We propose a framework for including information‐processing bounds in rational analyses. It is an application of bounded optimality (Russell & Subramanian, 1995) to the challenges of developing theories of mechanism and behavior. The framework is based on the idea that behaviors are generated by cognitive mechanisms that are adapted to the structure of not only the environment but also the mind and brain itself. We call the framework computational rationality to emphasize the incorporation of computational mechanism into the definition (...) of rational action. Theories are specified as optimal program problems, defined by an adaptation environment, a bounded machine, and a utility function. Such theories yield different classes of explanation, depending on the extent to which they emphasize adaptation to bounds, and adaptation to some ecology that differs from the immediate local environment. We illustrate this variation with examples from three domains: visual attention in a linguistic task, manual response ordering, and reasoning. We explore the relation of this framework to existing “levels” approaches to explanation, and to other optimality‐based modeling approaches. (shrink)

Utility maximization is a key element of a number of theoretical approaches to explaining human behavior. Among these approaches are rational analysis, ideal observer theory, and signal detection theory. While some examples of these approaches define the utility maximization problem with little reference to the bounds imposed by the organism, others start with, and emphasize approaches in which bounds imposed by the information processing architecture are considered as an explicit part of the utility maximization problem. These latter (...) approaches are the topic of this issue of the journal. (shrink)

Econometric analysis of discrete choice has made considerable use of random utility models to interpret observed choice behavior. Much empirical research concerns choice problems in which persons act with partial knowledge of the utilities of the feasible actions. Economists use random expected utility models to analyze such choice problems. A common practice is to specify fully the expectations that persons hold, in which case choice analysis reduces to inference on preferences alone. However, the expectations assumptions made in empirical (...) research rarely have much foundation. To enable more credible research, this paper considers inference when one specifies a set of expectations that decision makers may plausibly hold. I first pose the idea in abstraction and then specialize to binary response with linear utilities, where the analysis is particularly straightforward. I initially assume that decision makers possess unique subjective probability distributions on the states of nature and make choices that maximize expected utility. I later consider the possibility that persons place only partial probabilistic structure on the states of nature and make undominated choices. (shrink)

The rational price of the Pasadena and Altadena games, introduced by Nover and Hájek (2004 ), has been the subject of considerable discussion. Easwaran (2008 ) has suggested that weak expectations — the value to which the average payoffs converge in probability — can give the rational price of such games. We argue against the normative force of weak expectations in the standard framework. Furthermore, we propose to replace this framework by a bounded utility perspective: this shift renders (...) the problem more realistic and accounts for the role of weak expectations. In particular, we demonstrate that in a bounded utility framework, all agents, even if they have different value functions and disagree on the price of an individual game, will finally agree on the rational price of a repeated, averaged game. Thus, we explain the intuitive appeal of weak expectations, while avoiding both trivialization of the original paradox and the drawbacks of previous approaches. (shrink)

Game theory is a branch of economics that uses powerful mathematical models to predict what agents ought to do when interacting with other agents strategically. Bounded rationality is a sub-field of game theory that sets out to explain why, in some interesting cases, people don't act according their utility maximizing strategies, as described by game theory. Interactive Epistemology is formal tool used by Game Theorists and computer scientists to model interactive cases of knowledge. This interesting and useful tool (...) has been previously ignored by philosophers. I'd like to introduce philosophers to interactive epistemology. After doing so, I'll go on to describe the way I've used this powerful formal tool in my own research, by giving some arguments about Bounded Epistemology, which is an analogue of Bounded Rationality, and, if I'm right, is explainable according to many, but not all, of the same models. Doing so, however, requires first setting out and explaining many of these concepts more fully. (shrink)

In searching for an appropriate utility function in the expected utility framework, we formulate four properties that we want the utility function to satisfy. We conduct a search for such a function, and we identify Pareto utility as a function satisfying all four desired properties. Pareto utility is a flexible yet simple and parsimonious two-parameter family. It exhibits decreasing absolute risk aversion and increasing but bounded relative risk aversion. It is applicable irrespective of the (...) probability distribution relevant to the prospect to be evaluated. Pareto utility is therefore particularly suited for catastrophic risk analysis. A new and related class of generalized exponential (gexpo) utility functions is also studied. This class is particularly relevant in situations where absolute risk tolerance is thought to be concave rather than linear. (shrink)

A TRADITIONAL VIEW OF UTILITY AND RIGHTS According to a conventional view, no project could be more hopelessly misconceived than the enterprise of attempting a utilitarian derivation of fundamental rights. We are all familiar – too familiar, perhaps – with the arguments that support this conventional view, but let us review them anyway. We may begin by recalling that, whereas the defining value of utilitarianism – pleasure, happiness or welfare – contains no mention of the dignity or autonomy of (...) human beings, it is this value which utilitarianism in all its standard forms invokes as the criterion of right action. Worse, insofar as utilitarian policy must have as its goal the maximization of welfare conceived as an aggregate summed over the utilities of everyone affected, legal and political utilitarianism seems bound to have a collectivist bias, trading on the dangerous fiction of a social entity and ignoring the distinctness of separate selves with their several incommensurable claims. It seems that, if individuals can appear in the utilitarian calculus at all, it will only be as ciphers, abstract place-holders for units of welfare. For, as an aggregative value, utility must be indifferent to distribution, and insensitive to the preeminently distributive considerations marked by claims about rights. So, if whatever has utility can be broken down into units or elements which are subject to measurement or at least comparison by a common standard, then it will always be possible that a very great loss of welfare for one man or a few men can be justified if it produces a great many small increments of welfare for a vast multitude of men. (shrink)

This paper presents an axiomatic framework for the priority heuristic, a model of bounded rationality in Selten’s (in: Gigerenzer and Selten (eds.) Bounded rationality: the adaptive toolbox, 2001) spirit of using empirical evidence on heuristics. The priority heuristic predicts actual human choices between risky gambles well. It implies violations of expected utility theory such as common consequence effects, common ratio effects, the fourfold pattern of risk taking and the reflection effect. We present an axiomatization of a parameterized (...) version of the heuristic which generalizes the heuristic in order to account for individual differences and inconsistencies. The axiomatization uses semiorders (Luce, Econometrica 24:178–191, 1956), which have an intransitive indifference part and a transitive strict preference component. The axiomatization suggests new testable predictions of the priority heuristic and makes it easier for theorists to study the relation between heuristics and other axiomatic theories such as cumulative prospect theory. (shrink)

With the discovery of voluminous discordant empirical evidence, maximizing expected utility is rapidly disappearing as the core of the theory of human rationality, and a theory of bounded rationality, embracing both the processes and products of choice, is replacing it. There remains a large task of organizing our picture of economic and social processes and adding the new facts needed to shape the theory in an empirically sound way. It is also urgent that new tools now available for (...) conducting empirical inquiry and constructing models be incorporated in social science graduate education. (shrink)

Previous theory and research on bounded rationality has emphasized how limited cognitive resources constrain people from making utility maximizing choices. This paper expands the concept of bounded rationality to consider how people’s rationality may be constrained by their internalization of a qualitatively distinct standard for sound judgment, which is commonly labeled reasonableness. In contrast to rationality, the standard of reasonableness provides guidance for making choices in situations that involve balancing incommensurable values and interests or reconciling conflicting points-of-view. (...) We review recent evidence showing that laypeople readily recognize the distinctions between rationality and reasonableness and thus are able to utilize these as distinct standards to inform their everyday decision-making. The fact that people appear to have internalized rationality and reasonableness as distinct standards of sound judgment supports the notion that people’s pursuit of rationality may be bounded by their determination to also be reasonable. (shrink)

The bounded rationality theory has been perceived by social scientists as a more flexible version of the rational choice theory, also called expected utility theory. The former has the avantage of taking into consideration the fact that information is generally costly. It corrects the RCT on an important point. For the social sciences, the RCT is very useful, but far from representing a general theory which could explain the various kinds of behaviour the social sciences are confronted to, (...) even in its more flexible BRT version. The article makes the postulates underlying the RCT and the BRT explicit and shows that, when some of the postulates are eliminated, a genuinely general model is obtained: the model which is actually used in convincing sociological analyses.La Théorie de la rationalité limitée a été perçue par les sciences sociales comme une version assouplie de la théorie du choix rationnel, aussi appelée Modèle de l’utilité espérée. La TRL a l’avantage de tenir compte notamment du fait que l’information est généralement coûteuse, corrigeant ainsi l’irréalisme de la TCR sur un point essentiel. Du point de vue des sciences sociales, la TCR est fort utile, mais elle est loin de proposer une théorie générale de la rationalité permettant de rendre compte des divers types de comportement dont les sciences sociales ont à connaître, même dans sa version assouplie de la TRL. On identifie ici les postulats de la TCR et de la TRL et l’on montre qu’en abandonnant certains de ces postulats, l’on définit un modèle, le MRG qui, lui, peut prétendre à la généralité. C’est celui qui est utilisé naturellement par les analyses sociologiques qui ses sont imposées. (shrink)

Classical utilitarianism is very demanding and entails some counter-intuitive implications in moral dilemmas such as the trolley problem in deontological ethics and the repugnant conclusion in population ethics. This article presents how one specific modification of utilitarianism can avoid these counter-intuitive implications. In this modified utilitarian theory, called ‘discounted’ or ‘mild’ utilitarianism, people have a right to discount the utilities of others, under the condition that people whose utility is discounted cannot validly complain against such discounting. A complaint made (...) by a utility discounted person is not valid if either the existence of the discounting people in that option is in a specific sense necessary or the existence of the discounted person is in a sense not necessary. According to mild utilitarianism, we should choose the option that maximizes the total validly discounted or complaint-free discounted utility, i e. the sum of everyone’s utility minus the complaint-free discounts. As there are two conditions that make a complaint invalid, this right to discount can be translated into two versions: the right to bodily autonomy and the right to procreation autonomy. The former right relates to the mere means principle in deontological ethics, the latter right is useful in avoiding the repugnant conclusion problem in population ethics. The possibility of democratically imposing an upper bound on the permissible amount of discounting is discussed. (shrink)

Decision theory seems to offer a very attractive normative framework for individual and social choice under uncertainty. The decisionmaker should think of her choice situation, at any given moment, in terms of a set of possible outcomes, that is, specifications of the possible consequences of choice, described in light of the decisionmaker's goals; a set of possible actions; and a "state set" consisting of possible prior "states of the world." It is this framework for choice which provides the foundation for (...) expected utility theory, as demonstrated in the work of Leonard Savage. Problems arise, however, when the decisionmaker is boundedly rational: when the mental process of thinking about outcomes, actions, and states is itself expensive and time consuming. In the case of the unboundedly rational decisionmaker, decision theory enjoins her to employ maximally specific outcomes; to consider all possible actions; and to use a set of mutually exclusive and collective exhaustive states, each of which is sufficiently finely specified so that each action, together with each state, yields one and only one maximally specific outcome. In the case of the boundedly rational decisionmaker, this procedure is either infeasible or, if feasible, irrational. This paper presents the problem of bounded rationality. It surveys possible solutions, none of which are found to be attractive. And it concludes by discussing the difficulties that the problem of bounded rationality poses for the welfarist program for legal scholarship presented by Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell in their book, Fairness versus Welfare. (shrink)

Expected utility maximization problem is one of the most useful tools in mathematical finance, decision analysis and economics. Motivated by statistical model selection, via the principle of expected utility maximization, Friedman and Sandow (J Mach Learn Res 4:257–291, 2003a) considered the model performance question from the point of view of an investor who evaluates models based on the performance of the optimal strategies that the models suggest. They interpreted their performance measures in information theoretic terms and provided new (...) generalizations of Shannon entropy and Kullback–Leibler relative entropy and called them U-entropy and U-relative entropy. In this article, a utility-based criterion for independence of two random variables is defined. Then, Markov’s inequality for probabilities is extended from the U-entropy viewpoint. Moreover, a lower bound for the U-relative entropy is obtained. Finally, a link between conditional U-entropy and conditional Renyi entropy is derived. (shrink)

An expected utility model of individual choice is formulated which allows the decision maker to specify his available actions in the form of controls (partial contingency plans) and to simultaneously choose goals and controls in end-mean pairs. It is shown that the Savage expected utility model, the Marschak- Radner team model, the Bayesian statistical decision model, and the standard optimal control model can be viewed as special cases of this goal-control expected utility model.

An increasingly prevalent approach to studying human cognition is to construe the mind as optimally allocating limited cognitive resources among cognitive processes. Under this bounded rationality approach (Icard in Philos Sci 85(1):79–101, 2018; Simon in Utility and probability, Palgrave Macmillan, 1980), it is common to assume that resource-bounded cognitive agents approximate normative solutions to statistical inference problems, and that much of the bias and variability in human performance can be explained in terms of the approximation strategies we (...) employ. In this paper, we argue that this approach restricts itself to an unnecessarily narrow scope of cognitive models, which limits its ability to explain how humans flexibly adapt their representations to novel environments. We argue that more attention should be paid to how we form our cognitive representations in the first place, and advocate for pluralistic framework which jointly optimizes over both representations and algorithms for manipulating them. We identify several fundamental trade-offs that manifest in this joint optimization, and draw on recent work to motivate a unified formal framework for this analysis. We illustrate a simplified version of this analysis with a case study in social cognition, and outline several new directions for research that this approach suggests. (shrink)

We provide an economic interpretation of the practice consisting in incorporating risk measures as constraints in an expected prospect maximization problem. For what we call the infimum of expectations class of risk measures, we show that if the decision maker (DM) maximizes the expectation of a random prospect under constraint that the risk measure is bounded above, he then behaves as a “generalized expected utility maximizer” in the following sense. The DM exhibits ambiguity with respect to a family (...) of utility functions defined on a larger set of decisions than the original one; he adopts pessimism and performs first a minimization of expected utility over this family, then performs a maximization over a new decisions set. This economic behaviour is called “maxmin under risk” and studied by Maccheroni (Econ Theory 19:823–831, 2002). As an application, we make the link between an expected prospect maximization problem, subject to conditional value-at-risk being less than a threshold value, and a non-expected utility economic formulation involving “loss aversion”-type utility functions. (shrink)

Expected utility maximization problem is one of the most useful tools in mathematical finance, decision analysis and economics. Motivated by statistical model selection, via the principle of expected utility maximization, Friedman and Sandow (J Mach Learn Res 4:257–291, 2003a) considered the model performance question from the point of view of an investor who evaluates models based on the performance of the optimal strategies that the models suggest. They interpreted their performance measures in information theoretic terms and provided new (...) generalizations of Shannon entropy and Kullback–Leibler relative entropy and called them U-entropy and U-relative entropy. In this article, a utility-based criterion for independence of two random variables is defined. Then, Markov’s inequality for probabilities is extended from the U-entropy viewpoint. Moreover, a lower bound for the U-relative entropy is obtained. Finally, a link between conditional U-entropy and conditional Renyi entropy is derived. (shrink)

This essay gives necessary and sufficient conditions for recovering expected utility from choice behavior in several popular models of uncertainty. In particular, these techniques handle a finite state model; a model for which the choice space consists of probability densities and the expected utility representation requires bounded, measurable utility; and a model for which the choice space consists of Borel probability measures and the expected utility representation requires bounded, continuous utility. The key result (...) is the identification of the continuity condition necessary for the revelation of linear utility. (shrink)

It is known that, on average, people adapt their choice of memory strategy to the subjective utility of interaction. What is not known is whether an individual's choices are boundedly optimal. Two experiments are reported that test the hypothesis that an individual's decisions about the distribution of remembering between internal and external resources are boundedly optimal where optimality is defined relative to experience, cognitive constraints, and reward. The theory makes predictions that are tested against data, not fitted to it. (...) The experiments use a no-choice/choice utility learning paradigm where the no-choice phase is used to elicit a profile of each participant's performance across the strategy space and the choice phase is used to test predicted choices within this space. They show that the majority of individuals select strategies that are boundedly optimal. Further, individual differences in what people choose to do are successfully predicted by the analysis. Two issues are discussed: the performance of the minority of participants who did not find boundedly optimal adaptations, and the possibility that individuals anticipate what, with practice, will become a bounded optimal strategy, rather than what is boundedly optimal during training. (shrink)

After having explained why economics introduced utility functions and later the axioms about behaviour in a risky environment, the paper examines the interest for microeco-nomics of the concept of bounded rationality. It starts from a simple model of the labour market on which agents scarch and adapt their demands, contributing unconsciously to the emergence of a unique price. More complex models are thereafter introduced, which enables to draw a picture of the variety of possible trajectories in a dynamic (...) microeco-nomic system. This approach enables to enlarge microeconomics and to explain numerous facts poorly taken into account in the traditional presentations.Après avoir rappelé pourquoi la science économique avait introduit les fonctions d’utilité puis l’axiomatique des comportements en face du risque, l’article examine l’apport en microéco-nomie du concept de rationalité limitée. Il le fait à partir d’un modèle simple du marché du travail où les agents cherchent, et adaptent leurs exigences, contribuant, sous certaines hypothèses et sans en avoir conscience, à l’émergence d’un prix unique. Des modèles plus complexes sont ensuite examinés, ce qui permet de dresser un tableau de la variété des trajectoires possibles dans un système microéconomique dynamique. Cette approche permet d’élargir la théorie microéconomique en rendant compte de nombreux faits mal insérés dans la présentation traditionnelle. (shrink)

We extend de Finetti’s (1974) theory of coherence to apply also to unbounded random variables. We show that for random variables with mandated infinite prevision, such as for the St. Petersburg gamble, coherence precludes indifference between equivalent random quantities. That is, we demonstrate when the prevision of the difference between two such equivalent random variables must be positive. This result conflicts with the usual approach to theories of Subjective Expected Utility, where preference is defined over lotteries. In addition, we (...) explore similar results for unbounded variables when their previsions, though finite, exceed their expected values, as is permitted within de Finetti’s theory. In such cases, the decision maker’s coherent preferences over random quantities is not even a function of probability and utility. One upshot of these findings is to explain further the differences between Savage’s theory (1954), which requires bounded utility for non-simple acts, and de Finetti’s theory, which does not. And it raises a question whether there is a theory that fits between these two. (shrink)

When real-valued utilities for outcomes are bounded, or when all variables are simple, it is consistent with expected utility to have preferences defined over probability distributions or lotteries. That is, under such circumstances two variables with a common probability distribution over outcomes – equivalent variables – occupy the same place in a preference ordering. However, if strict preference respects uniform, strict dominance in outcomes between variables, and if indifference between two variables entails indifference between their difference and the (...) status quo, then preferences over rich sets of unbounded variables, such as variables used in the St. Petersburg paradox, cannot preserve indifference between all pairs of equivalent variables. In such circumstances, preference is not a function only of probability and utility for outcomes. Then the preference ordering is not defined in terms of lotteries. (shrink)

We study the theories I∇n, L∇n and overspill principles for ∇n formulas. We show that IEn ⇒ L∇n ⇒ I∇n, but we do not know if I∇n L∇n. We introduce a new scheme, the growth scheme Crγ, and we prove that L∇n ⇒ Cr∇n⇒ I∇n. Also, we analyse the utility of bounded collection axioms for the study of the above theories.

Extremist views on normative rationality fail to address differences in responding owing to intellectual ability or epistemic self-regulation. Individual difference research thus raises serious questions concerning the scientific utility of universal rationality and universal irrationality theories. However, recent data indicate that computational capacity theories do not account adequately for within-subject variability in normative responding, memory-reasoning independence, and instances of ability-normative reasoning independence.

This research examined whether youth's forecasted risk taking is best predicted by a compensatory (namely, subjective expected utility) or non-compensatory (e.g., single-factor) model. Ninety youth assessed the importance of perceived benefits, importance of perceived drawbacks, subjective probability of benefits, and subjective probability of drawbacks for 16 risky behaviors clustered evenly into recreational and health/safety domains. In both domains, there was strong support for a noncompensatory model in which only the perceived importance of the benefits of engaging in a risky (...) behavior predicted youths' forecasted engagement in risky behavior. The study overcomes earlier methodological weaknesses by fully decomposing participants' assessments into importance and probability aspects for both benefits and drawbacks. As such, the findings provide clear evidence in support of a boundedrationality perspective on youth decision making regarding risk taking. (shrink)

Distortions in memory impose important bounds on rationality but have been largely disregarded in economics. While it is possible to learn, it is more difficult, and sometimes impossible, to unlearn. This retention effect lowers individual utility directly or via reduced productivity, and adds costs to principal-agent relationships. The engraving effect states that the more one tries to forget a piece of information the more vivid it stays in memory, leading to a paradoxical outcome. The effects are based on, and (...) are supported by, psychological experiments, and it is shown that they are relevant in many economic situations and beyond. (shrink)

Popper's well-known demarcation criterion has often been understood to distinguish statements of empirical science according to their logical form. Implicit in this interpretation of Popper's philosophy is the belief that when the universe of discourse of the empirical scientist is infinite, empirical universal sentences are falsifiable but not verifiable, whereas the converse holds for existential sentences. A remarkable elaboration of this belief is to be found in Watkins's early work on the statements he calls “all-and-some,” such as: “For every metal (...) there is a melting point.” All-and-some statements are both universally and existentially quantified in that order. Watkins argued that AS should be regarded as both nonfalsifiable and nonverifiable, for they partake in the logical fate of both universal and existential statements. This claim is subject to the proviso that the bound variables are “uncircumscribed” ; i.e., that the universe of discourse is infinite. (shrink)

“Rationality” in Simon's “bounded rationality” is the principle that humans make decisions on the basis of step-by-step reasoning using systematic rules of logic to maximize utility. “Bounded rationality” is the observation that the ability of a human brain to handle algorithmic complexity and large quantities of data is limited. Bounded rationality, in other words, treats a decision maker as a machine carrying out computations with limited resources. Under the principle of embodied cognition, a cognitive mind is (...) an interactive machine. Turing-Church computations are not interactive, and interactive machines can accomplish things that no Turing-Church computation can accomplish. Hence, if “rationality” is computation, and “bounded rationality” is computation with limited complexity, then “embodied bounded rationality” is both more limited than computation and more powerful. By embracing interaction, embodied bounded rationality can accomplish things that Turing-Church computation alone cannot. Deep neural networks, which have led to a revolution in artificial intelligence, are both interactive and not fundamentally algorithmic. Hence, their ability to mimic some cognitive capabilities far better than prior algorithmic techniques based on symbol manipulation provides empirical evidence for the principle of embodied bounded rationality. (shrink)

Abstract The increasing prevalence of armed drones in the conduct of military operations has generated robust debate. Among legal scholars, the crux of the dispute generally pits those who herald the new technology's unparalleled precision against those who view such newfound capabilities as an inducement to employ excessive force. Largely overlooked in the discussion over how drone strikes can be accomplished lawfully is a more fundamental question: Can a model of warfare that eschews any risk of harm to one party (...) be squared with the ethical framework that informs the law of war? This matter has less to do with the technology per se than with a policy orientation that utilizes such technology as a strategy in itself, as opposed to one military tool in a larger arsenal. A corollary to the incongruity of riskless warfare is to query whether the ensuing breakdown of ethical and legal norms unwittingly encourages the very instability that the law of war attempts to control, thereby endangering the civilian populations of all parties to the conflict. While other authors have previously addressed the challenges posed by asymmetry to the law of armed conflict in different formats, this article explores these issues through a hypothetical scenario and seeks to elucidate some of the potential ramifications of the pursuit of physical impunity in war. (shrink)

In his 1676 text De Quadratura Arithmetica, Leibniz distinguished infinita terminata from infinita interminata. The text also deals with the notion, originating with Desargues, of the point of intersection at infinite distance for parallel lines. We examine contrasting interpretations of these notions in the context of Leibniz’s analysis of asymptotes for logarithmic curves and hyperbolas. We point out difficulties that arise due to conflating these notions of infinity. As noted by Rodríguez Hurtado et al., a significant difference exists between the (...) Cartesian model of magnitudes and Leibniz’s search for a qualitative model for studying perspective, including ideal points at infinity. We show how respecting the distinction between these notions enables a consistent interpretation thereof. (shrink)

This paper studies the dynamic characteristics of triopoly models that are constructed based on a 3-dimensional Cobb–Douglas utility function. The paper presents two parts. The first part introduces a competition among three rational firms on which their prices are isoelastic functions. The competition is described by a 3-dimensional discrete dynamical system. We examine the impact of rationality on the system’s steady state point. Studying the stability/instability of this point, which is Nash equilibrium and is unique in those models, is (...) illustrated. Numerically, we give some global analysis of Nash point and its stability. The second part deals with heterogeneous scenarios. It consists of two different models. In the first model, we assume that one competitor adopts the local monopolistic approximation mechanism while the other opponents are rational. The second model assumes two heterogeneous players with LMA mechanism against one rational firm. Studies show that the stability of NE point of those models is not guaranteed. Furthermore, simulation shows that when firms behave rational with symmetric costs, the stability of NE point is achievable. (shrink)

Background:The management of challenging behaviours in inpatient with intellectual disability and/or autism spectrum disorders can lead to an escalation of control measures. In these complex situations where patients have an intellectual disability/autism spectrum disorder accompanied by a psychiatric comorbidity, the experiences of caregivers related to the crisis management have rarely been studied.Purpose:This study examined the moral experiences of caregivers related to challenging behaviours’ management and alternatives to control measures.Research design:Using Charles Taylor’s hermeneutic framework, a 2-month focused ethnography with a participatory (...) approach was used.Participants and research context:Sixteen caregivers were interviewed in a Canadian mental health setting for adults with intellectual disability/autism spectrum disorder and psychiatric comorbidity.Ethical considerations:The research was conducted in compliance with the Declaration of Helsinki and local Research Ethics Board approval. Written informed consent was collected systematically from participants.Findings:By accounting for caregivers’ moral experiences, this study sheds light on a neglected dimension of the care relationship: the vulnerability of the caregiver. We highlight the main barriers and facilitators to alternatives to control measures. First, a caregiver’s vulnerability was characterised by the overall impact of challenging behaviours and the moral distress associated with the use of control measures and exclusion mechanisms of intellectual disability/autism spectrum disorder patients. Second, a strong ambiguity between care and control measures and a lack of inclusive approaches were identified as the two main barriers to challenging behaviour management. Third, the involvement, both professional and personal, of caregivers was deemed necessary to implement alternatives to control measures.Discussion:A conflict of values opposes two conceptions of autonomy: a rational autonomy, which is counterproductive to the reduction of control measures, versus a relational autonomy based on shared vulnerability.Conclusion:The recognition of caregiver’s vulnerability is a benchmark to create alternative approaches, which defuse the logic of control and promote an ethics of care within which caregivers’ self-concern can be understood as fostering mutual respect. (shrink)

The story of the body. Fay Bound Alberti takes the human body apart in order to put it back anew, telling the cultural history of our key organs and systems from the inside out, from blood to guts, brains to sex organs.

In this paper I draw from Martin Heidegger’s phenomenology of the 1920s to outline some basic features of his theory of intentionality that I believe have not been fully appreciated or utilized, and that allow for both novel and fruitful interventions in questions about meaning, the relationship between mind and the world, and epistemic justification, principally as they appear in John McDowell’s synoptic project in Mind and World. I argue that while elements of McDowell’s picture are ultimately unsatisfying and problematic, (...) much of his conceptual framework can and should be put into dialogue with Heidegger’s, and that in so doing we make available powerful resources for amending the McDowellian account. Moreover, these emendations have attractive implications for his distinctive desiderata. In particular, they provide original conceptions of normativity’s place in nature, of the boundaries of the space of reasons, and of the relationship between the answerability of thought both to the world and to human beings as a rational community. (shrink)

Many contemporary scholars argue that Schelling’s version of intellectual intuition retains certain central features of the Kantian and Fichtean conceptions. One of the common claims is that, as with Kant and Fichte, Schelling’s intellectual intuition is the power of the subject’s productive understanding. However, we show that for the Schelling of the Identitätsphilosophie period, intellectual intuition is the power not of an understanding that intuits, or a productive intellect, but of a receptive and penetrating sensibility that understands.

Loneliness is one of the most neglected aspects of emotion history, despite claims that the 21st century is the loneliest ever. This article argues against the widespread belief that modern-day loneliness is inevitable, negative, and universal. Looking at its language and etymology, it suggests that loneliness needs to be understood firstly as an “emotion cluster” composed of a variety of affective states, and secondly as a relatively recent invention, dating from around 1800. Loneliness can be positive, and as much a (...) part of the body as the mind. Using a longue durée approach, I argue that we cannot understand loneliness as a “modern epidemic” without considering its history, its meanings, its practice, and its links with the body. (shrink)