Important theories about the attribution of mental contents and/or linguistic meanings propose a theoretical characterization about mental and linguistic understanding. As one of the consequences of this, they cannot account for instances of genuine conceptual diversity: the exotic expressions and their conceptual repertoires must be re-describe by means of a theory, articulated in our conceptual repertoire, that eliminates that diversity. Wittgenstein, on the other side, has argued that understanding of the linguistic and non linguistic behavior of other creatures is based (...) on primitive ways of reciprocal understanding, settled on practical agreements. Consequently, he has characterized our relationship towards radically estrange behaviors as a form of “instinctive uncertainty”. On these bases, I will attempt to show how it is possible to dissolve skeptical problems and elude contrived solutions about other “forms of life”, recognizing that genuine conceptual diversity is possible. (shrink)

Identifico la naturaleza y el estatus epistémico de un sub-tipo de intuiciones lingüísticas que llamo intuiciones icónicas (IIs). Por medio de estas intuiciones, los hablantes son capaces de detectar correspondencias icónicas consistentes entre formas lingüísticas y significados. En primer lugar, identifico los principales rasgos del fenómeno lingüístico detectado por las IIs: el sonoro-simbolismo. Las correspondencias en las cuales consiste son icónicas porque están conformadas por diferentes tipos de semejanzas percibidas o asociaciones basadas en similitudes entre estímulos -uno de los cuales (...) es lingüístico. Luego analizo las principales caracterizaciones filosóficas y psicológicas alternativas de las intuiciones, y su rol evidencial, centrándome en las intuiciones lingüísticas. Sobre estas bases, concluyo que las intuiciones tendrían que ser concebidas como un constructo heterogéneo. En segundo lugar, argumento que las IIs no son ni creencias, disposiciones a la creencia, juicios o pareceres intelectuales con contenidos proposicionales, sino más bien pareceres perceptuales. Ellas consisten en la capacidad o sensibilidad para detectar correspondencias o asociaciones icónicas. En otras palabras, los inputs sonoros “rastrean” directamente los significados transmitidos por ellos. Se caracterizan por su peculiar fenomenología presentacional y su componente evaluativo. Ahora bien, de acuerdo al tipo de contenido y de procesamiento cognitivo involucrado, se puede distinguir entre las más puramente perceptuales, basadas en procesos asociativos y aquella que involucran experiencia acumulada, procesos analíticos y manipulación conceptual. Después de revisar la literatura psicolingüística experimental basada en intuiciones acerca del sonoro-simbolismo, argumento que las IIs son intuiciones de primer nivel, y como tales, una fuente confiable de evidencia directa y prima facie acerca de los rasgos icónicos en el lenguaje. Finalmente, argumento que estas IIs ofrecen una “ventana” privilegiada para explorar las relaciones entre lenguaje y percepción (y afecto/emoción). Concluyo argumentando que esta clase de intuición es un input no prescindible para la reflexión filosófica y la investigación científica sobre el lenguaje. Así, aunque defiendo la relevancia de las intuiciones para entender el significado lingüístico, las IIs no son de la misma clase ni requieren los mismos métodos para estudiarlas que aquellas que interesaron más a los filósofos. (shrink)

The second part of Philosophical Investigations and other contemporary writings contain abundant material dedicated to the examination of visual perception, along the lines of similarities and differences manifested in the use of concepts such as “seeing as”, “seeing aspects”, “noticing the aspect”, “aspect blindness”, among other, related ones. However, the application of these concepts to phenomena such as face perception and word perception has not received proper attention in the literature. Our interest lies in identifying the features pertaining facial perception (...) and recognition of its content in order to understand how and to what extent they contribute to shed light on perceptual (and experiential) relationships we have with language, in particular with its written form. In other words, we will try to show in what ways the “phenomenology of facial perception” or “physiognomy” helps to understand the “experience of meaning” and the “phenomenology of reading”. My interpretative hypothesis is that, in Wittgenstein’s view, the features shared by face and word perception are more profound than a mere analogy, and that, in the case of words, these features can explain specific semantic (perhaps, semantic-pragmatic) phenomena that should be included in an appropriate reconstruction of the varieties of use in natural languages. (shrink)

This article aims to make a philosophical contribution to the understanding of the communicative dimensions and functions of faces and facial expressions. First, I will refer to the expressivist and socio-communicative theories of FEs, and to a proposal to unify them under a pragmatic approach based on the theory of speech acts. Subsequently, I will examine the characterization of faces and FEs as social and behavioral affordances, and I will identify their characteristics and communicative functions, especially in “conversational displays”, to (...) justify why they are functionally special. I will then insert facial signals into the framework of a pragmatic perspective on human communication, both verbal and non-verbal, which is broader than speech act theory: a Pragmatics-First Approach to Human Communication. I will argue that it provides an adequate understanding of the pragmatic-interactive foundations of human communication, where Facereading is a central component. Finally, I will refer to the relationship between Facereading and the Second-person Perspective of social cognition. (shrink)

Psychological understanding is a required capacity for moral competence in the sense that understanding the intentions, beliefs, and interests of others is a critical input for evaluating the responsibilities involved in their behaviors and understanding, in turn, how to interact with them to achieve our purposes. For its part, interaction with others is at the heart of both capacities, since both are essential and closely related components of human social life. My aim in this paper, in relation to both assumptions, (...) will be to highlight a structural similarity between ordinary psychological cognition and moral cognition, showing as certain differentiated types of explanations on one domain and the other allows to identify a theoretical framework consistent that, in turn, it can account for the relationships between the two. For this, I will refer first, synthetically, to the _Social Intuitionist Model_ (MIS) of J. Haidt (2001), as it exemplifies a non-classical and dual approach to moral cognition in which moral intuitions play a more basic role than reasons. In the field of psychological cognition, I will refer with more detail to _the interactive or second-person approach_, enriched by the dual approach to cognition, in particular by the proposals on implicit or “minimal” varieties of mental attribution. In this context, I will identify the so-called _expressive behaviors: _their nature and role in human behavior and interactions, and their significance as the evidential basis for psychological understanding. They constitute the primary objects of psychological intuitions. I hope to show that expressive signals are “readable” through the intuitive abilities that detect them and understand their psychological significance in efficient ways. Having exposed the theoretical affinities between the MIS and the interactive-dual approach, I will emphasize that, just as for the first, moral intuitions come first, and reasons later, also for the interactive-dual approach of psychological understanding, psychological intuitions come first, and reasons later. (shrink)

Psychological understanding is a required capacity for moral competence in the sense that understanding the intentions, beliefs, and interests of others is a critical input for evaluating the responsibilities involved in their behaviors and understanding, in turn, how to interact with them to achieve our purposes. For its part, interaction with others is at the heart of both capacities, since both are essential and closely related components of human social life. My aim in this paper, in relation to both assumptions, (...) will be to highlight a structural similarity between ordinary psychological cognition and moral cognition, showing as certain differentiated types of explanations on one domain and the other allows to identify a theoretical framework consistent that, in turn, it can account for the relationships between the two. For this, I will refer first, synthetically, to the _Social Intuitionist Model_ (MIS) of J. Haidt (2001), as it exemplifies a non-classical and dual approach to moral cognition in which moral intuitions play a more basic role than reasons. In the field of psychological cognition, I will refer with more detail to _the interactive or second-person approach_, enriched by the dual approach to cognition, in particular by the proposals on implicit or “minimal” varieties of mental attribution. In this context, I will identify the so-called _expressive behaviors: _their nature and role in human behavior and interactions, and their significance as the evidential basis for psychological understanding. They constitute the primary objects of psychological intuitions. I hope to show that expressive signals are “readable” through the intuitive abilities that detect them and understand their psychological significance in efficient ways. Having exposed the theoretical affinities between the MIS and the interactive-dual approach, I will emphasize that, just as for the first, moral intuitions come first, and reasons later, also for the interactive-dual approach of psychological understanding, psychological intuitions come first, and reasons later. (shrink)

En este artículo examinaremos un caso de aplicación de la hipótesis de la relatividad lingüística : la influencia del género gramatical de las lenguas sobre la cognición o el pensamiento de los hablantes. Dado que las lenguas difieren tanto en sus repertorios léxicos como sobre todo en sus gramáticas de género para referir a las personas, a otras entidades animadas e incluso a entidades inanimadas, nuestro propósito será, en primer lugar, revisar la evidencia experimental reciente que avalaría la HRL en (...) este dominio, al comprobar una variedad de impactos cognitivos y psicológicos, variables según las lenguas de los hablantes. En particular, identificaremos cuáles son los “efectos relativistas” en el caso de los rasgos morfosintácticos de las lenguas con carga de género, y en relación con la universalización del género masculino. Sobre la base de la evaluación realizada e incorporando los aportes de los estudios de “género y lenguaje” de los enfoques feministas, concluiremos señalando de qué diversas maneras es viable e importante promover usos inclusivos del lenguaje e incluso cambios más profundos hacia un lenguaje inclusivo, con especial referencia al español. (shrink)

Carolina Sartorio argues that only the actual causes of our behaviour matter to our freedom. The key, she claims, lies in a correct understanding of the role played by causation in a view of that kind. Causation has some important features that make it a responsibility-grounding relation, and this contributes to the success of the view. Also, when agents act freely, the actual causes are richer than they appear to be at first sight; in particular, they reflect the agents' (...) sensitivity to reasons, where this includes both the existence of actual reasons and the absence of other reasons. So acting freely requires more causes and quite complex causes, as opposed to fewer causes and simpler causes, and is compatible with those causes being deterministic. The book connects two different debates, the one on causation and the one on the problem of free will, in new and illuminating ways. (shrink)

In this paper, we argue that there are epistemic norms on evidence-gathering and consider consequences for how to understand epistemic normativity. Though the view that there are such norms seems intuitive, it has found surprisingly little defense. Rather, many philosophers have argued that norms on evidence-gathering can only be practical or moral. On a prominent evidentialist version of this position, epistemic norms only apply to responding to the evidence one already has. Here we challenge the orthodoxy. First, we argue that (...) there is no significant normative difference between responding to evidence you have and gathering more evidence. Second, we argue that our practices of epistemically criticizing agents for their poor evidence-gathering indicate the existence of epistemic norms on evidence-gathering. Finally, we show that our thesis has important implications for recent debates about the relationship between epistemic norms and inquiry. (shrink)

En este artículo se analiza un conjunto de obras sobre ríos y represas que pertenece a la serie titulada Represa /Represión (2012-) de la artista colombiana Carolina Caycedo. La pregunta de la que se ocupa esta investigación es ¿cómo las estrategias estéticas de estas obras identifican los problemas socio-ecológicos generados por las represas y contribuyen a articular imaginarios políticos de sostenibilidad? El argumento principal es que las obras de Caycedo sobre el río Yuma o Magdalena contribuyen con la construcción (...) de una memoria histórica ambiental, a partir de saberes populares, campesinos y cosmovisiones indígenas. Con este fin, este texto caracteriza el problema de las represas a partir de los conceptos de ‘extractivismo’, de Macarena Gómez-Barris, y ‘desterritorialización’, de Rob Nixon, para luego realizar un recorrido por las obras de la artista, de cuyo análisis se va construyendo una caracterización de la memoria histórica ambiental de un segmento del río Yuma. El marco conceptual del trabajo incluye las nociones de ‘seres-tierra’, de Marisol de la Cadena y ‘territorio’, de Arturo Escobar, así como ‘memoria de los ríos’, de Kristina Lyons. La metodología se basa en el análisis conceptual y técnico de las piezas de Caycedo en el marco interdisciplinar de las humanidades ambientales. El análisis concluye que las obras de Caycedo generan espacios de memoria histórica ambiental desde perspectivas trasnacionales y, en estos espacios de encuentro que constituyen las obras, se relacionan y rearticulan los extremos de falsos antagonismos como naturaleza/cultura, humano/no humano y ciencia/arte. (shrink)

The present work discusses the complex nature of the term ‘gender’ in legal discourse, in the wake of the recent pushbacks that the 2011 Istanbul Convention has received from anti-feminist movements and nations that have not signed/ratified the document or have withdrawn from it. Though its original aim was to protect women’s rights, the debate has eventually surfaced deeply-rooted problems linked to gender-related vocabulary. For this reason, the study will analyse the use of the terms ‘gender’ and ‘sex’ in the (...) 1995 UN Beijing Declaration, the 1998 Rome Statute, and the 2011 Istanbul Convention, from a synchronic and diachronic perspective. It aims to provide a critical comparison of the definitions, translations, and interpretations of the term ‘gender’, in an attempt to overcome some of the issues involved in the harmonisation of EU documentation, which could certainly help guarantee fundamental rights and convince more states to sign/ratify the Convention, or at least, not allow them to use issues not related to women’s rights to not accept the document. The interpretation of gender-related violence is still ‘in progress’, and the lack of harmonisation could eventually hinder fundamental human rights instead of helping the Istanbul Convention save lives. (shrink)

L’auteur, psychologue clinicienne, explore à partir d’une situation clinique le champ des violences intrafamiliales extrêmes impliquant ici un inceste à la fois paternel, maternel et fraternel. C’est au décours de la maternité que ce passé traumatique (et non dit) fut ravivé, nécessitant du sujet d’importants remaniements psychiques pour ne pas sombrer dans la dépression profonde. Le suivi clinique engagé montre les limites du processus thérapeutique, lorsque l’impensable et a fortiori l’irreprésentable provoquent une incapacité d’élaboration du trauma et son dépassement. Enfin, (...) l’auteur propose d’éclairer les enjeux déterminants de la dynamique transférentielle et contretransférentielle, pour le travail d’historicisation et d’inscription du trauma par le sujet, qui vont s’inaugurer par des modalités inédites de création subjective présageant d’un véritable processus de subjectivation. (shrink)

The wide presence of the right to work in national and international legal texts contrasts with a lack of agreement about the concrete content of this right. According to the hegemonic interpretation, it consists of two elements: extension of wage labour and significant improvement of working conditions. However, if we study the history of right to work claims, especially from the French Revolution to 1848, we can notice that the meaning of this right was rather wider in the past. Rescuing (...) the historical significance of the right to work may help to face the problem of the future of work. In particular, and unlike what might seem at first sight, the claim that everyone should have his or her right to work guaranteed can be a way of articulating and concretizing issues such as workplace democracy, the organization of domestic work or the transition to a sustainable society. (shrink)

Beliefs can be resistant to evidence. Nonetheless, the orthodox view in epistemology analyzes beliefs as evidence-responsive attitudes. I address this tension by deploying analytical tools on capacities and masking to show that the cognitive science of evidence-resistance supports rather than undermines the orthodox view. In doing so, I argue for the claim that belief requires the capacity for evidence-responsiveness. More precisely, if a subject believes that p, then they have the capacity to rationally respond to evidence bearing on p. Because (...) capacities for evidence-responsiveness are fallible and may be masked, beliefs can be held in the face of counter-evidence. Indeed, I will argue that our best science of belief supports the claim that evidence-resistant beliefs result from masks on evidence-responsiveness capacities. This account of belief not only allows for resistance to evidence, but provides us with a framework for describing and explaining actual cases of evidence-resistance. (shrink)

The orthodox view in epistemology is that belief is constitutively evidence-responsive. I offer a novel argument for a version of this view, one that appeals to capacities to rationally respond to evidence. I do so by developing the Sellarsian idea that the concept of belief functions to mark the space of reasons in a non-intellectualist and naturalistic direction. The resulting view does justice to the role of belief in social interactions, joint deliberation, and rational persuasion, while including evidence-resistant beliefs and (...) animal beliefs as genuine beliefs. It has a range of further benefits: it helps us account for epistemic normativity, paves the way for better psychological models of belief revision, distinguishes beliefs from imaginings and mere acceptances, and helps us avoid noxious simplistic takes on human irrationality. (shrink)

The present article is part of a preliminary study concerning the discursive manifestations of US President Trump’s sexist beliefs. While many studies have focused on Trump’s usage of hostile sexism, this work examines the linguistic strategies utilised by Trump to convey benevolent sexism, a form of discrimination based on the idea that women are weak and need to be protected, that they should respect traditional male-centric gender roles, and that they should be idolised by men. Drawing upon Fiske and Glick’s (...) Ambivalent Sexism Theory, the study will analyse a corpus of all the positive tweets addressing women tweeted by Trump since the beginning of his 2016 campaign. The study sheds a light on how President Trump’s usage of hostile and benevolent sexism are actually two sides of the same coin: they both confirm the idea of women as an inferior sex. (shrink)

El presente artículo es una elaboración teórica descriptiva que desarrolla una aproximación filosófica antropológica del símbolo-religioso. El objetivo de este artículo apunta a identificar que la simbología-religiosa es requerida por el ser humano de modo perenne, en relación a la búsqueda de significados suficientes para dotar de interpretación y valor a la realidad, con la finalidad de construir una cultura estable para el existir. En función de dicho propósito se establece que el símbolo adviene desde la dimensión imaginal (Chillón, 2010) (...) de la inteligencia, extendiéndose hacia sectores que los conceptos y la productividad racional no logran abordar. Al respecto, el manuscrito establece que, comprender la función de la simbología desde su procedencia original en la experiencia religiosa, significa contribuir a la comprensión del resurgir religioso manifestado en la posmodernidad, aún a las condiciones de cambio continuo y la ausencia de direcciones sólidamente definidas (Bauman, 1996). Se establece que las mediaciones simbólicas-religiosas, conservan intacta su tarea de transitar el vínculo entre el ser humano y el misterio trascendente (Chillón, 2010; Diez de Velasco, Méndez, & Maffesoli; 2007; Mardones, 1996), a objeto de orientar la vida humana integralmente. (shrink)

Epistemic agents interact with evidence in different ways. This can cause trouble for mutual understanding and for our ability to rationally engage with others. Indeed, it can compromise democratic practices of deliberation. This paper explains these differences by appeal to a new notion: epistemic styles. Epistemic styles are ways of interacting with evidence that express unified sets of epistemic values, preferences, goals, and interests. The paper introduces the notion of epistemic styles and develops a systematic account of their nature. It (...) then discusses the implications of epistemic styles for central questions in epistemology, in particular, for issues surrounding rational engagement and for the debate between virtue epistemologists and epistemic situationists. (shrink)

This article investigates some main characteristics of TED talks, a new popularizing genre. In particular, it examines the process that recontextualizes scientific speeches into TED talks presented by their own authors, using several discursive conventions to negotiate their role as experts and to establish a closer relationship with their audience. Through a quantitative and qualitative analysis of the 2012 TED talks, the article will draw upon Hyland’s concept of ‘proximity’, and the five elements that he takes into account when illustrating (...) proximity in popularizing texts: organization, argument structure, credibility, stance and reader engagement. It will be observed that the linguistic techniques used to enhance comprehensibility, the use of evaluative and emotive adjectives, and the direct involvement of the audience through the use of inclusive pronouns help the speaker breach the expert/audience barrier, establishing an ‘alignment’. Rather than focusing on proximity of membership, these talks emphasize proximity of commitment, by concentrating not on the speakers’ identity and reputation, but rather on how they are personally involved in the topic of the speech. These techniques reveal TED’s idea that science should be ideas to be discussed rather than information to be passively received. (shrink)

Commentary on Pablo Hubacher Haerle’s paper “Is OCD Epistemically Irrational?”. I argue for expanding our assessment of rationality in OCD by considering a wider range of epistemic parameters and how they fit together.

Delusions are standardly defined as attitudes that are not amenable to change in light of conflicting evidence. But what evidence do people with delusion have for and against it? Do delusions really go against their total evidence? How are the answers affected by different conceptions of evidence? -/- This chapter focuses on how delusions relate to evidence. I consider what delusions-relevant evidence people with delusions have. I give some reasons to think that people typically have evidence for their delusions, and (...) that the evidence they have against them is often overstated. I draw on this discussion to consider whether delusions are evidentially supported and epistemically rational. Finally, I discuss implications for the nature of delusion, responsibility, and treatment and suggest directions for future research. Throughout, the discussion is sensitive to different conceptions of evidence and rationality in epistemology. -/- A central upshot is that what we should say about the epistemic standing of delusions depends substantively on our positions in epistemology, in particular, on the debate between internalists and externalists about evidence. If we want clarity on the epistemic standing of delusions, we need to incorporate more sophisticated tools from epistemology. (shrink)

O presente estudo investigou as relações entre qualidade de vida e presença de sintomas depressivos e ansiosos em profissionais da saúde que estão atuando com pacientes infectados pela COVID-19, em um hospital da região metropolitana de Porto Alegre. Setenta e um participantes (84,5% mulheres), com média de idade de 30 anos (± 6,7), responderam ao questionário sociodemográfico, ao Inventário de Depressão deBeck II, ao Inventário de Ansiedade de Beck e à Escala de Qualidade de Vida “WHOQOL-bref”. Dos profissionais amostrados, observou-se (...) escores significativamente maiores de depressão (64,8%) do que ansiedade (50,7%). Identificou-se que quanto maiores os escores de ansiedade e de depressão, menores os escores de qualidade de vida. Diante dos resultados, observou-se associações significativas em relação aos sintomas depressivos, aos sintomas ansiosos e à qualidade de vida. Concluiu-se que é de grande relevância abordar essa temática, visto que o prejuízo à saúde mental desses profissionais deve ser considerado, principalmente em tempos de pandemia. (shrink)

A questão feminina não é um tema visado por Arendt. O paradoxo encontrado por algumas teóricas em relação ao fato desta reconhecer-se enquanto judia, mas não enquanto mulher, faz afastar a essência do pensamento político arendtiano do movimento filosófico do feminismo, acusando Arendt de ceder à hegemonia masculina. Este prisma perde muito ao não reconhecer como sua crítica da modernidade oferece uma base sólida para pensar a mulher contemporaneamente. Sobretudo, tolhe a saída mais digna: a que reconhece o humano. O (...) escrito, a partir da revisão bibliográfica de obras como Entre o Passado e o Futuro (ARENDT, 2016) e Feminism theory and Hannah Arendt’s concept of public space (BENHABIB, 1993a), propõe demonstrar como o sujeito arendtiano, na condição de original, capaz de ação e na imprevisibilidade, existe e age no ínterim do passado-futuro é o sustentáculo teórico dos principais quadros dessa última fase do feminismo. O ponto central é retomar a discussão sobre teorias que retiram do ser a capacidade de agir, reduzindo-os ao homogêneo, e fazer a crítica às teorias contemporâneas sobre as mulheres. A partir da pesquisa, foi possível levantar diversas pensadoras que, iluminadas pela teoria de Arendt, pensam horizontes femininos para uma nova política. (shrink)

This theoretical paper proposes a new perspective to understand the moral distress of nurses more fully, using virtue ethics. Moral distress is a widely studied subject, especially with respect to the determination of its causes and manifestations. Increasing the theoretical depth of previous work using ethical theory, however, can create new possibilities for moral distress to be explored and analyzed. Drawing on more recent work in this field, we explicate the conceptual framework of the process of moral distress in nurses, (...) proposed by Ramos et al., using MacIntyrean virtue ethics. Our analysis considers the experience of moral distress in the context of a practice, enabling the adaptation of this framework using virtue ethics. The adoption of virtue ethics as an ethical perspective broadens the understanding of the complexity of nurses’ experiences of moral distress, since it is impossible to create a ready model that can cover all possibilities. Specifically, we describe how identity, social context, beliefs, and tradition shape moral discomfort, uncertainty, and sensitivity and how virtues inform moral judgments. Individuals, such as nurses, who are involved in a practice have a narrative history and a purpose ( telos) that guide them in every step of the process, especially in moral judgment. It is worth emphasizing that the process described is supported by the formation of moral competence that, if blocked, can lead to moral distress and deprofessionalization. It is expected that nurses seek to achieve the internal good of their practice, which legitimizes their professional practice and supports them in moral decision-making, preventing moral distress. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Frankfurt’s ‘Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility’ broke with the tradition of understanding the kind of freedom required for responsibility in terms of alternative possibilities. At the same time, it inspired and motivated a new family of views in its place: views that focus exclusively on actual sequences or the actual causes of behaviour. But, what exactly does that ‘exclusiveness’ claim amount to? At first sight, it may seem natural to interpret it as the claim that the only facts that (...) are relevant to an agent’s freedom are certain facts about actual causes. This would imply that any non-actual facts are simply irrelevant to the freedom of agents. This paper argues that this interpretation is mistaken, and proposes a better one. It also discusses the related but more general question of the type of project that we are invested in when giving a theory of freedom: Are we interested in the bottom-level grounding facts, or are we interested in some higher-level facts? (shrink)

I explore the question of how to ground the responsibility of agents in some tricky cases involving multiple agents who act in a non-coordinated fashion. These are scenarios where no single agent has the individual ability to make a difference to a harmful outcome, but where the outcome would have been avoided if they had all acted as they should have (thus, the agents collectively made a difference to the outcome’s occurrence). I argue that an important source of the problem (...) is that it’s hard to motivate a concept of cause that can be behind the agents’ responsibility in these cases. I illustrate the problem with a particular example: Yablo’s proportionality criterion on causation. I then sketch a possible solution. (shrink)

Moore’s Mechanical Choices is ripe with interesting ideas. Here I’ll focus on a particularly intriguing one that intersects with some aspects of my own work. It’s the suggestion that causalism should be amended in a way that doesn’t require causation. At first, this suggestion may sound absurd: How can causalism survive without causation, of all things? But I think that Moore is actually right about the main suggestion. I don’t think he’s right for the right reasons, but he’s still right (...) about the main idea. So, the aim of this paper is to explain how causalism can survive without causation, and how it may not. (shrink)

L’auteur, psychologue clinicienne, explore à partir d’une situation clinique le champ des violences intrafamiliales extrêmes impliquant ici un inceste à la fois paternel, maternel et fraternel. C’est au décours de la maternité que ce passé traumatique (et non dit) fut ravivé, nécessitant du sujet d’importants remaniements psychiques pour ne pas sombrer dans la dépression profonde. Le suivi clinique engagé montre les limites du processus thérapeutique, lorsque l’impensable et a fortiori l’irreprésentable provoquent une incapacité d’élaboration du trauma et son dépassement. Enfin, (...) l’auteur propose d’éclairer les enjeux déterminants de la dynamique transférentielle et contretransférentielle, pour le travail d’historicisation et d’inscription du trauma par le sujet, qui vont s’inaugurer par des modalités inédites de création subjective présageant d’un véritable processus de subjectivation. (shrink)

Does a person's liability to attack during a war depend on the nature of their individual causal contribution to the (unjust) threat posed? If so, how? The recent literature on the ethics of war has become increasingly focused on questions of this kind. According to some views on these matters, your liability hinges on the extent of your causal contribution: the larger your contribution to an unjust threat, the larger the amount of harm that we can impose on you in (...) order to avert the threat. Some philosophers have suggested that we can ground a quite general principle of civilian immunity on this basis. But, do causal contributions really come in degrees? Can we make sense of a graded notion of causal contribution that can be relevant to debates about liability in war? I argue there is good reason to be sceptical. The appearance that causal contributions come in degrees is just an illusion that can be explained away. (shrink)

The focus of this paper is an influential family of views in the ethics of self-defense and war: views that ground the agent’s liability to be attacked in self-defense in the agent’s moral responsibility for the threat posed. I critically examine the concept of responsibility employed by such views, by looking at potential connections with the contemporary literature on moral responsibility. I start by uncovering some of the key assumptions that Responsibility Views make about the relevant concept of responsibility, and (...) by scrutinizing those assumptions under the lens of more general theorizing about responsibility. I identify an important conflict that arises at that point. The problem is that the concept presupposed by Responsibility Views is in tension with the standard way of understanding the connection between the neutral and non-neutral forms of moral responsibility. I draw attention to a particular strategy that could be used to address this challenge, but I also identify some important obstacles that stand in the way. (shrink)

Este artigo apresenta tradução – a primeira para o português – e análise dos argumentos dos dois fragmentos supérstites de Sobre a Harmonia Feminina (Peri gunaikos harmonias), atribuído a Perictione, dita filósofa pitagórica. Ele pretende contribuir ao debate sobre o feminino na Antiguidade ­– tema do presente dossiê – ao discutir a autoria feminina de um discurso sobre a virtude das mulheres e argumentar que este é plausivelmente o mais antigo texto a atribuir às mulheres a tarefa de gerar a (...) afeição (philia) na família e em suas extensões em todas as circunstâncias. Palavras-chave: Perictione; harmonia; pitagorismo; mulheres; filósofas. (shrink)

Our goal was to explore self‐care practices among men who have sex with men in the context of Mpox in Brazil. This study used qualitative research methods, including interviews and thematic analysis, to collect and analyze data from male participants across the Brazilian territory. The narratives unveil men's perspectives on self‐care, risk reduction, and health beliefs during the Mpox pandemic. Our findings highlight a multifaceted approach to self‐care among men, encompassing hygiene, physical contact management, mask usage, skin lesion vigilance, and (...) adherence to official guidelines. Men's attitudes toward sexual behaviors emphasize the importance of reducing sexual partners, practicing safe sex, and combating misinformation through accurate information dissemination. The development of these behaviors and self‐care practices can be facilitated by nurses guided by Dorothea Orem's Self‐Care Theory, supported by patient‐centered care, with strategies to address and confront the stigma associated with the disease and provide emotional support. Thus, the study underscores the pivotal role of self‐care in mitigating infection risks, especially in the context of emerging infectious diseases. It acknowledges the impact of socio‐cultural factors and healthcare policies on men's preventive measures. However, it also recognizes limitations, such as potential bias due to stigma concerns and a nonrepresentative sample. Ultimately, the research advocates for tailored education, promotion of gender equity, and healthcare empowerment to effectively manage health risks in such contexts. (shrink)