In 2018 On My Own Publications was published as volume 82 of Heidegger’s collected works. Its content includes roughly 400 pages in which Heidegger himself reflects on Being and Time. A central theme in these pages, and the one to which this article is devoted, is Heidegger’s criticism of the way that the question of Being (Seinsfrage) is conceived there as the question of the understanding of Being (Seinsverständnisfrage). More specifically, the author aims to demonstrate the importance of these criticisms (...) – which include matters of both style and content – for understanding Being and Time itself and the general development of Heidegger’s thought. Though many critics already seized on what they took to be the inadequacy of starting with the understanding of Being, we can now see in detail how Heidegger himself conceived its inadequacy and how he specifically sought to address it in his later thought. (shrink)

I argue that one of the central concepts of the second part of Being and Time – resoluteness (Entschlossenheit) – represents a new way of doing philosophy and should therefore be understood as a philosophical method. Resoluteness is a specific way of comporting oneself towards things and is methodologically necessary to uncover these things as what they are. I draw on insights from the recently published On My Own Publications, in which Heidegger points to resoluteness as a crucial step towards (...) his later methodological stance. In doing so, I illuminate important aspects of Being and Time and contribute to ongoing debates about Heidegger’s philosophical method. I demonstrate that it is Heidegger’s critique of transcendental philosophy and of the inquiry into possibility conditions that is meant to be overcome by developing the idea of resoluteness as a philosophical method. (shrink)

Heidegger’s criticism of the transcendental philosophy of Kant and Husserl is primarily leveled at its underlying understanding of the transcendental subject. Heidegger argues that in order to give an adequate account of the intelligibility of the world, the transcendental subject must be factical. By discussing central aspects of Heidegger’s criticism, this paper shows that his notion of a factical transcendental subject is a necessary step out of aporias of transcendental philosophy. I argue that Heidegger’s emphasis on the facticity of the (...) human being must be understood not as an abandonment of the transcendental standpoint, but as a radicalization of its central ideas. Heidegger is thereby transforming transcendental philosophy into a transcendental ontology. I demonstrate that this allows Heidegger to reconceptualize the constitution of the world as social and historical without having to jettison the role of the transcendental subject. (shrink)

AI’s new ability to create artworks is seen as a major challenge to today’s understanding of art. There is a strong tension between people who predict that AI will replace artists and critics who claim that AI art will never be art. Furthermore, recent studies have documented a negative bias towards AI art. This paper provides a philosophical explanation for this negative bias, based on our shared understanding of the ontological differences between objects. We argue that our perception of art (...) depends on our understanding of the context of its creation: human-made art is experienced as an interplay between the artist and nature. In AI-generated art, this interplay is either absent or minimised. We conclude that the displacement of the “human factor” in art will not lead to an evolution of art, but to the end of art. (shrink)

The function of the formal indication is the mediation between concept and thing. This mediation is the concretization of the concept. I show that the formality of formal indications is the specific generality (Allgemeinheitscharakter) of philosophical concepts. This formality is their principality (Prinzipialität). Accordingly, a formally indicating concept would be a concept which gives the direction for the concretion as principally as possible. A principality which secures the repeatability and comprehensibility of philosophical insights. Looking at Heidegger’s lecture of the winter (...) semester 1921/22, it is shown that 1) Heidegger understands the principality as the Being of beings, 2) that philosophical language is about the mediation between the principality of concepts and the concreteness of things; and 3) that this principality is identified with the formality of the formal indication. This early lecture is decisive for Heidegger’s whole philosophy because it lays bare the necessary relation between ontology and philosophy of language. (shrink)

This book gives a systematic account of Martin Heidegger’s methodology. Contrary to the widespread conception that Heidegger’s (late) philosophy is lacking any kind of verifiable, provable insights, the author shows that a rejection of the scientific method does not imply a rejection of methodological, rigorous thinking. In fact, it can be shown that the method of Heidegger’s philosophy is more rigorous, more strict and more radical than the scientific method. But because the scientific method is conceived of as the non-plus-ultra (...) even within philosophy, in order to outline Heidegger’s methodology we have to give an account of his criticism of the scientific method. By showing the limitations of modern science, we can unfold the possibilities of philosophy. -/- The book consists of four parts: The first part is about Heidegger’s concept of subjectivity and his criticism of the Cartesian subject-object-dichotomy. The main argument of the first part is that the ‘subject’, inasmuch as it is understood ontologically, is essential for philosophy. We outline this – following Steven G. Crowell – as the philosophical significance of the first-person-perspective (Heidegger’s early philosophy between 1919 and 1927). -/- The second part is about what we call an ontological theory of constitution: A radicalization of the Kantian transcendental philosophy which does not orbit around transcendental subjectivity, but rather around concrete subjectivity (Dasein vs. the transcendental ego). We take a closer look on what Heidegger has written between 1927 and 1930. -/- The third part is about Heidegger’s late philosophy. The main topic of this third part is Heidegger’s “seynsgeschichtliche Besinnung auf das machenschaftliche Wesen der neuzeitlichen Wissenschaft“ – which is in essence a closer look on what modern science is, on its relation to technology, and on its very own historicality. We discuss the most famous published texts and lectures between 1930 and 1976, but focus on Heidegger’s Nietzsche lectures and his second magnus opus: the Contributions to Philosophy. -/- This criticism of modern science is the stepping stone for the fourth and final part, in which we take all the pieces and put them together by giving a systematic account of Heidegger’s methodology. In this final part we take a step back from Heidegger’s texts (and from his language) and confront Heidegger with the most famous criticism by Carl Friedrich Gethmann and Jürgen Habermas. -/- This allows us to give an account of the central concepts of Heidegger’s methodology: truth, knowledge and validity. We also talk about the status of philosophical concepts and in general: philosophical language, about Heidegger’s theory of philosophical conceptualization, which is known as the method of formal indication and about the possibility of an ontological foundation of modern science and epistemology. -/- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- GERMAN------------------------------------------------- -/- Der methodische Status insbesondere der Spätphilosophie Heideggers ist ein Problem: Mit den Mitteln der traditionellen Methodenlehre können die Aussagen dieser Philosophie nicht ausgewiesen und auch nicht begründet werden. Mit der neuzeitlichen Wissenschaft und ihrer Methode hat sie nichts mehr gemein. Aber muss dies heißen, dass diese Philosophie ihre Erkenntnisse überhaupt nicht mehr ausweisen kann? -/- Ich habe in dieser Arbeit versucht zu zeigen, dass auch die späte Philosophie Heideggers Methode hat. Auch wenn Heidegger in fast an den Mythos erinnernder Art und Weise über die Verbergung und das Sich-entziehen des Seyns spricht, handelt es sich um methodisch überprüfbare, ausweisbare Aussagen. Nur wird in Heideggers Methodologie Ernst gemacht mit dem Gedanken, dass die Philosophie eine eigene Methode braucht und sich nicht wie blind an der neuzeitlichen Wissenschaft orientieren dürfe. Eine Methode, die sie zum Teil für sich erst entwickeln muss. -/- Die Grundbegriffe dieser ‚neuen Methodologie‘ zu klären, war das Hauptanliegen dieser Arbeit. Es ging um den Wahrheits-, Erkenntnis- und Geltungsanspruch dieser Philosophie. -/- Dafür habe ich einen Blick geworfen insb. auf die frühe Philosophie Heideggers (1. Teil: 1919-1927), auf die wichtigen Texte und Vorträge im Kontext von Sein und Zeit (2. Teil: 1927-1930) und auf die Texte zu Nietzsche, zu den Beiträgen und zu Wissenschaft und Technik (3. Teil: 1930-1976). In einem vierten Teil habe ich die Grundzüge dieser Methodologie skizziert. Ich habe mich dabei an der Kritik von Jürgen Habermas orientiert, der am bekanntesten und am stärksten die These vertreten hat, dass die Spätphilosophie Heideggers irrational sei. Auch hier kam ich zu dem Schluss, dass Heideggers Kritik an dem okzidentalen Rationalismus nicht in die Irrationalität führen muss, wie Habermas nahelegt, sondern dass dadurch ein kritisches Verständnis von Rationalität möglich wird. (shrink)

Diese Textbesprechung soll aus drei Abschnitten bestehen. Im ersten Abschnitt werde ich allgemein darauf eingehen, wie Kraatz die ersten beiden Charakterzüge der formalen Anzeige erschließt und definiert. Im zweiten Abschnitt werde ich kritisch beleuchten, wie laut Kraatz die Angst mit dem dritten Charakterzug der formalen Anzeige zusammenhängt und warum sie dem Verstehensprozess formal-anzeigender Begriffe zugrundeliegen soll. Im letzten Abschnitt werde ich noch kurz auf Teil V des Buches eingehen, worin es um die Einbettung der formalen Analyse in Heideggers (...) allgemeine Bedeutungs- und Begriffstheorie geht. (shrink)

I. THE TASK OF DOGMATICS As a theological discipline dogmatics is the scientific self- examination of the Christian Church with respect to the content of ...

In this article I offer an opinionated overview of the central elements of Kant’s philosophical methodology during the critical period. I begin with a brief characterization of how Kant conceives of the aims of human inquiry – focusing on the idea that inquiry ideally aims at not just cognition (Erkenntnis), but also the more demanding cognitive achievements that Kant labels insight (Einsehen) and comprehension (Begreifen). Then I explore the implications of this picture for philosophy — emphasizing Kant’s distinction between critical (...) and doctrinal phases of philosophical inquiry, with the first of these playing both a negative and a positive role with respect to the second. Then, I will argue that this positive role is possible, according to Kant, only insofar as philosophy follows what I call a “capacities-first” methodology – that is, one that treats basic cognitive capacities (such as reason) and their self-conscious activities as fundamental (in both a cognitive sense and in an explanatory sense) for the sort of philosophy human beings are capable of. It is this methodology, I will argue, that allows Kant to introduce the first principles that philosophy in its doctrinal phase requires in a manner that is neither arbitrary nor (at least obviously) incompatible with Kant’s own critical restrictions on cognition. I conclude by discussing some of the implications of this methodological picture – including the methodological significance of self-consciousness and regressive or “transcendental” arguments, Kant’s distinction between analytic and synthetic methods in philosophy, and Kant’s conception of reason as autonomous. (shrink)

Muss Philosophie immer eine bierernste Angelegenheit sein? Einer, der das vehement bestritten hat, war der griechische Denker Diogenes, jener berühmte Tonnen-Philosoph, der bis heute als eine der schillerndsten und originellsten Gestalten des Altertums gilt. Seine Gesellschaftskritik lebte er mit einer nachgerade schockierenden Konsequenz vor. Seine Forderung: nicht mehr und nicht weniger als der konsequente Ausstieg aus der Zivilisation. Karl-Wilhelm Weeber stellt in diesem locker geschriebenen Band den scharfzüngigen, schlagfertigen und respektlosen Philosophen und seine Ideenwelt vor.

Zeigt, wie der äTonnenphilosophä in einer unsicheren Zeit eine auch heute noch gültige Überlebensphilosophie für das Individuum entwickelte und praktizierte.

Prolog -- Eros : auf dem Weg zur Erkenntnis -- Liebe als einheitsstiftende Macht -- Das tragische Chorspiel der Hellenen und ihre Imaginationen von Liebe -- Narkissos : die unstillbare Selbstliebe und das Spiegelmotiv -- Gnosis als erlösende Erkenntnis der Liebe -- Liebe in der kontemplativen Metaphysik Plotins -- Das Eine und das Viele -- Kontemplation und Liebe : das Mysterium Sacrum -- Sensorisches und Imaginatives : Weisen der Vergeistigung der Liebe -- Mystische Liebe : Gott-Leiden und Gott-Lieben in der (...) "Rheinischen Mystik" (Eckhart, Tauler, Seuse, Ruusbroec) -- Figurationen der Liebe auf den Brettern, die "die Welt bedeuten" (Wissen, Macht, Liebe, Tod) -- Amor fati : die Liebe zum Schicksal -- Die Liebe auf der Bühne des Theatrum Mundi -- Reflexionen und Mythopoetik der Liebe : philosophisch, theologisch, poetisch -- Liebe in der Theologie des Alten Bundes -- Liebe in der Theologie des Neuen Bundes. (shrink)

Originally published on the eve of the 1848 European revolutions, The Communist Manifesto is a condensed and incisive account of the worldview Marx and Engels developed during their hectic intellectual and political collaboration. Formulating the principles of dialectical materialism, they believed that labor creates wealth, hence capitalism is exploitive and antithetical to freedom. -/- This new edition includes an extensive introduction by Gareth Stedman Jones, Britain's leading expert on Marx and Marxism, providing a complete course for students of The Communist (...) Manifesto, and demonstrating not only the historical importance of the text, but also its place in the world today. (shrink)

Physical and chemical processes may act upon the mind; and when we are writing a difficult letter, our mind acts upon our body and, through a chain of physical...

Cet ouvrage a pour but de déterminer qu'il existe bien un rapport entre la mode vestimentaire et la pensée d'un moment. La philosophie néoplatonicienne de la Renaissance, toute occupée à définir le beau, représente un terrain idéal pour étudier le lien entre pensée philosophique et matérialité vestimentaire.

_Conjectures and Refutations_ is one of Karl Popper's most wide-ranging and popular works, notable not only for its acute insight into the way scientific knowledge grows, but also for applying those insights to politics and to history. It provides one of the clearest and most accessible statements of the fundamental idea that guided his work: not only our knowledge, but our aims and our standards, grow through an unending process of trial and error.

_Conjectures and Refutations_ is one of Karl Popper's most wide-ranging and popular works, notable not only for its acute insight into the way scientific knowledge grows, but also for applying those insights to politics and to history. It provides one of the clearest and most accessible statements of the fundamental idea that guided his work: not only our knowledge, but our aims and our standards, grow through an unending process of trial and error.

The way in which knowledge progresses, and especially our scientific knowledge, is by unjustified anticipations, by guesses, by tentative solutions to our problems, by conjectures. These conjectures are controlled by criticism: that is, by attempted refutations, which include severely critical tests. They may survive these tests; but they can never be positively justified: they can neither be established as certainly true nor even as 'probable'. Criticism of our conjectures is of decisive importance: by bringing out our mistakes it makes us (...) understand the difficulties of the problems which we try to solve. This is how we become better acquainted with our problem, and able to propose more mature solutions: the very refutation of a theory - that is, of a tentative solution to our problem - is always a step forward that takes us nearer the truth. And this is how we can learn from our mistakes. As we learn from our mistakes our knowledge grows, even though we may never know - that is, know for certain. Since our knowledge can grow, there can be no reason here for despair of reason. And since we can never know for certain, the can be no authority here for any claim to authority, for conceit over our knowledge, or for smugness. The essays and lectures of which this book is composed apply this thesis to many topics, ranging from problems of the philosophy and history of the physical and social sciences to historical and political problems. (shrink)

Marx and Engels's Communist Manifesto has become one of the world’s most influential political tracts since its original 1848 publication. Part of the Rethinking the Western Tradition series, this edition of the Manifesto features an extensive introduction by Jeffrey C. Isaac, and essays by Vladimir Tismaneanu, Steven Lukes, Saskia Sassen, and Stephen Eric Bronner, each well known for their writing on questions central to the Manifesto and the history of Marxism. These essays address the Manifesto's historical background, its impact on (...) the development of twentieth-century Communism, its strengths and weaknesses as a form of ethical critique, and its relevance in the post-1989, post-Cold War world. This edition also includes much ancillary material, including the many Prefaces published in the lifetimes of Marx and Engels, and Engels's "Principles of Communism.". (shrink)

Described by the philosopher A.J. Ayer as a work of 'great originality and power', this book revolutionized contemporary thinking on science and knowledge. Ideas such as the now legendary doctrine of 'falsificationism' electrified the scientific community, influencing even working scientists, as well as post-war philosophy. This astonishing work ranks alongside _The Open Society and Its Enemies_ as one of Popper's most enduring books and contains insights and arguments that demand to be read to this day.

If one formulates Helmholtz's ideas about perception in terms of modern-day theories one arrives at a model of perceptual inference and learning that can explain a remarkable range of neurobiological facts. Using constructs from statistical physics it can be shown that the problems of inferring what cause our sensory inputs and learning causal regularities in the sensorium can be resolved using exactly the same principles. Furthermore, inference and learning can proceed in a biologically plausible fashion. The ensuing scheme rests on (...) Empirical Bayes and hierarchical models of how sensory information is generated. The use of hierarchical models enables the brain to construct prior expectations in a dynamic and context-sensitive fashion. This scheme provides a principled way to understand many aspects of the brain's organisation and responses. In this paper, we suggest that these perceptual processes are just one emergent property of systems that conform to a free-energy principle. The free-energy considered here represents a bound on the surprise inherent in any exchange with the environment, under expectations encoded by its state or configuration. A system can minimise free-energy by changing its configuration to change the way it samples the environment, or to change its expectations. These changes correspond to action and perception, respectively, and lead to an adaptive exchange with the environment that is characteristic of biological systems. This treatment implies that the system's state and structure encode an implicit and probabilistic model of the environment. We will look at models entailed by the brain and how minimisation of free-energy can explain its dynamics and structure. (shrink)

If one formulates Helmholtz’s ideas about perception in terms of modern-day theories one arrives at a model of perceptual inference and learning that can explain a remarkable range of neurobiological facts. Using constructs from statistical physics it can be shown that the problems of inferring what cause our sensory inputs and learning causal regularities in the sensorium can be resolved using exactly the same principles. Furthermore, inference and learning can proceed in a biologically plausible fashion. The ensuing scheme rests on (...) Empirical Bayes and hierarchical models of how sensory information is generated. The use of hierarchical models enables the brain to construct prior expectations in a dynamic and context-sensitive fashion. This scheme provides a principled way to understand many aspects of the brain’s organisation and responses. In this paper, we suggest that these perceptual processes are just one emergent property of systems that conform to a free-energy principle. The free-energy considered here represents a bound on the surprise inherent in any exchange with the environment, under expectations encoded by its state or configuration. A system can minimise free-energy by changing its configuration to change the way it samples the environment, or to change its expectations. These changes correspond to action and perception, respectively, and lead to an adaptive exchange with the environment that is characteristic of biological systems. This treatment implies that the system’s state and structure encode an implicit and probabilistic model of the environment. We will look at models entailed by the brain and how minimisation of free-energy can explain its dynamics and structure. (shrink)

This book is a complete translation of Marx's critical commentary on paragraphs 261-313 of Hegel's major work in political theory.