Three main types of subjectivist ethics are distinguished and specified by the use of elementary game-theoretical notions. It will be argued that all these theories run into difficulties that cannot be overcome within the self-imposed limits of subjectivism.

Three main types of subjectivist ethics are distinguished and specified by the use of elementary game-theoretical notions. It will be argued that all these theories run into difficulties that cannot be overcome within the self-imposed limits of subjectivism.

(1984). Gender Differences in Subject Preference and Perception of Subject Importance among Third Year Secondary School Pupils in Single‐sex and Mixed Comprehensive Schools. Educational Studies: Vol. 10, No. 3, pp. 243-253.

Discussion of the ethics of memory modification technologies has often focused on questions about the limits of their permissibility. In the current paper, I focus primarily on a different issue: when is it rational to prefer MMTs to alternative interventions? My conclusion is that these conditions are rare. The reason stems from considerations of autonomy. When compared with other interventions, MMTs do a particularly poor job at promoting the autonomy of their users. If this conclusion is true, moreover, it provides (...) a fresh perspective on debates about the permissibility of MMTs. On the one hand, for those who would limit the use of MMTs to a narrow range of circumstances, the conclusion that MMTs are rarely preferable gives them further reason to eye MMTs with suspicion. On the other hand, for those who view MMTs as permissible in a wide range of circumstances, the conclusion may deflate their endorsement. (shrink)

In this paper, I seek to challenge two prevailing views about religious accommodation. The first maintains that religious practices deserve accommodation only if they are regarded as something unchosen on a par with the involuntary circumstances of life people must face. The other view maintains that religious practices are nothing more than preferences but questions the necessity of their accommodation. Against these views, I argue that religious conducts, even on the assumption that they represent voluntary behaviours, deserve in certain (...) circumstances certain kinds of accommodation. They must be understood as one possible expression, along with nonreligious or secular beliefs, of a person's convictions of conscience, which are strong ethical commitments upon which depends the moral integrity of those having such convictions. I demonstrate that the main ground for religious accommodation is the need to protect fairly, through such rights as religious freedom and freedom of conscience, the ethical commitments and conscientious beliefs of all citizens. Finally, against the objection that such a view risks leading to the proliferation of demands for accommodation, I maintain that a deliberative approach to religious accommodation is in a good position to put serious hurdles in the path of unreasonable demands. (shrink)

Numerous studies have convincingly shown that prospect theory can better describe risky choice behavior than the classical expected utility model because it makes the plausible assumption that risk aversion is driven not only by the degree of sensitivity toward outcomes, but also by the degree of sensitivity toward probabilities. This article presents the results of an experiment aimed at testing whether agents become more sensitive toward probabilities over time when they repeatedly face similar decisions, receive feedback on the consequences of (...) their decisions, and are given ample incentives to reflect on their decisions, as predicted by Plott’s Discovered Preference Hypothesis (DPH). The results of a laboratory experiment with N = 62 participants support this hypothesis. The elicited subjective probability weighting function converges significantly toward linearity when respondents are asked to make repeated choices and are given direct feedback after each choice. Such convergence to linearity is absent in an experimental treatment where respondents are asked to make repeated choices but do not experience the resolution of risk directly after each choice, as predicted by the DPH. (shrink)

Numerous studies have convincingly shown that prospect theory can better describe risky choice behavior than the classical expected utility model because it makes the plausible assumption that risk aversion is driven not only by the degree of sensitivity toward outcomes, but also by the degree of sensitivity toward probabilities. This article presents the results of an experiment aimed at testing whether agents become more sensitive toward probabilities over time when they repeatedly face similar decisions, receive feedback on the consequences of (...) their decisions, and are given ample incentives to reflect on their decisions, as predicted by Plott’s Discovered Preference Hypothesis (DPH). The results of a laboratory experiment with N = 62 participants support this hypothesis. The elicited subjective probability weighting function converges significantly toward linearity when respondents are asked to make repeated choices and are given direct feedback after each choice. Such convergence to linearity is absent in an experimental treatment where respondents are asked to make repeated choices but do not experience the resolution of risk directly after each choice, as predicted by the DPH. (shrink)

Grant and Quiggin suggest that agents employ heuristics to constrain the set of acts under consideration before applying standard decision theory, based on their restricted model of the world to the remaining acts. The aim of this paper is to provide an axiomatic foundation, and an associated representation theorem, for the preference model proposed by Grant and Quiggin. The unawareness of the agent is encoded both in the specification of the states and in an elaboration of the set of consequences. (...) We illustrate how the representation can be applied to rationalize two notions of the precautionary principle that were proposed and discussed in Grant and Quiggin. (shrink)

This research formed phase 1 of the Economic and Social Research Council project ‘Pupils’ Approaches to Subject Option Choices’ and is a near repeat of a project carried out in the mid-1980s, thus allowing for a comparison of approaches to subject choice a decade apart, comparing the situation pre- and post-National Curriculum implementation. The simple two-part questionnaire, completed by 1600 children in 11 schools, shows the differences across time and between-school differences in subject preference, but little instability in perceptions of (...) subject importance. Some useful additional data, giving student's reasons for liking subjects and finding subjects important, were obtained from interviews in four schools which formed phase 2 of the project. Comparisons are drawn with the data collected in 1984 on a similar basis. Issues of concern are highlighted with respect to particular subjects and to students’ stated reasons for liking subjects or finding them important, with regard to how this might relate to their subsequent subject choices and career development. (shrink)

We investigate the conflict between the ex ante and ex post criteria of social welfare in a new framework of individual and social decisions, which distinguishes between two sources of uncertainty, here interpreted as an objective and a subjective source respectively. This framework makes it possible to endow the individuals and society not only with ex ante and ex post preferences, as is usually done, but also with interim preferences of two kinds, and correspondingly, to introduce interim (...) forms of the Pareto principle. After characterizing the ex ante and ex post criteria, we present a first solution to their conflict that extends the former as much possible in the direction of the latter. Then, we present a second solution, which goes in the opposite direction, and is also maximally assertive. Both solutions translate the assumed Pareto conditions into weighted additive utility representations, and both attribute to the individuals common probability values on the objective source of uncertainty, and different probability values on the subjective source. We discuss these solutions in terms of two conceptual arguments, i.e., the by now classic spurious unanimity argument and a novel informational argument labelled complementary ignorance. The paper complies with the standard economic methodology of basing probability and utility representations on preference axioms, but for the sake of completeness, also considers a construal of objective uncertainty based on the assumption of an exogeneously given probability measure. JEL classification: D70; D81. (shrink)

How do we ascribe subjective probability? In decision theory, this question is often addressed by representation theorems, going back to Ramsey (1926), which tell us how to define or measure subjective probability by observable preferences. However, standard representation theorems make strong rationality assumptions, in particular expected utility maximization. How do we ascribe subjective probability to agents which do not satisfy these strong rationality assumptions? I present a representation theorem with weak rationality assumptions which can be used (...) to define or measure subjective probability for partly irrational agents. (shrink)

Recently a new question has emerged in the philosophy of religion: not whether God exists, but whether God’s existence is or would be preferable. The existing literature on the subject is sparse. The present essay, in dialogue form, is an attempt to marshal and evaluate arguments on both sides.

This paper examines relationships between accountants’ personal values and their moral reasoning. In particular, we hypothesize that there is an inverse relationship between accountants’ “Conformity” values and principled moral reasoning. This investigation is important because the literature suggests that conformity with rule-based standards may be one reason for professional accountants’ relatively lower scores on measures of moral reasoning (Abdolmohammadi et al. J Bus Ethics 16 (1997) 1717). We administered the Rokeach Values Survey (RVS) (Rokeach: 1973, The Nature of Human Values (...) (The Free Press, New York)) and the Defining Issues Test (DIT) (Rest: 1979, Development in Judgment Moral Issues (University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, MN)) to164 graduating accounting students enrolled in capstone courses at two universities in the Northeastern United States. As potential entrants into the accounting profession, these subjects bring their values and moral reasoning to bear on attitudes and behaviors in the workplace. We find a highly significant inverse relationship between “Conformity” values and principled moral reasoning (i.e., those who prefer Conformity values have lower levels of moral reasoning). However, we also find that accounting students as a group do not prefer Conformity values above other values such as Self-actualization and Idealism, and we find positive relationships between Self-actualization and Idealism values and moral reasoning. Implications for values and ethics research are discussed. (shrink)

Daniel M. Hausman holds that preferences in economics are total subjective comparative evaluations—subjective judgments to the effect that something is better than something else all things told—and that economists are right to employ this conception of preference. Here, I argue against both parts of Hausman’s thesis. The failure of Hausman’s account, I continue, reflects a deeper problem, that is, that preferences in economics do not need an explicit definition of the kind that he seeks. Nonetheless, Hausman’s (...) labors were not in vain: his accomplishment is that he has articulated a useful model of the theory. (shrink)

The notion of ‘revealed preference’ is unclear and should be abandoned. Defenders of the theory of revealed preference have misinterpreted legitimate concerns about the testability of economics as the demand that economists eschew reference to (unobservable) subjective states. As attempts to apply revealed-preference theory to game theory illustrate with particular vividness, this demand is mistaken.

This paper uses the idea of a proxy, which figures in discussions of bounded rationality, to construct an argument for a revisionary conclusion about ideal instrumental rationality. I consider how subjective responses can figure as proxies in heuristics and develop the following argument: (1) Proxies, even if relatively easy to recognize, can sometimes be messy, prompting incomplete or cyclic preferences. (2) From the point of view of ideal instrumental rationality, it is permissible for an agent to be concerned (...) with a proxy rather than with what it is a proxy for. And so, (3) although it is standardly assumed, as part of the prevailing conception of ideal instrumental rationality, that rational preferences are complete and acyclic, neither incomplete preferences nor cyclic preferences can be dismissed as invariably irrational from the point of view of ideal instrumental rationality. (shrink)

Preferences are often thought to be relevant for well-being: respecting preferences, or satisfying them, contributes in some way to making people's lives go well for them. A crucial assumption that accompanies this conviction is that there is a normative standard that allows us to discriminate between preferences that do, and those that do not, contribute to well-being. The papers collected in this volume, written by moral philosophers and philosophers of economics, explore a number of central issues concerning (...) the formulation of such a normative standard. They examine what a defensible account of how preferences should be formed for them to contribute to well-being should look like; whether preferences are subject to requirements of rationality and what reasons we have to prefer certain things over others; and what the significance is, if any, of preferences that are arational or not conducive to well-being. (shrink)

This paper focuses on a specific challenge for welfarist theories of intergenerational justice. Subjective welfarism permits and even requires that a generation, G1, inculcates cheap preferences in the next generation, G2. This would allow G1 to deplete resources instead of saving them, which seems to contradict the ideal of sustainability. The aim of the paper is to show that, even if subjective welfarism requires the cultivation of cheap preferences among future generations, it can accommodate two major (...) objections to cheap preferences engineering, the Autonomy Objection and the Fairness Objection. The paper argues that teaching autonomy-related abilities is compatible with cheap preferences engineering insofar as autonomy is understood as an end-state and not as a precondition. Furthermore, teaching autonomy-related abilities could even be required in order to improve G2’s prospects for well-being. However, since being autonomous renders G2 able to revise their initially cheap preferences, G1 should also save enough resources to enable members of G2 to do so. Therefore, cultivating cheap preferences among G2 does not allow G1 to deplete the available resources. (shrink)

Economists, who adopt the principle of consumer sovereignty, treat preferences as unquestioned for the purposes of their analysis. They also represent preferences for future outcomes as having value in the present. It is shown that these two characteristics of neoclassical modelling rest on similar reasoning and are essential to achieve high aggregatability of preferences and values. But the meaning and broader implications of these characteristics vary according to the arguments given to support these methodological choices. The resulting (...) ambiguities raise questions regarding economists' attitudes towards the study (by other disciplines) of preference formation and reformation. Under a strong, positivist interpretation (which is philosophically problematic), consumer sovereignty represents a rejection of any meaningful study of these subjects; under a weaker, methodological understanding, consumer sovereignty merely draws a boundary between economics and other disciplines. The weaker version is argued to be more defensible, and economists are urged to engage in interdisciplinary work that will clarify how preferences are formed, criticised and reformed. (shrink)

Changing preferencesis a phenomenonoften invoked but rarely properlyaccounted for. Throughout the history of the social sciences, researchers have come against the possibility that their subjects’ preferenceswere affected by the phenomenato be explainedor by otherfactorsnot taken into accountin the explanation.Sporadically, attempts have been made to systematically investigate these in uences, but none of these seems to have had a lasting impact. Today we are still not much further with respect to preference change than we were at the middle of the last (...) century. This anthology hopes to provide a new impulse for research into this important subject. In particular, we have chosen two routes to amplify this impulse. First, we stress the use of modellingtechniquesfamiliar from economicsand decision theory. Instead of constructing complex, all-encompassing theories of preference change, the authors of this volume start with very simple, formal accounts of some possible and hopefully plausible mechanism of preference change. Eventually, these models may nd their way into larger, empirically adequate theories, but at this stage, we think that the most importantwork lies in building structure.Secondly,we stress the importance of interdisciplinary exchange. Only by drawing together experts from different elds can the complex empirical and theoretical issues in the modelling of preference change be adequately investigated. (shrink)

L. A. Paul’s Transformative Experience makes the claim that many important life decisions are epistemically and personally transformative in a way that does not allow us to assign subjective values to their outcomes. As a result, we cannot use normative decision theory to make such decisions rationally, or when we modify it to do so, decision theory leads us to choose in a way that is in tension with our authenticity. This paper examines Paul’s version of decision theory, and (...) whether this version in fact admits of the challenge she wants to raise. I focus on her psychological realist view of utilities and beliefs and her notion of rational, authentic preferences as informed by imaginative acquaintance. I argue that Paul fails to engage critically with traditional accounts of decision theory and, on closer inspection, it is not clear that her version of decision theory entails a tension between rational and authentic choice. More importantly, I argue that if her contribution is instead to bring to light the importance of authenticity alongside rational decision-making, the definition she provides of authenticity in fact undermines her argument. (shrink)

The sciences of kalam and fiqh, which have a special importance in the history of Islamic thought and science, became prominent with their interactions with other sciences in their formation processes and their contributions to the evolution of religious thought. In the literature, the field representing the linguistic, religious, mental and practical aspects of fiqh has become widespread with the concepts of usūl-i fiqh and fürū-i fiqh, and the part about creed as usūlü'd-dīn or fiqhu'l-akbar. It has drawn our attention (...) that Imam Abū Ḥanīfa and Imam Shāfiʿī's ijtihads, fatwas and thoughts have remained up to date in every century without exception in the vortex of overdoing and understatement in these two disciplines. However, there are some narrations stating that although these imams were interested in kalam, they kept a distance from it. Their, famous students also indicated that they gave them advice in this sense. Therefore, this study has been prepared in order to examine the background of the aforementioned issues. For this purpose, the reasons why two imams preferred the science of fiqh in the main axis of the subject were subjected to a general criticism. Consequently, it has been seen that both imams had similar concerns and their ideas have been overlapping in the face of the creed developments of the period. (shrink)

We obtain rich measures of the risk preferences of a sample of Vietnamese farmers, and revisit the link between risk preferences and economic well-being. Far from being particularly risk averse, our farmers are on average risk neutral and, thus, more risk tolerant than typical Western subject populations. This generalises recent findings indicating that students in poorer countries are more risk tolerant than students in richer countries to a general population sample. Risk aversion is, furthermore, negatively correlated with income (...) within our sample, but does not correlate with wealth. This also casts doubt on high levels of risk aversion causing failure to adopt new technologies, which we discuss. (shrink)

We present an axiomatic model of preferences over menus that is motivated by three assumptions. First, the decision maker is uncertain ex ante (i.e., at the time of choosing a menu) about her ex post (i.e., at the time of choosing an option within her chosen menu) preferences over options, and she anticipates that this subjective uncertainty will not resolve before the ex post stage. Second, she is averse to ex post indecisiveness (i.e., to having to choose (...) between options that she cannot rank with certainty). Third, when evaluating a menu she discards options that are dominated (i.e., inferior to another option whatever her ex post preferences may be) and restricts attention to the undominated ones. Under these assumptions, the decision maker has a preference for commitment in the sense of preferring menus with fewer undominated alternatives. We derive a representation in which the decision maker’s uncertainty about her ex post preferences is captured by means of a subjective state space, which in turn determines which options are undominated in a given menu, and in which the decision maker fears, whenever indecisive, to choose an option that will turn out to be the worst (undominated) one according to the realization of her ex post preferences. (shrink)

Preferences are often thought to be relevant for well-being: respecting preferences, or satisfying them, contributes in some way to making people's lives go well for them. A crucial assumption that accompanies this conviction is that there is a normative standard that allows us to discriminate between preferences that do, and those that do not, contribute to well-being. The papers collected in this volume, written by moral philosophers and philosophers of economics, explore a number of central issues concerning (...) the formulation of such a normative standard. They examine what a defensible account of how preferences should be formed for them to contribute to well-being should look like; whether preferences are subject to requirements of rationality and what reasons we have to prefer certain things over others; and what the significance is, if any, of preferences that are arational or not conducive to well-being. (shrink)

Preferences are often thought to be relevant for well-being: respecting preferences, or satisfying them, contributes in some way to making people's lives go well for them. A crucial assumption that accompanies this conviction is that there is a normative standard that allows us to discriminate between preferences that do, and those that do not, contribute to well-being. The papers collected in this volume, written by moral philosophers and philosophers of economics, explore a number of central issues concerning (...) the formulation of such a normative standard. They examine what a defensible account of how preferences should be formed for them to contribute to well-being should look like; whether preferences are subject to requirements of rationality and what reasons we have to prefer certain things over others; and what the significance is, if any, of preferences that are arational or not conducive to well-being. (shrink)

Experimental evidence suggests that individual consumption has not only personal value but also enters the social part of the utility. Existing models of social preferences make ad hoc parametric assumptions about the nature of this duality. This creates a problem of experimental identification of preferences since without such assumptions it is impossible to distinguish whether consumption or social concerns are driving the behavior. Given observed choice, the Axiomatic model of preferences in this article makes it possible to (...) unambiguously determine personal and social utility without any assumptions about their relationship. The unique separation can be achieved only if the individual choices in different subgroups of other people are available. Preferences over consumption and status are used as an example to demonstrate how the utility is constructed. The model shows what kind of information about choice is needed to empirically determine the nature of social preferences without making restrictive assumptions. This can help to estimate whether personal consumption or social value is more important in economic decisions. (shrink)

This paper examines the notion of “subjective well-being” as it is used in literature on subjective measures of well-being. I argue that those who employ the notion differ at least superficially on at least two points: first, about the relationship between subjective well-being and well-being simpliciter, and second, about the constituents of subjective well-being. In an effort to reconcile the differences, I propose an interpretation according to which subjective measures presuppose preference hedonism: an account according (...) to which well-being is a matter of desired mental states. (shrink)

It is commonly assumed that preferences are determinate; that is, that an agent who has a preference knows that she has the preference in question and is disposed to act upon it. This paper argues the dubiousness of that assumption. An account of indeterminate preferences in terms of self-predicting subjective probabilities is given, and a decision rule for choices involving indeterminate preferences is proposed. Wolfgang Spohn’s and Isaac Levi ’s arguments against self-predicting probabilities are also considered, (...) in light of Wlodek Rabinowicz’s recent criticism. (shrink)

We generalize a previous result about dynamically consistent menu preferences to the case where preferences are not necessarily complete. We show that, as it is the case when preferences are complete, a subjective state space version of dynamic consistency is linked to a comparative theory of preference for flexibility. In words, an objective signal is interpreted as an event in the agent’s subjective state space and the agent acts in a dynamically consistent way after that (...) if and only if we can attribute all the differences between the agent’s preferences before and after the signal to the fact that the agent values flexibility more before the signal than after. (shrink)

Are risk preferences stable over time? To address this question we elicit risk preferences from the same pool of subjects at two different moments in time. To interpret the results, we use a Fechner stochastic choice model in which the revealed preference of individuals is governed by some underlying preference, together with a random error. We take cumulative prospect theory as the underlying preference model (Kahneman and Tversky, Econometrica 47:263–292, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, Journal of Risk and Uncertainty (...) 5:297–323, 1992). We observe that the aggregate pattern of preferences is very similar in both sessions, and it matches the results reported in the literature. Most subjects are risk averse for gains, and risk seeking for losses. However, the subjects that jointly agree with the reflection effect of prospect theory are around 50%. The percentage of individuals that change their responses across sessions is quite high, 63%. Estimating the stochastic choice model we find that 72% of the subjects have an underlying preference which agrees with the reflection effect of prospect theory. The remaining 28% are mainly classified as risk averse for both gains and losses. The results reinforce the empirical validity of the reflection effect. Deviations from the reflection effect can be attributed to noise, as well as to the existence of a fraction of risk averse subjects. (shrink)

Introduction: The use of human samples in genomic research has increased ethical debate about informed consent (IC) requirements and the information that subjects should receive regarding the results of the research. However, there are no quantitative data regarding researchers’ attitudes about these issues. Methods: We present the results of a survey of 104 US and 100 Spanish researchers who had published genomic epidemiology studies in 61 journals during 2006. Results: Researchers preferred a broader IC than the IC they had actually (...) obtained in their published papers. US authors were more likely than their Spanish colleagues to support obtaining a broad IC, covering either any future research project or any projects related to a group of diseases (67.6% vs 43%; adjusted OR = 4.84, 95% CI, 2.32 to 10.12). A slight majority of researchers (55.8%) supported informing participants about individual genomic results only if the reliability and clinical validity of the information had been established. Men were more likely than women to believe that patients should be informed of research results even if these conditions were not met (adjusted OR = 2.89, 95% CI = 1.46 to 5.72). Conclusions: This study provides evidence of a wide range of views among scientists regarding some controversial ethical issues related to genomic research, suggesting the need for more study, debate and education. In the interim, journals might consider including the investigators’ policies regarding these ethical issues in the papers they publish in the field of genomic epidemiology. (shrink)

This paper challenges the conventional methodological tendencies of current monistic treatments of subjective consciousness (SC). I argue that it is highly unlikely that any one position will ‘solve’ the SC problem, as monism supposes. Instead, I argue for treating theories of SC akin to scientific models, that (like models) theories only apply under certain empirical conditions, where each simply explains a necessary aspect of SC. Hence, a pluralistic, rather than monistic, approach is preferable to the literature as a whole. (...) In lieu of conventional metaphysics, I advocate applying a form of scientific realism to models of SC, scientific perspectivism. As authors must rely on some intuitive and/or experiential description of what is problematic about SC, theories are better treated as models deriving from a plurality of interpretive perspectives. (shrink)

The behavior of individuals currently living will generally have long-term consequences that affect the well-being of those who will come to live in the future. Intergenerational interdependencies of this nature raise difficult moral issues because only the current generation is in a position to decide on actions that will determine the nature of the world in which future generations will live. Although most are willing to attach some weight to the interests of future generations, many would argue that it is (...) not necessary to treat these interests as equivalent to those of the current generation. A common approach in this context is to use a system of discounting to evaluate future benefits and harms. This paper assesses the logic of discounting drawing on the writings of economists and philosophers. Much of the economic literature concerns the choice of an appropriate social discount rate. The social discount rate can be taken to reflect beliefs about the rights of future generations, a subject that has been extensively debated in the phioosophic literature. The writings of both economists and philosophers concerned with the weight to attach to the interests of future generations are reviewed and evaluated in this paper and the implications for environmental policy are discussed. (shrink)

In Preference, Value, Choice, and Welfare, I argued, among other things, that preferences in economics are and ought to be total subjective comparative evaluations, that the theory of rational choice is a reformulation of everyday folk-psychological explanations and predictions of behaviour, and that revealed preference theory is completely untenable. All three of these theses have been challenged in essays by Erik Angner (2018), Francesco Guala (2019) and Johanna Thoma (2021a, 2021b). This essay responds to these criticisms and defends (...) these three theses. (shrink)

The notion of comparative probability defined in Bayesian subjectivist theory stems from an intuitive idea that, for a given pair of events, one event may be considered “more probable” than the other. Yet it is conceivable that there are cases where it is indeterminate as to which event is more probable, due to, e.g., lack of robust statistical information. We take that these cases involve indeterminate comparative probabilities. This paper provides a Savage-style decision-theoretic foundation for indeterminate comparative probabilities.

The individual physical appearances of robots are considered significant, similar to the way that those of humans are. We investigated whether users prefer robots with male or female physical appearances for use in daily communication situations and whether egalitarian gender role attitudes are related to this preference. One thousand adult men and women aged 20–60 participated in the questionnaire survey. The results of our study showed that in most situations and for most subjects, “males” was not selected and “females” or (...) “neither” was selected. Moreover, the number of respondents who chose “either” was higher than that who chose “female.” Furthermore, we examined the relationship between gender and gender preference and confirmed that the effect of gender on the gender preference for a robot weakened when the human factor was eliminated. In addition, in some situations for android-type robots and in all situations for machine-type robots, equality orientation in gender role attitudes was shown to be higher for people who were not specific about their gender preferences. It is concluded that there is no need to introduce a robot that specifies its gender. Robots with a gender-neutral appearance might be more appropriate for applications requiring complex human–robot interaction and help avoid reproducing a gender bias. (shrink)

Abstrack In this study, the subject of preference, its conceptual field and its historical process, as well as the methods of determining and choosing different readings of mutawatir recitation imâms are discussed. The different phrasing of the Qur'an began from the revelation period of the revelation. It is seen that there were some discussions about the different readings of the Qur'an among the Companions in the early period, albeit a little. These different recitations of some of the Companions, who see (...) their own reading better or who are not aware of their friends' readings, are the Prophet's. The fact that they took them to the Prophet indicates this. As a matter of fact, Allah's command to "read whatever is easy from the Qur'an" (Muzzammil, 73/20) and the hadith of the Messenger of Allah "read whatever is easy from it", together with the different reading license, also implicate his preference. Arab tribes who used different dialects from the Quraysh dialect during the Medina period and those who converted to Islam from other non-Arab nations faced some difficulties in pronouncing and understanding the Qur'an, which was revealed in the Quraysh dialect. Wanting to solve this serious problem, Hz. Prophet was given the permission to read with seven letters, the differences in recitation began to be seen. The concepts of preference and elder refer to the practices of the imams of recitation in the process of creating their own recitations together with their proofs, which they chose from among the recitations of their predecessors. In the science of hujjat, the most used concepts, along with other concepts, are the concepts of old age, preference and need. Ihticaj is a concept that expresses choosing one among different recitations by citing evidences and proofs. As a matter of fact, when the works of the recitation scholars on this subject are examined, it is seen that the imâms made their choices by citing evidence from the Qur'an, Sunnah, Mushafs and language rules regarding the differences in recitation. In the science of recitation, some other concepts such as ulema, especially proof, and illet and evidence were also used. Whether it is the Qurra that stands out in the field of natural recitation, or the imams of mutawatir recitation, they have formed their preferences by bringing evidence from verses, sunnah, mushaf, saned and language in line with the criteria of sound recitation. (shrink)

This volume contains a selection of Professor Uzawa's important contributions to mathematical economics. Subjects covered by these nineteen essays include consumption, production, equilibrium, capital, growth, planning, international trade, and the theory of social overhead capital. Written in the 1960s and early 1970s, the papers form a basis upon which economic theory has developed over the last twenty years. The collection includes some of Uzawa's classic contributions, such as 'Preference and Rational Choice in the Theory of Consumption', 'Time Preference, the Consumption (...) Function, and Optimum Asset Holdings', 'Neutral Inventions and the Stability of Growth Equilibrium', 'On a Two-Sector Model of Economic Growth', 'Time Preference and the Penrose Effect in a Two-Class Model of Economic Growth', and 'On the Economics of Social Overhead Capital'. The collection will be useful not only in understanding the nature of the development in economic theory today, but also in reflecting upon the direction toward which economic theory will be advancing in the future. (shrink)

This work is about the deceptive nature of psychotherapy. In particular, it is about those therapies that claim to provide the client with insight and self-knowledge when in practice they are a means of social control absorbing clients into socially acceptable norms. Through a philosophical analysis of key concepts such as knowledge, insight, and subjectivity, and through an examination of mechanisms intrinsic to psychotherapeutic practice, such as power, interpretation, and suggestion, this monograph unveils how psychotherapy deludes clients into believing they (...) have discovered their true self. Rather than gaining self-knowledge and insight into their true or core self, clients are subtly reconstructed and reconfigured along prevailing social values. Furthermore, the very epistemological and metaphysical world-view clients are deceived into believing is highly suspect and founded upon a fascistic understanding of knowledge. As an alternative to such domination, psychotherapy needs to reconstruct itself along Nietzschean-Deleuzian lines where the focus is on multiple identities, difference, and creativity. Rather than focusing on an analysis of past memories to alleviate symptoms such as anxiety or depression, therapeutic intervention should aim for a non-repressive conception of self-knowledge and insight based upon a creative future and not a regretful past. This entails a different understanding of knowledge and reality that is not based on subjugating the world to what we know about it, but on immersing ourselves within reality in all of its concrete richness. And such an approach is preferable not because it is “true” but because it is more liberating. (shrink)