(1997). Competing definitions of cultural boundaries in the ideology of language: The Corsican case. The European Legacy: Vol. 2, Fourth International Conference of the International Society for the Study of European Ideas, pp. 424-431.

This commentary addresses the complexities of representation in sociolinguistic transcripts, considering the meaning potentials of different representational choices at the level of both ideology and identity. It considers the kinds of authenticity and evidence that are indexed by simplified versus more detailed transcripts, suggesting that a simplified transcript may give more direct access to elements of the original speaker's voice. Second, it discusses the role of transcripts as scholarly texts, and questions their use as sociolinguistic records suitable for reinterpretation by (...) scholars who do not have access to the original recordings. Third, it emphasizes that the use of non-standard orthographies is an unreliable source of data on sociolinguistic variation, because few authors use non-standard forms in consistent and principled ways. Fourth, it proposes that translations may take different forms depending on whether they are efforts to be `faithful' to `authentic' speech in the target versus the source language. Finally, it reflects on the act of transcription as part of professional practice and identity among linguists. (shrink)

The volume Conceptual Figures of Fragmentation and Reconfiguration is a collection of revised versions of the papers presented at a research seminar which took place at the School of Social Sciences and Humanities, Universidade NOVA de Lisboa, between January and June 2019. The seminar is one of the core activities of the project “Fragmentation and Reconfiguration: Experiencing the City between Art and Philosophy”, based at IFILNOVA – Nova Institute of Philosophy in Lisbon. This volume strives to reassess the relationship between (...) fragmentation and reconfiguration, the contemporary relevance of which can be appreciated by focusing on the experience of the city, in particular the aesthetic experience of the city. Following the structure of the original seminar presentations, and drawing on key philosophical authors such as Goethe, Benjamin, Wittgenstein, Foucault, Deleuze, Joyce, Proust, and Perec, each of the nine contributors focuses on a specific conceptual figure: Catastrophe (Gianfranco Ferraro); Ruins (Maria Filomena Molder); Chaosmopolitanism (Bartholomew Ryan); Morphogenesis (Maurizio Gribaudi); Atlas (Nélio Conceição); Archive (João Duarte); Collection (Maria João Gamito); Panoramic Presentation (Alexandra Dias Fortes); and Aesthetic Experience (Nuno Fonseca). (shrink)

The volume Conceptual Figures of Fragmentation and Reconfiguration is a collection of revised versions of the papers presented at a research seminar which took place at the School of Social Sciences and Humanities, Universidade NOVA de Lisboa, between January and June 2019. The seminar is one of the core activities of the project “Fragmentation and Reconfiguration: Experiencing the City between Art and Philosophy”, based at IFILNOVA – Nova Institute of Philosophy in Lisbon. This volume strives to reassess the relationship between (...) fragmentation and reconfiguration, the contemporary relevance of which can be appreciated by focusing on the experience of the city, in particular the aesthetic experience of the city. Following the structure of the original seminar presentations, and drawing on key philosophical authors such as Goethe, Benjamin, Wittgenstein, Foucault, Deleuze, Joyce, Proust, and Perec, each of the nine contributors focuses on a specific conceptual figure: Catastrophe (Gianfranco Ferraro); Ruins (Maria Filomena Molder); Chaosmopolitanism (Bartholomew Ryan); Morphogenesis (Maurizio Gribaudi); Atlas (Nélio Conceição); Archive (João Duarte); Collection (Maria João Gamito); Panoramic Presentation (Alexandra Dias Fortes); and Aesthetic Experience (Nuno Fonseca). (shrink)

This collection includes twenty original philosophical essays in honour of Wolfgang Spohn. The contributions mirror the scope of Wolfgang Spohn’s work. They address topics from epistemology (e.g., the theory of ranking functions, belief revision, and the nature of knowledge and belief), philosophy of science (e.g., causation, induction, and laws of nature), the philosophy of language (e.g., the theory of meaning and the semantics of counterfactuals), and the philosophy of mind (e.g., intentionality and free will), as well as problems of ontology, (...) logic, the theory of practical rationality, and meta-philosophy. ― Contributors: Ansgar Beckermann, Wolfgang Benkewitz, Bernd Buldt, Ralf Busse, Christoph Fehige, Wolfgang Freitag, Gordian Haas, Volker Halbach, Franz Huber, Andreas Kemmerling, Manfred Kupffer, Hannes Leitgeb, Godehard Link, Arthur Merin, Thomas Müller, Julian Nida-Rümelin, Martine Nida-Rümelin, Hans Rott, Holger Sturm, Thomas Ede Zimmermann, Alexandra Zinke. (shrink)

In this paper, we put forward an interdisciplinary framework describing different levels of self-representations, namely non-conceptual, conceptual and propositional self-representations. We argue that these different levels of self-representation are differently affected by cultural upbringing: while propositional self-representations rely on “theoretical” concepts and are thus strongly influenced by cultural upbringing, non-conceptual self-representations are uniform across cultures and thus universal. This differentiation offers a theoretical specification of the distinction between an independent and interdependent self-construal put forward in cross-cultural psychology. Hence, this does (...) not only allow for a deeper understanding of different self-conceptions, but also for a formulation of new hypotheses regarding the cultural influence on self-representations. As one example, we will highlight the role of the proposed levels of self-representation for emotional experience and formulate some major implications of our interdisciplinary framework for future empirical research. (shrink)

O presente texto parte de um diálogo com um artigo publicado recentemente na revista HOPOS (Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science), de autoria dos pesquisadores Fons Dewulf e Massimiliano Simons, intitulado “Positivism in Action: The case of Louis Rougier” (2020). No artigo, os pesquisadores abordam a trajetória pouco frequentada de Louis Rougier, filósofo francês cuja fortuna crítica associou-se à sua participação na rede de intelectuais liberais do pós-guerra e a sua função central na organização (...) do Colóquio Walter Lippmann, ainda em 1938. Os autores abordam a trajetória de Rougier de maneira disciplinarmente inusual: procuram interpretar suas teorias filosóficas à luz de seus comprometimentos políticos, defendendo uma imbricação entre ambas as facetas do pensamento de Rougier. Quero sugerir que uma abordagem disposta a compreender as relações dinâmicas entre uma trajetória intelectual e seu entorno social se beneficia de uma abordagem como essa, às quais pode ser acrescida uma dimensão propriamente institucional das trajetórias intelectuais. Para observá-la, proponho acionar o debate sobre virtudes epistêmicas tal como tem sido pensado por autores como Herman Paul, Lorraine Daston e J. Dongen, com o objetivo de investigar se o debate sobre as non-textual things da atividade intelectual podem ser um caminho para transitar de forma profícua entre texto e contexto. Palavras-chave: Virtudes epistêmicas. História da Filosofia. Louis Rougier. Liberalismo. (shrink)

This article explores the role of the Deaf child as peer educator. In schools where sign languages were banned, Deaf children became the educators of their Deaf peers in a number of contexts worldwide. This paper analyses how this peer education of sign language worked in context by drawing on two examples from boarding schools for the deaf in Nicaragua and Thailand. The argument is advanced that these practices constituted a child-led oppositional pedagogy. A connection is drawn to Freire’s (1972) (...) theory of critical pedagogy. Deaf children’s actions as peer educators are framed as an act of resistance towards the oppression of their language and culture. A contrast is drawn between oralist pedagogy that is historically associated with punitive practices and didactic methods and the experiential and dialogic interaction that characterised peer learning of sign languages. The argument is made that the peer teaching and learning processes enabled the self-actualisation of the Deaf children whereas the oralist methods were based on a deficit model that focused on modifying deaf children according to the norms of hearing society. The implications of this for current policy and practice are inferred to be about access to sign languages and the importance of Deaf communities in deaf children’s education. The argument is made that space needs to be created for deaf children to engage in peer learning. (shrink)

Defending first-person introspective access to own mental states, we argue against Carruthers' claim of mindreading being prior to meta-cognition and for a fundamental difference between how we understand our own and others' mental states. We conclude that a model based on one mechanism but involving two different kinds of access for self and other is sufficient and more consistent with the evidence.

It may be unethical to deny children with cystic fibrosis access to ethically approved clinical trials from which they might benefitDespite advances in nutritional management, aggressive antibiotic usage, and physiotherapy, cystic fibrosis remains a life limiting illness with high morbidity that imposes considerable burdens on children and families.1 Although survival to 40 years is predicted for children born in 1990s, the median age of death in 2003 was 24.2 years .The pathophysiological features of CF are produced by a defective gene (...) on chromosome 7, resulting in the defective production of a protein that regulates cellular ion transport. Defective ion transport is thought to lead to increased mucus viscosity , with poor airway clearance, recurrent bacterial infection, lung damage, and death.Gene therapy , the insertion of a normally functioning gene into deficient host cells using a suitable vector, is a potential treatment or cure for diseases produced by single gene defects—for example, CF. Gene therapy does, however, have potential or actual risks, leading many to suggest that evidence of efficacy in adults should be demonstrated before trials are conducted in children. Many serious diseases in adults such as CF have their onset in childhood. If early treatment provides greater hopes of benefit, children may be more appropriate targets for GT in CF than adults. It may be unethical to deny them access to properly constructed, ethically approved clinical trials from which they might benefit.Since research in children should be scientifically valid, in the child’s best interests, and the subject of valid consent, this article will consider these parameters in relation to trials of GT in children with CF. Because of the importance of consumer participation in the design of research we present the results of a questionnaire about GT trials delivered …. (shrink)

Is there anything wrong with publishing philosophical work which one does not believe (publishing without belief, henceforth referred to as ‘PWB’)? I argue that there is not: the practice isn’t intrinsically wrong, nor is there a compelling consequentialist argument against it. Therefore, the philosophical community should neither proscribe nor sanction it. The paper proceeds as follows. First, I’ll clarify and motivate the problem, using both hypothetical examples and a recent real-world case. Next, I’ll look at arguments that there is something (...) wrong with PWB, and show that none is sound. Then, I’ll give some reasons for thinking a norm against PWB is detrimental to the profession. Do I believe these arguments? If I’m right, it shouldn’t matter. (shrink)

Previous research suggested a role of gaze in preference formation, not merely as an expression of preference, but also as a causal influence. According to the gaze cascade hypothesis, the longer subjects look at an item, the more likely they are to develop a preference for it. However, to date the connection between viewing and liking has been investigated predominately with self-paced viewing conditions in which the subjects were required to select certain items from simultaneously presented stimuli on the basis (...) of perceived visual attractiveness. Such conditions might promote a default, but non-mandatory connection between viewing and liking. To explore whether the connection is separable, we examined the evaluative processing of single naturalistic food images in a 2 x 2 design, conducted completely within subjects, in which we varied both the type of exposure (self-paced versus time-controlled) and the type of evaluation (non-exclusive versus exclusive). In the self-paced exclusive evaluation, longer viewing was associated with a higher likelihood of a positive evaluation. However, in the self-paced non-exclusive evaluation, the trend reversed such that longer viewing durations were associated with lesser ratings. Furthermore, in the time-controlled tasks, both with non-exclusive and exclusive evaluation, there was no significant relationship between the viewing duration and the evaluation. The overall pattern of results was consistent for viewing times measured in terms of exposure duration (i.e., the duration of stimulus presentation on the screen) and in terms of actual gaze duration (i.e., the amount of time the subject effectively gazed at the stimulus on the screen). The data indicated that viewing does not intrinsically lead to a higher evaluation when evaluating single food images; instead, the relationship between viewing duration and evaluation depends on the type of task. We suggest that self-determination of exposure duration may be a prerequisite for any influence from viewing time on evaluative processing, regardless of whether the influence is facilitative. Moreover, the purported facilitative link between viewing and liking appears to be limited to exclusive evaluation, when only a restricted number of items can be included in a chosen set. (shrink)

The article argues that there are different ways of justifying suspension of judgement. We suspend judgement not only privatively, that is, because we lack evidence, but also positively, that is, because there is evidence that provides reasons for suspending judgement: suspension is more than the rational fallback position in cases of insufficient evidence. The article applies the distinction to recent discussions about the role of suspension for inquiry, Turri's puzzle about withholding, and formal representations of suspension.

The paper develops an inductive extension of AGM-style belief base revision theory with the aim of formally implementing Freitag’s :254–267, 2015, Dialectica 70:185–200, 2016) solution to Goodman’s paradox. It shows that the paradox dissolves once belief revision takes place on inductively closed belief bases, rather than on belief sets.

The book discusses the central notion of logic: the concept of logical consequence. It shows that the classical definition of consequence as truth preservation in all models must be restricted to all admissible models. The challenge for the philosophy of logic is therefore to supplement the definition with a criterion for admissible models. -/- The problem of logical constants, so prominent in the current debate, constitutes but a special case of this much more general demarcation problem. The book explores the (...) various dimensions of the problem of admissible models and argues that standard responses are unwarranted. As a result, it develops a new vision of logic, suggesting in particular that logic is deeply imbued with metaphysics. (shrink)

In this paper, I provide an account of the wrong that is done to women when everyday people fail to believe allegations of sexual assault made by women. I argue that an everyday person wrongs both the accuser and women causally distant from the accuser when they fail to believe the accuser’s allegation. First, I argue that there are responses that we, as everyday members of society, owe to victims of sexual assault. A condition enabling everyday people to respond in (...) the way owed to victims is that they have an outright belief that the accuser was assaulted. Actively suspending judgement about whether a crime occurred is in tension with the ability to respond to the victim in a way that supports and validates them. When an everyday person fails to have an outright belief in the truth of an allegation, they wrong the accuser because they risk failing to satisfy the conditions enabling them to fulfill their obligation to her. Second, I argue that everyday people wrong women who are causally distant from the accuser because in our social context, women are often treated in particular ways – especially in the sexual domain – because they are women. As a result, when women hear that an everyday person fails to believe a particular allegation, they easily project themselves into the accuser’s position and reasonably worry that if they were to be assaulted, they too would be met with doubt and disbelief by the people in their community. (shrink)

This paper provides the first examples of rings of algebraic numbers containing the rings of algebraic integers of the infinite algebraic extensions of where Hilbert's Tenth Problem is undecidable.

The aim of this paper is to propose a systematic classification of emotions which can also characterize their nature. The first challenge we address is the submission of clear criteria for a theory of emotions that determine which mental phenomena are emotions and which are not. We suggest that emotions as a subclass of mental states are determined by their functional roles. The second and main challenge is the presentation of a classification and theory of emotions that can account for (...) all existing varieties. We argue that we must classify emotions according to four developmental stages: 1. pre-emotions as unfocussed expressive emotion states, 2. basic emotions, 3. primary cognitive emotions, and 4. secondary cognitive emotions. We suggest four types of basic emotions (fear, anger, joy and sadness) which are systematically differentiated into a diversity of more complex emotions during emotional development. The classification distinguishes between basic and non-basic emotions and our multi-factorial account considers cognitive, experiential, physiological and behavioral parameters as relevant for constituting an emotion. However, each emotion type is constituted by a typical pattern according to which some features may be more significant than others. Emotions differ strongly where these patterns of features are concerned, while their essential functional roles are the same. We argue that emotions form a unified ontological category that is coherent and can be well defined by their characteristic functional roles. Our account of emotions is supported by data from developmental psychology, neurobiology, evolutionary biology and sociology. (shrink)

For females without a functioning womb, the only way to become a biological parent is via assisted gestation—either surrogacy or uterus transplantation (UTx). This paper examines the comparative impact of these options on two types of putative ‘womb‐givers’: people who provide gestational surrogacy and those who donate their uterus for live donation. The surrogate ‘leases’ their womb for the gestational period, while the UTx donor donates their womb permanently via hysterectomy. Both enterprises involve a significant degree of self‐sacrifice and medical (...) risk in order to enable another person(s) to become a parent by either providing gestational labour or enabling the other person to undertake gestation themselves. In this paper, we explore the burdens and the benefits from the perspective of the womb‐giver in order to inform ethical debate about assisted gestation. This is a perspective that is often neglected in the bioethical discourse. With both surrogacy and UTx, when success follows the womb‐giver’s sacrifice, the key benefit is delivered to the intending parent(s), but as this article examines, the womb‐giver may also enjoy some unique (relational) benefits as a result of their sacrifice. Ultimately, the choice of how a womb‐giver lends assistance in gestation will impact on their bodily autonomy; some will prefer to carry a pregnancy and others to donate their uterus. We argue that the perspective of the womb‐giver is crucial and thus far has not been afforded sufficient consideration in ethical discussion. (shrink)

Recent empirical studies have established that disgust plays a role in moral judgment. The normative significance of this discovery remains an object of philosophical contention, however; ‘disgust skeptics’ such as Martha Nussbaum have argued that disgust is a distorting influence on moral judgment and has no legitimate role to play in assessments of moral wrongness. I argue, pace Nussbaum, that disgust’s role in the moral domain parallels its role in the physical domain. Just as physical disgust tracks physical contamination and (...) pollution, so moral disgust tracks social contamination. I begin by examining the arguments for skepticism about disgust and show that these arguments threaten to overgeneralize and lead to a widespread skepticism about the justifiability of our moral judgments. I then look at the positive arguments for according disgust a role in moral judgment, and suggest that disgust tracks invisible social contagions in much the same way as it tracks invisible physical contagions, thereby serving as a defense against the threat of socio-moral contamination. (shrink)

The book discusses the central notion of logic, the concept of logical consequence, and its model-theoretic definition as truth-preservation in all models. Whether the model-theoretic definition captures the modal and epistemological features of our pre-theoretic notion depends on what models model. The book argues that, given a non-formal understanding of models, the universal quantifier used in the definition of consequence must be restricted: if literally all models had to be considered, no argument would ever be logically valid. A central challenge (...) of the philosophy of logic is therefore to supplement the model-theoretic definition by a criterion for admissible models. The problem of logical constants, so prominent in the current literature on logical consequence, constitutes but a special case of this much more general demarcation problem. The book explores the various dimensions of the problem of admissible interpretations and proposes that the standard views are unjustified or even unjustifiable. As a consequence, it develops a new vision of logic and suggests in particular that our notion of logical consequence is deeply imbued with metaphysics. (shrink)

This paper offers a defense of ‘publishing without belief’ (PWB) – the view that authors are not required to believe what they publish. I address objections to the view ranging from outright denial and advocacy of a belief norm for publication, to a modified version that allows for some cases of PWB but not others. I reject these modifications. In doing so, I offer both an alternative story about the motivations for PWB and a diagnosis of the disagreement over its (...) permissibility. The original defense focused on consequentialist reasons for allowing PWB, offering mostly defensive arguments against potential criticisms. But I argue that once we shift our focus to the reasons why authors might be prone to PWB, we see a difference in two types of motivation: whereas I imagine PWB as arising from underconfident agents, critics point to cagey or nefarious authorial practices, or authors’ failure to clarify their own degrees of belief. Underlying the debate over norms of philosophical publishing, we find two different conceptions of philosophy itself. (shrink)

Empowerment, an already central concept in public health, has gained additional relevance through the expansion of mobile health (mHealth). Especially direct-to-consumer self-testing app companies mobilise the term to advertise their products, which allow users to self-test for various medical conditions independent of healthcare professionals. This article first demonstrates the absence of empowerment conceptualisations in the context of self-testing apps by engaging with empowerment literature. It then contrasts the service these apps provide with two widely cited empowerment definitions by the WHO, (...) which describe the term as a process that, broadly, leads to knowledge and control of health decisions. We conclude that self-testing apps can only partly empower their users, as they, we argue, do not provide the type of knowledge and control the WHO definitions describe. More importantly, we observe that this shortcoming stems from the fact that in the literature on mHealth and in self-testing marketing, empowerment is understood as a goal rather than a process. This characterises a shift in the meaning of empowerment in the context of self-testing and mHealth, one that reveals a lack of awareness for relational and contextual factors that contribute to empowerment. We argue that returning to a process-understanding of empowerment helps to identify these apps’ deficits, and we conclude the article by briefly suggesting several strategies to increase self-testing apps’ empowerment function. (shrink)

According to the classical invariance criterion, a term is logical if and only if its extension is isomorphism-invariant. However, a number of authors have devised examples that challenge the sufficiency of this condition: accepting these examples as logical constants would introduce objectionable contingent elements into logic. Recently, Gil Sagi has responded that these objections are based on a fallacious inference from the modal status of a sentence to the modal status of the proposition expressed by that sentence. The present paper (...) demonstrates that Sagi’s response, though successful, is futile. There is another objection, based on the same type of example, that is not susceptible to Sagi’s criticism: accepting the examples as logical terms would have the fatal consequence that any contingent metalanguage sentence is entailed by the truth of some logically true object-language sentence. I conclude with a sketch of an alternative to the classical invariance criterion. (shrink)

The philosophical debate over disgust and its role in moral discourse has focused on disgust’s epistemic status: can disgust justify judgments of moral wrongness? Or is it misplaced in the moral domain—irrelevant at best, positively distorting at worst? Correspondingly, empirical research into disgust has focused on its role as a cause or amplifier of moral judgment, seeking to establish how and when disgust either causes us to morally condemn actions, or strengthens our pre-existing tendencies to condemn certain actions. Both of (...) these approaches to disgust are based on a set of assumptions that I call, in what follows, the evidential model of disgust. This paper proposes an alternative model, which I call the response model. Instead of looking at disgust as a cause and justification of judgments of moral wrongness, I will argue that disgust is better understood as a response to wrongness. More precisely, I argue that disgust is a response to norm violations, and that it is a fitting response insofar as norm violations are potentially contagious and therefore pose a threat to the stability and maintenance of norms. (shrink)

It is uncontroversial that something goes wrong with the blaming practices of hypocrites. However, it is more difficult to pinpoint exactly what is objectionable about their blaming practices. I contend that, just as epistemologists have recently done with blame, we can constructively treat hypocrisy as admitting of an epistemic species. This paper has two objectives: first, to identify the epistemic fault in epistemically hypocritical blame, and second, to explain why epistemically hypocritical blamers lose their standing to epistemically blame. I tackle (...) the first problem by appealing to an epistemic norm of consistency. I address the second by arguing that the epistemically hypocritical blamer commits to an opting-out of the set of shared epistemic standards that importantly underlies our standing to epistemically blame. I argue further that being epistemically hypocritical undermines a blamer’s standing even to judge epistemically blameworthy. (shrink)

Let F be a finitely generated field and let j : F → N be a weak presentation of F, i.e. an isomorphism from F onto a field whose universe is a subset of N and such that all the field operations are extendible to total recursive functions. Then if R1 and R2 are recursive subrings of F, for all weak presentations j of F, j is Turing reducible to j if and only if there exists a finite collection of (...) non-constant rational functions {Gi} over F such that for every x ε R1 for some i, Gi ε R2. We investigate under what circumstances such a collection of rational functions exists and conclude that in the case when R1 R2 are both holomorphy rings and F is of characteristic 0 or is an algebraic function field over a perfect field of constants, the existence of the above-described collection of rational functions is equivalent to the requirement that the non-archimedean primes which do not appear as poles of elements of R2 do not have factors of relative degree 1 in some simple extension of K. (shrink)

We investigate the issues of Diophantine definability over the non-finitely generated version of non-degenerate modules contained in the infinite algebraic extensions of the rational numbers. In particular, we show the following. Let k be a number field and let K inf be a normal algebraic, possibly infinite, extension of k such that k has a normal extension L linearly disjoint from K inf over k. Assume L is totally real and K inf is totally complex. Let M inf be a (...) non-degenerate O k -module, possibly non-finitely generated and contained in O Kinf . Then M inf contains a submodule M¯ inf such that M inf /M¯ inf is torsion and O k has a Diophantine definition over M¯ inf. (shrink)

One of the main theorems of the paper states the following. Let R-K-M be finite extensions of a rational one variable function field R over a finite field of constants. Let S be a finite set of valuations of K. Then the ring of elements of K having no poles outside S has a Diophantine definition over its integral closure in M.

Let K be a countable field. Then a weak presentation of K is an isomorphism of K onto a field whose elements are natural numbers, such that all the field operations are extendible to total recursive functions. Given a pair of two non-finitely generated countable fields contained in some overfield, we investigate under what circumstances the overfield has a weak presentation under which the given fields have images of arbitrary Turing degrees or, in other words, we investigate Turing separability of (...) various pairs of non-finitely generated fields. (shrink)