This paper outlines a theory and computer implementation of causal meanings and reasoning. The meanings depend on possibilities, and there are four weak causal relations: A causes B, A prevents B, A allows B, and A allows not‐B, and two stronger relations of cause and prevention. Thus, A causes B corresponds to three possibilities: A and B, not‐A and B, and not‐A and not‐B, with the temporal constraint that B does not precede A; and the stronger relation conveys only the (...) first and last of these possibilities. Individuals represent these relations in mental models of what is true in the various possibilities. The theory predicts a number of phenomena, and, contrary to many accounts, it implies that the meaning of causation is not probabilistic, differs from the meaning of enabling conditions, and does not depend on causal powers or mechanisms. The theory also implies that causal deductions do not depend on schemas or rules. (shrink)

Given a basic conditional of the form, If A then C, individuals usually list three cases as possible: A and C, not‐A and not‐C, not‐A and C. This result corroborates the theory of mental models. By contrast, individuals often judge that the conditional is true only in the case of A and C, and that cases of not‐A are irrelevant to its truth or falsity. This result corroborates other theories of conditionals. To resolve the discrepancy, we devised two new tasks: (...) the “collective” truth task, in which participants judged whether sets of assertions about a specific individual, such as: If A then C, not‐A, C, could all be true at the same time; and one in which participants judged the truth of conditional predictions about specific future events. The results consistently matched the three possibilities, thereby corroborating the model theory. They also showed a massive violation of the probability calculus in estimates of the probabilities of the four cases in the partition of conditionals (A and C, A and not‐C, not‐A and C, and not‐A and not‐C), which summed to over 200%. (shrink)

Inferences about spatial, temporal, and other relations are ubiquitous. This article presents a novel model-based theory of such reasoning. The theory depends on 5 principles. The structure of mental models is iconic as far as possible. The logical consequences of relations emerge from models constructed from the meanings of the relations and from knowledge. Individuals tend to construct only a single, typical model. They spontaneously develop their own strategies for relational reasoning. Regardless of strategy, the difficulty of an inference depends (...) on the process of integration of the information from separate premises, the number of entities that have to be integrated to form a model, and the depth of the relation. The article describes computer implementations of the theory and presents experimental results corroborating its main principle. (shrink)

Analiso e critico neste artigo a solução apresentada por Robert Brandom para o problema por ele formulado acerca do critério de distintividade das percepções presentes nas meras enteléquias. Brandom considera ser problemática a vinculação entre distinção e consciência feita por vários intérpretes de Leibniz com o propósito de dar conta dos diferentes graus de distinção das percepções, pois tal vinculação somente pode ser válida para almas e espíritos, não se aplicando às enteléquias, as quais não são dotadas de nenhum tipo (...) de senciência ou de reflexão. Em função disso, Brandom propõe uma interpretação que não apresentaria essa difculdade. Segundo essa proposta, uma percepção será tão mais distinta quanto maior for seu domínio expressivo, isto é, seu grau de distinção será determinado pela quantidade de inferências que se deixam realizar a partir dela. Torna-se possível, assim, de acordo com ele, a comparação de diferentes percepções e a ordenação delas em uma série que vai das menos distintas às mais distintas tomando como base seus respectivos domínios expressivos. Mostro neste artigo que tanto esse – a meu ver, aparente – problema levantado por Brandom quanto a solução por ele proposta decorrem de uma compreensão parcial e equivocada da teoria leibniziana das mônadas, de tal forma que estaríamos aqui diante de uma solução equivocada para um problema inexistente. (shrink)

The main objective of this research is to identify the current panorama of scientific production associated with governance in university institutions. A bibliometric analysis was developed in Scopus using R Core Team 2022-Bibliometrix and Vosviewer software. The results highlight the countries with the highest productivity in the topic of study, with the most representative authors favoring the understanding of governance. The main thematic clusters stand out. It recognizes the role of university governance and its migration to direct spaces and the (...) transition from a face-to-face model. (shrink)

This paper reports three studies of temporal reasoning. A problem of the following sort, where the letters denote common everyday events: A happens before B. C happens before B. D happens while B. E happens while C. What is the relation between D and EEfficacylls for at least two alternative models to be constructed in order to give the right answer for the right reason. However, the first premise is irrelevant to this answer, and so if reasoners were to ignore (...) it, then they would need to construct only one model. Experiment 1 showed that one-model problems were answered faster and more accurately than multiple-model problems. When the question preceded the premises in the statement of the multiple-model problems there was a slight tendency for the latencies of response to speed up in the predicted way. Experiment 2 modified the procedure, in part by using practice problems with many irrelevant premises, so that reasoners might grasp the advantage of ignoring them. Its results showed that when the premises preceded the question, the multiple-model problems were significantly harder than one-model problems. But when the question was presented first, the difference was significantly reduced in line with the theory's prediction. Experiment 3 used only problems with valid conclusions, and so the construction of multiple models was never necessary. However, there was still a significant difference between one-model problems and multiple-model problems. (shrink)

John Laird was a Scottish philosopher who specialised in metaphysics and moral philosophy. In this early work, which was originally published in 1920, Laird set out to analyse some of the more perplexing problems of philosophical realism. The text includes a brief survey of philosophical realism at the beginning and critical notes throughout. This book will be of value to anyone with an interest in the works of Laird and the history of philosophy.

O principal objetivo deste artigo é mostrar, contra as interpretações da filosofia de Leibniz que tendem a reduzir sua noção de substância a uma concepção derivada unicamente de considerações de natureza lógica, que o conceito leibniziano de substância possui raízes lógicas, físicas e teológicas que são mutuamente independentes.

The mental model theory predicts that reasoners normally represent what is true, but not what is false. One consequence is that reasoners should make "illusory" inferences, which are compelling but invalid. Three experiments confirmed the existence of such illusions based on disjunctions of disjunctions. They also established a successful antidote to them: Reasoners are much less likely to succumb to illusions if the inferences concern disjunctions of physical objects (alternative newspaper advertisements) rather disjunctions of the truth values of assertions. The (...) results shed light both on the cause of the illusions and on the current controversy among different theories of reasoning. (shrink)

John Laird was a Scottish philosopher who specialised in metaphysics and moral philosophy. In this book, which was first published in 1929, Laird provides a detailed analysis of the philosophical nature of value. The text begins with a discussion of the main definitions of value, before going through a more detailed examination of the various applications of value in turn. This book will appeal to anyone with an interest in value and the history of philosophy.

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be (...) preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. To ensure a quality reading experience, this work has been proofread and republished using a format that seamlessly blends the original graphical elements with text in an easy-to-read typeface. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)