Averroès, musulman andalou du XIIe siècle, discute le " De anima " d'Aristote dans une approche rationalisante du rapport entre religion et philosophie, entre étude de la vérité révélée et surnaturelle, et étude démonstrative de l'univers. La béatitude spirituelle de l'homme est décrite dans le Coran. En philosophie, elle serait l'union de son intellect à l'intellect agent universel.

English summary: This Arabic edition and French translation of Avicennas commentary on Aristotles Lambda offers a clear opportunity to better understand the Greek philosophers influence on medieval Arabic philosophy, especially concerning the hierarchy of the universe. French description: Ce texte d'Avicenne est l'un des seuls commentaires sur Aristote laisses par le philosophe persan. Il s'attaque au noyau theologique de la Metaphysique du Stagirite, les chapitres 6 a 10 du livre Lambda. Avicenne depend d'une tradition greco-arabe (Alexandre d'Aphrodise, Themistius, l'ecole "peripateticienne" (...) de Bagdad). La tradition arabe a aussi attribue a Aristote plusieurs oeuvres d'origine neoplatonicienne, notamment une Theologie adaptee de Plotin, et un Livre du Bien pur, adaptation des Elements de Theologie de Proclus. Le Dieu d'Aristote est ainsi pour Avicenne la Cause premiere efficiente de l'etre. La structure hierarchique de l'univers resulte de l'emanation produite par l'autointelligence du premier Principe. Il ne fait pas de doute, pour Avicenne, que ces doctrines aient ete celles du Stagirite. (shrink)

Not all scientific explanations work by describing causal connections between events or the world's overall causal structure. In addition, mathematicians regard some proofs as explaining why the theorems being proved do in fact hold. This book proposes new philosophical accounts of many kinds of non-causal explanations in science and mathematics.

En dehors de Pascal en France, c'est surtout en Allemagne que tragique et tristesse ont été mis en rapport avant que leur distinction soit largement développée par Walter Benjamin dans son livre sur le drame baroque. L'opposition faite par Benjamin entre le Trauerspiel et la tragédie peut être interprétée comme l'aboutissement et l'achèvement d'une distinction courante dans la philosophie allemande depuis Hegel entre le " tragique " (antique) et le " triste " de la modernité (romantique). Si ces deux termes (...) ne sont pas ressentis en français comme formant un couple de concepts, il n'en va pas de même dans la philosophie et l'esthétique allemandes, où ils apparaissent régulièrement ensemble, exprimant soit une différence de degré (Hegel, Simmel), soit de nature (Nietzsche, Ziegler), soit enfin un rapport de polarité (Benjamin) et où se jouent des rapports différents avec le mythe et l'histoire. C'est un des grands mérites de Benjamin que d'avoir saisi cette polarité entre le tragique et le triste, qui n'avait jamais été formulée explicitement avant lui, et de l'avoir élevée au rang de théorie dans son opposition entre Trauerspiel et tragédie. Pour comprendre en profondeur les implications du concept de Trauerspiel introduit par Benjamin, et du concept de tristesse qui lui est lié, il est nécessaire de se replonger dans la tradition allemande, de connaître le milieu philosophique dans lequel Benjamin a fait ses études, en particulier les discussions autour de la philosophie de l'histoire et de la structure du temps au début du XXe siècle. Toute la pensée de Benjamin s'éclaire alors sous un jour nouveau qui permet de mieux saisir le lien entre ses écrits de jeunesse et sa pensée ultérieure. (shrink)

Despite the fact that there is considerable evidence against the causal efficacy of proximal (short-term) conscious intentions, many studies confirm our commonsensical belief in the efficacy of more distal (longer-term) conscious intentions. In this paper, I address two questions: (i) What, if any, is the difference between the role of consciousness in effective and in non-effective conscious intentions? (ii) How do effective conscious distal intentions interact with unconscious processes in producing actions, and how do non-effective proximal intentions fit into this (...) process? I argue that answers to these questions point to a picture of distal conscious intending as a form of self-programming. The metaphor of ?self-programming? will be elucidated by using a distinction between ?structuring? and ?triggering? causes. Though the self-programming metaphor does not amount to a full theory of conscious intending, I argue that it may be a useful heuristic in developing such a theory. I also argue that the metaphor is phenomenologically plausible. (shrink)

English summary: Marc Andre Wiegand analyzes the neo-Kantian premises of Gustav Radbruch's legal philosophy.

De Platon à Pierre Bourdieu en passant par Marcel Mauss, Joseph Jacotot, Jules Michelet et Karl Marx, l'écriture du présent ouvrage a été motivée par la volonté de faire retour sur les termes exacts de la critique développée par Jacques Rancière contre la sociologie de Pierre Bourdieu et de remettre sur le métier la vieille question de l'écart entre le philosophe et le politique.

Conflicts of interest are rampant in the American medical community. Today it is not uncommon for doctors to refer patients to clinics or labs in which they have a financial interest (40% of physicians in Florida invest in medical centers); for hospitals to offer incentives to physicians who refer patients (a practice that can lead to unnecessary hospitalization); or for drug companies to provide lucrative give-aways to entice doctors to use their "brand name" drugs (which are much more expensive than (...) generic drugs). In Medicine, Money and Morals, Marc A. Rodwin draws on his own experience as a health lawyer--and his research in health ethics, law, and policy--to reveal how financial conflicts of interest can and do negatively affect the quality of patient care. He shows that the problem has become worse over the last century and provides many actual examples of how doctors' decisions are influenced by financial considerations. We learn how two California physicians, for example, resumed referrals to Pasadena General Hospital only after the hospital started paying $70 per patient (their referrals grew from 14 in one month to 82 in the next). As Rodwin writes, incentives such as this can inhibit a doctor from taking action when a hospital fails to provide proper service, and may also lead to the unnecessary hospitalization of patients. We also learn of a Wyeth-Ayerst Labs promotion in which physicians who started patients on INDERAL (a drug for high blood pressure, angina, and migraines) received 1000 mileage points on American Airlines for each patient (studies show that promotions such as this have a direct effect on a doctor's choice of drug). Rodwin reveals why the medical community has failed to regulate conflicts of interest: peer review has little authority, state licensing boards are usually ignorant of abuses, and the AMA code of ethics has historically been recommended rather than required. He examines what can be learned from the way society has coped with the conflicts of interest of other professionals --lawyers, government officials, and businessmen--all of which are held to higher standards of accountability than doctors. And he recommends that efforts be made to prohibit and regulate certain kinds of activity (such as kickbacks and self-referrals), to monitor and regulate conduct, and to provide penalties for improper conduct. Our failure to face physicians' conflicts of interest has distorted the way medicine is practiced, compromised the loyalty of doctors to patients, and harmed society, the integrity of the medical profession, and patients. For those concerned with the quality of health care or medical ethics, Medicine, Money and Morals is a provocative look into the current health care crisis and a powerful prescription for change. (shrink)

Several philosophers have argued that ‘constraints’ constrain (and thereby explain) by virtue of being modally stronger than ordinary laws of nature. In this way, a constraint applies to all possible systems, for a variety of possibility that is broader (that is, more inclusive) than the variety we employ when we say that the ordinary laws of nature apply to all physically possible systems. Explanations by constraint are thus more broadly unifying than ordinary causal explanations. Philosophical examples of good candidates for (...) constraints have heretofore been drawn almost exclusively from fundamental physics. This paper argues for the existence of such constraints (even multiple levels of them) in at least one human science (linguistics), not just in physics. (shrink)

Alexander Pho and Benjamin A. White respond to Nicolas Dixon’s critique of mixed martial arts (MMA) through a ‘companions in innocence’ argument. Taking up a counterexample that Dixon is quick to dismiss, the authors argue that MMA techniques are on a par with the ‘pain-leveraging’ tactics used by cyclists and that pressing for a moral distinction between cycling and MMA leads to absurd conclusions about other practices. So, because cycling is morally permissible, MMA is morally permissible. This companions in innocence (...) argument fails. But cycling can be used to develop a better, though only partial, defense of MMA. (shrink)

Standardly, epistemic peers regarding a given matter are said to be people of equal competence who share all relevant evidence. Alternatively, one can define epistemic peers regarding a given matter as people who are equally likely to be right about that matter. I argue that a definition in terms of likelihood captures the essence of epistemic peerhood better than the standard definition or any variant of it. What is more, a likelihood definition implies the truth of the central thesis in (...) the debate on peer disagreement, the so-called Equal Weight View, according to which we should give the opinions of our peers the same weight we give our own. Adopting a likelihood definition, however, does not end the debate on peer disagreement, because the alleged theoretical alternatives to the Equal Weight View, reinterpreted in the light of a likelihood definition, can in fact be shown to be compatible with this view—though the reinterpreted versions may appear less plausible than the original ones. (shrink)

This article is an examination of killing in war in its moral and normative dimension – with attention given to how killing affects the acting agent. The author argues against the commonplace belief – often tacitly held if not consciously asserted – among academics, the general public, and even – if surprisingly – military professionals, that killing, including in a justified war, is always morally wrong – even when legally sanctioned and necessary to avert a greater moral wrong. This critique (...) of the “killing is wrong but in war it is necessary” trope is motivated in part by the large numbers of psychiatric battle casualties (specifically moral injury) suffered during operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and which have attended military activity throughout history. The article approaches the issue through the field of Christian ethical reflection on just war. In building a moral framework for killing in combat, the article explores a typology of homicide, intention, double effect, love, and whether the attitudinal expectations of just warriors in the Christian tradition is realistic in combat. With this moral framework for killing in hand, this article concludes by drawing a critical distinction between moral injury and moral bruising. (shrink)

Genocide is a matter of law. It is also a matter of history. Engaging some of the most disturbing responses to the Armenian genocide, Marc Nichanian strikingly reveals the complex role played by law and history in making this and other genocides endure as contentious events. Nichanian's book argues that both law and history fail to contend with the very nature of events for which there is no archive (no documents, no witnesses). Both history and law fail to address (...) the modern reality that events can be—and are now being—perpetrated that _depend_ upon the destruction of the archive, turning monstrous deeds into nonevents. Genocide, this book makes us see, is in one sense the _destruction_ of the archive. It relies on the historiographic perversion. (shrink)

The evidence that we get from peer disagreement is especially problematic from a Bayesian point of view since the belief revision caused by a piece of such evidence cannot be modelled along the lines of Bayesian conditionalisation. This paper explains how exactly this problem arises, what features of peer disagreements are responsible for it, and what lessons should be drawn for both the analysis of peer disagreements and Bayesian conditionalisation as a model of evidence acquisition. In particular, it is pointed (...) out that the same characteristic of evidence from disagreement that explains the problems with Bayesian conditionalisation also suggests an interpretation of suspension of belief in terms of imprecise probabilities. (shrink)

A commonly neglected feature of the so-called Equal Weight View, according to which we should give our peers’ opinions the same weight we give our own, is its prima facie incompatibility with the common picture of philosophy as an armchair activity: an intellectual effort to seek a priori knowledge. This view seems to imply that our beliefs are more likely to be true if we leave our armchair in order to find out whether there actually are peers who, by disagreeing (...) with us, force us to revise our beliefs. This article argues that the Equal Weight View should be spelled out in such a way that not only actual peer disagreement requires us to revise our beliefs, but also merely possible peer disagreement. This result is not a reductio ad absurdum of the view. Quite the opposite: it shows that the view is, contrary to appearance, compatible with our common way of doing philosophy. (shrink)

Both individually and as a collection, these essays will promote understanding and provoke further debate amongst students and established scholars alike.

Inhaltsverzeichnis/Table of Contents: Introduction. Marc SLORS: Epiphenomenalism and Cross-Realization Induction. Michael PAUEN: Is Type Identity Incompatible with Multiple Realization? Sven WALTER: Need Multiple Realizability Deter the Identity-Theorist? Achim STEPHAN: Emergentism, Irreducibility, and Downward Causation. Carl GILLETT: The Varieties of Emergence: Their Purposes, Obligations and Importance. Wim DE MUIJNCK: Causation by Relational Properties. Albert NEWEN & Rimas ČUPLINSKAS: Mental Causation: A Real Phenomenon in a Physicalistic World without Epiphenomenalism or Overdetermination. Bernd LUDWIG: Warum kommen „mentale Ursachen“ physikalischen Erklärungen eigentlich nicht (...) in die Quere? Einige grundsätzliche Überlegungen zur Verwendung des Ausdrucks „A verursacht B“ im Umkreis moderner naturwissenschaftlicher Theorien. Besprechungen/Review Articles. Buchnotizen/Critical Notes. (shrink)

De essays die hier zijn verzameld, gaan alle op hun manier op zoek naar wat het betekent dat wij, modernen, 'subject' zijn geworden. Voor de moderniteit, in de christelijke middeleeuwen, was God het 'subjectum', dit wil zeggen de 'drager' waarin de mens zichzelf en zijn wereld gegrondvest wist. Met de moderniteit heeft de mens die rol van 'drager' en 'subject' overgenomen: de plaats waarin hij zichzelf en zijn wereld gegrond kon weten, was voortaan enkel en alleen nog zijn eigen eindige (...) 'zelf'. De essays die Marc De Kesel hier bijeenbrengt, stellen op diverse manieren de vraag naar wat het wil zeggen dat de plaats waar wij, modernen, onszelf treffen, niet langer de plaats is waar een God ons zou hebben geschapen en evenmin de plaats waar wij zonder meer bij onszelf aanwezig zouden zijn (en onze drager, ons eigen 'subjectum' zou zijn). Aan de hand van een aantal hedendaagse (Lacaniaanse, Bataillaanse en andere) denkschema's tracht hij aan te tonen hoe die plaats ons wezenlijk vreemd blijft, omdat wij drager-subject zijn geworden van iets dat ons in laatste instantie blijft ontsnappen; alleen moet dat 'transcendente' niet langer in een of andere verre God worden gezocht, maar in de banale woordenstroom waar ons dagelijks bestaan op drijft. De Kesels essays gaan vaak rechtstreeks in op concrete situaties, wat ze dwingt hun gedachtengang dicht bij de realiteit te houden. Dit kan een denken dat onze filosofische traditie niet schuwt, alleen maar ten goede komen. (shrink)

Unknown peers create a problem for those epistemologists who argue that we should be conciliatory in cases of peer disagreement. The standard interpretation of ‘being conciliatory’ has it that we should revise our opinions concerning a specific subject matter whenever we encounter someone who is as competent and well informed as we are concerning this subject matter (and thus is our peer) and holds a different opinion. As a consequence, peers whom we have never encountered and who are hence unknown (...) to us are not taken into account. This, however, appears odd; not only because it is an accidental matter which peers we happen to encounter and which not, but also because it would allow people to deliberately isolate themselves from any kind of intellectual exchange on the topic under consideration. The paper argues that we should take the problem of unknown peers seriously, and that disregarding the problem is an instance of the more general mistake of assuming that evidential quality and justified believability can be dealt with separately. Moreover, a solution to the problem of unknown peers is suggested. (shrink)

Marc Hauser puts forth the theory that humans have evolved a universal moral instinct, unconsciously propelling us to deliver judgments of right and wrong independent of gender, education, and religion. Combining his cutting-edge research with the latest findings in cognitive psychology, linguistics, neuroscience, evolutionary biology, economics, and anthropology, Hauser explores the startling implications of his provocative theory vis-à-vis contemporary bioethics, religion, the law, and our everyday lives.

Some recent studies have highlighted a link between a favorable childhood environment and the strengthening of neuronal resilience against the changes that occur in natural aging neurodegenerative disease. Many works have assessed the factors —both internal and external — that can contribute to delay the phenotype of an ongoing neurodegenerative brain pathology. At the crossroads of genetic, environmental and lifestyle factors, these relationships are unified by the concept of cognitive reserve (CR). This review focuses on the protective effects of maintaining (...) this CR through the cognitive aging process, and emphasizes the most essential time in life for the development and strengthening of this CR. The in-depth study of this research shows that early stimulation with regard to social and sensory interactions, contributes to the proper development of cognitive, affective and psychosocial capacities. Childhood thus appears to be the most active phase in the development of CR, and as such we hypothesize that this constitutes the first essential period of primary prevention of pathological aging and loss of cognitive capacities. If this hypothesis is correct, early stimulation of the environment would therefore be considered as a true primary prevention and a public health issue. The earlier identification of neurodevelopmental disorders, which can affect personal and professional development across the lifespan, could therefore have longer-term impacts and provide better protection against aging. (shrink)

Dieser Text geht der Frage nach, ob und, wenn ja, inwieweit sich Gedankenexperimente in der praktischen Philosophie in ihrer Struktur und ihrer epistemischen Signifikanz von Gedankenexperimenten in der theoretischen Philosophie oder in den Naturwissenschaften unterscheiden. Anhand einer allgemeinen Strukturanalyse von Gedankenexperimenten wird dabei aufgezeigt, dass bei Gedankenexperimenten in der praktischen Philosophie zwar häufig die angemessene Bewertung eines zugrunde gelegten Szenarios im Zentrum steht und nicht, wie zum Beispiel in theoretischen Philosophie oft, dessen angemessene Beschreibung, dass dieser Unterschied aber kaum Auswirkungen (...) hat auf die prinzipielle Anwendbarkeit – abgesehen von einer bisher übersehenen Konsequenz: Man darf in einem Gedankenexperiment nicht annehmen, dass moralische, ästhetische oder entscheidungstheoretische Prinzipien in unterschiedlichen möglichen Welten verschieden sind. Andernfalls käme dem Gedankenexperiment keinerlei epistemische Signifikanz zu. (shrink)

Le texte de la plus ancienne traduction arabe de la Métaphysique, faite au IXe siècle par le nestorien Usṭāṯ à l’époque et dans le cercle du «philosophe des Arabes», al-Kindī , est connu principalement par l’utilisation qu’en fit Averroès dans le Grand Commentaire de la Métaphysique, édité par le Père Bouyges d’après le manuscrit unique de Leyde. Elle comprenait la majeure partie du texte d’Aristote, à l’exception des livres Α, Κ , Μ et Ν. L’attribution à Usṭāṯ de la traduction (...) de Δ a en outre été récemment mise en doute. (shrink)

In chemistry one observes different relationships [rapports] between different bodies, which act such that they unite easily with one another. These relationships have their degrees and their laws. One observes their different insofar as, among several materials are confounded and that have some disposition to unite together, one perceives that one of these substances always unites constantly with a certain other [substance] preferably to all others.

Our ability to acknowledge and recognise our own identity - our 'self' - is a characteristic doubtless unique to humans. Where does this feeling come from? How does the combination of neurophysiological processes coupled with our interaction with the outside world construct this coherent identity? We know that our social interactions contribute via the eyes, ears etc. However, our self is not only influenced by our senses. It is also influenced by the actions we perform and those we see others (...) perform. Our brain anticipates the effects of our own actions and simulates the actions of others. In this way, we become able to understand ourselves and to understand the actions and emotions of others. -/- This book is the first to describe the new field of 'Motor Cognition' - one to which the author's contribution has been seminal. Though motor actions have long been studied by neuroscientists and physiologists, it is only recently that scientists have considered the role of actions in building the self. How consciousness of action is part of self-consciousness, how one's own actions determine the sense of being an agent, how actions performed by others impact on ourselves for understanding others, differentiating ourselves from them and learning from them: these questions are raised and discussed throughout the book, drawing on experimental, clinical, and theoretical bases. -/- The advent of new neuroscience techniques, like neuroimaging and direct electrical brain stimulation, together with a renewal of behavioral methods in cognitive psychology, provide new insights into this area. Mental imagery of action, self-recognition, consciousness of actions, imitation can be objectively studied using these new tools. The results of these investigations shed light on clinical disorders in neurology, psychiatry and in neuro-development. -/- This is a major new work that will lay down the foundations for the field of motor cognition. (shrink)

continent. 2.3 (2012): 224–228 Introduction Jamie Allen Thierry Geoffroy’s conceptual, event- and environment-based art practice has generated over two-decades of definitional activity around what he terms “format art.” The works re-galvanize the energies of a syndicatable, open and atmospheric arrangement, of varying specifics dependent on context, participants and environment. With formats like the Emergency Room, Biennalist, and the Critical Run, Geoffroy endeavors to imbricate art and artist in the most exigent and current of social, political and mediatised spectacles. (...) The result seems to plant us at a triangulation of the configurations proposed by Alan Kaprow, Andrea Fraser and Alan Abel. Geoffroy plays up a guileless innocence (at times sporting the “Naive Blue Helmet”) as he interviews spectactors at the 2012 dOCUMENTA13 exhibitions in Kassel, Germany. What he evokes is a declamation of the appropriative, unenthusiastic, cool inclinations of the mainstream art festival, the profligate biennial (triennial, quadrennial, etc.) circuit and national and global ideological cultural-engines. In propositional artifacts, definitional articles and direct transmissions from Geoffroy’s Emergency Room field office at dOCUMENTA13, the masking of an emergency is here questioned: Can an art show like dOCUMENTA be dangerous? —JA Is dOCUMENTA designed to make people cry about something and not make them see something else? Is the contemporary a distraction from the present? Can art in delay have any impact with today? Do we learn anything by seeing art shows reflecting on history? Could 860,000 visitors have been intoxicated by an apathic gaze than keep them away from reacting? Why is dOCUMENTA proud of having recieve no critic? Why is proximity less important? Why was dOCUMENTA in Kabul? Can weapons designed to kill protesters sold to a repressing regime be contradictory to the support of the Arab Spring? Is the contemporary like a flea market to avoid to debating the important topics of today? Can art be in advance of the broken arm, and avoid accident? Is the goal of dOCUMENTA to create a revolution or to entertain? Is dOCUMENTA betterly done than Disney Land? Is it better to watch Fox News for two years or to go to dOCUMENTA for two days? If a curator, curating a contemporary art show about war, forgets to debate about the weapons factories next door, should it be considered as a professional mistake? Is it OK to employ philosophers to promote vodka? Is navigation a threat? Can an art show like dOCUMENTA be dangerous? Thierry Geoffroy / Colonel author of the month Global Art and the Museum @ZKM: " THE NEXT DOCUMENTA SHOULD BE CURATED BY A TANK " Link to Emergency Room Dictionary < /a> "COOLNESS" from the EMERGENCY ROOM DICTIONARY by COLONEL MUSIC Biennalist at dOCUMENTA 13 "TIRED" from the EMERGENCY ROOM DICTIONARY by COLONEL MUSIC Link to " APATHY " (from the Emergency Room Dictionary ) AWARENESS MUSCLE [fr. muscle de la conscience ] In the same sense memory can be trained, an awareness muscle can be developed by an effort. To develop the awareness muscle, the artist has to reduce his gesticulations. When an artist is busy the artist is not very aware the artist is occupied. A daily training is necessary But how to train? Scanning the news in a critical way could be one exercise. Daily debating politics with others could be another. Looking at other point of views usually produces significant improvements. Fighting prejudice is an excellent exercise. Many other forms of training could also produce beneficial effects for the awareness muscle. Continuous and daily training is important. For instance rewinding and slow motioning what has been absorbed getting away the sugar from the propaganda machines talking to everyone excercise comparatif critical run. If not daily trained the awareness muscle can degrade into atrophy To develop the awareness muscle requires will-power Thierry Geoffroy / Colonel. (shrink)

Richard Boyd’s Homeostatic Property Cluster Theory is becoming the received view of natural kinds in the philosophy of science. However, a problem with HPC Theory is that it neglects many kinds highlighted by scientific classifications while at the same time endorsing kinds rejected by science. In other words, there is a mismatch between HPC kinds and the kinds of science. An adequate account of natural kinds should accurately track the classifications of successful science. We offer an alternative account of natural (...) kinds that better recognizes the diversity of epistemic aims scientists have for constructing classifications. That account introduces the idea of a classificatory program and provides criteria for judging whether a classificatory program identifies natural kinds. (shrink)

L'idéal universaliste, qui a traversé les siècles jusqu'à aujourd'hui en surplombant les traditions intellectuelles tant chinoise qu'européenne, a façonné un certain nombre de nos représentations et imposé l'idée d'une antinomie entre ce qui relève de l'universel et ce qui renvoie à l'existence du particulier. Outre ce que, à bien y regarder, cette incompatibilité supposée peut avoir de paradoxal, divers épisodes chinois ou européens montrent que, au cours de sa très longue histoire, l'universalisme a aussi entretenu des relations équivoques avec des (...) créations historiques instituant des communautés particulières, telle la nation. Et ce sont ses rapports, tantôt connivents, tantôt antagoniques avec un ensemble de constructions mentales ou historiques particularisantes que l'auteure envisage en première partie. A partir du XVIIe siècle, les deux universalismes évoluent dans une certaine interaction, au gré des rencontres de leurs divers représentants ou de moments de proximité intellectuelle : c'est cette histoire de leurs relations, longue de plus de quatre siècles, que retrace la seconde partie. Le dialogue né de cette interaction, marqué par des méprises et incompréhensions, aura été quelque peu tortueux, mais néanmoins fructueux, dans la mesure où il aura favorisé une prise de conscience par chacun des deux universalismes... d'eux-mêmes. (shrink)