approaches (particularly a Millian approach) to social decision making. In its full generality, Non-Interference produces an impossibility result: together with Weak Pareto Optimality, it implies that a social welfare ordering must be dictatorial. However, interesting restricted versions of Non-Interference are compatible with standard social welfare orderings.

Since Sen's insightful analysis of Arrow's Impossibility Theorem (Sen, 1970/1979), Arrow's theorem is often interpreted as a consequence of the exclusion of interpersonal information from Arrow's framework. Interpersonal comparability of either welfare levels or welfare units is known to be sufficient for circumventing Arrow's impossibility result (e.g. Sen, 1970/1979, 1982; Roberts, 1980; d'Aspremont, 1985). But it is less well known whether one of these types of comparability is also necessary or whether Arrow's conditions can already be satisfied in (...) much narrower informational frameworks. This note explores such a framework: the assumption of (ONC+0), ordinal measurability of welfare with the additional measurability of a 'zero-line', is shown to point towards new, albeit limited, escape-routes from Arrow's theorem. Some existence and classification results are established, using the condition that social orderings be transitive as well as the condition that social orderings be quasi-transitive. (shrink)

This article assesses John Rawls's case against the welfare state as a means for implementing socio-economic justice, and for a ‘property-owning democracy’, from both a normative and a methodological point of view. It points out several flaws of Rawls's critique of the welfare state, through a focus on an existing variety of it — a Swedish-style universal welfare state — which can be said to be relatively successful, both in terms of normative merits and in terms of (...) institutional stability and capacity for self-perpetuation. On this basis, the article argues that a universal welfare state should constitute the institutional bedrock of Rawlsian social justice, even though it cannot completely fulfil all its requirements. It also develops some reasons to think that, in order to adequately and stably implement those requirements of Rawlsian justice that cannot be fulfilled even by a universal welfare state, the latter should be supplemented by democratic socialism, not by a ‘property-owning democracy’. (shrink)

Two conservative theorists, F. A. Hayek and Michael Oakeshott, have advanced theories of law with important and plausible central theses focusing on the rule of law. The author argues, however, that in each case the theorist ‐ or at least some of his followers on the contemporary British and American political scene ‐ have wrongly inferred strong conclusions from these theories which are inimical to the welfare state. In conclusion, the author points to possible ways of reconciling rule of (...) law to social justice. (shrink)

The article inquires into some of the most relevant current transformations of the idea of the social in contemporary European welfare capitalism. Some crucial institutional ideas — employability and activation — of EU welfare capitalism and their connections with the new spirit of capitalism — network capitalism — are discussed. In particular, the way these ideas contribute to enacting institutional regimes of justification, framing in this a new idea of the social, is explored. The features of (...) the latter will be deepened with particular concern for two constitutive elements of European societal self-representation — individualization (as a social ideal and project) and publicness (as a fundamental characteristic of the institutional programme) — and regarding emerging paradoxes characterizing their current development. Arguments will be advanced in order to show that the currently dominant institutional regime of justification does not have a univocal, one-way fate of development, and both ties and opportunities are reconfigured. The idea of the social, even if reframed according to the social and institutional logics the article explores, is a terrain of (cultural, political, social and institutional) conflict. In this, possible counter-factual interpretations of the emerging institutional devices and practices, already at work on the social stage, can be further developed and strengthened. (shrink)

This article provides a systematic analysis of social choice theory without the Pareto principle, by revisiting the method of Murakami Yasusuke. This article consists of two parts. The first part investigates the relationship between rationality of social preference and the axioms that make a collective choice rule either Paretian or anti-Paretian. In the second part, the results in the first part are applied to obtain impossibility results under various rationality requirements of social preference, such as S-consistency, quasi-transitivity, (...) semi-transitivity, the interval-order property, and acyclicity. (shrink)

"Donald Moon argues that neither rights nor equality can serve as adequate moral or political basis for a welfare state in addressing the Hegel’s dilemma. The Hegel’s dilemma is that organisation of economic life through the market in a democratic state produces great wealth as well as great poverty and individuals in such state fall in either category. The wide gulf in wealth among individuals in a market economy is a problem which a democratic welfare state seeks to (...) address but, for Moon, rights or equality is not adequate moral and political basis of the welfare state for solving the problem. He proposes the principles of economic management, provision of services and social insurance as alternative and adequate bases for a welfare state in addressing the problem. This paper queries Moon’s proposal. The paper argues that Moon’s proposed institutional principles are inadequate in addressing the problem without a fundamental moral and/or political basis upon which these principles can be justifiably founded. The paper posits that rights provide a plausible and adequate foundational moral and political basis for the principles in order to adequately address the problem created by the market economy without jeopardising the idea of human self-respect. Keywords: Democracy, Equality, Social Insurance, Market Economy, Rights, Welfare State ". (shrink)

This article attempts to locate the solicitor-advocacy reforms in the UK in the context of wider New Right led reforms of the welfare state and suggests that such reforms are part of a broader package aimed at weakening social democracy, encouraging the use of the market as an allocation mechanism and instilling 'efficiency' within and control over the professions. On the basis of interviews with organizational clients in Scotland, it is argued that the reforms may have a significant (...) impact upon the junior Bar and that while they may ultimately benefit corporate clients they are likely to bring further disadvantage to individual clients who are already weak within the professional-client relationship. (shrink)