"œLa phronesis como forma mentis de eticidad"Este ensayo pretende restaurar el espacio en que el pensamiento griego situ� los conceptos de virtud y de prudencia, invocando una nueva interpretaci�n sobre el problema de la �tica y la subjetividad. El autor diserta sobre la virtud de la prudencia con el uso de una hermen�utica com�n a la tradici�n cultural del Occidente europeo y que integra lo mejor de la interpretaci�n hist�rica que Croce, Heidegger o Bultmann, por ejemplo, han legado al debate (...) filos�fico. Todo esto sin perder de vista que esas interpretaciones tambi�n son la expresi�n de una subjetividad humana con un contexto hist�rico preciso, siempre contingente y nunca perfectamente asible. "œPhronesis as a forma mentis of ethicity"This essay tries to restore the space in which Greek thought placed the concepts of virtue and prudence, calling on a new interpretation of the problem of Ethics and subjectivity. The author disserts about prudence as a virtue and the use, in the European culturan tradition, of Hermeneutics, which compose the best of historical interpretation that Croce, Heidegger or Bultmann, for example, have inherited to the philosophical discussion. This debate also considers that these interpretations are the expression of a human subjectivity with a definite historical context, always contingent and never perfectly seizable. (shrink)

NO es toda la obra, es solo el escaneo de algunos de los ensayos.

"œCiencia y arte" Para el autor el hombre moderno, aun en medio de su "cientificidad", se descubre perdido en muchos laberintos y obsesionado con fetiches de ascendencia simbólica y ritual. Los í­dolos de Bacon siguen dominando el escenario; el homo homini lupus de Hobbes parece todaví­a un paisaje natural; la ley se sigue ofreciendo a los hombres corno señor de Ios señores. Las preguntas de la ciencia acompañan a las preguntas de la filosofí­a y a las expresiones del arte: son (...) las eternas preguntas de la condición humana. Si la filosofí­a y la ciencia intentan apagar la inquietud intelectual principal-mente, el arte y la religión lo harán en el campo del sentimiento, de la intuición y de la representación. "œScience and Art" The author declares that modern man, although involved in scientificity, is lost inside labyrinths and obsessed with symbolic fetishes. Bacons idols are in the scene; Hobbes is homo homini lupus still works like a natural landscape; law is still offered to men as master of masters. Scientific questions, philosophical questions and art expressions walk hand to hand, as they are the eternal questions of human condition. While Philosophy and Science try to extinguish the intelectual worries, Art and Religion will do the same in the fields of feelings, intuition and representation. (shrink)

Croce is a heir of the best posrenacentist traditions. Maquiavelo and Galileo are presents in the rigor of his thought and the intention to apprehend the concreteness and the verifiableness. But also they are Hegel, and before Vico, in its unfolded universalist glance on the historical process. ..

The concept of God is a key word in the history of philosophy. It encloses, in history, man’s innate desire to give meaning to his existence or to achieve an identity that is not only physical or biological. Science, rationality and faith get together to try to find a solution to the problem of ..

How can science be brought to connect with experience? This book addresses two of the most challenging problems facing contemporary neurobiology and cognitive science. Firstly, understanding how we unconsciously execute habitual actions as a result of neurological and cognitive processes that are not formal actions of conscious judgment but part of a habitual nexus of systematic self-organization. Secondly, attempting to create an ethics adequate to our present awareness that there is no such thing as a transcendental self, a stable subject (...) or soul. The author combines researches in cognitive science and phenomenology with two representatives of what he calls the 'wisdom traditions': Confucianism and Buddhist epistemology. (shrink)

The objective of this paper is analyzing to which extent the multiverse hypothesis provides a real explanation of the peculiarities of the laws and constants in our universe. First we argue in favor of the thesis that all multiverses except Tegmark’s “mathematical multiverse” are too small to explain the fine tuning, so that they merely shift the problem up one level. But the “mathematical multiverse" is surely too large. To prove this assessment, we have performed a number of experiments with (...) cellular automata of complex behavior, which can be considered as universes in the mathematical multiverse. The analogy between what happens in some automata (in particular Conway’s “Game of Life") and the real world is very strong. But if the results of our experiments can be extrapolated to our universe, we should expect to inhabit—in the context of the multiverse—a world in which at least some of the laws and constants of nature should show a certain time dependence. Actually, the probability of our existence in a world such as ours would be mathematically equal to zero. In consequence, the results presented in this paper can be considered as an inkling that the hypothesis of the multiverse, whatever its type, does not offer an adequate explanation for the peculiarities of the physical laws in our world. (shrink)

The target article concludes that it is essential to introduce the personal level in cognitive science. We propose to take this conclusion one step further. The personal level should consist of first-person accounts of specific, contextualized experiences, not abstract or imagined cases. Exploring first-person accounts at their own level of detail calls for the refinements of method that can link up with neural accounts.

El fracaso político de la Revolución francesa deja un regusto amargo de que el problema del ser humano se encuentra en la Modernidad y, concretamente, en la escisión radical que abre la conciencia. Los ideales del Bien y la Verdad son señaladas como formas muertas, carentes de potencia erótica, inservibles para movilizar al ser y, por tanto, anacrónicos para una época que quiere despertar bajo el signo de la Belleza. Un joven Schelling escribe bajo este sol naciente una obra en (...) la que el arte aparece como una praxis capaz de suturar aquella herida que abre la conciencia. La imaginación y la síntesis poética son elementos ineludibles en el transitar por una vida humana que busca su plenitud en el retorno a la unidad originaria con lo Absoluto. El gesto del genio artístico será el privilegiado para este tránsito al origen. (shrink)

El ensayo ofrece una lectura de la tragedia Woyzeck, del dramaturgo alemán del siglo XIX Georg Büchner. Se intenta mostrar que la obra de ficción constituye una suerte de antípoda respecto de su fuente de inspiración: el informe psiquiátrico que precipitó la condena del sujeto histórico que da título al drama. En esta perspectiva, se propone como clave de lectura el complejo de variaciones que aporta la obra en torno al tópico o la figura de la animalidad como fuerza neutra, (...) impensable e incontrolable que no solo arrastra al protagonista hacia la desgracia, sino que además opera como principio dinámico de toda la galería de personajes. The essay offers a reading of the Woyzeck tragedy, by the XIX century German playwright Georg Büchner. It intends to portray that the fictional work constitutes a sort of antipodes in relation to its source of inspiration: the psychiatric report that precipitated the sentence of the historical subject, which gives the title to the drama. On this point of view, a reading codeis proposed from the set of variations that the play contributes to the subject or the figure of animality. As a neutral, inconceivable, and uncontrollable force, which not only pulls the protagonist towards tragedy, but also functions as a dynamic principle of the complete rangeof characters. (shrink)

En este trabajo me propongo comparar el patrón argumentativo de los sofistas del siglo V a. C. tal como son retratados en la obra de Platón con el de los erísticos del _Eutidemo_. Defenderé que ninguno de estos sofistas es presentado por Platón como experto en dialéctica refutativa, actividad discursiva que caracteriza a la erística. Por el contrario, el retrato platónico de Pródico, Hipias, Gorgias y Protágoras los muestra como incapaces, desinteresados u hostiles a la argumentación de tipo dialéctica.

What would it mean for an emotion to successfully “recognize” something about an object toward which it is directed? Although the notion of "emotional recognition" is central to Rick Furtak’s _Knowing Emotions_, the text does not provide an account of this concept that enables us to assess the extent to which a given emotional response is recognitive. This article draws from the text to articulate a novel account of emotional recognition. According to this account, emotional recognition can be assessed not (...) only in terms of the “accuracy” of an emotional construal in a strictly epistemological sense, but also in terms of the quasi-ethical ideal of responding emotionally to what we encounter in ways that are “specific,” “deep," and “balanced.". (shrink)

RESUMEN Una interpretación extendida del Eutidemo sostiene que la práctica erística de la cual Platón busca distanciarse en el diálogo constituye una referencia velada a la dialéctica desarrollada por el socrático Euclides y sus seguidores megáricos. No obstante, los expertos reconocen que la segunda demostración erística pone en boca de Eutidemo y Dionisodoro dos posiciones que fueron defendidas por Antístenes, según las cuales no es posible decir falsedades ni contradecir. Este trabajo busca analizar las refutaciones de dicha sección y confrontarlas (...) con los testimonios sobre Antístenes a fin de evaluar hasta qué punto nos encontramos en presencia de los mismos argumentos. Defenderé que si bien las refutaciones del Eutidemo poseen una inspiración antisténica, principalmente respecto de las tesis que buscan sostener, las mismas se basan en una serie de supuestos ambiguos que responden más a los lineamientos de la práctica erística que a los fundamentos del pensamiento antisténico. Argumentaré, asimismo, que esta diferencia podría explicarse a partir del hecho de que el Eutidemo puede ser leído como una respuesta al Encomio de Helena de Isócrates, en donde este ataca a los socráticos por dedicarse a la erística y al desarrollo de doctrinas paradójicas, entre las cuales incluye las tesis de Antístenes. ABSTRACT A widespread interpretation of the Euthydemus claims that the Eristic practice from which Plato seeks to distance himself in the dialogue constitutes a veiled reference to the dialectics developed by the Socratic Euclid and his Megarian followers. However, experts acknowledge that the second Eristic demonstration puts two positions in the mouth of Euthydemus and Dionysodorus which were defended by Antisthenes, according to which it is not possible to say falsehoods nor to contradict. This work seeks to analyze the refutations of this section and compare them with the testimonies about Antisthenes in order to evaluate to what extent they are the same arguments. I will defend that although the refutations of the Euthydemus have an Antisthenic inspiration, mainly with respect to the theses they seek to support, these are based on a series of ambiguous assumptions that correspond more to the principles of Eristics than to the grounds of Antisthenic thought. I will also argue that the difference could be explained by the fact that the Euthydemus can be understood as a response to Isocrates ’ Encomium of Helen, where he attacks the whole Socratic circle for devoting to Eristics and to the development of paradoxical doctrines, including the theses of the Antisthesis. (shrink)

This paper sets forth a familiar theme, that science essentially consists of two interdependent episodes, one imaginative, the other critical. Hypotheses and other imaginative conjectures are the initial stage of scientific inquiry because they provide the incentive to seek the truth and a clue as to where to find it. But scientific conjectures must be subject to critical examination and empirical testing. There is a dialogue between the two episodes; observations made to test a hypothesis are the inspiration for new (...) conjectures. Inductive generalizations may also inspire hypotheses, but cannot validate them. A hypothesis is empirically tested by ascertaining whether or not predictions about the world of experience deduced from the hypothesis agree with what is actually observed. This has been appropriately considered the 'criterion of demarcation' that distinguishes science from other knowledge. But scientific hypotheses must satisfy other tests as well, e.g., whether they have explanatory value and further understanding. I briefly explore such issues as verifiability and falsifiability, empirical content and truthfulness, contingency and certainty, fact and theory, error and fraud. Science like any human activity is subject to error and to the foibles and other failings of human beings. But severe attempts of empirical falsification and other trials yield knowledge that stands the test of time and provides a foothold for further knowledge. Moreover, scientists have developed social mechanisms, such as peer review and publication, to evaluate their work. Because the research of scientists depends on the validity of previous knowledge, it is of great consequence that they discern valid from invalid knowledge and thus scientists are inclined to transcend ideology, nationality, friendship, monetary interest and other prejudices when the mettle of scientific knowledge is at stake. I use historical examples to illustrate some relevant aspects of scientific practice: its success (Mendel), misrepresentation (Darwin), ideological abuse (Lysenko), arrogant violation of the requirement of testing (Koch), theory replacement (Priestly and Lavoisier, Newton and Einstein), and the indispensability of context (Oswald Avery and Alfred Wegener). (shrink)

Stephen Jay Gould’s monumental The Structure of Evolutionary Theory ‘‘attempts to expand and alter the premises of Darwinism, in order to build an enlarged and distinctive evolutionary theory . . . while remaining within the tradition, and under the logic, of Darwinian argument.’’ The three branches or ‘‘fundamental principles of Darwinian logic’’ are, according to Gould: agency (natural selection acting on individual organisms), efficacy (producing new species adapted to their environments), and scope (accumulation of changes that through geological time yield (...) the living world’s panoply of diversity and morphological complexity). Gould’s efforts to contribute something important to each of these three fundamental components of Darwinian Theory are far from successful. (shrink)

El presente artículo recoge una conferencia inédita. Por un lado, el autor se centra en examinar los usos impropios de la noción de dialéctica, rechazando su concepción como lógica alternativa a la formal, como ciencia o como método en un sentido estricto. Por otro lado, muestra una caracterización de la dialéctica como una «metódica» en sentido amplio que se propone captar totalidades concretas en su despliegue desde un punto de vista materialista, histórico y crítico, con finalidades emancipatorias, cuya cientificidad sólo (...) podría admitirse si se entiende en un sentido subordinado. (shrink)

La idea de ciudadanía conlleva las nociones de derechos, pertenencia política y obligaciones cívicas. El distinto énfasis sobre cada uno de estos elementos nos remite a tradiciones histórica e intelectualmente distintas en su concepción. No obstante, el principio de la autonomía de las identidades, tal y como se reclama en numerosos países nacionalmente plurales, plantea todo un desafío a la forma en que tradicionalmente se han venido planteando las virtudes políticas de la ciudadanía, Este artículo parte de una revisión histórica (...) de las nociones liberal y republicana de la misma, analiza su relación con la idea de la nacionalidad y termina con una reflexión sobre la lealtad como virtud política y las condiciones para su posible reformulación como patriotismo federal en los Estados plurinacionales. (shrink)

Los museos han perdido visitantes como consecuencia de la COVID-19 y la ciudadanía sigue creyendo que la ciencia es aburrida. En este contexto de crisis, examinamos, mediante técnicas de análisis de contenido, la presencia de la arqueología en programas de radio y estudiamos los recursos lingüísticos que hacen a la comunicación capaz de emocionar, aumentado las posibilidades de éxito de la divulgación científica. Concluimos que la escasez de equipo humano cualificado en comunicación de la ciencia y experto en recursos para (...) hacerla más atractiva, puede poner en peligro la recuperación de los museos como centros de ocio, cultura y conocimiento. (shrink)

What makes Christopher P. Long’s study of Aristotle’s ontology especially rewarding is that it is philosophically motivated. The goal is not simply to “get right what Aristotle said,” but rather to think in dialogue with Aristotle, which implies a willingness to think beyond and even against him. Long makes the general philosophical motivation of his book perfectly clear: it is the desire to find “a way between the totalizing tendencies of modernism and the anarchy of postmodernism”. This is an ethical (...) motivation, since for Long justice requires both a recognition of the fundamental autarchy of each being and a recognition of principles. But why turn back to an ancient Greek philosopher in this contemporary debate? The reason is that Long sees Aristotle as pointing “to a form of knowledge that is neither totalizing nor anarchic”. This third way of knowing is described by Long as a matter of conceptualizing the individual in such a way as to acknowledge its singularity and not reduce it to the mere instantiation of a concept. It is to see the individual neither as an inexplicable singularity nor as only the particular instantiation of a universal. Long finds this neither/nor in Aristotle’s concept of the τόδε τι, which he at one point aptly describes as “the very conceptualization of that which always escapes the concept” : “The term τόδε τι designates this individual emerging out of its isolated singularity, prior to its being reduced to particularity, the mere instantiation of a dominating concept”. Thus we get the following account of what a non-totalizing and non-anarchic form of knowledge would be like and therefore of what Long seeks to find in Aristotle. (shrink)

The question addressed here is how Aristotle can characterize the ‘unmoved mover’ that is the ‘first ousia’ and first principle of his metaphysics not only as being alive, but as a model for the best kind of human life. The first step towards understanding this characterization is the distinction between ‘motion’ and ‘activity’ that Aristotle develops in 6th chapter of Metaphysics. Only on the basis of this distinction can we understand how the unmoved mover can be active without being in (...) motion. The second is the argument in De Anima that the soul as principle of life is not any kind of motion, being unmoved even by itself. The soul indeed ‘moves’ in the sense of causing motion, but while remaining itself unmoved. On this basis we see that the meaning of ‘life’ in us is not fundamentally different from its meaning in the divine, and that therefore we can indeed find in the ultimate object of metaphysics a model for how we ourselves are to live. (shrink)

El presente ensayo explora el itinerario de la crítica que Nietzsche ejerció sobre el arte de Wagner en tres pasos. Primero, se trata de reconocer la juvenil admiración del filósofo por la ópera wagneriana entendida como un renacimiento del drama musical antiguo. Luego, se explora el tránsito hacia su desilusión en la clave de la influencia de Schopenhauer sobre Wagner. Finalmente, el ensayo remata en la crítica madura de Nietzsche sobre Wagner, donde se advierten los prolegómenos decimonónicos de la transformación (...) general del arte en espectáculo en el sentido contemporáneo. (shrink)

This work proposes an interpretation of Euthydemus 283c-288b taking into account the problem of the false in the Sophist. My hypothesis will be that the second eristic demonstration of the Euthydemus can be understood as a representation of Sophist 236d-239b: while in this passage there it is the Stranger is the one who states what the sophist would say to defend himself from the seventh definition, in which he is accused of producing falsehoods, in the Euthydemus two sophists are who (...) use the notions of non-being and falsehood to refute such accusation. The work has three parts. Firstly, I shall analyze Sophist 236d-239b and contextualize it within the framework of the seventh definition. Secondly, I focus on the characterization of Euthydemus and Dionysodorus as sophists. Finally, I analyze the three arguments that organize the second demonstration of the Euthydemus, trying to understand its structure and its role in the drama of the dialogue. (shrink)