Drawing on a landscape analysis of existing data-sharing initiatives, in-depth interviews with expert stakeholders, and public deliberations with community advisory panels across the U.S., we describe features of the evolving medical information commons. We identify participant-centricity and trustworthiness as the most important features of an MIC and discuss the implications for those seeking to create a sustainable, useful, and widely available collection of linked resources for research and other purposes.

According to the received view of practical decisions, ‘deciding to X’ is synonymous with ‘forming an intention to X’. In this article, I argue against the received view on the basis of both experimental evidence and theoretical considerations. The evidence concerns a case involving a side-effect action in which people tend to agree that an agent decided to X yet disagree that the agent had a corresponding intention to X. Additionally, I explain why one should expect decisions and intentions to (...) diverge in the case of certain side-effect actions. (shrink)

RÉSUMÉ: Cet article concerne le rejet controversé de la notion de signification métaphorique par Donald Davidson. Il a deux objectifs: d’abord, de montrer que l’argument de Davidson contre la signification métaphorique est vicié par une ambiguïté qui, une fois révélée, lui ôte toute portée; et deuxièmement, d’expliquer d’où vient cette ambiguïté. L’explication proposée rapporte l’erreur de Davidson au sujet de la signification métaphorique à sa négligence de la notion de signification du locuteur et, plus généralement, à une orientation théorique envers (...) le langage, qui ne s’intéresse, principalement, qu’aux aspects de la communication qui peuvent recevoir un traitement sémantique formel. (shrink)

RÉSUMÉCet article concerne le rejet controversé de la notion de signification métaphorique par Donald Davidson. Il a deux objectifs: d'abord, de montrer que l'argument de Davidson contre la signification mètaphorique est vicié par une ambiguîté qui, une fois révélée, lui ôte toute portée; et deuxièmement, d'expliquer d'où vient cette ambiguîté. L'explication proposée rapporte l'erreur de Davidson au sujet de la signification métaphorique à sa négligence de la notion de signification du locuteur et, plus généralement, à une orientation théorique envers le (...) langage, qui ne s'intéresse, principalement, qu'aux aspects de la communication qui peuvent recevoir un traitement sémantique formel. (shrink)

The concept of intention is widely thought to involve a confidence condition of some sort, a condition that specifies certain beliefs that one must either have or lack if one intends to do something. Two of the most common formulations of this condition are the following: (i) A intends to X only if A believes that they (probably) will X; and (ii) A intends to X only if A does not believe that they (probably) will not X. A third, much (...) weaker formulation can also be considered: (iii) A intends to X only if A does not believe that it is highly unlikely that they will X. In this article I report on a series of experiments that indicate that ordinary speakers of English do not apply the concepts of intention and belief in accordance with any of the foregoing hypotheses. These experimental results provide empirical evidence against the idea that there is a confidence condition in the concept of intention. (shrink)

In this paper I show that two conflicting theories of literal meaning can be found in Donald Davidson's philosophy of language. In his earlier writings, Davidson espoused the common sense idea that words have literal meanings independently of particular contexts of use. In his later writings, however, Davidson insisted that the literal meaning of a word is a function of the speaker's intentions in using it, from which it follows that words do not have literal meanings independently of particular contexts. (...) In this paper I examine and evaluate the transition from Davidson's earlier to his later view of literal meaning. I show that the change in view came about through Davidson's efforts to extend a theory of literal meaning to malapropisms but that Davidson's understanding of malapropisms is seriously flawed. I conclude that Davidson had no good reason for espousing his later intentions-based theory of literal meaning. (shrink)

What is the relation between acting intentionally and acting for a reason? While this question has generated a considerable amount of debate in the philosophy of action, on one point there has been a virtual consensus: actions performed for a reason are necessarily intentional. Recently, this consensus has been challenged by Joshua Knobe and Sean Kelly, who argue against it on the basis of empirical evidence concerning the ways in which ordinary speakers of the English language describe and explain certain (...) side-effect actions. Knobe and Kelly's argument is of interest not only because it challenges a widely accepted philosophical thesis on the basis of experimental evidence, but also because it indirectly raises an important and largely neglected question, the question of whether or in what sense an agent can perform a side-effect action for a reason. In this article, I address this question and provide a positive answer to it. Specifically, I argue that agents act for a reason whenever they perform side-effect actions as trade-offs. Thus, I claim that there are three distinct types of rational action: actions performed as ends in themselves, actions performed as means to further ends, and side-effect actions performed as trade-offs. Given this multiplicity of types of rational action, the question of whether or not actions performed for a reason are necessarily intentional is in need of refinement. The more specific question that lies at the heart of this article is whether or not side-effect actions performed as trade-offs are necessarily intentional. I conclude that, contrary to what Knobe and Kelly suggest, the question remains open. (shrink)

One of the most successful and influential contributions to examining the intersection between society and its effect on public action is Jurgen Habermas's landmark The structural transformation of the public space (1962). But as subsequent scholars pointed out, the Habermasian definition of “public sphere” needed to be expanded beyond its original historical context. This article contributes to that ongoing expansion by arguing that a social movement in the United States, social justice feminism, created an alternative public space in the United (...) States by 1907 to the mainstream discourse championed by patriarchal political and social leaders about the effects of the Second Industrial Revolution. The alternative social justice feminist public space differed from Habermas’s original conception in three important ways: it involved a more ideological viewpoint; it encompassed a myriad of cross-class and cross-gender coalitions; and the movement embraced direct political action, promoting and passing women’s labor legislation as an “entering wedge” for the eventual inclusion of all workers under state protection. (shrink)

In _Cynical Suspicions and Platonist Pretentions_, John McGuire conducts a critical analysis of contemporary political theory with a view to facilitating a less reductive understanding of political disaffection.

“Intention Cognitivism” (IC) refers to a family of theories concerning the relation between the concepts of intention and belief. While there are important differences between the various theories that belong to this family, each is committed to the idea that an agent intends to X only if they believe that they (probably) will X. In this article I argue against this core commitment of IC on the basis of recent experimental evidence concerning the ways in which ordinary speakers of English (...) use the concepts of intention and belief. After summarizing some of this evidence, I consider a possible defense of IC, one based on the distinction between full versus partial intentions and beliefs. I report on a new study that was conducted specifically to evaluate this defense of IC, the results of which indicate that this distinction fails to protect IC against the compelling empirical evidence against it. Additionally, I consider, and argue against, two recent arguments for IC. (shrink)

That the central thesis of Donald Davidson’s classic article on metaphor “What Metaphor Means” (WMM) is ambiguous between a weak and a strong interpretation is the primary claim that I sought to establish in my article “Sentence Meaning, Speaker Meaning, and Davidson’s Denial of Metaphorical Meaning.” In addition to this, I argued that the weak claim is trivially true and the strong claim is obviously false. Therefore, I concluded that when the central thesis of WMM is disambiguated, it is insignificant. (...) Finally, I explained the ambiguity in that thesis in terms of Davidson’s neglect in WMM for the concept of speaker meaning and this, in turn, in terms of a certain theoretical orientation to language that Davidson held at the time of writing WMM. In his commentary on my article, “Speaker Meaning and Davidson on Metaphor: A Reply to McGuire,” Robert J. Stainton raises objections to several of the foregoing claims. In this article, I review and defend each of these claims against Stainton’s objections. (shrink)

This article defends the idea that causal relations between reasons and actions are wholly irrelevant to the explanatory efficacy of reason-explanations. The analysis of reason-explanations provided in this article shows that the so-called “problem of explanatory force” is solved, not by putative causal relations between the reasons for which agents act and their actions, but rather by the intentions that agents necessarily have when they act for a reason. Additionally, the article provides a critique of the principal source of support (...) for the thesis that reason-explanations are causal explanations, namely, Davidson's argument in “Actions, Reasons, and Causes.” It is shown that Davidson's argument for this thesis rests crucially on two mistakes: his definition of intentional action and his ontological prejudice against intentions. (shrink)

This thesis is a critical examination of three influential and interrelated aspects of Donald Davidson's philosophy of action. The first issue that is considered is Davidson's account of the logical form of action-sentences. After assessing the argument in support of Davidson's account, and suggesting certain amendments to it, I show how this modified version of Davidson's account can be extended to provide for more complicated types of action-sentences. The second issue that is considered is Davidson's views concerning the individuation of (...) actions; in particular, I examine Davidson's theory concerning the ontological implications of those sentences that assert that an agent did something by means of doing something else. The conclusion that I seek to establish in this case is essentially negative--that Davidson's theory is false. The third issue that is considered is Davidson's theory concerning the logical implications of those sentences that assert that an agent did something as a means of doing something else, which is also commonly known as the causal theory of action. Here I argue against Davidson's view by providing an alternative, and more satisfying response to the theoretical challenge that generates the causal theory. Subsequent to this I attempt to explain what motivates Davidson's commitment to the causal theory. (shrink)

In 1978 Donald Davidson published an article entitled “What Metaphors Mean” (WMM), in which he championed the idea that “metaphors mean what the words, in their most literal interpretation, mean, and nothing more.” In 1986 Davidson published a somewhat related article entitled “ A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs” (NDE), in which he defended a unique and controversial theory of literal meaning according to which the literal meaning of an expression is determined by the speaker’s first intention in uttering it. Both (...) of these articles (WMM and NDE) have attracted a considerable amount of attention in the literature. However, the connection between these two articles has received much less attention, and those interested in Davidson’s philosophy of language have had to conjecture about whether the ideas expressed in WMM are consistent with those of NDE. The principal goal of this article is to clarify the connection between the main ideas expressed in those two articles. (shrink)

This article discusses some of the philosophical themes in the Hollywood film "The Truman Show." I argue that the film presents and interesting twist on the traditional philosophical problem of skepticism. Whereas Descartes' skeptical worries were based on the deceptive nature of sense perception, the source of illusion and skepticism in the Truman Show is the modern media system and "reality TV." This engaging film compels viewers to reflect upon the extent to which we are all ensnared in a world (...) of lies and deceit. (shrink)

This article is concerned with the question of whether, and to what extent, the concept of metaphor properly applies to pictures (e.g., paintings or photographs). The question is approached dialectically through an examination of the views of Sonia Sedivy, who advances the following 4 claims: (a) that pictures possess propositional content, (b) that there are metaphoric pictures, (c) that metaphoric pictures do not possess metaphoric content, and (d) that there can be no theory of pictorial metaphor. Although the first of (...) Sedivy's claims is rejected in this article, the existence of pictorial metaphors is not denied. Thus, the fact that pictures do not possess propositional content does not preclude the possibility of pictorial metaphors. What are required, though, are changes to the conception of pictorial metaphor that Sedivy advances. (shrink)

© 2015, Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg.Genetic studies have identified single nucleotide polymorphisms associated with the risk of prostate cancer. It remains unclear whether such genetic variants are associated with disease aggressiveness. The NCI-SPORE Genetics Working Group retrospectively collected clinicopathologic information and genotype data for 36 SNPs which at the time had been validated to be associated with PC risk from 25,674 cases with PC. Cases were grouped according to race, Gleason score and aggressiveness. Statistical analyses were used to compare the frequency (...) of the SNPs between different disease cohorts. After adjusting for multiple testing, only PC-risk SNP rs2735839 was significantly and inversely associated with aggressive and high-grade disease in European men. Similar associations with aggressive and high-grade disease were documented in African-American subjects. The G allele of rs2735839 was associated with disease aggressiveness even at low PSA levels in both European and African-American men. Our results provide further support that a PC-risk SNP rs2735839 near the KLK3 gene on chromosome 19q13 may be associated with aggressive and high-grade PC. Future prospectively designed, case-case GWAS are needed to identify additional SNPs associated with PC aggressiveness. (shrink)

John Henry Newman had a fascination with the angels, as evidenced by three of his published poems, a passage devoted to angels in his Apologia pro Vita Sua, as well as sermons on the angels. Surprisingly, Newman’s interest in angels has not attracted much scholarly attention. After examining some of Newman’s writings that touch upon angels, this essay suggests that Newman’s Romantic and Evangelical background prepared him for his reading of the Fathers in 1828, which in turn influenced his (...) consideration of the significance of angels in the spiritual life. (shrink)

Recently, John Doe, an undocumented immigrant who was detained by United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement, was admitted to a hospital off-site from a detention facility. Custodial officers accompanied Mr. Doe into the exam room and refused to leave as physicians examined him. In this analysis, we examine the ethical dilemmas this case brings to light concerning the treatment of patients in immigration detention and their rights to privacy. We analyze what US law and immigration detention standards allow regarding (...) immigration enforcement or custodial officers’ presence in medical exams and documentation of detainee health information. We describe the ethical implications of the presence of officers in medical exam rooms, including its effects on the quality of the patient-provider relationship, patient privacy and confidentiality, and provider's ability to provide ethical care. We conclude that the presence of immigration enforcement or custodial officers during medical examination of detainees is a breach of the right to privacy of detainees who are not an obvious threat to the public. We urge ICE and the US Department of Homeland Security to clarify standards for and tighten enforcement around when officers are legally allowed to be stationed in medical exam rooms and document detainees’ information. (shrink)

These are the abstracts of papers for the conference, History Unveiled Science Unfettered: A Conference in Celebration of James E. McGuire University of Pittsburgh, January 19, 2002.

Though the revised edition of A Theory of Justice, published in 1999, is the definitive statement of Rawls's view, so much of the extensive literature on Rawls's theory refers to the first edition.

Reissued here in its corrected second edition of 1864, this essay by John Stuart Mill argues for a utilitarian theory of morality. Originally printed as a series of three articles in Fraser's Magazine in 1861, the work sought to refine the 'greatest happiness' principle that had been championed by Jeremy Bentham, defending it from common criticisms, and offering a justification of its validity. Following Bentham, Mill holds that actions can be judged as right or wrong depending on whether they (...) promote happiness or 'the reverse of happiness'. Although attracted by Bentham's consequentialist framework based on empirical evidence rather than intuition, Mill separates happiness into 'higher' and 'lower' pleasures, arguing for a weighted system of measurement when making and judging decisions. Dissected and debated since its first appearance, the essay is Mill's key discussion on the topic and remains a fundamental text in the study of ethics. (shrink)