A 'self-refutation argument' is any argument which aims at showing that a certain thesis is self-refuting. This study was the first book-length treatment of ancient self-refutation and provides a unified account of what is distinctive in the ancient approach to the self-refutation argument, on the basis of close philological, logical and historical analysis of a variety of sources. It examines the logic, force and prospects of this original style of argumentation within the context (...) of ancient philosophical debates, dispelling various misconceptions concerning its nature and purpose and elucidating some important differences which exist both within the ancient approach to self-refutation and between that approach, as a whole, and some modern counterparts of it. In providing a comprehensive account of ancient self-refutation, the book advances our understanding of influential and debated texts and arguments from philosophers like Democritus, Plato, Aristotle, Epicurus, the Stoics, the Academic sceptics, the Pyrrhonists and Augustine. (shrink)

Luca Castagnoli, Ancient Self-Refutation. The Logic and History of the Self- Refutation Argument from Democritus to Augustine, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2010, pp. XX+394. Hardback, ISBN 9780521896313. In his book Ancient Self-Refutation L. Castagnoli rightly observes that selfrefutation is not falsification; it overturns the act of assertion but does not prove that the content of the act is false. He argues against the widely spread belief that Sextus Empiricus accepted the self-refutation of (...) his own expressions. Castagnoli also claims that Sextus was effective in answering to the self-refutation charge. The achievement of the book is the discovery that in passages where Sextus seems to embrace the selfrefutation of his expressions (PH 1.14-15), he does not use the term peritropé, technical for self-refutation, but the term perigraphé, which means self-bracketing. Selfbracketing is weakening one’s own thesis, but not overturning it. Castagnoli claims that Sextus embraces the self-bracketing of his expressions, but never accepts their selfrefutation. However, Castagnoli is not right in saying that self-refutation is a shameful mistake for everybody. The mature skeptic cannot even think that self-refutation is wrong, because it would be a dogmatic view. Sextus seems to accept self-refutation at the end of Against the Logicians, where he presents the argument against proof and the metaphor of the ladder (M 8.480-1). Regardless of Sextus’ declarations, we have reason to think that he does not avoid self-refutation in a pragmatic sense. Self-bracketing of his position is not a consistent dialectical strategy, as Castagnoli writes, but the end of a rational discussion. Sextus avoids absolute self-refutation (we cannot falsify what he suggests), but he is unable to avoid pragmatic self-refutation (there is no way to assert his position without contradiction). This is the case even if Sextus refuses to assert his position. (shrink)

Pragmatic self-refutation is when one asserts something but one’s act of assertion refutes the content of that assertion. In this paper, I consider whether Donald Davidson is guilty of this when arguing against the possibility of alternative conceptual schemes.

In the following discussion, I examine what constitutes the dialectical strain in Putnam’s thought. As part of this examination, I consider Putnam’s criticism of the fact/value dichotomy. I compare this criticism to Putnam’s analysis of the metaphysical realist’s position, a position which has occupied Putnam’s thinking more than any other philosophical stance. I describe how Putnam pursues a chargeof self-refutation against the metaphysical realist and against the proponent of a fact/value dichotomy, a charge which assumes dialectical significance. So (...) it is that the self-refuting nature of these positions is linked to their unintelligibility. My conclusion relates Putnam’s dialectical project to his wider philosophical ambitions, ambitions which are influenced in large part by Wittgensteinian considerations. (shrink)

In the following discussion, I examine what constitutes the dialectical strain in Putnam’s thought. As part of this examination, I consider Putnam’s criticism of the fact/value dichotomy. I compare this criticism to Putnam’s analysis of the metaphysical realist’s position, a position which has occupied Putnam’s thinking more than any other philosophical stance. I describe how Putnam pursues a chargeof self-refutation against the metaphysical realist and against the proponent of a fact/value dichotomy, a charge which assumes dialectical significance. So (...) it is that the self-refuting nature of these positions is linked to their unintelligibility. My conclusion relates Putnam’s dialectical project to his wider philosophical ambitions, ambitions which are influenced in large part by Wittgensteinian considerations. (shrink)

It has often been argued that since all sound arguments are either inductive or deductive, and philosophical arguments are neither, no philosophical arguments are sound. In his recent book Philosophical Reasoning, Passmore attempts to show that sound philosophical arguments are possible. He does this not by attacking the premise that all sound arguments are either inductive or deductive, but rather by attacking the premise that philosophical arguments are neither deductive nor inductive. In fact, he asserts, “Philosophical reasoning, if it is (...) to be valid at all, must be deductive in its formal structure.” Passmore’s point is that deductive arguments are by no means confined to mathematical reasoning. Mathematics uses deductive inference in one way, and philosophy in another. Passmore does not attempt to define this alleged difference between the way mathematics uses deductive inference and the way philosophy uses it. Instead he gives examples of kinds of argument that are often used in philosophy and seldom elsewhere. One such kind of argument consists in pointing out that one’s opponent has begged the question. Another is the so-called ‘infinite regress’ argument. Again, the kind of argument that a philosopher is using when he ‘reminds’ his interlocutor of a principle that he has presumably forgotten or overlooked in the process of formulating his philosophical position is fairly common in philosophy although not frequently used in other fields. Other sorts of argument cited by Passmore as basically philosophical are ‘verbal analysis’ and ‘self-refutation’. The considerations that Passmore has in mind in characterizing all of these arguments as philosophical are stylometric. By this I mean that what motivates him to classify an argument as philosophical is not any property attaching to the argument itself, but rather the fact that it occurs for the most part in philosophical contexts. He explicitly states that other kinds of arguments, including those mainly used in mathematical contexts, can occur in philosophy, and that the arguments which he classifies as philosophical can occur in non-philosophical contexts. (shrink)

A critical examination of the charge of self-refutation, particularly as leveled by orthodoxy-defending philosophers against those maintaining epistemologically unorthodox, especially relativistic or skeptical, views. Beginning with an analysis of its classic illustration in Plato’s *Theaetetus* as leveled against Protagoras’s “Man is the measure ...,” I consider various aspects of the charge, including logical, rhetorical, pedagogic, affective, and cognitive.

Eliminative materialism is the position that common?sense psychology is false and that beliefs and desires, like witches and demons, do not exist. One of the most popular criticisms of this view is that it is self?refuting or, in some sense, incoherent. Hence, it is often claimed that eliminativism is not only implausible, but necessarily false. Below, I assess the merits of this objection and find it seriously wanting. I argue that the self?refutation objection is (at best) a (...) misleading reformulation of much more mundane objections to eliminativism and that, contrary to its advocates? endorsements, it adds nothing of genuine interest to the debate over the existence of prepositional attitudes. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Abstract Self ‐ Refutation Defining Relativism about a Feature F Relativism about Truth Defining Global Relativism Difficulties with Unrestricted Global Relativism Difficulties with Global Indexical Relativism Applying Global Relativism to Itself Self ‐ Refutation Again References.

Les philosophes analytiques contemporains ont contribué à une bonne compréhension de la logique des arguments auto-réfutants. Cependant, bien que Mackie fournisse une analyse perspicace des divers types d'auto-contradiction logique, il échoue dans son appréciation de la signification que revêtent bon nombre d'arguments en vue d'une analyse de l'intentionnalité humaine. L'A. de l'article montre que l'analyse de J. Hintikka surpasse celle de Mackie dans la mesure où elle donne un exposé plus complet de la signification épistémologique des arguments auto-réfutants. Il complète (...) cette analyse avec certaines découvertes propres à B. Lonergan dans ce domaine. (shrink)

Plato argues, at Theaetetus 170e-171c, that Protagoras’ relativism is self-refuting. This argument, known as the ‘exquisite argument’, and its merits have been the subject of much controversy over the past few decades. Burnyeat (1976b) has argued in defense of Plato’s argument, but his reconstruction of the argument has been criticized as question-begging. After offering an interpretation of Protagoras’ relativism, I argue that the exquisite argument is successful, for reasons that Burnyeat hints at but fails to develop sufficiently. I consider (...) Protagorean relativism under both of the two possible readings with respect to its scope: global relativism, according to which all truths are only relatively true, and qualified relativism, according to which the relativistic thesis itself is excepted. Taking into consideration some contemporary work on relativism and self-refutation, I show that Plato’s argument succeeds on both of these readings. Given that Protagoras could avoid self-contradiction simply by denying that an enduring subject exists, I argue that the exquisite argument is best understood as confronting Protagoras with a dilemma between self-contradiction and self-defeat of various sorts, all of which lead to the same result, that Protagoras violates the requirements of rational discourse in such a way that he becomes an absurd figure who has nothing to say to us. (shrink)

This paper first explains why the charge of self-refutation against extreme relativism is so important and then defends extreme relativism against two of the most recent and most sophisticated accusations of self-refutation. It is shown that these accusations seem plausible only because they illicitly employ principles appropriate only to absolute truth; hence these accusations are unsound. One central topic of discussion in the paper is the relation between "a believes that p" and "p is true for (...) a". (shrink)

This paper first explains why the charge of self-refutation against extreme relativism is so important and then defends extreme relativism against two of the most recent and most sophisticated accusations of self-refutation. It is shown that these accusations seem plausible only because they illicitly employ principles appropriate only to absolute truth; hence these accusations are unsound. One central topic of discussion in the paper is the relation between "a believes that p" and "p is true for (...) a". (shrink)

The essay is a critical examination of the charge of self-refutation, particularly as leveled by orthodoxy-defending philosophers against those maintaining epistemologically unorthodox, especially relativistic or skeptical, views. (It was originally published in *Common Knowledge* in 1993, and reprinted in the journal's 25th anniversary issue.) Beginning with an analysis of its classic illustration in Plato’s Theaetetus as leveled by Socrates against Protagoras’s “Man is the measure..,” the essay considers various aspects of the charge, including its paradigmatic theatrical staging, its (...) frequent pedagogic restaging, its logical and rhetorical structure, its complex emotional and psychological effects, and its apparent cognitive dynamics. After discussion of the comparable structure and dynamics of related self-undoings in myth and drama, the examination of alleged exposures of self-contradiction moves to general observations regarding the recurrent encounter between conviction and skepticism and the question of how best to understand the phenomenon of fundamentally clashing and arguably incommensurable beliefs. These encounters and questions are usefully addressed and illuminated, Smith suggests, by constructivist epistemology, contemporary history and sociology of science, and recent work in cognitive theory. In connection with the logically circular question-begging or self-affirmation commonly involved in demonstrations of the relativist’s self-refutation, Smith gives particular attention to the evidently endemic tendency to cognitive self-stabilization. (shrink)

Nietzsche’s perspectivism has aroused the perplexity of many a recent commentator, not least because of the doctrine’s apparent self-refuting character. If, as Nietzsche holds, there are no facts but only interpretations, then how are we to understand this claim itself? Nietzsche’s perspectivism must be construed either as a fact or as one further interpretation—but in the former case the doctrine is clearly self-refuting, while in the latter case any reasons or arguments one may have in support of one’s (...) perspective are rendered bothimpotent and superfluous. The unpalatable consequences of Nietzsche’s perspectivism are further highlighted by considering its effects on Nietzsche’s treatment of the fundamental laws of logic, such as the principle of non-contradiction. Finally, Nietzsche’s perspectivism, if not self-refuting, at least seems to be refuted by his own writings, where he confidently puts forward various doctrines and critiques, thus indicating that he does not think of his own beliefs as being true merely in a perspectival sense. There is every reason, I conclude, to be perplexed about Nietzsche’s perspectivism. (shrink)

In the Postscript to the second edition of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions Kuhn addresses charges of relativism by exhibiting his notion of scientific progress, a notion he claims is not relativistic. Critics have largely bypassed this as an evasion on Kuhn’s part. This essay argues that Kuhn’s model of progress does not rescue him from self-refutation charges, and that this criticism can be pressed regardless of whether he embraces global relativism. It concludes by tracing the ongoing controversy (...) regarding Kuhn and relativism to the elusive nature of Kuhn’s prose. (shrink)

In this paper, I will examine whether the reflexivity thesis of David Bloor’s Strong Programme in the Sociology of Knowledge is self-refuting. I will argue that even though the relativism in the Strong Programme is self-refuting, I do not think Bloor’s reflexivity thesis implies relativism. By looking at the case of determinism, I intend to show that we can and should treat the reflexivity thesis independently of relativism. Therefore, the reflexivity thesis is not necessarily subject to self- (...) class='Hi'>refutation objection. Abstrak Dalam tulisan ini, saya akan membahas apakah tesis refleksivitas dalam Program Kuat Sosiologi Pengetahuan yang diusung oleh David Bloor mengimplikasikan penyanggahan diri. Saya hendak berargumen bahwa kendati relativisme yang diimplikasikan Program Kuat menyanggah dirinya sendiri, saya tidak melihat tesis refleksivitasyang diusung Bloor per se mengimplikasikan relativisme. Dengan merujuk pada contoh determinisme, saya ingin menunjukkan bahwa tesis refleksitivitas dapat dan semestinya diperlakukan secara terpisah dari relativisme. Dengan demikian, tesis refleksivitas tidak dapat serta-merta menjadi sasaran argumen yang menyoal penyanggahan diri. (shrink)

One of the fundamental theses of Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics is that all knowledge is historically conditioned. This thesis appears to be self-refuting. That is, it appears to contradict itself insofar as its assertion that every knowledge claim is historically conditioned seems to assert an absolute, unconditionally true knowledge claim. If the historicity thesis does, in fact, refute itself in this way, then that spells trouble for philosophical hermeneutics. Gadamer was well aware of this, and so he attempts in several (...) passages to respond to this charge of self-contradiction. Those passages, however, are brief and difficult to understand. They consequently have been either neglected or inadequately understood. This paper makes better sense of those passages in order to defend Gadamer’s historicity thesis as coherent. (shrink)

Dissoi Logoi 4.6 presents a beautiful self-refutation argument, which I analyse here, offering a different assessment of its relation to self-contradiction and the Liar paradox from the only one available in the literature.

Luca Castagnoli, Ancient Self-Refutation. The Logic and History of the Self- Refutation Argument from Democritus to Augustine, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2010, pp. XX+394. Hardback, ISBN 9780521896313. -/- Abstract. In his book Ancient Self-Refutation L. Castagnoli rightly observes that selfrefutation is not falsification; it overturns the act of assertion but does not prove that the content of the act is false. He argues against the widely spread belief that Sextus Empiricus accepted the self- (...) class='Hi'>refutation of his own expressions. Castagnoli also claims that Sextus was effective in answering to the self-refutation charge. The achievement of the book is the disperitropécovery that in passages where Sextus seems to embrace the selfrefutation of his expressions (PH 1.14-15), he does not use the term peritropé, technical for self-refutation, but the term perigraphé, which means self-bracketing. Selfbracketing is weakening one’s own thesis, but not overturning it. Castagnoli claims that Sextus embraces the self-bracketing of his expressions, but never accepts their selfrefutation. However, Castagnoli is not right in saying that self-refutation is a shameful mistake for everybody. The mature skeptic cannot even think that self-refutation is wrong, because it would be a dogmatic view. Sextus seems to accept self-refutation at the end of Against the Logicians, where he presents the argument against proof and the metaphor of the ladder (M 8.480-1). Regardless of Sextus’ declarations, we have reason to think that he does not avoid self-refutation in a pragmatic sense. Self-bracketing of his position is not a consistent dialectical strategy, as Castagnoli writes, but the end of a rational discussion. Sextus avoids absolute self-refutation (we cannot falsify what he suggests), but he is unable to avoid pragmatic self-refutation (there is no way to assert his position without contradiction). This is the case even if Sextus refuses to assert his position. (shrink)

My concern is with a version of scepticism which, following a number of philosophers, I will entitle global scepticism. According to global scepticism no one is to any degree justified in holding any belief. Global scepticism is a live option, and has at least one compelling argument in its favour1 Nevertheless, one's first reaction to global scepticism is likely to be that it is self-refuting. The issue I will be discussing here is whether global scepticism is self-refuting. In (...) the first section I consider arguments to the conclusion that global scepticism is self-refuting, and argue that the global sceptic need take only one of them seriously. In the next I examine a global sceptic's reply to the argument in question, and a response to that reply available to the anti-sceptic. What emerges is an apparent impasse. The global sceptic has a response to each reply that the anti-sceptic makes in support of the anti-sceptic's original argument. However, it seems that the anti-sceptic is able to effectively reply to each of the global sceptic's responses. In the last section I develop an argument to show that global scepticism is self-refuting which breaks the deadlock between the global sceptic and anti-sceptic. (shrink)